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# KORESPONDENCYA POUFNA RZĄDU ANGIELSKIEGO

DOTYCZĄCA

POWSTANIA POLSKIEGO 1863 R.

WYDAŁ

TYTUS FILIPOWICZ

PARIS  
LIBRAIRIE H. LE SOUDIER  
BOULEVARD ST. GERMAIN, 174—176.

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1914

Gt. Brit. Foreign office

# CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

RESPECTING THE

## INSURRECTION IN POLAND: 1863

EDITED BY

TYTUS FILIPOWICZ

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Eugene Meyer, Jr.



## EDITOR'S PREFACE.

This volume is a reprint of confidential documents of the British Foreign Office concerning the diplomatic action relating to the Polish insurrection of 1863. The original copy of the collection reprinted here has the same title and date as the Parliamentary Paper (C. 3150) published by the British Government in the year 1863, and covers the same subject. But the volume which we reproduce differs from the Parliamentary Paper in its contents, and, in the particulars of the title page, by the remarks: „Printed for the use of the Foreign Office“ and: „Confidential“. Whereas the Confidential Book presents an unbroken chain of the diplomatic correspondence referring to the events connected with the Polish insurrection for the first quarter of 1863, the Parliamentary Paper, dealing with the same period, contains out of a total of 443 documents only 170, and many of these in fragments.

The original copy of the Confidential Book is now to be found in the library of the Academy of Science in Cracow. As far as I was able to ascertain, there is no duplicate of it in any of the great public libraries in London, or in special collections like the Russell Collection in the British Library of Political Science. The documents of the Foreign Office, placed in the Public Record Office, are accessible to the public up to the year 1831, and for those having special permits up to 1861, so that the period of time to which the documents relate remains still sealed by official secrecy. When, in a course of a few years, special permits are extended to the year 1863, students of that period will still be by no means sure of giving to the public all that they think important, as they are expected to submit their notes and extracts to the Foreign Office before being allowed to print them. So far as it appears from the catalogue of the documents in the Public Record Office, the Confidential book is not there, although some letters of Lord Napier, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, mentioned in the catalogue but inaccessible to the public, may be those printed in the Confidential Book; but this, of course, I have not been able to verify. The original is, in all probability, a unique volume except for those which are preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office.

The reprint is an exact copy of the original; almost too exact, as some obviously misspelt names are left uncorrected. The only new items introduced are some marks and

footnotes: one asterisk on the left-hand side of the consecutive numbers of documents means that the given document is also published in the Parliamentary Paper C. 3150, 1863; two asterisks, — that only a part of the document is published there; in the latter case a passage omitted in the Parliamentary Paper is included in parenthesis [], and a footnote is given. Outside the text are added: the general title page, the preface, the index of names, and the table of contents in the Polish language, much more detailed than in the original English.

The Confidential Book was published in the usual quarto form of a Parliamentary Paper; but while Parliamentary Papers (or so-called Blue Books) are printed on a white paper, the Confidential Book is printed on the blue paper throughout. The type is exactly the same as that used in the Parliamentary Paper C. 3150, 1863; and when comparing the two together it is easy to see that the separate documents appearing in both are printed from identical sets of type. Evidently, therefore, the two books were issued simultaneously or nearly so, the incomplete Parliamentary Paper being an abridged edition of the Confidential Book. Everything contained in the Parliamentary Paper is printed in the Confidential book with the exception of few unimportant letters and translations of French documents into English.

Bound together in one volume with the original copy of the Confidential Book are two other official publications, also marked: „Printed for the use of the Foreign Office“: „Confidential“. These two papers contain: „Correspondence relating to the negotiations of the years 1814 and 1815 respecting Poland“ and „Correspondence respecting the affairs of Poland 1831—32“; so that the volume indicates the chief landmarks in the attitude of the British Government towards the Polish question in the XIX-th century. These two other publications are not reproduced here, as some of the documents given in them were printed in Parliamentary Papers, others are to be found in various standard works on diplomatic history, and those few yet unpublished are already accessible in the archives.

The original volume of the Confidential Book bears on its front page the name „Earl Russell“ written in pencil. One might risk the inference that it is the copy which was used by Earl Russell (Lord John Russell), from 1859 till 1865 Foreign Secretary in the Cabinet of Lord Palmerston.

All hitherto published accounts of the diplomatic events connected with the Polish rising are drawn from sources which for historical purposes were incomplete. Consequently, although some of the descriptions represent accurately the external side of events, they do not give insight into the internal political considerations which influenced diplomatic machinery. The Confidential Book reveals many springs and motives which up to this day remained hidden, inexplicable, or doubtful. It forms a veritable mine of information concerning the attitude not only of Great Britain, but also of France, Austria, and Prussia towards the Polish question in 1863, and the attitude of these Powers towards each other.

The Confidential Book shows clearer than any documents published hitherto what were the real chances of an armed intervention of the Powers in the Russo-Polish conflict of 1863. It shows also the potential tendencies of certain Continental states, which;

had they chosen actively to interfere, would not have neglected to promote the re-arrangement of some frontiers of Europe, much less in the interests of Poland than in their own. Some documents dissipate the legend of the French Government's disinterestedness in its desire to bring about concerted action in favour of the Poles. Others again show the wonderful efficiency of British diplomatists in availing themselves of the Polish revolt to effect the rupture of the nascent friendship between France and Russia, without however permitting the Emperor Napoleon to take any step likely to prejudice the interests of Russia or Prussia.

Cracow, November 1912.

*T. F.*



## PRZEDMOWA WYDAWCY.

Tom niniejszy zawiera przedruk dokumentów poufnych Angielskiego Ministerium Spraw Zagranicznych, dotyczących się akcji dyplomatycznej związanej z powstaniem polskim 1863 r. Oryginał dokumentów tutaj przedrukowanych nosi ten sam tytuł i datę jak t. zw. Księga błękitna (C. 3150) wydana przez rząd Angielski w r. 1863 i dotycząca tychże wypadków, lecz różni się od Księgi błękitnej swą zawartością przedewszystkiem, a w szczególności — dodatkowymi na okładce słowami: „Drukowane dla użytku Ministerium Spraw Zagranicznych“ i „Poufne“. Księga poufna zawiera łańcuch nieprzerwany korespondencji dyplomatycznej dotyczącej się wypadków związanych z powstaniem polskim podczas pierwszych trzech miesięcy 1863 r., gdy tymczasem „Księga błękitna“, przedłożona swego czasu Parlamentowi i dostępna publiczności, pokrywając ten sam okres czasu, z ogólnej liczby 443 dokumentów daje tylko 170, a z tych wiele tylko w urywkach.

Oryginał Księgi poufnej został obecnie złożony do Biblioteki Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie. O ile byłem w możności sprawdzić, drugiego egzemplarza Księgi poufnej niema w żadnej z wielkich bibliotek publicznych w Londynie ani w zbiorach specjalnych jak np. kolekcya Russel'a przy Brytańskiej Bibliotece Nauk Politycznych. Dokumenty Ministerium Spraw Zagranicznych złożone w angielskim Urzędzie Dokumentów Publicznych, dostępne są ogólnie tylko do roku 1831, a dla mających specjalne upoważnienia — do roku 1861, tak że na dokumentach dotyczących powstania do dziś dnia spoczywa pieczęć tajemnicy oficjalnej. Gdy, po upływie jakiegoś czasu, pozwolenia specjalne zostaną rozszerzone na dokumenty późniejsze, badacze tego okresu nie będą mieli żadnej pewności opublikowania wszystkiego, co uważają za ważne, gdyż notki i wyciągi, porobione przez korzystających z pozwoleń specjalnych, podlegają cenzurze Ministerium Spraw Zagranicznych. Z katalogu Urzędu Dokumentów Publicznych widoczne jest, że niema tam Księgi poufnej, choć niektóre listy lorda Napiera, ambasadora W. Brytanii w Petersburgu, wzmiankowane w katalogu lecz publiczności niedostępne, mogą być tymi, jakie spotykamy w Księdze poufnej; tego jednak, oczywiście, sprawdzić nie mogłem. Oryginał Księgi poufnej jest, według wszelkiego prawdopodobieństwa, unikatem, o ile nie liczyć egzemplarzy zachowanych w archiwum Angielskiego Ministerium Spraw Zagranicznych.

Przedruk niniejszy jest kopią dokładną oryginału, niemal zbyt dokładną, pozostawione są bowiem bez zmian niektóre nazwy i nazwiska w oryginale przekreścone. Jedynym elementem nowym dodanym w przedruku są pewne znaki i notki: krzyżyk po lewej stronie liczby porządkowej dokumentu oznaczają, iż dany dokument był wydrukowany w Księdze błękitnej C. 3150, 1863; dwa krzyżyki — że dany dokument był tam umieszczony częściowo; w tym ostatnim wypadku ustęp pominięty w Księdze błękitnej jest wzięty w klamry [], i dodana jest notka u dołu. Poza tekstem są dodane: ogólna karta tytułowa, przedmowa, wykaz treści dokumentów ułożony po polsku w znacznie szerszych rozmiarach niż w oryginale angielskim, wreszcie indeks osobowy.

Księga poufna była wydana w zwykłym formacie quarto używanym dla Ksiąg błękitnych, lecz tak zwane „Księgi błękitne“ drukowane są na papierze białym, zaś Księga poufna — na papierze błękitnym. Czcionki użyte są te same jak w Księdze błękitnej C. 3150, 1863; porównyując obydwa wydawnictwa łatwo jest dostrzedz, że dokumenty oddzielne, znajdujące się i tu i tam, drukowane są z tych samych „składów“ zecerskich. Najwidoczniej zatem obydwie księgi zostały wydane jednocześnie lub prawie jednocześnie, przyczem Księga błękitna była wydaniem skróconym Księgi poufnej. W Księdze poufnej znajdujemy wszystko co zawiera Księga błękitna z wyjątkiem kilku małoważnych listów i tłumaczeń dokumentów francuskich na język angielski.

Oryginał Księgi poufnej oprawny jest w jeden tom razem z dwoma innymi wydawnictwami oficjalnymi, oznaczonymi również: „Drukowane dla użytku Ministerium Spraw Zagranicznych“ i „Poufne“. Są to: „Korespondencya tycząca się negocyacyi w latach 1814 i 1815 co do Polski“, oraz: „Korespondencya co do spraw Polski 1831—32“; tak, że tom, jako całość, zawiera główne wytyczne polityki rządu Brytańskiego w sprawie polskiej w ciągu XIX-go stulecia. Dwa wydawnictwa powyższe nie są umieszczone w przedruku niniejszym, gdyż niektóre dokumenty w nich przytoczone pojawiły się w Księgach błękitnych, inne znaleźć można w dziełach specjalnych tyczących historii dyplomatycznej, a kilka dotychczas niewydanych są już obecnie dostępne w archiwach.

Na karcie tytułowej oryginału Księgi poufnej widać napisane ołówkiem nazwisko „Earl Russel“. Możemy tedy z pewnym prawdopodobieństwem przypuszczać, że jest to egzemplarz używany ongi przez księcia Russel (lorda John Russel), który pomiędzy rokiem 1859 a 1865 był ministrem spraw zagranicznych w gabinecie Palmerstona.

Wszystkie dotychczasowe opisy zabiegów dyplomatycznych, związanych z powstaniem polskim, oparte są na źródłach pozostawiających dużo do życzenia ze stanowiska ścisłości historycznej. Niektóre dzieła, przedstawiające dokładnie stronę zewnętrzną wypadków, z powodu braku danych musiały pozostawić w cieniu wewnętrzne racje polityczne, które kierowały dyplomacją. Księga poufna odsłania wiele sprzecznych i motywów, po dziś dzień ukrytych, niewyjaśnionych, lub wątpliwych. Stanowi ona istną kopalnię danych, tyczących stosunku do sprawy polskiej w 1863 roku nie tylko Anglii, lecz także Francji i Prus, a również wzajemnych stosunków tych państw pomiędzy sobą.

Księga poufna wykazuje wyraźniej niż wszelkie dokumenty znane dotychczas, jakie były szanse istotnej zbrojnej interwencji mocarstw w roku 1863. Przedstawia również ówczesne dążenia ukryte pewnych państw kontynentu, które, w razie zdecydowania się

na interwencję czynną, nieomieszkałyby zmienić niektórych granic Europy nietyle w interesach Polski, ile w swych własnych. Inne dokumenty rozpraszają legendę o bezinteresowności rządu francuskiego w jego dążeniu do przeprowadzenia wspólnej akcji mocarstw na korzyść Polaków. Inne znów wykazują sprawność zadziwiającą wykorzystania przez dyplomatów angielskich polskiego powstania w celu zerwania świeżo wzrastającej przyjaźni pomiędzy Francją i Rosją, jednakże tak, by jednocześnie nie dopuścić cesarza Napoleona do przedsięwzięcia jakiegokolwiek kroku mogącego szkodzić interesom Rosji lub Prus.

Kraków, listopad 1912.

*T. F.*





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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Insurrection in Poland:  
1863.

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† No. 1.

*Acting Consul-General White to Earl Russell. — (Received January 26, 1863).*

(No. 40).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, December 31, 1862.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the Government here have dissolved the District Council of Prasnyz in consequence of some of the expressions made use of during the discussions of that body. This is the second of the new Councils which has been thus dissolved out of thirty-nine; and this renders null and void all the proceedings of that body, even the selection of Commissioners of Arbitration for awarding the terms of disputed peasant-leases.

The Government are, however, bound by law to convoke the electors of these districts for a new election within twelve months from the date of dissolution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

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† No. 2.

*Acting Consul-General White to Earl Russell. — (Received January 26).*

No. 1).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, January 11, 1863.*

A FORTNIGHT ago certain discoveries were made by the police here, to which very great importance was attached at the time by the highest authorities in this country, but their value has considerably diminished since, as the activity of the revolutionary faction has remained unabated, notwithstanding the arrest of those individuals whom the police supposed to be the chief leaders of the conspiracy.

These arrests comprised several railway officials, one of whom, of the name of Kowalewski, was spoken of as the head of the Police Department of the Revolutionary Committee; another person of the name of Epstein, the son of a wealthy Jewish banker,

was supposed also to have taken an active part in seditious measures, and great joy was manifested in official circles at his apprehension.

A few days later the police seized several persons in the very act of printing a revolutionary newspaper, and the letter-press was also taken on that occasion. The house where these were found was taken possession of by the police, and in the course of the following day a man of the name of Schwartz was arrested when coming to that very house, probably with a view to get some copies of the paper. He attempted to make his escape on seeing the police, but he was followed and taken after some attempt at resistance. Several important papers were found in his possession, among them his commission appointing him an agent to the Revolutionary Committee. Schwartz is a French subject, but the son of Polish parents; he appears to have received a good education as civil engineer in Paris.

About the same time, the French Government arrested three Polish refugees in Paris, whose papers were searched and whose connection with Mazzini and with the Revolutionary Committee at Warsaw appears to have been beyond a doubt.

All these discoveries were made at a time when numerous agents of the Revolutionary Committee are driving about the country, both in the kingdom and in Lithuania, enrolling members for the Secret Society, threatening the Government officials with their vengeance, and spreading alarm among all peaceably disposed inhabitants.

It was hoped at first by those persons in the Government, who are more sanguine, that they were on the eve of very great discoveries on the subject of the revolutionary organization, but these hopes do not appear to have been realized as yet.

One of the most important persons seized is a man of the name of Abicht, a native of Lithuania, who was taken the other day, quite by accident, in the small town of Garwolin, about fifty miles from Warsaw, by the local authorities, who suspected him of belonging to a party of highwaymen who had robbed the post in that locality.

This suspicion arose from the circumstance of the Jewish waiter in the inn where Abicht and his companions were staying, having discovered pistols in his portmanteau, which made the Jew give information of this to the Local Mayor, or Bürgermeister, who arrested them at once.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

† No. 3.

*Acting Consul-General White to Earl Russell. — (Received January 26).*

(No. 2).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, January 14, 1863.*

AS the execution of the measure of forced enlistment is drawing near, the Revolutionary faction continues to deceive the masses by a bold attitude, pretending all along that it possesses the power to resist the orders of the Government, and that the carrying out, in a peaceable manner, of this exceptional measure will be attended with insurmountable difficulties.

A few days after the seizure of the types of the seditious paper the „Ruch“, these people published a fresh number of that newspaper, denying the fact of the discovery of

their printing press, with a view to prevent the discouragement which this might produce among their partisans.

Immediately afterwards the Revolutionary Committee issued a circular which was sent to various local authorities throughout the country, threatening with vengeance and summary punishment any person in the employment of the Government, or any magistrate, aiding or assisting in any way to carry out the recruitment.

A few days after that, the Jewish waiter whose information had led to the apprehension of Abicht, the Revolutionary agent, at Garwolin, as mentioned in my despatch of the 11th instant, came to Warsaw to receive a pecuniary reward of the amount of 200 roubles bestowed on him by the Grand Duke for having given that information. The Jew applied during three days at the Treasury for payment, and the third day he was stabbed at the gate with a dagger on coming out of the Paymaster-General's Office, evidently with the intention to intimidate informers and the Provincial authorities during the approaching conscription. The Jew was not mortally wounded, it appears; he was even able to follow his murderer through the streets, when he fell: a man was taken by the police, a locksmith by profession, who is supposed to be the guilty party, but his identity does not appear to have been sufficiently established as yet.

I think it necessary to mention here that Abicht came to Poland from England with a British passport, [a circumstance which I have had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 4 of this date of the Consular series]<sup>1</sup>.

The lists of persons destined to be taken as recruits have been made out, and the conscription is to begin in the course of a few days in Warsaw, and to follow in the Provinces and in the other towns of the Kingdom. No effort has been spared to include in it all able-bodied men who are suspected of revolutionary tendencies, and who have been marked out as such by the police during the last two years; but from what is known of the inefficiency of that Department of the Government, it may be easily supposed that this sort of information cannot be always relied on.

The number of recruits to be raised this time from the Kingdom is kept secret. I have reason, however, to suppose that it is intended to get at the rate of 5 per 1,000 of the population; and as this amounts in the towns to about 1,200,000, the number would be 6,000 men. As the rural population is exempt this time, the villages have only 2,000 men to supply: thus making a total of 8,000 men.

The exact number, however, does not appear to be definitively settled, and the Grand Duke is allowed a certain margin as to the figure of recruits to be supplied this time by the Kingdom.

The result of this measure is looked forward to with intense interest both by the rulers and by the governed; and if the expectations of the former are attended with success, the conscription is to be over in a month's time, and when it is completed the Grand Duke will probably proceed to St. Petersburg for a few weeks, to submit to His Majesty further projects for the pacification of his Imperial brother's Polish subjects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

<sup>1</sup> The words in parenthesis are omitted in the Parliamentary Paper. C. 3150. (Edit.).

† No. 4.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received January 26).*

(No. 1).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, January 19, 1863.*

THE projected conscription for the Russian army, which had been announced by the Government to take place at the commencement of the present year, was carried into effect in this town on the night of the 14th instant, when about 2,000 men were taken for service.

The members of the Government were under considerable apprehension that carrying this resolution into effect would produce disturbances throughout the country, as the agitators of the revolutionary party had used their utmost endeavours to incite the people to resist the levy, and, if necessary, even to appeal to arms. The date on which the levy was to be made was kept a secret, and steps were taken by the authorities to repress any hostile movement should such take place; but, notwithstanding the threatening attitude of the ultra party, the measure was carried out without any disturbance as far as the town was concerned.

The effect produced by the sudden and complete success of the Government in this matter is most marked; the Revolutionary party appears to be paralyzed, and the working classes have already commenced to open their eyes to the folly of further resistance, and to the impotence of the ultra party to offer any effectual opposition to the Government. Unfortunately a number of working men and others belonging to the secret societies have been induced to assemble not far from this town, in obedience to the orders given them by the chiefs of the movement; their numbers are, however, not supposed to amount to more than 500 or 600, the greater portion of whom are unarmed. Troops have been despatched to disperse and capture these insurgents, and it is to be feared some blood will be shed in effecting this; but the weakness of the ultra party, and the impossibility of their resisting the Government, will, at least, be clearly demonstrated by this foolish attempt, and I believe, my Lord, it is not too much to anticipate that the Polish movement will now shortly be brought to an end, and the country resume, if not a peaceful attitude, at least one of comparative quiet and freedom from revolutionary attempts.

The conscription has still to be carried out in the country districts, and the date on which this is to take place is still kept a secret, but after the success of the measure in Warsaw I imagine no serious opposition need be feared in the provinces; no doubt numbers of persons liable to be taken will endeavour to leave the country, and it is highly probable that the forests of the Kingdom will for some time be used as places of refuge, and the roads of the kingdom rendered unsafe for travellers by the presence of these persons, who will be reduced to brigandage to obtain means of support.

In conclusion, my Lord, I may remark that, notwithstanding the present resistance to the Government, the state of affairs in this country has, to all outward appearance, materially improved during the last two months.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

No. 5.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received January 26).*

(No. 2).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, January 21, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that a Proclamation has, as I am informed, just been published by the Revolutionary Committee in this kingdom denouncing the Marquis Wielopolski and his son as outlaws in consequence of the part taken by them in the recent action of the Government in the matter of the conscription, and calling upon the Poles to resist the levy in the country districts; stating also that the resistance to the Government failed in the town of Warsaw in consequence of the French Government having acted the part of gendarme for the Russian Government, and so prevented the arrival of the arms that had been expected.

I have no information to give your Lordship on the subject of the suppression or capture of the insurgents mentioned in my despatch No. 1 of the 19th instant to your Lordship, but I imagine any moment may bring the account of the total failure of this revolutionary movement, as troops have been despatched from two different places for the purpose of surrounding them.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

No. 6.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received January 27).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, January 27, 1863.*

AN officer who arrived to-day from Warsaw reports that the insurrection is general, and is extending towards Lithuania. Considerable bands are in arms at different places. Many officers, and all railway, telegraph, and other Polish officials have joined the insurgents, who had received considerable supplies of arms and money from abroad, and have seized others at the military stations.

No. 7.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received January . .)*

(Telegraphic).

*Warsaw, January 27, 1863.*

FRESH skirmishes have occurred between the armed bands of rebels and the troops, advantageous to the latter. Martial law re-established. Warsaw quiet. Further news by the messenger.

†† No. 8.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received January 29).*(No. 50).  
My Lord,*Berlin, January 27, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the original of a letter which I have just received from Her Majesty's Consul at Warsaw, giving an account of the insurrectionary movement which has taken place in Poland.

[Colonel Stanton's letter, which I cannot have copied before the departure of the post, has probably been brought to Berlin by the same gentleman whose intelligence, as received from a third person, I forwarded to your Lordship some hours ago by telegraph]<sup>1</sup>.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

†† Inclosure in No. 8.

*Colonel Stanton to Sir A. Buchanan.*

Sir,

*Warsaw, January 25, 1863.*

THE lines of telegraph connecting this with Berlin and St. Petersburg having been cut, I have been unable to report the march of events in this country. I therefore [avail myself of the offer of Baron Tettan, who has kindly undertaken to deliver a letter to your Excellency, to]<sup>1</sup> forward a few lines on the state of affairs here; and I have the honour to request, should your Excellency consider the intelligence of sufficient importance to be forwarded, that it may be transmitted to Earl Russell and Lord Napier.

[I must apologize to your Excellency for sending a note of this description, but I am requested by Baron Tettan to send only a small note that he can easily put away. I have therefore avoided the usual official form]<sup>1</sup>.

Your Excellency will have heard that immediately after the conscription was made in this town, a number of persons assembled in the neighbourhood to resist the action of the Government, and that troops were dispatched to disperse and capture these. Since that date events of a much more serious nature have taken place, and collisions have occurred between the insurgents and the Imperial troops in several places in the kingdom. The idea of the Revolutionary leaders was to effect a general rising on the night of the 22nd, and to fall upon the various small detachments of troops scattered throughout the country at the same moment. Some of these attempts were made, and a few small parties of troops surrendered; in general, however, the troops were able to beat off the attacks, and numbers of prisoners have been made. The most serious affair appears to have taken place in the town of Plock, where an attack was made on the guard-house, but was repulsed after some heavy firing, which lasted a considerable time. I am not aware what

<sup>1</sup> Not in the Parliamentary Paper (Edit.).

casualties occurred, but the losses are reported to be heavy; nor am I able at present to give your Excellency any idea of the number of the insurgents; they have, however, succeeded in cutting the telegraphs as well as the railway between this town and St. Petersburg, having, as I am informed, destroyed one or two bridges on this line. Some rails were also taken up on the Warsaw and Vienna Railroad, but these have, I believe, been replaced, and the communication by this line preserved.

Unfortunately the Government were not prepared with flying columns to act immediately in the different districts, and some valuable time has been lost in putting down this movement, which has now taken such dimensions that it is to be feared a considerable amount of bloodshed will take place before the rising is completely suppressed; but it is difficult to imagine that any serious opposition could be offered to the forces at the disposal of the Government, and as the movement appears at present to be confined to the townspeople, backed by the clergy, the peasant population holding aloof, it is to be hoped that quiet will shortly be re-established, and that the wavering portion of the inhabitants of the kingdom will see the folly of resistance to the overwhelming force of Russia. The success of the conscription in Warsaw itself appears to have precipitated the action of the Revolutionary agents, and to have upset all their calculations, and I imagine we are not likely to have any disturbance in this town; and as the mask is now thrown off, the Government as well as the people themselves can see who are the actual instigators and leaders in this foolish attempt.

[Again apologizing to your Excellency for writing in this manner, I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON]<sup>1</sup>.

† No. 9.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 50).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 26, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from the official newspaper of yesterday's date containing some particulars of the recent outbreak in various parts of Poland in connection with the military recruitment.

Your Lordship was informed some time since [by the correspondence of Her Majesty's Consul-General at Warsaw, as well as more briefly by my despatch No. 383 of the 21st October, 1862]<sup>1</sup>, that the Russian Government had restored the barbarous system of recruitment by designation in Poland, in lieu of the humaner plan of conscription by lot, which had been prescribed by a law of the year 1859, but which had never been exercised, as no levy has been made since that date. Nor was a recurrence to the former scheme by which the Emperor Nicholas exhausted and subdued the energies of the Polish people the only bad feature in the recent enactment: the scheme itself was partially

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).



applied; it was to be put in force in the towns, but not in the country, the Government having a double object in view, — on one side to conciliate the landed proprietors and peasantry, and on the other side to seize upon the most obnoxious persons in the urban population and carry them off as soldiers. About 8,000 recruits, as I understand, were to be levied in the Polish towns by Mixed Commissions composed of military officers and civil functionaries who have an absolute power of selection. Without affirming that in all cases this faculty would be abusively exercised without regard to the numbers or resources of families or to the station and avocations of the parties liable to service, it is certain that the selection of the authorities would be frequently prompted by considerations of a political character, and it may be feared that the instruments of Government would sometimes be accessible to motives of a corrupt nature. In fact, it was a design to make a clean sweep of the revolutionary youth of Poland, to shut up the most energetic and dangerous spirits in the restraints of the Russian army. It was simply a plan to kidnap the opposition, and carry it off to Siberia or the Caucasus. This proposal, so totally out of keeping with the humane and intelligent order of things recently inaugurated in Poland, created great surprise among many persons well affected to the Russian Government; for it was apprehended that even if the Government should succeed in disposing of a number of dangerous antagonists, yet the moral obloquy attending this act would greatly outweigh the material advantage to be gained. It seemed to my humble judgment to be the single considerable error committed in Poland since the nomination of Marquis Wielopolski; yet it had the approval of that Statesman and the sanction of the Grand Duke Constantine. How far the present revolt is the work of men driven to desperation by the prospect of being caught up and made Russian soldiers, or how far it is the work of revolutionary incendiaries availing themselves of this opportunity, and instigators, cannot yet be ascertained. The arbitrary recruitment will, however, give a colour to resistance and excuse the acts of the revolutionary party in the eyes of Europe. They will have a justification, or at least extenuation, which nothing but some great act of injustice on the part of Russia could have afforded them. It is obvious, however, that, under every provocation, insurrection in Poland under any circumstances is a crime; for it is insurrection without the least chance of success, which can only terminate in increased severities and aggravated hatred.

Among reflecting Russians, the only defence I have ever heard given for the suspension of the Law of 1859 and the return to the old system is this: that the regular military conscription is not introduced in Russia itself, and that if the levy had been taken in Poland on the modern European plan, Poland would have been better treated than the Empire; that it was most equitable to continue the arbitrary method in both countries until a good law could be contrived for both.

I cannot assent to this argument. The institutions of Poland are in many respects more advanced than those of Russia. This is, no doubt, a strong motive for improving the Russian laws; it is no motive for debasing those of Poland.

There is no reason why the French law of conscription should not have been matured for application in Russia Proper during the last six years in which there has been no levy of soldiers in the Empire. The measure complained of is, in my humble opinion,



simply a malignant, and, I hope, expiring effort of the old system of despotic violence. The result is deplorable, but it is natural. We can only hope that the Emperor will not allow himself to be drawn into a reactionary course in other respects by an incident which has been, in part at least, provoked by the imprudence of his Representatives and advisers.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER

† No. 10.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 51).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 26, 1863.*

IT is the custom of the Emperor to review one of the regiments of the Guard every Sunday after church.

Yesterday His Majesty reviewed the Ismailoff Regiment in the Grand Manège, near the palace. At the conclusion of the parade the Emperor, who was on horseback, having assembled around him the officers of the regiment, as well as the general officers of his suite, among whom were the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, proceeded to inform them of the news that had reached him, the day before, of the disturbances in Poland. I hear from one of the Emperor's Aides-de-camp, who was present, that the Emperor, who spoke in a tone of great sadness, but at the same time with much firmness, related the circumstances of the outbreak in almost the same terms as those in which they are given in the telegraphic despatches published in the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of yesterday's date. His Majesty described the formation of bands of insurgents on both banks of the Vistula and the atrocities committed by them, of their having fallen upon small detachments of soldiers and murdered them in cold blood; and, in one instance, when they were unable to drive a small number of soldiers out of a house in which they were defending themselves, of their having set fire to it and burnt the soldiers alive; besides the death of these unoffending men, the Emperor said we have to lament the loss of a comrade who once served in this regiment, Colonel Kozlianinow, who was killed in a reconnaissance near Warsaw. After expressing the grief and indignation with which he had heard of these events, the Emperor said, „You must not suppose, however, that I consider these atrocious deeds are to be laid to the account of the Polish nation; they are the work of agents of a revolutionary party who are employed in creating disturbances in various parts of Europe, and who will stop at no crime in the accomplishment of their designs“.

In conclusion, the Emperor made a remarkable admission with reference to disaffection existing in the Russian army; that instances of such a feeling existed, His Majesty said, cannot unfortunately be denied, but, he added, he felt convinced that if he should be obliged to call upon his troops to assist their comrades in Poland, he could rely on their unshaken fidelity. He himself had commanded the Ismailoffski Regiment during the lifetime of his father, and he knew he could implicitly depend upon them;

but it was not only in the Guards that he had this confidence, he was convinced the same loyal feeling existed throughout the Russian army. This address, which was received with enthusiastic acclamation, was pronounced in such an earnest and impressive manner that many of the officers were moved to tears, and the Grand Duke Michael is said to have sobbed aloud.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 11.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 3).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, January 25, 1863.*

THE telegraph having been broken in several places, and communication thus interrupted between Warsaw and the other capitals, I have been unable to report earlier to your Lordship on the progress of events in this country.

In my despatch of the 19th instant I had the honour to state to your Lordship that a number of persons had assembled, not far from this town, for the purpose of resisting the action of the Government in the matter of recruiting for the army; that troops had been sent to disperse and capture them; and that such a result might be expected at any moment. It appears, however, my Lord, that notwithstanding the notice the Government have so long had of the intention of the ultra-party to endeavour to resist the levy of recruits, no effectual measures had been taken to resist an attempt at rising on the part of the people; the consequence has been, as I am informed by official persons, that in some districts of the kingdom, but more especially in those of Plock and Siedlee, attacks have been made on isolated parties of soldiers, and some sharp skirmishes taken place, in which blood has been shed on both sides, the insurgents being always worsted and losing many prisoners. So little attention was, however, paid to the probabilities of an outbreak that on the night of the 22nd instant the railways from this town to St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut and the telegraphs broken, and although the former have been put in working order again, they are liable to constant interruption of a similar nature, as constant supervision will be required to insure the whole line of communication.

There can, my Lord, I imagine, be no doubt as to the upshot of this outbreak; but it cannot be denied that by want of the very commonest oversight in the military arrangements in the country, matters have been permitted to take much more serious dimensions than should have been the case, and a proportionate waste of blood will be required before it is completely suppressed.

I may mention to your Lordship that it is reported in official circles that the intention of the insurgents was to have risen against the troops throughout the country districts during the night of the 22nd instant, and to have murdered in cold blood any that could be surprised.

The heaviest skirmish is reported to have taken place in the town of Plock, where

the firing lasted for some time and heavy casualties are reported, but I am as yet unable to give your Lordship any positive details of the matter. It is also stated that when the firing commenced the bells of the various churches were rung to give the alarm-signal to the insurgents, thus proving, were such proof required, the complicity of the priests with the movement.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† No. 12.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 5).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, January 28, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship translations of two revolutionary proclamations that have been issued by the so-called National Committee at Warsaw.

The first of these, dated the 16th instant, is forwarded to your Lordship in French, as I was unable to procure a copy of the original.

This proclamation calls upon the country to rise against the Russians, and to resist the conscription to the last extremity, declaring also the Marquis Wielopolski and his son, as well as all the persons who had assisted in carrying out the conscription in Warsaw, as outlaws and traitors to their country.

The second proclamation, under date of the 22nd instant, is worthy of notice, from the attempt to induce the peasants to join the movement by the promise held out to them, of having the land now in their possession given to them absolutely, whilst at the same time it speaks of reimbursing the landlords from the National Treasury.

I do not imagine, my Lord, that either of these documents will produce much effect on the people to whom they are addressed, but I forward them under the belief that they may prove of interest to your Lordship.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

*Proclamation of the National Committee, dated January 16, 1863.*

LE recrutement a eu lieu en partie à Varsovie. Notre ennemi, comme un assassin et un vil criminel, est venu attaquer des gens endormis et enlever les pères de nombreuses familles, et au lieu des fils aînés enlevant les cadets. En un mot il s'est emparé de tous ceux qu'il a trouvés sous sa main pour remplacer les absents. Le monde n'avait pas encore vu un semblable système de recrutement. Il est digne de son auteur, de ce grand et vil criminel, traître à son pays. Wielopolski.

Le Comité Central National avait tout préparé pour empêcher le recrutement, mais il a rencontré des entraves qu'il lui avait été impossible de prévoir, notamment de la part du Gouvernement Français, qui condamne notre mouvement et oppose des obstacles semblables à ceux que les gendarmes Russes y apportent. Il a retardé l'importation des armes en Pologne en nombre suffisant pour effectuer un soulèvement instantané. Le Comité, ne se laissant pas détourner par ces obstacles, s'occupait à trouver d'autres moyens, quand le recrutement a eu lieu subitement au milieu de la nuit.

Polonais! Faut-il nous retirer devant les difficultés que nous rencontrerons? Livrerons-nous nos frères à un service dégradant? Non, marchons en avant avec foi et courage, avec Dieu et confiance dans la sainteté de notre cause. Le Comité Central National se présente avec d'autant plus de vigueur et d'énergie que les circonstances sont plus difficiles; notre étendard n'est pas tombé, et ne tombera pas. Unissez-vous, frères, autour de lui, et avec d'autant plus de vigueur et d'ardeur que notre ennemi nous presse et nous persécute. Ne faiblisiez pas, mais au contraire fortifiez-vous; vous devez être des héros et vous le deviendrez. Notre ennemi rencontrera dans ses projets criminels une valeureuse résistance qui finira par le vaincre.

Polonais, secourez nous de votre valeur, de votre dévouement; persistons ensemble jusqu'au bout, et Dieu nous accordera la victoire.

Le Comité Central National proclame le pays entier en état exceptionnel, et ordonne à tous les dignes fils de la patrie de se défendre jusqu'à extinction quand même ce serait isolément contre le recrutement et de libérer ceux qui se trouvent entre les mains du Moscovite, de prêter aide et protection à tous ceux qui se cachent.

Les Wielopolski, père, et son fils Sigismond, ainsi que toute cette bande criminelle qui a participé au recrutement à Varsovie, ainsi que tous ceux qui jusqu'aujourd'hui ont prêté la main ou la prêteront aux criminelles tentatives de l'usurpation, seront mis hors la loi, et il est permis à chacun, sans encourir aucune espèce de responsabilité par devant Dieu et la patrie, de les juger et d'exécuter les jugements qu'ils auront encourus.

*Varsovie, ce 16 Janvier, 1863.*

Le Comité Central National.

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<sup>†</sup> Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

*Proclamation of the National Committee, dated January 22, 1863.*

(Translation).

THE contemptible Government of the invaders, rendered furious by the resistance of the victim that it tortures, has determined to strike a decisive blow by carrying away many thousands of its bravest and most strenuous defenders, dressing them in the hated Muscovite uniform, and driving them thousands of miles to suffer eternal misery and destruction.

Poland will not, cannot, submit to this violence and degradation without an attempt at resistance. It would be a shame, before posterity were she to submit to it without an energetic effort. Legions of young men, brave and devoted to the cause of their country,

have sworn to cast away the abhorred yoke or to die, and they place their reliance in the just assistance of the Almighty. Follow these, O Polish nation!

The Central National Committee, the only legal Government of your country, bids you all appear on the last battle-field, the field of glory and victory, where it pledges itself to give you success before God and Heaven; for the Committee knows that as you have been heretofore penitents or avengers, so you are ready to become to-morrow heroes and giants of strength. It knows you ready to achieve your liberty and independence by deeds of courage, and to make such sacrifices as no people have as yet inscribed on the annals of their history. It knows well that you are ready to give all your blood, your lives, and your freedom without regret, hesitation, or weakness, as an offering to your rising country.

In return the Central Committee promise to wield the sceptre of authority with an unflinching hand, so that your strength will not be wasted. Your sacrifices will not be in vain. It will know how to overcome all difficulties, to break through all impediments; it will pursue and punish every disinclination, nay even every case of want of sufficient zeal in our holy cause, with the utmost severity required from a tribunal which metes out justice in the name of an offended country.

This being the first day of open resistance, the commencement of the sacred combat, the Committee proclaim all the sons of Poland free and equal, without distinction of creed and condition. It proclaims further that the land held heretofore by the agricultural population in fee, for corvée labour, or for rent, becomes henceforth their freehold property without any restriction whatsoever. The proprietors will receive compensation from the public treasury. All cottagers and labourers who shall serve the families of those who may die in the service of their country will receive allotments from the national property in land regained from the enemy.

To arms, therefore, ye Poles, ye Lithuanians, and ye Ruthenians! The hour of our common deliverance has struck; the ancient sword is drawn from the scabbard; the sacred flag of our common country is unfurled.

And now we appeal to you, Muscovite nation — miserable and tormented, sad and afflicted with ourselves. Thy sons have also been dangling on gibbets, or have found a frosty death like our own people in the snows of Siberia; therefore we forgive you the murder of our country, the blood of Praga and Oszmiana, the violence in the streets of Warsaw, the tortures in the dungeons of the citadel: but woe to ye; if in this solemn hour ye give assistance to the tyrant who crushes you whilst he murders us; if instead of regret for the past and holy desires for the future, you do this, you shall be accursed and condemned to a shameful and perpetual slavery, and then we must fight you to extermination, the last fight of European civilization with Asiatic barbarity.

*Warsaw, January 22, 1863.*

The Central National Committee.

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† No. 13.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 6).

My Lord,

Warsaw, January 29, 1863.

THE insurrectionary movement which, as I have already had the honour of reporting to your Lordship, broke out in the Kingdom of Poland on the night of the 22nd instant, has not up to the present moment met with any marked success; nor, as far as I can gather, have the measures of the Government to suppress it been very successful. Several sharp engagements are reported to have taken place between the insurgents and small detachments of troops, and these appear invariably to have resulted in the defeat of the former with loss. But although many prisoners have been taken, various bands still keep the field, the nature of the country assisting their escape. Amongst the prisoners taken are, as is stated, two Russian officers who deserted from the Warsaw garrison. It may, however, be presumed that the outbreak not having succeeded in the first instance, when the troops were surprised in their cantonments, in making any serious impression, can now have no prospects of success, when the troops are prepared, and columns in motion in different districts to hem in or pursue the insurgents.

Considerable inconvenience has indeed been felt by the facility with which the rebels have cut the lines of communication of the Government as well as the telegraphs of the kingdom, and the difficulty of maintaining them in working order is undoubtedly great so long as the rebels are able to keep even a few men together in the vicinity of these lines. The railroad between Warsaw and St. Petersburg has been seriously injured, some bridges on the line having been partially destroyed; but the damage to the other lines has, I believe, been confined to the removal of a few rails.

The movement at present, my Lord, appears to be confined to the working classes of the towns, with a few small proprietors, and some lower Government officials, as well as many of the country clergy; the larger landed proprietors and peasants, as well as the Jews, keeping aloof from it. The students of the various colleges or schools have also hitherto in general kept quiet, but great pressure is, I believe, applied by the National Committee and its agents to force both the proprietors and students to join the insurrection.

Since the commencement of the movement a large number of proprietors have arrived at Warsaw, where they have held meetings to determine the course of action to be pursued by them, and it is to be hoped that the Government will avail itself of this opportunity of gaining them to its side by some well-timed concession; and as the socialist nature of the movement can hardly now be doubted, it is highly probable that very many among them would be glad of a pretext for siding with the Government were such offered them.

In the mean time, my Lord, the old reactionary party in the Government are taking advantage of the outbreak, and are intriguing to prevent any concession being offered, and press the necessity of having none but Russians in the Government; and it is to be feared that their influence may so far prevail as to induce His Imperial Highness the

Grand Duke to order the most stringent and bloody measures of repression to be taken against the insurgents, not perceiving that such a course would only strengthen the discontent in this country, as well as excite the indignation of other countries against their cause.

The position of the Marquis Wielopolski in the Government has become more difficult in consequence of this outbreak. The Russian party, who have always been opposed to him, represent him as the immediate cause of the insurrection by having insisted on the conscription being carried out; and at the same time he receives little or no support from the Polish members of the Government: but, as far as I am informed, his Excellency is countenanced by the Grand Duke and appears still firm in his position.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† No. 14.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 7).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, January 29, 1863.*

THE Government having published in the „Official Gazette“ some reports from officers in command in the disturbed districts of this Kingdom, I have the honour to forward translations of these to your Lordship under the belief that they may be relied on as conveying positive information on the present outbreak.

I have also the honour to mention to your Lordship that an order of the day from His Majesty the Emperor, dated the 25th of January, has been published, declaring that rebels taken with arms are to be forthwith tried by court-martial, and empowering the Military Chiefs of the districts of Warsaw, Lublin, Nadnu, Kalisch, Plock, and Augustow to confirm and carry out capital sentences.

I beg further to inform your Lordship that martial law has again been proclaimed throughout the Kingdom of Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

*Extract from the official „Gazette“ of January 26, 1863.*

(Translation).

ON the night of the 22nd January, bands of rebels attacked the scattered detachments of troops dispersed in various places in the Kingdom of Poland; these bands were armed with firelocks, revolvers, knives, scythes, &c.

In Plock the attack was made at night, and was repulsed: the troops lost two men,



taking about fifty armed rebels; the latter succeeded in carrying away their dead and wounded favoured by the darkness of the night.

In Plonsk an armed band attacked at midnight the 3rd company of the regiment of Mourom: the attack was repulsed, twenty soldiers were wounded, the assailants lost three killed, four wounded, forty-four prisoners, and about 200 stand of arms.

In the village of Jedlno, near Radom, the 4th company of the 2nd battalion of Sappers was attacked at 2 A. M.; the rebels entered the houses where the soldiers slept, and by surprise and intimidation took possession of their arms and ammunition: from information obtained in the village, and from two prisoners, it appears that the rebels numbered 140.

A 1 P. M. in the small town of Bodzentyn, in the neighbourhood of the ancient convent of St. Croix, on the church bell ringing a number of rebels attacked the troops in their sleep; the soldiers mounting guard or on duty belonging to the 2nd Rifle company of the Smolensk regiment, and one officer, were either killed or severely wounded: the company assembled and proceeded in the direction of Kielce; the rebels also had some casualties, but their number is unknown. Two carts with arms were captured from them.

Major Rüdiger, commanding the 1st battalion of the Mohileff regiment of Infantry received about midnight the intelligence of the approach of armed bands near Szydłowietz. About 2 A. M. he ordered the assembly: the rebels having commenced firing, and the night being very dark, and it being difficult to manoeuvre in the narrow streets, he retired about half a verst on the road to Radom: at 7 A. M. the troops reoccupied the town, the rebels moving away on the high road towards Kielce in the direction of the forest; in the skirmish two soldiers were killed, nine wounded, of whom two are since dead, and eight are missing; forty prisoners were taken with their arms, but the dead and wounded were carried away.

From the Government of Lublin the following information has been received: —

On the morning of the 23rd January, at 4 A. M. the rebels attacked the Artillery Park at Lubartow, but were repulsed by the 9th company of the Vologda regiment. Twenty prisoners were taken. The officer commanding the company, an officer of gendarmes, and several soldiers, were wounded.

Moveable Park No. 2 was attacked at Koden, and the Commander of the Park taken prisoner; two companies of Infantry were sent to their assistance.

In the village of Buhowo 20 armed rebels were taken, but were liberated by a fresh band of insurgents. A detachment of Lancers has been sent in that direction.

In the town of Radzyn, at midnight, bands of rebels attacked the troops in their quarters, who lost 5 killed and 7 wounded; among the latter, Major-General Kannabich, commanding the brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel Meibaum, commanding a battery. The rebels were repulsed.

At the village of Stok, at three and a-half versts from Siedlce, an armed band attacked the 10th Company of the Kostroma Regiment; the Commander of the company and a large portion of the men were at that time on guard at Siedlce. The troops defended themselves, and 3 having been shut up in a house were, after a desperate defence,



burnt with the house. Troops having come to their rescue, the rebels abandoned the village, and fled on country carts that were awaiting them. The loss of the troops was, 7 killed, 5 wounded, and 55 prisoners; three carts with scythes and other arms were also taken.

At Lukow the rebels, having a force of 300 Foot and 50 Horse, attacked, at 2 A. M., two companies (Nos. 5 and 8) of the Kostroma Regiment. The sentries were killed; and the rebels having opened fire on the troops, these two companies were drawn up in front of the wall opposite to the Monastery. A company was sent to Lukow from the neighbouring village of Mroczek.

In the town of Biala, Major-General Mamaieff, commanding the 2nd Brigade of Horse Artillery, having obtained early information of the approach of armed bands, assembled his troops. The rebels having heard of this, fled; 11 prisoners were taken, of whom 9 were armed.

In the Government of Warsaw an armed band proceeded to attack a company of the Vitebsk Regiment near Radomsk. The officer commanding the company has sent 7 armed prisoners, who were seized by the peasants in that neighbourhood.

Two non-commissioned officers of the 1st Battalion of Sappers, and 28 privates, marching on the 23rd instant near Groiec, were attacked by an armed band; 3 privates were severely wounded, the 2 non-commissioned officers slightly, and 1 man is missing. After the first shots had been fired the band ran away, leaving behind them a cart with two horses, a saddle-horse, and three rifles, a fourth having been found on the highway; the men sitting in the cart effected their escape.

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† Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

*Extract from the Official „Guzette“ of January 27, 1863.*

(Translation).

THE following particulars are collected from various Military Reports lately received: —

General Siemeka has effected a reconnaissance in the forests of Plonsk with three columns. No armed bands have been met with in that locality. Single insurgents have been met with and taken, mostly inhabitants of Warsaw; they were exhausted, hungry, and ragged, mostly very young men, and had abandoned their companions for the purpose of returning to Warsaw; some of them even declared it to be their intention to report themselves to the authorities after their return and plead guilty. Eighteen men were taken in this forest.

The depositions of these and other prisoners concur in showing that these bands consist of men who were enticed to leave Warsaw by persons unknown to them, who persuaded them that all males from 16 to 30 were to be made recruits, desiring them to proceed in the direction either of Blonie or of Serock.

At these places they found commanders whose names are not known to them, as they called each other by their initials. By these they were conducted into the forests,

and told that they were to assist in the formation of a national army; good food, pay, and arms being promised them, none of which were found them. Their rations consisted of bread and raki, and it was only by threats of capital punishment that they were induced to follow their leaders.

From this it may be gathered that the majority of stragglers are the victims of the Red party, whom in this as in so many other instances it has deluded by misrepresentations into serving as a nucleus for a supposed insurrection. The peasants steadily refuse to take a part in the movement, and such landowners as give the insurgents any assistance in the shape of food or money, or conceal any of them, do so under the terrorism of the Revolutionary party. The movement consists exclusively of small landed proprietors, the lower class of officials, and of upper farm servants.

The defeat of the insurgents at Plock and Plonsk has had the result to dishearten and demoralize them. No large band has since been discovered in these localities or in the neighbourhood of Modlin; on the contrary, the men taken in the large forests situated near those places are all of them deserters from different bands which have disappeared.

†† No. 15.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 42).

My Lord,

*Vienna, January 29, 1863.*

THE insurrectionary movement in the Kingdom of Poland has caused considerable anxiety to the Austrian Government, but they have not taken any other than the usual precautionary measures which prudence dictates under such circumstances, and Count Rechberg assured me this morning that there had been no disturbance amongst the Polish population of the Austrian Empire. neither did there appear to be any connection between them and the movement in the kingdom.

[At Cracow some of the students had been engaged to leave the town, but most of them had returned.

Warsaw was quiet; the nobility and rural population generally had not joined the movement, which was kept up by the small nobility without fortunes, who had seduced the discontented and idlers (prolétaires) to join in the insurrection; that, however, they were well armed and organized, and, though he had no apprehension as to the final result of the disturbances, they might not be speedily suppressed, for the conspiracy was evidently widely spread<sup>1</sup>.

I asked Count Rechberg how he accounted for the outbreak. He explained that, according to the information he had received, the Russian Government were partially in fault. They were aware of the conspiracy, and had obtained a list of people supposed to be concerned in it, and in order to prevent the outbreak they had ordered the seizure of these people for military service, and found them fully prepared for armed resistance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

† No. 16.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 44. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, January 29, 1863.*

WITH reference to my preceding despatch No. 43, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Rechberg received a telegram this morning from Count Thun at St. Petersburg, reporting that Prince Gortchakoff had complained to him that arms had been supplied to the insurgents in Poland from Cracow, and had hinted that this was not entirely unknown to the authorities. ✓

Count Rechberg seemed very indignant at such an insinuation, and telegraphed at once to Count Thun to the effect that the Imperial Government would be very thankful for any information that could lead to the discovery of persons engaged in such plots in the Austrian dominions.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† No. 17.

*Mr. Murray to Earl Russell. — (Received February 2).*

(No. 5).

My Lord,

*Dresden, January 30, 1863.*

AS the Saxon Chambers are not sitting now, and the country is in a state of quiet and general prosperity, the attention of those who take an interest in political matters is naturally turned to the events which are taking place in the neighbouring countries of Prussia and Poland. With respect to the former, your Lordship is doubtless kept fully and accurately informed through Her Majesty's Mission at Berlin, but in respect to the latter you may find some difficulty in obtaining any information that can be relied upon, neither have I the means of sending your Lordship any direct intelligence from the districts where the revolt has taken place; but as there are a great many Poles here, refugees and others, I have occasional opportunities of learning their sentiments, although there are very few of them with whom I am personally acquainted.

So far as I am able to ascertain, the insurrection has not been organized or countenanced by the political leaders of the anti-Russian party, and is regretted by them as being ill-advised, premature, and calculated to do more harm than good to their cause. ✓ These opinions would, of course, undergo a total change if there were any symptoms of success attending the movement, but for the present the impression among them seems to be such as I have described to your Lordship; the events of the next two weeks will probably determine whether it is to be numbered among the local and partial outbreaks of which several have before occurred and been easily quelled, or whether it is to assume the proportions of a national insurrection.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

†† No. 18.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 9).*

(No. 65).

My Lord,

*Vienna, February 5, 1863.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had yesterday with Count Rechberg, I inquired what news he had from Poland.

His Excellency said the insurrection in the kingdom was assuming greater dimensions than he expected last week, and the Government were naturally alarmed on the subject, as the excitement was spreading across the frontier. At present there were no very serious symptoms of active sympathy, but many strangers had already crossed over into the Imperial dominions. They would be taken care of, and returned when order was re-established; and in the meantime the Imperial Government could not be otherwise than anxious as to the extension the movement may assume.

I understood from him that all officers on leave and men on furlough had been ordered to their regiments in Galicia, and I believe that the cavalry will be strengthened; but the Government are much averse to any unnecessary dislocation of troops at this moment on account of the season, as well as of the additional expense.

[I inquired of Count Rechberg if M. Balabine had made any communication respecting the Treaty of Extradition between the two Empires. He replied, he was happy to say that up to the present moment it had not been alluded to, and he feared, if Russia called for its overt execution, it would cause trouble; for I understand his Excellency to say that it was not a simple cartel for the delivering up of deserters from the army, but that it extended much further, and I presume that he is fearful lest it may be sought to apply the conditions of the Treaty to political as well as to military offenders; for any such proceeding on the part of the Austrian Government at the present day would bring down a storm of unpopularity on them which they would gladly avoid<sup>1</sup>].

I enclose a police notice from Lemberg, with a translation by Mr. Mounsey, which the Imperial Government have issued with a view to deter people from enrolling themselves in the revolutionary bands now holding their Committees in Galicia.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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† Inclosure in No. 18.

*Notice.*

(Translation).

*Lemberg, February 3, 1863.*

A NOTICE, dated the 2nd instant, was issued to-day by the Director of Police to the following effect: —

„For some days past persons have been enrolled here for the purpose of passing the

<sup>1</sup> The last paragraph but one is not in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

frontier and joining the insurgents in Poland. A considerable number of armed young men have also lately left the town. The Director of Police calls attention to the fact that such enrolment, as well as any attempted passage of the frontier with the above-mentioned intention, will be treated according to paragraph 66 of the Criminal Code<sup>a</sup>.

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† No. 19.

*Mr. Lowther to Earl Russell. — (Received February 9).*

(No. 8).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 6, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that General Alvensleben, an aide-de-camp of His Majesty the King, has left Berlin for St. Petersburg. It is supposed that the object of his journey is to obtain accurate information relative to the disturbances now taking place in Warsaw, and if possible make some arrangement with the Russian Government by which the Polish insurgents may be prevented from crossing the frontier and coming into Prussia, where their presence would create alarm and endanger the security of property which may be at some of the Government offices.

M. de Rauch, another aide-de-camp of His Majesty, has been sent also to Warsaw.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. LOWTHER.

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No. 20.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 12).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, February 12, 1863.*

INSURRECTION in Poland extending, and number of Russian troops said to be insufficient for its suppression.

Disturbances and other symptoms of sympathy with the insurrection have occurred in Prussian Poland.

Two corps of observation are forming on the frontier, and assistance, if required, will be afforded to Prussia.

Bismark says Prussia will never permit the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland.

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† No. 21.

*Mr. West to Earl Russell. — (Received February 13).*

(No. 32).

My Lord,

*Twinn, February 10, 1863.*

AN attempt was made yesterday by one of the members of the Extreme Left to embarrass the Government by asking them for explanations on the affairs of Poland.

Count Pasolini said that he considered a discussion on this subject premature; that instructions should be given to the Italian Agents in accordance with the principles of Italian policy, and deprecated this interruption to the business before the Chamber. A somewhat animated discussion ensued, caused by the persistence of the Extreme Left in endeavouring to obtain from the Chamber a public expression of sympathy with the Polish insurrection, but the orders of the day to this effect were ultimately rejected.

Count Pasolini was then called upon to state whether there was any truth in certain reports as to the intended cession of the Islands of Elba and Sardinia to France, and he replied simply by an emphatic „No“.

I have, &c.

(Signed) L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

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No. 22.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 14).*

(No. 189. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 13, 1863.*

PRINCE METTERNICH has been informed by his Government that while the Emperor of Austria will scrupulously observe the European Treaties existing with regard to Poland, as well as any bilateral engagements which he may have contracted with the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty will defer as long as practicable taking any measures which would be likely to produce a disagreeable impression on his Polish subjects. Prince Metternich has been further informed that the prorogation of the Diet of Galicia was ordered in consequence of advice given by some notabilities of the country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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† No. 23.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 56).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 29, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in reference to my despatch No. 51 of the 26th of January, an extract of the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ containing the official version of the speech addressed by the Emperor to the Ismailofski Regiment on the 12th instant concerning the revolt in Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

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† Inclosure in No. 23.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of January  $\frac{1}{2}$  and  $\frac{1}{2}$ , 1863.*

HIER Dimanche, 13 Janvier, à la fin de la parade du Régiment des Gardes Izmaïlovski, au manège Michel, Sa Majesté l'Empereur a appelé auprès de lui tous les officiers présents à la parade et leur a adressé l'allocution suivante :

„Comme beaucoup d'entre vous, Messieurs, ignorent probablement les derniers événements du Royaume de Pologne, je veux que vous les appreniez par ma bouche.

„Après le recrutement, qui s'est terminé d'une manière si satisfaisante à Varsovie, du 2 au 3 Janvier, des bandes d'insurgés ont commencé à se montrer dès le 6 sur les deux rives de la Vistule. Des détachements ont été immédiatement envoyés pour les disperser. Enfin, dans la nuit du 10 au 11, une attaque subite a été dirigée dans tout le Royaume, à l'exception de Varsovie, contre nos troupes distribuées dans leurs cantonnements. Des atrocités inouïes ont été commises : ainsi, par exemple, aux environs de Siedlec, nos soldats attaqués ont fait une défense désespérée dans une maison que les insurgés ont incendiée, ne trouvant pas d'autre moyen de s'en emparer ; néanmoins, nos braves troupes ont dispersé partout les rebelles.

„D'après les premières informations, nos pertes se bornent à trente hommes tués, et dans le nombre, notre vieux frère d'armes du Régiment d'Izmaïlovsky, le Colonel Kozliatinow, Commandant du régiment d'Infanterie de Mourom. Le nombre de nos blessés s'élève à 100, et parmi eux le Général Kannabich. Une tentative semblable a eu lieu près de Bialystok, sur le territoire même de l'empire.

„Cependant, même après ces nouvelles atrocités, je ne veux pas accuser toute la nation Polonaise. Je vois dans tous ces pénibles événements le travail du parti révolutionnaire, voué partout au renversement de l'ordre légal.

„Je sais que ce parti compte trouver des traîtres jusque dans nos rangs ; mais il n'ébranlera pas ma foi dans le dévouement à ses devoirs qui distingue ma fidèle et glorieuse armée.

„Je suis convaincu qu'aujourd'hui plus que jamais, chacun de vous, sentant et comprenant toute la sainteté du serment, fera son devoir comme l'exige l'honneur de notre drapeau.

„J'ai moi-même commencé à servir dans vos rangs ; plus tard j'ai eu l'honneur de vous commander pendant quelques années, et c'est pourquoi vos sentiments de dévouement me sont bien connus : j'étais fier de vous devant feu l'Empereur mon père.

„Je suis sûr que, si les circonstances l'exigent, vous montrerez encore aujourd'hui à l'oeuvre que je puis compter sur vous et que vous justifierez mon entière confiance“.

Les paroles prononcées par Sa Majesté l'Empereur ont été accueillies par d'enthousiastes et unanimes hourras.

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†† No. 24.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 65).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 4, 1863.*

THE „*Invalide Russe*“, the official organ of the Russian War Department, announced in its number of yesterday's date that it was considered necessary, in consequence of the recent events in Poland, to strengthen the Cavalry stationed in that country. With this object, the Cavalry regiments of the Guard which were to have been sent to Warsaw in the spring are to be dispatched at once to Vilna.

The Body Guard and Ataman Regiments of Cossacks accordingly left this capital for Poland yesterday by the Dünaburg and Kovno Railway. The Lancers of the Guard, the Grodno Hussars, and the Light Horse Battery of the Guard, No. 3, will be shortly despatched in the same direction.

[The Prussian Minister informs me that he knows from a good source that the total military force at the orders of the Russian Government within the Kingdom of Poland and on its immediate borders amounts to nearly 100,000 men of all arms.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER 1].

†† No. 25.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 75).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 7, 1863.*

THE official journal of the 4th instant contained the inclosed article, which embodies an authoritative apology for the policy of the Russian Government in the matter of the recruitment in Poland.

The Russian Government admit that the method of recruitment by arbitrary selection is an „abnormal“ measure, that it can scarcely be reconciled with the notions of strict legality; but the Government contend that this measure is forced upon authority in self-defence, that it is the consequence of that permanent revolutionary agitation of which Poland is the instrument and scene, not the primary cause of the revolt which has broken out in that country.

If we look to the extent and organization of the present revolutionary movement in Poland, it seems highly probable that it has been long premeditated. It does not appear to be the work merely of men driven to desperation by the prospect of seizure, or of those actually ravished<sup>2</sup> by the military violence of the Russian Government from their homes. It has all the aspect of a systematic well-laid scheme. It is the fruit of a wide-spread

<sup>1</sup> The last paragraph is not in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

<sup>2</sup> „Torn“ — in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).



conspiracy, set in motion and armed from abroad. The military recruitment enforced by the Russian Government has been the opportunity, not the first instigation. It probably forced on the explosion prematurely, by threatening to carry off a number of persons embarked in the revolutionary cause, and it may have placed at the disposal of the revolutionary leaders a number of persons who would not have appeared in arms unless they had been threatened with the deprivation of their personal freedom.

The Russian Government avow that their authority cannot be maintained by strict legality. „Legality“, they say, „is our death“; and they confess that the recruitment was to be employed as the means of dispersing, gagging, and shutting-up their political adversaries.

In my humble opinion neither the previous existence of the conspiracy nor the object of breaking up the revolutionary organization can justify the measure of arbitrary recruitment. This measure seems to me to violate all the principles of justice and policy, and to be of very doubtful efficacy in a material point of view. The Government of Russia is no longer founded on the reign of mere brute force. It makes a public and incessant appeal to the sympathies of Europe, and it has nowhere greater need of this moral support than in the administration of Poland. During the last two years several measures have been inaugurated both in the Empire and in the Polish Kingdom, which have earned for the Russian Sovereign the good will of all reasonable friends of human progress, and have inspired in the commercial and financial classes of Europe some confidence in the solidity and morality of the Russian Government. But the exercise of arbitrary military violence in connection with the recruitment is out of all keeping with these humane and intelligent tendencies. It is an exception so flagrant and offensive to the general system that it tends to shake the public faith in the sincerity and consistency of the Government, and awakens unpleasant apprehensions of its future policy in other respects. But, indeed, the course followed by Government was peculiarly unhappy, in this, — that it not only sanctioned a superannuated and reactionary measure, but it actually repealed or suspended a good law, that of 1859, for the purpose of putting in operation the barbarous enactments of an earlier period. No success in capturing political antagonists, no mere material gain, could counterbalance the loss of moral sympathy which would necessarily attend the prosecution of such a course, even if it had been pacifically and successfully carried out.

If, on the other hand, the Russian Government had carried into effect the provisions of the equitable law of military conscription promulgated in 1859, and had in so doing provoked resistance on the part of the Polish people, the Government would have had on its side the sympathies of observant and intelligent Europe; for reasoning men will admit that an army must be raised, and that Poland must contribute to it, and they would have recognized that the system applied in Poland was of a humane and more civilized character than that which was exercised in the Empire proper.

The Government have not only, in a moral point of view, committed a great error, but have positively lost an opportunity of gaining a great advantage.

The Russian Government flatters itself that they will confirm their material position by effecting the military levy, and even by provoking and suppressing the insurrection,

for they have forced their enemies into the light, and will be able to strike them in greater numbers and on a wider field.

Many patriotic Poles will, no doubt, be killed or sent to the Asiatic provinces, or laid in life-long military bondage, and the material strength of the Revolutionary party may be diminished for a time; but for every patriot slain, silenced, or shut up, a hundred may perhaps be created in the new generation, which will succeed to a fresh inheritance of animosities and vengeance. Nor will the Government be able to lay hands on all its internal enemies; and, moreover, the Polish emigration and the great revolutionary conspirators lie abroad, beyond the reach of Russia, ever ready to repair the broken web of conspiracy. It may also be asked whether the Russian Government acts wisely in consenting to embody so many revolutionary elements in the ranks of its army, and we may doubt whether the Russians of patriotic national sentiments will be contented to see the military service of their country used as an instrument of political terror and as the penitentiary of political offenders.

Neither in a moral nor a material point of view does the measure of arbitrary recruitment appear well devised in the interest of the Russian Government, and whatever may now be said, I know very well that the most influential persons, in the Russian Administration as well as at Court, privately blame the measure, disavow all participation or responsibility in it, and impute the whole guilt and misfortune to the headstrong confidence of Marquis Wielopolski.

That Marquis Wielopolski approved the measure there can be no doubt. He avows it now and defends it still. [I have always been surprised that a man of so much intelligence, patriotism, and independence could have sanctioned such an aberration from the path of liberality and justice; but with many great and enlightened qualities the Polish statesman blends an arbitrary temper and an indomitable pride. His perspicacity has been blinded by passion. He sees in the ultra-democratic party his personal enemies, and the enemies of the policy in which he hopes to found the peaceful regeneration of Poland in connection with Russia. He thought that he had found a good opportunity and a good means for striking a mortal blow at his adversaries. If I am correctly informed, he has no regrets and makes no doubt of eventual triumph]<sup>1</sup>.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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Inclosure 1 in No 25.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of January 13, 1863.*

GRACE aux actives et prévoyantes dispositions des autorités locales, le recrutement s'est opéré à Varsovie dans l'ordre le plus parfait. Nulle part il n'y a eu de résistance; les recrues se sont prêtées de bonne grace à la réquisition des agents publics et elles ont été traitées avec tous les égards voulus.

Mais il était à prévoir, que dans les provinces les choses ne se passeraient pas avec autant de calme.

<sup>1</sup> The words in parenthesis are not in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

L'étendue du terrain sur lequel les agents du recrutement étaient appelés à opérer rendait leur tâche beaucoup plus difficile.

Les nouvelles qui nous arrivent aujourd'hui, en date du  $\frac{6}{18}$  Janvier, par les voies ordinaires, confirment ces prévisions.

Un rassemblement de réfractaires s'est réuni à une huitaine de verstes de Varsovie, sur la route de Minsk. Quelques-uns s'étaient munis d'armes; mais ils ne tardèrent pas néanmoins à se disperser.

Deux autres bandes, évalués à 400 ou 500 hommes, se sont réunies à Blonic et aux environs de Siérock et de Pultusk, pour se rendre ensuite dans les forêts de Kampinos et de Nasielsk. La rigueur de la saison et le manque de vivres se font déjà sentir parmi eux.

Les mesures nécessaires ont été immédiatement prises par ordre du lieutenant de l'Empereur. Des troupes ont été envoyées dans les localités précitées, qu'elles parcourront en colonnes mobiles.

Nous recevons en outre les dépêches télégraphiques suivantes: —

*„Varsovie, 10 Janvier.*

„La bande réunie dans le bois aux environs de Blonic a passé la Vistule dans le but de se réunir à celle des forêts de Nasielsk. On suppose qu'elles s'élèvent à près de 1.000 hommes. Des troupes ont été envoyées pour les cerner. Une quarantaine de fuyards désarmés ont déjà été faits prisonniers“.

Autre Dépêche.

*„Varsovie, 11 Janvier.*

„Les bandes sur la rive droite de la Vistule se renforcent. Elles ont quelques armes. Un régiment a été envoyé dans leur direction. Rien de nouveau en ville. Tout y est calme“

Autre Dépêche.

*„Varsovie, 12 Janvier.*

„Dans la nuit du 10 au 11, des attaques ont été dirigées presque partout contre les troupes cantonnées séparément. Les rebelles pénétraient dans les maisons et tuaient isolément les soldats; partout les détachements ont eu le temps cependant de se réunir et de repousser les rebelles; dans la poursuite, ils leur enlevaient les armes et faisaient des prisonniers. Notre perte est évaluée à trente hommes tués et le triple de blessés. Celle des rebelles a été infiniment plus considérable. Le Colonel Kozlianinov avait été tué la veille en faisant une reconnaissance dans les bois. Le General Kanabich est blessé. Les rencontres les plus sérieuses ont eu lieu à Plock, Plonsk, Radzit, et dans les environs de Siedlce. Des mesures sont prises pour une concentration générale de troupes. Tout le royaume est déclaré en état de siège“.

Autre Dépêche.

*„Wilna, 12 Janvier.*

„Dans la nuit du 10 au 11, une bande armée assez nombreuse, venant du Royaume de Pologne, a attaqué inopinément le cantonnement de la 7e compagnie du régiment de

Libau à Sourage, petit bourg situé sur la frontière. Le chef de la compagnie parvint à réunir 60 hommes et, craignant d'être cerné, se retira vers Zabloudow, où se trouve l'Etat Major de son bataillon. Un tambour et deux soldats ont été tués: un bas officier et un soldat ont disparu. Tout est tranquille dans le reste de la contrée. Les mesures sont prises pour maintenir les communications<sup>4</sup>.

#### Autre Dépêche.

„Varsovie, 12 Janvier.

„Le parti révolutionnaire avait décidé de faire une St. Barthélemy dans la nuit du  $\frac{10}{12}$  au  $\frac{11}{12}$  Janvier. A minuit eurent lieu simultanément dans toutes les provinces des attaques sur différentes villes et sur des détachements de troupes cantonnés dans les bourgs et les villages. Surprenant les soldats pendant leur sommeil, les insurgés les égorgèrent dans leur lit; dans un village aux environs de Siedlce, où des soldats se défendaient vigoureusement dans la maison qu'ils occupaient, les insurgés ont incendié la maison en brûlant vifs les braves qui s'y trouvaient. Partout ces atrocités ont été réprimées aussitôt par les troupes, qui ont fait essuyer de très grandes pertes aux insurgés, repoussés sur tous les points. La loi martiale vient d'être proclamée par tout le royaume<sup>4</sup>.

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† Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of <sup>January 23</sup> February 4, 1863.*

LES feuilles étrangères, dans leurs appréciations des derniers événements de Pologne, insistent particulièrement sur l'illégalité du recrutement et affectent d'y voir la cause véritable et légitime du soulèvement des provinces.

Les entrepreneurs de révolution en commandite, qui, de leur paisible abri, ont été les instigateurs de cette sanglante et douloureuse tragédie, ont dû sourire en lisant cette naïve assertion.

Ils savent parfaitement à quoi s'en tenir sur la question de savoir si la révolution a été la conséquence du recrutement, ou si c'est le recrutement qui a été nécessité par la révolution.

Il n'est pas besoin de posséder une dose exceptionnelle de pénétration pour apercevoir le travail révolutionnaire qui depuis plusieurs années prépare le bouleversement de l'Europe et choisit chaque printemps pour l'échéance de ses entreprises.

Ce travail a été déjoué jusqu'à présent par différentes circonstances qui tiennent à la politique générale. Mais rien ne l'a découragé. Pour ceux qui vivent du désordre, le maintien de l'ordre est un suicide qu'on ne peut évidemment pas attendre de leur bonne volonté.

Le devoir des Gouvernements était donc de se montrer aussi infatigables pour la défense de la société que le sont ses implacables adversaires.

La Pologne était l'un des principaux foyers de leur activité; ils trouvaient dans les passions d'un patriotisme et de convictions religieuses faciles à égarer parmi des populations généralement peu éclairées, tous les éléments d'action que recherchent les artisans

des révolutions. Ce qu'il fallait avant tout aux chefs, c'était une armée du désordre. Grâce aux ressources qu'un régime de terreur, emprunté aux traditions les plus sauvages du moyen âge, extorquaient à la majorité paisible mais inerte et timide des habitants, cette armée a été facilement recrutée. La populace de Varsovie et des principales villes du Royaume, démoralisée comme l'est celle de toutes les grandes cités, la classe de la petite bourgeoisie et de la petite noblesse, qui a en Pologne une physionomie tout à fait à part, offraient au comité d'action cet élément bien connu dans tous les pays qui ont subi des crises révolutionnaires, c'est-à-dire, une masse d'individus ayant tout à gagner et rien à perdre au désordre.

Si l'on voulait déjouer et paralyser cette ténébreuse entreprise, ce n'était donc point à la tête qu'il fallait la frapper. La tête est insaisissable, grâce à l'abri qu'elle trouve au dehors; c'était le bras qu'il fallait atteindre, les armes qu'il fallait saisir, les instruments qu'il fallait rendre inoffensifs.

C'est ce qu'a fait le Gouvernement Russe.

Nous ne contestons nullement que la mesure qui a fait peser le recrutement sur la populace des villes, en exemptant la population des campagnes, ne soit une mesure anormale.

Mais avant d'exiger du Gouvernement une stricte légalité, qu'il ne demanderait pas mieux que de pouvoir observer, il faudrait d'abord veiller à ce que les attaques contre lesquelles il est appelé à se défendre ne sortissent pas de la voie légale.

Un mot profond a été dit dans un autre pays à une époque de crise: „La légalité nous tue“. Si ce mot était vrai de la part d'un Gouvernement qui n'avait devant lui qu'un ennemi intérieur, il doit l'être à bien plus forte raison pour un Gouvernement dont la tâche est de protéger le pays contre des agressions venues du dehors.

C'est ce qu'oublient trop les publicistes doctrinaires épris de légalité. Ils ne songent pas à la position exceptionnelle que fait au Gouvernement Russe cette conspiration permanente ourdie à l'étranger, couverte d'une protection qui la rend insaisissable, pouvant en toute sécurité tramer ses complots, agiter, bouleverser, pervertir le pays, sans s'exposer à aucune des conséquences qu'entraînent partout ailleurs les entreprises révolutionnaires.

C'est bien le moins qu'attaqué de cette sorte, le Gouvernement Russe ait la faculté de désarmer chez lui un agresseur qu'il ne peut rencontrer face à face.

La mission que s'est donnée le Gouvernement Russe est de réconcilier deux peuples issus de la même famille, séparés par les fatalités de l'histoire, mais réunis par la force irrésistible des choses; d'apaiser les passions qui les divisent, de les amener à coexister en paix, à développer parallèlement leur prospérité, leur richesse, leur génie national, en se prêtant mutuellement concours et affection, au lieu de se haïr et de s'entredétruire. Cette tâche, il y travaille avec une persévérance que ne laisseront pas ces coupables menées. Ceux qui se mettent en travers sont les ennemis de la Pologne non moins que les siens.

Le Gouvernement Russe ne se sent aucune tendresse pour eux.

Il réserve sa sollicitude pour la population paisible des villes et des campagnes, qui vit d'ordre et de travail et qui est la première intéressée à la répression de tentatives

qui ne peuvent que compromettre le progrès réel du pays dans la voie des améliorations et des réformes qui lui a été ouverte. Là est, à ses yeux, la vraie Pologne.

Quant aux malheureux qui se laissent corrompre ou égarer pour le service d'une cause anti-patriotique et anti-sociale, tout ce que le Gouvernement pouvait faire, c'était de les soustraire à ces détestables influences, de les préserver de leurs propres entraînements en les mettant hors d'état de nuire à la partie saine de la société. C'était là précisément le but du recrutement, et il aurait épargné à beaucoup de ces infortunés les misères, les souffrances, et les châtimens auxquels les ont exposés d'impitoyables meneurs.

Le prétexte soi-disant légal dont ils se couvrent ne saurait tromper personne. Ils n'ont pas attendu ce prétexte pour ourdir leurs complots contre la tranquillité publique. Il y a des années qu'ils se trament à la face de toute l'Europe. Depuis plusieurs mois le Gouvernement était informé de leurs projets; il savait parfaitement que le recrutement serait le signal d'une explosion toujours ajournée. Mais il savait aussi que si ce prétexte était choisi, c'était précisément parce que les chefs se sentaient frappés directement par une mesure qui allait leur enlever leurs victimes et les priver des moyens de bouleverser leur patrie.

Le Gouvernement devait donc y voir un motif de persévérer dans sa résolution de purger la Pologne de ces éléments de trouble, de la rendre à elle-même et à la liberté de ses propres inspirations. Lorsque le Gouvernement n'aura plus qu'elle en face de lui, il ne demande pas mieux que d'en revenir à l'ordre légal qu'il a lui-même inauguré.

La tournure que prennent les événements dans le Royaume prouve d'ailleurs combien le mouvement était factice et superficiel, combien peu il rencontre de sympathies parmi les classes laborieuses, et combien par conséquent, le Gouvernement était fondé à le considérer comme une entreprise étrangère, nuisible, hostile au bien-être réel du pays. Les théories émises par les insurgés dans leurs Proclamations, les violences et les atrocités qu'ils ont commises attestent également quel but anti-social se cachait derrière l'étalage d'un faux patriotisme.

Sous ce rapport, les événements, si douloureux qu'ils soient, renferment d'utiles leçons. Nous avons l'espoir qu'elles ne seront perdues ni pour la Pologne ni pour les opinions honnêtes et sensées en Europe.

No. 26.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell — (Received February 16).*

(No. 76).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 7, 1863.*

THE telegraphic reports, official narratives, and miscellaneous extracts from the Russian journals having reference to the revolt in Poland, which appear from day to day in the official newspapers, do not convey distinct or trustworthy impressions of the course of events in that country. I believe that the German press offers intelligence more worthy of belief and attention. Nevertheless, in order that your Lordship may have before you all the particulars which the Russian Government sanctions and desires to accre-



dit, I have placed together in a separate roll, in the form most convenient for perusal, those portions of the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ which contain the Polish news from the 1<sup>st</sup>/<sub>2</sub>th of January to the present date.

If I do not go into greater detail on this subject it is because I presume that Her Majesty's Government is supplied by Colonel Stanton, who has better means of obtaining information than I can possess at so great a distance from the scene of operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 27.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 77).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 8, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of this date, by which we are informed that the insurrectionary forces in Poland tend to concentrate themselves, and that strong bodies have drawn together at two points — on the east at Wengrow, in the Government of Lublin, and towards the south at Wachock, in the Government of Radom. The insurgents have, however, by the official account, been already expelled from the former of these positions.

The Minister of the Interior told me last night that the strange story, published in yesterday's paper, of an attempt to poison Marquis Wielopolski and the whole of his family and household, is certainly authentic. His Excellency also vouches for the report of the murder of a woman by a priest, because she would not reveal the hiding-place of her husband. The priest was subsequently put to death by the neighbouring peasants. These horrid incidents mark, in the opinion of M. Walnieff, the ferocious exasperation with which the revolutionary party have entered upon the struggle. Many anecdotes of the barbarity of the insurgents are indeed circulated, but I do not repeat them to your Lordship; they cannot be strictly authenticated, and they are such as have unhappily accompanied revolutionary outbreaks and partizan warfare in all countries in every age. No mention is naturally made here of the severities which may not improbably be perpetrated by the Imperial troops.

In justice to the Imperial Government I am bound to state that there has been no inflammatory publication of the alleged atrocities of the insurgents in the official newspapers. I have, indeed, been assured that Prince Gortchakoff has deprecated the circulation of these stories, as tending to produce an excess of animosity on the part of the Russians.

The Government continue to affirm that the rural population are indifferent to the National cause, or even friendly to the Russian authorities. Persons connected with Poland here, or possessing revolutionary sympathies, with equal confidence deny that such is the case.

It is certain that about thirty Polish officers have deserted to the Revolutionary party.

The Roman Catholic priests undoubtedly take a very leading share in the movement, and use all their spiritual influence in instigating the people to resistance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† Inclosure in No. 27.

*Extracts from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of <sup>January 27</sup>/<sub>February 8</sub>, 1863.*

LES nouvelles de Pologne, que nous nous sommes empressés d'insérer dans notre journal au fur et à mesure qu'elles nous parvenaient par les voies télégraphiques ou postales, dessinent avec une netteté chaque jour plus grande le caractère du mouvement insurrectionnel et confirment de point en point nos premières appréciations.

A mesure que les désordres se prolongent, l'attitude des populations rurales devient de plus en plus hostile au parti révolutionnaire, et un incident des plus regrettables, qui se trouve relaté dans l'article de „l'Invalide“ que nous avons reproduit dans notre numéro d'hier, prouve que les exactions, les déprédations et les violences de tout genre commises par les meneurs de l'insurrection commencent à lasser la patience du peuple et à provoquer en lui une exaspération facile d'ailleurs à concevoir.

Ainsi, par exemple, l'exécution sommaire de ce prêtre récollet qui avait assassiné de sa main une paysanne du village de Sanniki et incendié sa maison parce qu'elle s'était refusée à lui révéler où se trouvait son mari qu'on voulait enrôler de vive force, prouve que le prestige religieux dont le bas clergé Polonais a fait un si funeste usage décroît sensiblement.

Il faut espérer, du reste, que cet acte de représailles n'est qu'un fait isolé qui ne se reproduira pas ailleurs, car il a été sévèrement enjoint aux paysans de ne pas se rendre justice eux-mêmes et de se borner à saisir les insurgés et à les remettre aux autorités locales, le Gouvernement Impérial étant fermement résolu à ne jamais employer des moyens qui pourraient lui faciliter, il est vrai, l'oeuvre de répression, mais qui répugnent à ses immuables principes de loyauté et d'humanité.

Dans plusieurs localités, du reste, cette pensée a été comprise et mise à exécution, et c'est grâce aux indications des paysans et à leur concours dévoué qu'on est parvenu à disperser une partie des bandes d'insurgés et à faire bon nombre de prisonniers.

Il est fort probable aussi que cette attitude de la masse populaire a été le motif principal et déterminant du revirement qui s'est opéré en dernier lieu dans la tactique des rebelles.

Au lieu de persévérer dans le système de guérillas qui était le plus conforme à leurs moyens et le plus propice à une guerre d'insurrection, puisqu'il mettait le Gouvernement dans l'obligation de disséminer ses troupes et de les fatiguer en marches et en contre-marches à la poursuite d'un insaisissable adversaire, — les insurgés ne trouvant pas dans les campagnes le concours et l'appui sur lesquels ils comptaient, sont obligés de se concentrer.

Les deux points principaux de concentration qui semblent avoir été choisis sont Wengrow, dans le Gouvernement de Lublin, et Wachock, dans celui de Radom.



A Wengrow, les insurgés sont au nombre de 6,000 environ, et c'est là que paraît s'être établie la direction centrale et supérieure du mouvement. A la date du  $\frac{18}{1}$  Janvier les nouvelles étaient qu'on y élevait à la hâte des fortifications, qu'on barricadait les rues et que l'on creusait des fossés; mais la dépêche télégraphique insérée dans notre numéro d'avant-hier,  $\frac{25 \text{ Janvier}}{6 \text{ Février}}$ , nous a déjà informés que deux jours après, c'est-à-dire, le  $\frac{21 \text{ Janvier}}{2 \text{ Février}}$ , cette position avait été enlevée après un combat opiniâtre, et que les débris de cette bande principale se sont dispersés dans les forêts avoisinantes, où ils sont activement poursuivis.

A Wachock, les forces insurrectionnelles s'élèvent à 3,000 ou 4,000 hommes, qui ont commencé par brûler le pont de Bialobrzegi sur la Pilica, afin d'intercepter les communications avec Varsovie, et qui se préparent à la résistance.

Les télégrammes d'hier nous apprennent enfin que dans le Gouvernement de Grodno et sur les frontières de la Prusse et de la Galicie, quelques bandes isolées se montrent tantôt sur un point, tantôt sur l'autre; mais elles sont vigoureusement poursuivies, et dans toutes les rencontres qui sont signalées elles ont été battues en essayant des pertes fort considérables.

Les nouvelles complémentaires qu'on a reçues attestent que ni les paysans ni les colons ne sont sympathiques au soulèvement; loin de là, ils s'opposent parfois de vive force aux tentatives des conjurés, et s'appliquent à seconder de toute manière les mesures du Gouvernement, en arrêtant les vagabonds pour les livrer à nos troupes.

A Krubin, métairie située près de la petite ville de Gombin, district de Gostynin, un prêtre Catholique, excitant les paysans à se réunir aux révoltés, a tué de sa propre main une femme qui refusait d'indiquer le lieu où se trouvait son mari absent, et a ensuite mis le feu à l'habitation de sa victime. Le jour suivant, ce même prêtre fut surpris et tué par les paysans. Il était à cheval et accompagné d'un ouvrier de fabrique; ce dernier parvint cependant à se sauver, après avoir abandonné un fusil, un poignard et deux sabres, dont l'un avait appartenu à un gendarme que ce même prêtre avait fait périr précédemment.

Nos troupes, réparties en détachements séparés, ont commencé à prendre l'offensive et à agir en colonnes mobiles contre les principales bandes d'insurgés; on a maintenant des renseignements assez précis sur leurs positions.

† No. 28.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 8).

My Lord,

Warsaw, February 4, 1863.

SINCE the date of my last despatches to your Lordship the insurrectionary movement in this kingdom has extended considerably; and notwithstanding the partial successes of the troops sent to repress the original insurgents, bands numbering, in all, some thousands, are now in the field against the Imperial authority. These bands, as is at present reported, are distributed in three separate localities; the first, and most important, being

concentrated near the town of Wachock, in the Government of Radom; it numbers from 6,000 to 8,000 men, and is commanded by a man of the name of Langiewicz, formerly an officer in Garibaldi's army, and Professor in the Polish Military School in Italy, who, according to report, recently arrived in this kingdom, accompanied by twenty pupils of that Academy. The country held by this band is more undulating and broken than the other districts of the kingdom, and is thickly wooded; the band has been largely reinforced from the mining population of the locality, and having the Government forges in their possession employ them in the preparation of scythes, knives, and other rough arms of this description, whilst the vicinity of the Gallician frontier of Austria enables them to procure more easily gunpowder and fire-arms than is the case elsewhere, at the same time affording a secure retreat in case of serious defeat.

The second band is concentrated in the district of Siedlee, having its head-quarters at the town of Wengrow, towards the Lithuanian frontier; it is said to consist of about 3,000 men, amongst whom are many fugitives from Warsaw, and a number of small freeholders, who are very numerous in this locality, and is commanded by Lewandowski. Three columns of troops, under the command of General Bontems, are acting against this band, and information is hourly expected here of an engagement between these troops and the insurgents.

The third concentration of insurgents is in the forest of Bolimow, near the town of Lovicz; this band, numbering about 2,000, has been acting against the line of railway from this town to Vienna, and, without doing any serious mischief, constantly interrupting the communications by that line.

Other bands exist in the districts of Augustow and Lublin, but the three named appear to be the most formidable in every way.

It is reported, my Lord, that the military authorities of the kingdom are now concentrating their troops in the larger towns, abandoning all outposts to prevent these being surprised, and are preparing to enter on a regular campaign against the disaffected districts; and this may probably account for the facility with which the insurgents have been able to assemble in such force, and the result of such a campaign can hardly be doubtful when the comparative forces of the two parties are considered. The Imperial troops in the kingdom may be estimated at over 100,000 men, well armed and equipped, with abundant stores of war material of all sorts, whilst the insurgents can only be partially armed, are unprovided with artillery or any stores of ammunition, and utterly untrained. I must confess, my Lord, I was not prepared for an insurrectionary movement on so extensive a scale as has already taken place, and, it must be admitted, the leaders have known how to take advantage of the false step of the Government in ordering the conscription for the kingdom on the very arbitrary basis already reported to your Lordship, and that the movement assumes daily more the appearance of a national rising, though the upper classes and the peasantry still keep aloof.

It would be wearying to your Lordship to detail all the petty actions and skirmishes that have already taken place, but, as far as I can gather from the various reports, the troops have, as was to be expected, been almost invariably successful when acting in any force.

I may also mention to your Lordship, as being a significant fact, that in several of the country districts where the conscription had been commenced, the military authorities, on their own responsibility, and without any orders from superior authority, have released all the conscripts that had been taken.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

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† No. 29.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

No. 9).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, February 6, 1863.*

FROM a notice published last evening in the Government „Gazette“, it appears that an engagement took place on the 3rd instant at the town of Wengrow between the insurgents and a small Russian force, resulting in the total defeat of the former, who lost from 150 to 200 men killed; no prisoners were taken, and the insurgents, whose numbers are not reported, retired into the neighbouring forests. Unfortunately for the Government only one column of troops of the three reached the scene of action in time, and the insurgents were thus enabled to escape total destruction. It is further reported that some valuable papers relating to the insurrection, including a correspondence with Mieroslawski and Mazzini, were captured in the town of Wengrow. The loss of the troops in this affair is reported to be only four wounded.

The result of this action, although unsatisfactory for the Government from the failure of the other columns in effecting the proposed combined movement, must, it may reasonably be supposed, have a most depressing effect on the other insurgent bands, and show them the folly of attempting with a half-armed mob to resist the attack of regular troops supplied with artillery; and I should not be surprised, my Lord, to find that in that part of the kingdom open resistance to the Government will shortly cease and that the bands that have assembled there expecting assistance from Lithuania, which, from all accounts remains perfectly quiet, will gradually disperse. It is reported, my Lord, that three peasants have been hanged by the insurgents at Wengrow, and that in that district, as well as others, this class has kept entirely aloof from the movement.

In the southern districts of the kingdom, however, the insurgents have made considerable head, and as yet no troops appear to have been sent against them. In the Government of Radom four of the eight district towns are in the hands of the insurgents, who it appears have established some sort of Provisional Government in these towns, and appointed the old Chiefs of districts to the same office under their Government. They issue passports to Jewish traders and others who wish to pass their lines, decree taxes, and have ordered a conscription amongst all classes, peasants included, of all males from 18 to 35 years of age.

I am unable to account to your Lordship for the reasons why no attempt has as yet been made by the military authorities to recover the ground lost in these districts;

it appears incredible that with a force of 100,000 men at their disposal, they are unable to form moveable columns to act in more than one direction after making the necessary allowance for garrisons of the capital, large towns, and fortresses of the kingdom, and it cannot be doubted that the want of such a column-acting in the Government of Radom has allowed the insurgents to obtain such a footing in that Government that their suppression must now be more tedious and bloody than need have been the case; the material loss to the Government is also very considerable, as in many of the towns now in their hands, the insurgents have seized the Government funds, as well as small quantities of arms and ammunition captured from the small garrisons left in them; and although it is easy to understand that it should be the first object of the military authorities to secure their communications with the capital of the Empire, and clear the Northern frontier of the kingdom from the presence of these insurgent bands, it is difficult to understand why, at the same time, no attempt has been made to hold the insurgents in the Southern districts in check, even if unable to disperse them.

In the town of Warsaw itself, my Lord, perfect tranquillity prevails, but rumours exist of an intended outbreak here also. A Committee, calling itself the Central National Committee, but who are entirely unknown, issues orders and proclamations to the insurgents; and I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a translation of a Decree issued by this body acting as a Provisional National Government, which will show your Lordship that whatever the nature or cause of the insurrection may nominally be, the persons who act as leaders to it are not backward in showing their Socialist tendencies. I beg also to forward to your Lordship a translation of an order of the day of the 4th February issued in the name of the Insurrectionary Military Chief of Warsaw.

I have already had the honour of mentioning to your Lordship that a very considerable number of the landed proprietors of the kingdom had arrived in Warsaw, and that meetings had been held by them to decide on their course of action during the present movement. It appears now, my Lord, that being unable to arrive at any decision, it was agreed at their last meeting that no general determination being possible, each proprietor should act on his own view of the case: this decision is much to be regretted, as the pressure of the Revolutionary Chiefs, which might without difficulty be resisted by them as a body, becomes much more difficult when only opposed by the individual, and it is to be feared that under this pressure some of the large proprietors may be induced to join the movement, notwithstanding the small prospect of any good to their cause resulting from so doing. But it must be admitted, my Lord, that the position of the Polish nobility is at the present moment most difficult: distrusted by the Government that cannot protect their estates from pillage or their persons from insult, they are also proclaimed traitors to their country by the revolutionary leaders, because they will not join the present insurrection, and at the same time they are exposed to the vengeance of the peasant class, who have been taught to consider them as their oppressors, and as standing in the way of any definite settlement of their rights; and although it is still possible that on the suppression of this outbreak, the liberal intentions of the Emperor towards the Polish subjects may be honestly carried out, and the country gain in the end by the overthrow of the ultra party, it is much to be feared that advantage will be taken of the occasion to re-

establish the old régime of arbitrary government carried out by military authority throughout the kingdom.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

<sup>†</sup> Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

*Proclamation of the Central National Committee as a National Government.*

TAKING into consideration that making the peasants freeholders has been so long delayed (notwithstanding the general wish of the country) by the usurping Government; taking further into consideration that the proprietors are entitled to compensation for the loss of rent, corvée, &c., it is decreed as follows: ---

Article 1. Land held under any title whatsoever, corvée, rent, or otherwise, by small farmers, together with all buildings thereon, becomes from this date the freehold property of the holder, without any obligation of rent or otherwise, except the duty of paying taxes and of serving the country.

Art. 2. The former proprietors will receive compensation from the national funds by means of Government Stock.

Art. 3. The amount of compensation and the nature of the stock will be settled by separate Decrees.

Art. 4. All ukases, laws, &c., published by the usurping Government on the subject of peasant leases, are declared null and void.

Art. 5. The present Decree applies not only to private estates, but also to Crown lands, lands bestowed by the Crown, Church property, &c.

Art. 6. The carrying out of the present Decree is confided by the Central National Committee, acting as National Provisional Government, to the Military and Palatinate Chiefs.

Given at Warsaw, 22nd January 1863.

<sup>†</sup> Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

*Order of the day of the Chief of the Town of Warsaw.*

*February 4, 1863.*

Article 1. AS numbers of landed proprietors, instead of serving their country in their residences, are wasting their time and their money in Warsaw, they are hereby desired to return forthwith to their homes, unless exempted from their obligation by the Chief of the town, and to fulfil their duty to their country, more especially those who are young.

All functionaries of the Organization are to carry out this order.

Art. 2. The enthusiastic zeal of the young men makes them hasten to the national camps; but as the fatigues of a winter campaign are beyond the strength of many, all under 18 years of age are hereby desired not to leave Warsaw, as they cannot be admitted into the national ranks.

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† No. 30.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 10).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, February 9, 1863.*

THE prolonged existence of the insurrection that lately broke out in this kingdom, and the dimensions it has assumed in spite of the military occupation of the country by the Russian Government, lead me to believe that some further remarks on the general state of the kingdom may not prove uninteresting to your Lordship.

It is, my Lord, the general opinion of persons in high position in the Government here, that the Revolutionary party in Europe had so worked on the minds of the middle and lower classes of this country, under the disguise of patriotism, that an insurrectionary movement would have broken out shortly even had no conscription for the army been attempted, and that this party have gradually but surely been organizing the working classes of the towns into bands, to be ready to throw off the mark of subjection, and to appeal to arms when such an appeal might be considered as likely to produce favourable results.

The events that have occurred in this kingdom during the last two years, and the very marked attitude of opposition to the Government that all classes of the people except the peasantry have assumed during that period, give, my Lord, much weight to such an opinion; and it is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the attempt to enforce the conscription in the arbitrary manner that had been announced, and which was almost an undisguised attempt to destroy the Revolutionary party by seizing the subordinates when unable to touch the chiefs, determined these latter to take advantage of an occasion that otherwise it might have been difficult for them to have obtained; and by taking advantage of the well-known aversion of the Poles to serve in the ranks of the Russian army, to appeal at the same time to their patriotism, and to excite them to have recourse to arms to resist the attempt of the Russian Government to tear them from their homes.

I cannot believe, my Lord, that the leaders themselves can have had any serious idea that the revolt could succeed; but seeing that should the conscription be carried out throughout the kingdom the great mass of their supporters would be removed from their action, they have been forced to commence this dangerous game before their measures were thoroughly prepared, or else to consent to postpone the attempt in this kingdom for an indefinite period.

The proclamations issued by the Central Committee in this town, and addressed more especially to the cupidity of the peasants, in the hopes of inducing them to join the insurrection by the bribe of having the lands in their possession made over as freehold

property to them, demonstrates also most clearly that the leaders of the movement are deeply imbued with the spirit of socialism, and that it is by the propagation of this spirit in the Kingdom of Poland, and in the neighbouring Russian provinces, that they hope to be able to make a stand against the Government.

It is deeply to be regretted that the more sensible and influential classes of the inhabitants of the kingdom should have failed, partly through distrust of the Government measures, and partly through fear of being denounced by the leaders of the Revolutionary party as traitors to their country, to give their support to the Government in carrying into effect the improvements in the administration proposed by His Majesty the Emperor; and it cannot be doubted that the attitude of the upper classes during the last two years has given much [more] weight to the insidious counsels of the revolutionists, and assisted in spreading amongst the lower classes that socialist spirit that is at the present moment bearing such bitter fruit.

It appears also, my Lord, highly probable, that when raising the standard of revolt in this kingdom, the revolutionary party have been reckoning on the revolt spreading as well to the Austrian province of Galicia and the Grand Duchy of Posen, as to the Polish provinces of Russia, where Polish national sympathies were supposed to be sufficiently keen to cause a general rising in favour of the national cause.

Another fact connected with this insurrection worthy of remark, and which proves that it can hardly be considered a national movement, is the attitude of the peasantry of the kingdom at the present moment; as this, by far the most numerous class of the inhabitants of the kingdom, not only has not joined the ranks of the insurgents, but has in many parts of the country assisted the troops against them; and the same feeling appears to have prevailed in the other Russian provinces. The movement, therefore, being confined to the working classes, with some few small landed proprietors and the country clergy, cannot, my Lord, I imagine, continue much longer to make any serious opposition to the Russian troops: but the insurrection cannot fail to produce much misery in the disturbed districts, and to act in a most deplorable manner on the industrial resources of the kingdom; it also must tend to keep alive the hostile feelings of the Pole towards his conqueror, who unfortunately, if reports are to be relied upon, retaliates in a barbarous manner for the early successes and atrocities of the insurgents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† No. 31.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 11).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, February 11, 1863.*

IN my despatch [No. 8] to your Lordship dated the 4th instant, I had the honour to mention that the principal band of insurgents in this kingdom was assembled in the Government of Radom, having its head-quarters at the town of Wachock, and that a considerable



portion of the district was in their possession. I have now the honour to report that according to all accounts an engagement has taken place between this band and the Russian troops, the result being that the insurgents have retreated from Wachock, and that this town and some villages in the neighbourhood have been burnt by the troops. Particulars of the affair are not known here. The Government report that the insurgents are broken, having lost some 60 men killed and 50 taken prisoners, the loss of the troops being reported at 1 soldier killed and 2 wounded. Serious doubts are entertained of the correctness of this report, and it is believed that the troops, particularly the dragoons engaged, suffered severe loss. It is not known positively in what direction the mass of the insurgent band has retreated, but it is presumed they are still in the fastnesses of the south-eastern portion of the kingdom.

It appears also, my Lord, that the band that had assembled in the neighbourhood of Wengrow, which I also had the honour of reporting to your Lordship, have passed the frontier of the kingdom and endeavoured to penetrate into Lithuania; that they have been met by troops sent from the town of Bialystok, and that a severe engagement has taken place at the town of Siemiatycze, the loss of the insurgents being reported by the Government to amount to 1000 in killed and wounded, the troops also suffering some loss.

The band that has for some time been interrupting the railway communication between this town and Austria and Prussia has also been attacked by the troops, and is reported to be dispersed, having lost some 50 men killed and 40 prisoners. Four Russian officers who had been made prisoners by the band were also recovered. It is worthy of remark, my Lord, that these officers had not received any ill-treatment from their captors, notwithstanding the rumours that are current of the atrocities perpetrated by the Russian troops, which might have led to reprisals being made.

I beg also to mention to your Lordship that the Prussian Government have sent an officer to this country as Military Commissioner, and it is supposed that a Military Convention between the two Governments is about to be concluded. This officer reached Warsaw on Monday last, the 9th instant, but as yet I am unable to inform your Lordship of the result of his visit.

It is further reported here, my Lord, that a band of insurgents crossed the Prussian frontier on the 8th instant near the town of Strasburg (not far from Thorn), and that they have been dispersed by the Prussian troops, who had some casualties in the affair.

Other actions are also reported in different parts of the kingdom, in all of which a great loss of life is stated to have occurred, and it is much to be feared that the barbarous custom of killing the wounded has been practised by the troops.

As the result of all the operations at present, it may, my Lord, be stated that the communications between St. Petersburg and Warsaw are again established, as also between the latter town and the Prussian frontier; but that the frontier station of Josnowica on the Breslau line of railway, and the greater portion of the Gallician frontier near Cracow, are in the hands of the insurgents.

The town of Warsaw remains tranquil, but fears are entertained that on the 27th instant, the anniversary of the battle of Grochow, some attempt may be made which will



bring on a massacre in this town; and although no possible good can result from such an attempt, it is to be feared that there are persons sufficiently mad to attempt to bring on such a massacre for the sake of demonstrating to Europe the severities and horrors that Russian troops are capable of inflicting. Indeed, my Lord, many persons believe that the Government have done their utmost to bring on the present state of affairs for the express purpose of being able to quench the national sympathies by a wholesale slaughter of their opponents. I do not, my Lord, give this as my own opinion, or indeed believing it in any degree, but I have heard the remark made by thinking and sensible persons.

I cannot conclude this despatch without mentioning to your Lordship that a diabolical attempt was lately made to poison the Marquis Wielopolski and his family; fortunately the attempt failed, but several members of the family and household have suffered from the effects of the poison.

Since writing the above, I have been informed that one of the leaders of the insurrection, Frankowski by name, has been captured by the Russian troops.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

†† No. 32.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 67).

My Lord,

*Vienna, February 12, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG is anxious, but not alarmed, as to the excitement in Galicia consequent on the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland. His Excellency has said to me that all attempts to enrol men for service in Poland were now effectually stopped, and that most of those who had joined the insurgents had returned disgusted with the treatment they had received. There were, however, observed his Excellency, many hot-headed youths in Galicia always ready to join a movement for the national cause, and it was on this account, and with the desire to prevent exciting speeches that might be delivered by some members of the Provincial Diet at Lemberg, that the Government had decided to suspend the sittings, and an adjournment had consequently been ordered to the 2nd of March. [This suggestion came, he added, from Prince Sapieha, the President of the assembly, and his opinion was backed by many of the important members, and strongly recommended by Count Mensdorff] <sup>1</sup>.

The object of the adjournment was two-fold, — to prevent speeches of a revolutionary tendency being pronounced at the Diet, and also to save some of the young and inexperienced members [amongst whom was the son of Prince Sapieha] <sup>1</sup> from compromising themselves, their political friends, and, perhaps, their future existence.

As to the news from Russian Poland, Count Rechberg said that the accounts were conflicting; the successes of the Imperial troops were considerable, but the insurrection

<sup>1</sup> The words in parenthesis are not in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

was, nevertheless, spreading far and wide, and though he could not doubt the ultimate suppression of the movement, it was not likely to be effected for a long time to come.

[I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, an article from the semi-official „Donau Zeitung“, with a translation by Mr. Barrington, on the causes which induced the adjournment of the Galician Diet]<sup>1</sup>.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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Inclosure in No. 32.

*Extract from the „Donau Zeitung“ of February 10, 1863.*

(Translation).

ACCORDING to telegraphic intelligence received from Lemberg, the Galician Diet has been adjourned till the 2nd of March. The cause of this measure has been assigned, according to one version, to the disturbances in Russian Poland; another version is, that it had come to the knowledge of the Government that it was purposed to make some national demonstration in the Galician Diet in favour of the insurrection in Russian Poland.

Whatever be the truth of these statements, it cannot be denied that the present disturbed state of things was unfavourable to the peaceable continuation of the session of the Diet, whose business it was to promote the material interests of the country, and to occupy itself with questions of a sober, practical nature.

The Government wishes that the session of a local Diet should produce as fruitful results in Galicia as promises to be the case in the German provinces of the Empire; it has, therefore, in order to insure these results, been all the more disposed to order a short adjournment, because from the fact that amongst the members of the Diet, which has not sat for some days past, opinions in this sense appear to have found favour.

In exercising the right of adjournment, which it possesses in virtue of the Constitution, the Government was primarily influenced by consideration for the country, and for all classes of the population, and this consideration was justified by the consent of the population with regard to the troubles in Russian Poland having on the whole been satisfactory.

A national demonstration in the Diet would have served as a spark to inflame the tinder already in existence, and would have been easily fanned into a flame in some parts of the country by a few hot-headed people. It is to be hoped that the Government by the simple act of adjournment will succeed in guarding against so untimely an eventuality. How desirable this is, is shown by events in Prussia, where the Government has decided on the prompt adoption of preventive measures, which have appeared necessary in consequence of the close proximity of the scene of rebellion, and of the rising excitement generated by it.

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<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

†† No. 33.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 68. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, February 12, 1863.*

A REPORT having reached me that a proposition had been made to the Austrian Government to enter into a Convention with Russia and Prussia for the better protection of their common interest in Poland, I have just inquired of Count Reehberg if there was any foundation for this report. His Excellency replied he was happy to say that no overture on the subject had been made to him; that all the Russian Government had requested was that refugees might be disarmed and taken care of, and that this was unnecessary, for whenever such cases occurred along the Galician frontier the people were dealt with according to usage. I asked Count Reehberg what was the nature of a Military Convention said to have been concluded between Russia and Prussia concerning the affairs of Poland. He replied that he was not in possession of the details of it, but he supposed its main object was to facilitate the passage of Russian troops through Prussia into Poland, and to establish a common course of action in face of the insurrection. He added that on hearing of this Convention, he had telegraphed to Count Thun at St. Petersburg to discourage any communication on the subject to Vienna; that Galicia was comparatively tranquil; and that unless the Polish insurrection assumed greater dimensions, the Austrian Government would consider the general understanding which existed between the two Imperial Governments sufficient for present purposes.

His Excellency then remarked that the concentration along the Polish frontier of three Prussian corps d'armée, about 60,000 men, was a much larger force than could be necessary. He was happy to think that Count Mensdorff had but 12,000 men in Galicia, that he was told to apply for any amount of reinforcement he might require, and that he had answered that the force at his disposal was ample, that the rural population were quiet, and that up to the present moment he saw no cause for serious alarm.

[Count Reehberg added with reference to the extensive movement of Prussian troops towards the Polish frontier, that he could not think M. de Bismarck's object was other than political; it was meant as a friendly act towards Russia, a species of military co-operation with her, and also a justification before the country and the Chambers of an increased expenditure for the army]<sup>1</sup>.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD

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<sup>1</sup> The last paragraph is not in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

† No. 34.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 71).

My Lord,

Vienna, February 12, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a précis [translation] by Mr. Mounsey of an interesting article from the „Ost Deutsche Post“, contrasting the policy relatively pursued by Austria and Prussia in reference to the Polish insurrection.

The writer of the article, in alluding the present attitude of the Berlin Cabinet as regards the events now passing in the Kingdom of Poland, points out that the effect of M. de Bismarck's policy on this subject will probably be to render more difficult, on the one hand, the reconciliation between political parties in Prussia; whilst, on the other hand, it must strengthen the intimacy already existing between the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg, and thus contract the influence of Prussia as a leading liberal Power in Germany.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 34.

*Précis of Article in the „Ost Deutsche Post“ of February 11, 1863.*

THE prorogation of the Galician Provincial Diet will not, it is affirmed, be extended beyond the 2nd of March.

This measure, we are told, was taken by the Government in accordance with the wishes of several influential Polish members, but we believe principally out of regard for Russia, which has already complained of Austria's passive bearing towards the revolution, and, it is even said, accused her of connivance with it. The violent speeches which were expected in the Diet would have given the Russian Government new grounds of complaint, and to avoid this a prorogation for three weeks had been ordered. We have no news from Lemberg as to the manner in which this measure has been received. But as the majority of the Diet concurred in it, it will probably have created little surprise.

The Prussian Government finds itself in a very different position. Disturbances seem to be apprehended amongst the Polish inhabitants of Posen and West Prussia. Several corps d'armée have been concentrated there, and, according to the latest news, military law will soon be proclaimed in several districts.

The semi-official „Nord-Deutsche Zeitung“ has brought us the important news that an understanding has been arrived at by the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg with regard to Poland. This is the first step towards a more intimate alliance between the two Courts, and it is entirely in accordance with the spirit of M. de Bismarck's policy.

Altogether the Polish insurrection will have a great effect on the internal policy of Prussia. It will further the plans of the Junker party; for if, as a semi-official Berlin journal foresees, decisive measures become necessary for the preservation of the integrity of the

Kingdom in this eastern provinces, the King will find the prosecution of his arbitrary projects considerably facilitated. The toga must go to the wall when the sword leaps from the scabbard.

M. de Bismarck seems determined to make the most of the present conjuncture of affairs. The concentration of so many troops cannot have been ordered merely for the preservation of order in the Prussian Polish provinces, and must have reference to internal questions. The Government are aware from the events of 1846 and 1848 that they have only the smaller nobles to fear; the greater part of the agricultural population and the great nobles have never shown any desire to join insurrectionary movements. Besides this, the Poles in Silesia and Old Prussia form but a small minority, and can boast of a very small majority in Posen; whilst the Germans in the provinces are vastly superior to them in influence, intelligence, and property. On the other hand, this Polish insurrection may very possibly throw M. de Bismarck out of his reckoning. He has learnt from Napoleon how a nation may be consoled for the loss of freedom by an enterprising foreign policy, and he sought to put this lesson in practice by his demonstrations against Austria, Hesse Cassel, and Denmark. This he can no longer do so long as the third of the Prussian army mounts guard on the Polish frontier.

Prussian policy will, therefore, receive an impulse in one direction or the other from the events which are taking place in Poland. At home, the reconciliation of parties will be more difficult; abroad, the intimacy of Prussia and Russia will lead to greater antagonism against Austria. The men who lead the policy of these countries will be perfectly agreed on the latter point. We are not afraid of this intimacy. Prussia at the head of a liberal movement in Germany is a dangerous rival for Austria; but hand-in-hand with Russia, she is harmless, both from a German and European point of view.

The more Prussia throws herself into the arms of the great Northern Power, so much the more will Constitutional Austria be enabled to count on the sympathy, and, in case of need, the assistance of Western Europe.

No. 35.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 73).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 14, 1863.*

[WITH reference to Mr. Lowther's despatch No. 8 of the 7th instant], I have the honour to inform your Lordship that General Alvensleben, who is now in Warsaw, having arrived there two days ago from St. Petersburg, has concluded a Military Convention with the Russian Government, according to which the two Governments will reciprocally afford facilities to each other for the suppression of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland, and which may be expected to follow in the Polish Provinces of Prussia.

As far as I have been able to learn, it has been agreed that the Commanders-in-chief of the two Governments will keep each other informed of the movements of the troops

under their orders; that if the troops of the one Government should retire before the insurgents into the territory of the other, they will be allowed to retain their arms, and to recross the frontier as soon as they may be in a position to do so, and that the troops of either Government will be at liberty to pursue insurgents into the territory of the other.

The Prussian railways are also to be placed at the disposal of the Russian military authorities for the transport of troops through Prussian territory from one part of the Kingdom of Poland to another. The Government further contemplate, in case of necessity, to give military assistance to the Russian Government for the suppression of the insurrection in the kingdom; but I am told that no engagement has yet been entered into with respect to the nature or extent of such assistance.

In the meanwhile, however, four corps of the Prussian army are concentrating on the frontiers, under the command of General Waldersee, whose head-quarters are at Posen, and the reserves of two of these corps and of a division of a third have been ordered to join their regiments. As yet no disturbances of importance have occurred in the Grand Duchy, and it is believed that the Chiefs of the insurrection do not intend that any movement shall take place there or in Galicia, unless some important successes shall be obtained in the kingdom. In the neighbourhood of Thorn, however, and in the old Polish Provinces of Prussia, where the conspiracy is possibly less general and not so well organized, and its members are therefore less subject to discipline, some disturbances have occurred.

From the information which has reached the Prussian Government, the whole kingdom, with the exception of the large towns held by the Russian troops, appears to be in a state of revolt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 36.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 74. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 14, 1863.*

M. DE BISMARCK, in acquainting me a few days ago with his intension to take measures in concert with the Russian Government to prevent the extension of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland, said the question was of vital importance to Prussia, as her own existence would be seriously compromised by the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland.

I asked whether he meant to say that if Russia found any difficulty in suppressing the insurrection, the Prussian Government intended to afford them military assistance; and he not only replied in the affirmative, but added that if Russia got tired of the contest and were disposed to withdraw from the kingdom — a course which some Russians

were supposed to think advantageous to her interests — the Prussian Government would carry on the war on their own account.

To this I answered that if I were to understand that they would endeavour to conquer the kingdom in the event of Russia relinquishing her sovereignty over it, I felt assured Europe would resist such an attempt; and his Excellency was at first inclined to argue against the probability of any serious resistance being offered on the part of the Great Powers to a Prussian conquest of Poland. However, as he said afterwards that it was unnecessary to consider what the interest of Prussia would require in the event of the abandonment of her Polish Provinces by Russia, as the contingency was never likely to arise, his language on this point should merely be looked upon as a strong manner of expressing the determination of Prussia to oppose to the utmost of her power the re-establishment of Polish independence, should Russia be ever disposed to grant it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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† No. 37.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 79).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 14, 1863.*

A JOINT proclamation was issued on the 1st instant by the President of the province of Posen, and the General in command of the troops in that district, warning the inhabitants against aiding or abetting the insurgents in the neighbouring Kingdom of Poland. In this document, of which a translation is herewith inclosed, the atrocities committed by the insurgents are alluded to as inspiring general horror; and any kind of assistance given to the latter, however indirect in its nature, is denounced as a crime against the laws of Prussia, involving, as such, the punishment due to high treason.

This manifesto has elicited from the Polish members of the Chamber of Deputies, in conjunction with some of the members of the Party of Progress, an interpellation, of which I likewise inclose a translation, and to which it is understood that M. de Bismarck intends to give a very decided answer.

The objects of the interpellation are to place on record the unconstitutional nature of the joint Military and Civil Government which the interpellators maintain has by this manifesto been proclaimed in the province of Posen; to protest against the unfounded assertion of atrocities having been committed by the insurgents; and to urge the impolicy of creating a spirit of bitterness amongst the Polish inhabitants of the province by bringing forward such assertions in the garb of official accusations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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† Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

*Proclamation to the Inhabitants of the Province of Posen.*

(Translation).

THE armed insurrection which has broken out in the Kingdom of Poland against the lawful authority of the Government has changed our immediate neighbourhood into a theatre of bloody events; but whilst the cruelties perpetrated by the insurgents inspire the greatest horror, they at the same time afford the certainty that this criminal undertaking will bring about the destruction of those whose fanaticism has made them partakers in it.

Inhabitants of the province of Posen! We can indulge in the confident hope that the public peace will not be broken in any portion of the province. Our guarantees for this are the sense for order which animates the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants; the watchfulness of the public organs, which are called upon to be beforehand with any intended breach of the peace; and lastly, the power given to us by His Majesty, and which, should the event require it, we will use to the very utmost in the maintenance of quiet and order.

We cannot, however, but entertain the fear that attempts will be made to seduce individual inhabitants of the province to a participation in the insurrectionary movement of the neighbouring country; a participation which, if even only an indirect one, but substantiated by any public manifestation, or by any act of support or assistance of whatever kind, would have to be regarded (considering the notorious tendencies of the insurrection), as an undertaking against the laws of this country (*i. e.*, Prussia), and might therefore involve the heavy penalties of treason.

We hold it, therefore, to be our duty to warn all inhabitants against taking any part in the insurrection, &c.

*Posen, February 1, 1863.*

(Signed)

COUNT WALDERSEE,  
*General in command of 5th Army Corps.*  
*HORN, President of the Province of Posen.*

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† Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

*Interpellation of MM. Kantak and Chlapowski, supported by several Members of the Party of Progress.*

(Translation).

THE following proclamation has been issued in connexion with the late events in the Kingdom of Poland by the President of the Grand Duchy of Posen, conjointly with the Military Governor (here follows the proclamations; see Inclosure 1).



Every one is of course free to pass what judgment he pleases on passing events, on their causes, their objects, and their character; still less can the right be disputed on the part of the Administration to warn the inhabitants of the country of the consequences resulting from illegal acts.

On the present occasion, however, it is pre-eminently the unusual form (that, namely, of the Civil Head of the Administration calling upon the Chief Military functionary to countersign his proclamation) which excites apprehension, as if the Grand Duchy of Posen already found itself in an exceptional state, with a prospect of further exceptional measures. This apprehension is confirmed and intensified in the first place by the above-named authorities, in a threatening manner, invoking „the power in their hands“ rather than the laws, and in the next place by the declaration, repugnant to the Criminal Code of Prussia, that every participation in the events taking place in the neighbouring country, even „of an indirect kind“, is to be considered as an undertaking against the laws of the country, and therefore capable of drawing down on the offender the heavy penalties of high treason.

Nor can the warning expressed in this proclamation be considered from its general tone as a well-meaning one. For when the President and the Military Governor of the Grand Duchy speak in one and the same Proclamation of the „notorious tendency“ of the insurrection, and describe the same, in spite of the first accounts having been either contradicted or not confirmed, as „inspiring horror by the atrocities that have been committed“, it cannot have escaped them that, regard being had to the deep sympathy which those events necessarily excite amongst the entire Polish population, an official accusation of this kind thoughtlessly brought forward, and misrepresenting the character of the movement, is adapted to embitter and wound a portion of the population of the Grand Duchy, and to disquiet the other.

Moved by these considerations, the Undersigned ask the following questions of the Government: —

1. Whether, and since when, the Grand Duchy of Posen has been subjected to the exceptional state of a combined civil and military administration?

2. Whether the Government approves of the form and contents of the Proclamation of the 1st of February?

*Berlin, February 7, 1863.*

(Signed)

KANTAK.  
VON CHLAPOWSKI.  
&c. &c.

† No. 38.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 16).*

(No. 84).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 14, 1863.*

THE conclusion of the Military Convention with Prussia, referred to in my despatch No. 73. of this date, and the rumoured intention of the Government to enter into further

engagements with Russia for the repression of insurrectionary movements in the Polish provinces of Prussia and Russia, has given great dissatisfaction to the public, who are said to apprehend a restoration of the Russian influences which prevailed at Berlin previously to the war of the Crimea.

It is not impossible, however, that the principal object of the Government in giving military importance as regards Prussia to what is passing in the Kingdom of Poland, is to find a reasonable pretext for increasing the expenditure of the army, in opposition to any vote which may take place in the Chamber of Deputies with a view to reducing the army Estimates for the year, which are based on the plan, rejected last Session, for the re-organization of the army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 39.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 17).*

(No. 79).

My Lord,

*Vienna, February 14, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, an article from the „Botschafter“ of this morning, with a translation by Mr. Mounsey, which has been called forth by the Military Convention lately concluded between Prussia and Russia, with a view to the suppression of the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland.

It is remarkable as pointing out the relative positions and different policy of Austria and Prussia in this question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† Inclosure in No. 39.

*Extract from the „Botschafter“ of February 14, 1863.*

(Translation).

WHILE we hear that Prussia, without being necessitated thereto as yet by the bearing of her Polish subjects, has agreed to assist Russia in suppressing the insurrection in Russian Poland, it is counted as a crime against Austria by certain parties that she has not hastened to offer similar assistance. We are not yet acquainted with the text of the Russian circular note addressed to Austria in this sense. We believe it to be an indirect accusation of the latter, and even Prussian journals denounce to the world as unnatural the sympathy which the Liberal party in Austria is supposed to entertain towards the revolted Poles.

We might confine ourselves to answering these absurdities by saying that the accusation made against Austria on this subject by Prussia and Russia are the greatest services

that could be rendered to her. For in this, as in most other questions, we desire to have nothing in common either with Russia or with Prussia under her present régime.

The question is, however, too serious to be answered by the above remark. It is ridiculous to suppose or to give oneself the appearance of supposing that Austria — even the Liberal Austria of the day — takes part with the revolution wherever it be, far or near.

In the American civil war, in exciting which Russian agents gave considerable assistance, Austria declared herself without hesitation for the cause of legitimate government. How, then, could she be favourable to a revolution which is going on at her doors? And it is not to be supposed her Government required to be enlightened by the Berlin papers as to the complications which might arise from the Polish insurrection. No, because Austria has become liberal and constitutional, she has not become revolutionary. On the contrary, the constitutional course which she has adopted now necessitates a really conservative policy, combining reform, gradual development, and a solution of inherited evils. Whatever may be the opinion of our statesmen on the Polish question, for the existence of which Austria can least of all be accused, its solution by revolutionary means is neither the wish nor the interest of Austria. But nothing can be more ridiculous than to suppose that Austria, without regard to her own interests, will play the part of Russian guardian when we consider that insurrection has been excited and spurred on against her in every quarter; that Russia and Prussia have recognized a kingdom sprung from the robbery of Austrian territory; that Prussia, in mockery of her own origin and composition, has sought to turn the principle of nationalities against Austria by endeavouring to drive the latter out of the Confederation as a non-German power; and that very lately Russia has done everything in her power to excite revolt on the Lower Danube, in the hope that by its reaction in the neighbouring provinces of Austria the peace of the empire would be seriously menaced.

If we would express the feelings which prevail in Austria with reference to the Poles, we should be guilty of an untruth were we to maintain that we do not wish them success. We speak of the feelings expressed in private and social life. It would be unnatural were it otherwise. But political education has made such progress with us that no one, not even the Poles themselves, can expect our Government to sacrifice to a sentimental policy the first conditions of our existence as a State.

Austria, however, has a right to protest before Poland and the world against the share ascribed to her in the iniquitous deed of partition. She has done whatever she could, and she will continue to strive against adding bad to evil. She will endeavour by means of a liberal and humane Government to ameliorate the condition of the Austrian Poles, to save them from entering on rash and foolish enterprises, and from a darker fate; the rest she will leave to Providence, and though reproach may be cast on her for so doing, we are sure that a vast majority of the Austrian people will applaud her policy.

No Austrian can for a moment entertain the thought of another holy alliance with Prussia and Russia, with Bismarck and Gortchakoff.

As however, Prussia is a part of Germany, we regret the view which she appears to have taken on the Polish question, and from which no good will accrue to her.

† No. 40.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 18).*

(No. 81).

My Lord,

Vienna, February 15, 1863.

MANY false statements having appeared in foreign journals with the apparent object of misrepresenting the policy of Austria on the Polish question, it has been deemed advisable by the Imperial Government to insert in their semi-official journal the „Donau Zeitung“, a formal denial of these statements.

I have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information a translation of this article by Mr. Barrington.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† Inclosure in No. 40.

*Extract from the „Donau Zeitung“ of February 14, 1863.*

(Translation).

IN consequence of the events passing in Russian Poland, reports have been thrust upon the world by several foreign newspapers, which, being completely untrue, only have the effect, either intentionally or unintentionally, of damaging the position of Austria in that quarter.

Thus, among other instances, the „Breslau Journal“ of the 12th of this month, under the pretext of a warning against some pretended telegrams to which an official Austrian origin is ascribed, publishes a correspondence from Warsaw, to the effect that „the Austrian Government had sold some thousands of arms out of the arsenal in Lemberg, and had otherwise surreptitiously abetted the revolution“.

We are authorized to state that this report, both as regards the sale of arms, the accusation of secret aid afforded to the revolution, and also the publication of the telegrams in question, is purely fictitious.

We are inclined to put into the same category of purposely senseless discoveries other rumours also, and specially those which go so far as to raise conjectures about the occupation of the „Polish Throne“.

No. 41.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(No. 42).

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 18, 1863.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 84 of the 14th instant, giving the probable reasons for the conclusion of the Military Convention between Prussia and Russia with reference to the present insurrection in Poland.

Is it not possible that in this Convention with Russia M. de Bismarck looks to the contingency of his requiring the aid of Russian troops to put down the Liberal majority in Prussia?

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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† No. 42.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 18).*

(No. 85).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 16, 1863.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 74. of the 14th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Colonel Treschow, a Prussian officer, has left Berlin for Warsaw, where he will be attached to the head-quarters of the Russian army, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Military Convention which has been signed between the Governments of Prussia and Russia, respecting the measures to be taken in concert by the military authorities on the frontiers of their respective Polish provinces for the suppression of insurrectionary movements.

Colonel Reuter, a Russian officer who has arrived here, is supposed to be charged with a similar mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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† No. 43.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(No. 43).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 18, 1863.*

IN reply to your despatch No. 85. of the 16th instant, mentioning the nomination of Commissioners for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Military Convention between Russia and Prussia for the suppression of the insurrection in Poland, I have to instruct you to endeavour to procure and transmit to Her Majesty's Government a copy of the Convention in question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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No. 44.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 18).*

(No. 194. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 17, 1863.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had lately with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and during which the state of Poland was adverted to, his Excellency said, that whatever

the natural sympathy the Emperor might feel for the Polish cause, his Majesty was determined to give no encouragement to the insurgents, and to take no step which might be construed into an act of an unfriendly nature towards Russia. At the same time his Excellency could assure me that there was no truth in any of the reports prevalent, that there existed any engagement between His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, by which His Majesty was bound to leave the Poles to their fate. The Emperor was perfectly free to act as he might please, and as events might render necessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 45.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 19).*

(Telegraphic).

*Warsaw, February 19, 1863.*

INFORMATION received here that Langiewicz, with 3,500 insurgents, has taken refuge in Galicia.

No. 46.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received February 20).*

(Telegraphic).

*Warsaw, February 20, 1863.*

FURTHER reports received; Langiewicz still in Poland. Insurgents who retired into Galicia were remnant of band defeated nearer Cracow.

No. 47.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 20, 1863.*

HAS any account been received at Vienna that Langiewicz, with 3,500 Polish insurgents, has taken refuge in Galicia?

No. 48.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 20).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, February 20, 1863.*

UP to 6 p. m. no official account received of Langiewicz's retreat on Austrian territory. He is supposed to have been defeated and his followers dispersed.

† No. 49.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell — (Received February 21).*

(No. 12).

My Lord,

Warsaw, February 17, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship a translation of an order of His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine addressed to the troops in this kingdom, which appeared in the official „Gazette“ of last evening, and which it is hoped may put a stop to the excesses of which the troops are accused.

I beg also to forward to your Lordship a translation of an order from the Military Chief of the Warsaw Department, which appeared in the same „Gazette“.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† Inclosure in No. 49.

*Extract from the Warsaw „Gazette“ of February 16, 1863.**Order of His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine.*

(Translation).

HIS Imperial Highness the Grand Duke, Namiestnik of the kingdom, has been pleased to issue the following order to the troops quartered in the Kingdom of Poland, under date of the  $\frac{2nd}{14th}$  instant: —

„I desire all the Chiefs of military detachments to preserve the strictest discipline in the ranks, and to be careful of their conduct. Soldiers guilty of pillaging or of committing acts of violence towards peaceable inhabitants, who have not participated in the rebellion, shall be punished with the utmost severity of the Military Criminal Laws“.

*Order of the Military Chief of the Warsaw Department.*

With a view to secure the tranquillity of Warsaw and to give protection against the machinations of the evil-disposed who spread alarm, His Imperial Highness the Namiestnik has been pleased to authorize the following rules: —

1. A renewal of the prohibition of having any kind of arms or powder in the possession of persons not having permissions to that effect: all persons who have delayed conforming to this rule may avoid responsibility by delivering them to the proper police authorities within forty-eight hours, *i. e.*, before the 19th instant, after which date persons having any arms, warlike instruments, or powder in their possession are punishable by martial law, according to Articles 261 and 262 of the Code, as guilty of acts of rebellion.

2. Holders or distributors of seditious placards or printed matter will likewise be punished by courts-martial as rebels.

3. It is prohibited to all persons, without special permission, to be in the streets after 10 o'clock at night, or to appear in the streets without a lantern after 7 P. M. Offenders against this or other military rules will be apprehended and punished.

4. In cases of alarm in town all persons are to retire from the streets, the doors and gates of the houses are to be properly closed, and persons remaining in the streets are exposed to the dangers attending military operations.

5. In cases where a house may be occupied by insurgents, or shots fired from its windows, that house will be forthwith destroyed by artillery.

In bringing the above rules to the knowledge of the public, I invite all peaceable inhabitants not to allow themselves to be alarmed by false rumours, as energetic measures have been adopted to stop any attempt at disorder or insurrection. The troops under my command, whilst ready to act against the disturbers of the peace, will understand how to perform their duty, and at the same time to protect the lives and property of the peaceable inhabitants.

General Aide-de-camp,  
(Signed) · BARON KORFF.

† No. 50.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 21).*

(No. 206).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 20, 1863.*

BEFORE this despatch can reach your Lordship, Baron Gros will, no doubt, have communicated to you one addressed yesterday by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to himself on the present state of affairs in Poland. In this despatch, which the French Minister has just been good enough to read to me, his Excellency gives an account of the communications which have been made to him by the Representatives of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, from the two first, with reference to the Convention lately signed at St. Petersburg; from the last, explaining the attitude taken by the Austrian Government.

It would be needless, even if I had the time before the departure of the messenger, to go into the details of this despatch, since it will be communicated to your Lordship. I will merely state, that while the position of the Russian Government in a part of whose dominions the insurrection which has led to the Convention exists, induces M. Drouyn de Lhuys to abstain from expressing any opinion upon that document, his Excellency reminds the Russian Government of the engagements under which the partition of Poland was reluctantly consented to by the other Powers, parties to the Treaty of Vienna: he calls attention to the sympathy which the cause of Poland has ever excited in France, and he expresses the hope that the Russian Government may be enabled, by prudent and conciliatory measures, to allay the agitation before it gains proportions that may become alarming to Russia herself, to France, and to Europe.



From the Prussian Government, M. Drouyn de Lhuys does not conceal the opinion that the signature of the St. Petersburg Convention is, on the part of Prussia, a grave political fault. She has thereby assumed that local disturbances in that part of Poland which belongs to Russia involves the whole Polish question — for, according to the accounts received by the French Government, the Duchy of Posen is in the enjoyment of complete tranquillity — and she thus makes herself responsible for the acts of the Russian Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys contrasts the conduct of Austria with that of Prussia in a favourable light to the former, founding his opinion on the communications made to him by Prince Metternich.

His Excellency then observes that he has reason to know that the same communications from the three Governments have been made to your Lordship, and that he believes that the conduct of Prussia has called forth your remonstrances. He ends by expressing the wish to know the sentiments and opinions of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 51.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 21).*

(No. 207. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 20, 1863.*

IN my preceding despatch I have given your Lordship but a short and hurried account of the despatch which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has addressed to Baron Gros with reference to the affairs of Poland, in order that I might have time to state to your Lordship in greater detail the observations to me with which his Excellency accompanied the perusal of it.

He said that his despatch to Baron Gros contained the substance of three despatches which he had addressed to St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna, after they had received the Emperor's sanction, and that His Majesty was exceedingly desirous to consult with Her Majesty's Government as to the propriety of taking some step in common with reference to the St. Petersburg Convention. Should Her Majesty's Government think that a joint remonstrance should be made to the Russian and Prussian Governments, he could state at once that the Imperial Government would be ready to adopt that course, and to concert the terms and form of it with Her Majesty's Government; but he asked himself whether an attempt should not be made to induce Austria to join with England and France in the remonstrance, and thus, as it were, to break up the coalition against the liberties of Poland. The case might be placed before the Austrian Government in a manner which would not alarm them: they may be simply asked to invoke with England and France the due observance of the Treaties of 1815 with regard to Poland, and an opportunity might thus be afforded to her of repairing a grievous wrong by restoring

the city and territory of Cracow to the independence of which, at the instigation of Russia, she had deprived them; nay — England, France, and Austria agreed — an appeal might be made to Prussia to stand by the Treaties of 1815, and some hope might be entertained of at length securing to Poland that independence and national administration to which she had a right.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to assure me that the Emperor had no desire or wish to obtain more for Poland than Treaties assigned to her; but it was not to be endured, he said, that the Polish question should be revived every ten years to unsettle men's minds and menace the tranquility of Europe.

Without, as it seemed to me, altogether excluding the possibility of war, were the present state of things to continue, M. Drouyn de Lhuys declared that war was far from the Emperor's thoughts. His Majesty had arrived, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at an age when corporal activity begins to fail; it would not suit him to take the field himself, still less would he like to leave the glory of leading his armies to victory to others. Then again he was hampered by other questions, such as Rome, Mexico, Cochin China, which deprived him of a part of his military resources; in short, it was not war that His Majesty looked to, but a peaceable return to the engagements of 1815. It surely was some gain to others that the Emperor should invoke the fulfilment of those Treaties.

Such, my Lord, is a summary, as far as time will allow me to give it, of a very animated and, I must add, interesting exposition by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of the Emperor's views with regard to Poland. On so grave a matter I, of course, avoided any expression of opinion beyond a general assent to the moderation of His Majesty's views, and to the good which would result could they be carried into execution. I asked whether Baron Gros had been charged to speak upon the subject to your Lordship. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that as yet he had neither written nor spoken to any one but myself, but that he would, if I thought it advisable, write to Baron Gros. The Emperor's desire was to act on the Polish question in complete unison with Her Majesty's Government.

I answered that I thought his Excellency would do well to explain himself on a matter of such importance fully and unreservedly to the French representative in London, and I believe that he will do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

† No. 52.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 271).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 21, 1863.*

THE French Ambassador has just called upon me to say that the Government of the Emperor, although not in possession of the text of the Convention between Russia and Prussia, know enough of its purport to form an opinion unfavourable to the prudence and opportunity of that Convention.

The French Government consider that the Government of the King of Prussia have by their conduct revived the Polish question. They consider this measure all the more imprudent inasmuch as the Polish Provinces of Prussia are represented [here] as perfectly tranquil.

The French Government consider also that the Government of Russia should be advised to appease irritation, and calm the discontent prevailing by measures of conciliation and mildness.

The French Ambassador has no orders to propose any concert with the British Government, but he is instructed to ask whether the views which he had explained were conformable to those entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

I informed him that Her Majesty's Government entertained precisely the views which he had explained on the part of his Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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No. 53.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 21).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, February 21, 1863.*

RECHBERG has no news of decisive character from Poland.

His accounts leads to expectation that Russia will soon master the insurrection. Many refugees have come over.

No proposition from Russia. Prussian Minister here has sounded Rechberg as to joining in a Convention. His Excellency has declined. Says to do so would be wilfully to provoke insurrection in Galicia.

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No. 54.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(No. 43).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 21, 1863.*

I AGREE with your Excellency in the observations contained in your despatch No 75 of the 7th instant, with reference to the apology published in the official Gazette for the arbitrary method of recruiting adopted in Poland by the Russian Government.

No argument can make it right to turn conscription into proscription, and to condemn men to military service because they are suspected of revolutionary designs. The security of innocence is thus at one blow destroyed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

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No. 55.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 22, 1863.*

AUSTRIA has acted very wisely in declining the Prussian overtures respecting Poland.

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No. 56.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 23).*

(No. 213. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 22, 1863.*

COUNT GOLTZ, the Prussian Ambassador, was at my house last night, and, having expressed a wish to speak to me upon Polish affairs, a conversation of some length took place between us, the purport of which I make no apology for communicating to your Lordship in the present state of those matters.

The object which Count Goltz no doubt had in view was to ascertain whether any understanding existed between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor with regard to the course which both would pursue. He asked me then whether I could inform him of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government in regard to what was passing in Poland.

I replied that I had received no instructions from your Lordship, but that he must be well aware that in a country constituted as was England, such a Convention as was reported to have been signed between Prussia and Russia at St. Petersburg, must excite disapprobation, if not indignation, not only in the minds of public men, but of the nation at large.

Count Goltz replied that he was prepared to hear this, and he then asked me what I thought would be the conduct of the French Government.

I rejoined that I would not conceal from him, and probably he knew it himself, that the St. Petersburg Convention had caused great irritation. Both the Emperor and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I said, had spoken to me concerning it in a manner which showed that they were deeply offended at it. It had been the most unwise measure on the part of the Prussian Government, I added; for there could be no doubt, that the French people had become indifferent to the Polish question, and that the present insurrection would have excited but little sympathy had Russia been left to deal with it alone, but the imprudent conduct of Prussia had again aroused a public feeling in favour of the Poles, which might assume a more dangerous form were the presumed stipulations of the Convention to be acted upon. In fact, I allowed Count Goltz to see that I did not conceive war to be altogether impossible, if the Prussian Government did not act with the greatest circumspection.

Count Goltz said that this was the opinion which he had himself formed, and which he had communicated to his Government. He argued, however, that there would be no display of public opinion in this country unless excited and fomented by the Government. I replied that on most questions this would be true. There were, however, certain matters on which the country might feel very strongly, and on which the Government might think it imprudent to exercise any control over that feeling. The interference of any foreign Government to aid Russia in subjugating the Poles was one of these.

Count Goltz then confessed that he considered his Government to have committed a grave political error, but he said that it was his duty, as the King's representative, to make the best defence for him that he could. With this view he had seen the Emperor on the previous day, and after adverting to the language of the Government press in Paris, and to other manifestations of disapprobation of his Government, he had communicated confidentially to His Majesty the text of the St. Petersburg Convention, and had endeavoured to show that it was not likely that it could ever be acted upon. The Emperor, Count Goltz continued, had been courteous but cautious in his replies. His Majesty expressed regret that the Prussian Government, with which he was sincerely desirous of maintaining the most friendly relations, should have taken a step which his Majesty could not approve; and with regard to the Convention not receiving its execution, the Emperor observed that the principle remained on record, whether executed or not.

Some conversation then ensued between His Majesty and Count Goltz as to whether the Convention should be officially communicated to the French Government or not, the Emperor finally requesting that nothing might be done for the present. Count Goltz inquired my opinion upon this point, and I represented to him that the official communication to foreign Governments of the Convention would only involve his Government still further. Would it not be possible rather to let it drop altogether by making some sort of declaration, such as that the Convention had been concluded in the first moment of alarm, and in a hurry, when it was supposed that the insurrection had gained greater proportions than had since proved to be the case, and that it was no longer needed? Count Goltz said that he hoped that something of the kind might be possible.

The only other observation of importance which Count Goltz made during the conversation, was to the effect that Prussia never would consent to the erection of Poland into an independent Kingdom. I said that she had a right to so much independence as had been secured to her by Treaty.

Count Goltz is certainly alarmed at what is passing here. It is as well that he should be so, and therefore, while expressing to him my conviction that the Emperor has no desire to quarrel with Prussia or to go to war, I have equally told him that he may depend on one thing — that His Majesty will never permit a slight (even if only presumed on his part) on the French nation to pass unnoticed; and that I conceive that any active co-operation on the part of the Prussian Government to put down the insurrection in Russian Poland will be considered as a slight, and resented accordingly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 57.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 23).*

(No. 214).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 22, 1863.*

IT having been currently reported last night that the Emperor had determined on concentrating a corps of observation towards the Rhine, I wrote this morning to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, to inquire whether there was any foundation for the report, and I desired Colonel Claremont to make inquiries on his part.

The latter has informed me that from such intelligence as he can obtain on a Sunday, he is not inclined to believe that any movement of the kind is contemplated. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has replied that he is not in a position to answer my question to-day, but that he hopes to be able to do so to-morrow.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 58.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 23).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, February 23, 1863, 4 p. m.*

DESPATCHES go to Baron Gros to-night, with the draft of a note which it is proposed the French and English, and if possible the Austrian, Governments should address to the Cabinet of Berlin.

† No. 59.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 78).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 10, 1863.*

I REGRET that I omitted, by yesterday's messenger, to report to your Lordship the arrival at this place of General Alvensleben, a Prussian officer charged with the duty of concerting measures for the repression of the Polish insurrection, which, in one case at least, has crossed the borders of the Grand Duchy of Posen.

I learn that General Alvensleben has signed an Engagement or Convention with the Russian military authorities, by which the Imperial forces are permitted to proceed against fugitive insurgents across the Prussian boundary. A similar freedom is stipulated for the Prussian army on the territory of Russia.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 60.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 79).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 13, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a file of the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“, from the 9th to the 13th instant, containing the successive reports published by this Government of the operations in Poland.

From these fragmentary accounts it is difficult to deduce any distinct impression of the posture of affairs, or the forces of the insurrection. Some incredulity has been excited here by the high statements of the losses experienced by the patriots compared with those suffered by the Imperial troops. It is, indeed, difficult to believe that a thousand Poles were slaughtered in one affair by the Russian soldiers, with the loss on their side of twelve men; and if it be true, it does not reflect any credit on the humanity of the army. We may, however, believe that there is a very great disparity of loss between the two parties, for besides the advantage of possessing artillery, the Russians are armed with good rifled muskets, which have a deadly effect at 600 yards, while the insurgents have, for the most part, only fowling-pieces, a few revolvers, pikes, scythes, and other rustic weapons. They may be shot down in perfect security by the regular forces.

The losses of the army will probably chiefly occur by typhus fever and other maladies in their country quarters.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 61.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 83).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 13, 1863.*

IN my despatch to your Lordship No. 75 of the 7th February, I reported to your Lordship that several Cavalry regiments were under orders to repair to Poland. I learn that this force may be estimated at about 2,500 men.

The second division of the Imperial Guards is also directed to march in the same direction. I believe, however, that the Guards will not for the present go beyond Wilna, and that the troops stationed at Wilna will be pushed forward into the Kingdom.

A battery of artillery of eight guns will accompany the second division.

The proper strength of an Infantry division of the Guards on the peace footing would be about 9,200 men. I am told, however, that owing to the weakness of the battalions at this moment, the division referred to would not yield more than 7,500 efficient combatants.



Should this be the case, the reinforcements ordered to Poland or its vicinity since the commencement of the present outbreak would amount to about 10,000 men in all.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 62.

*Consul-General Crowe to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 4).

My Lord,

*Leipzig, February 18, 1863.*

THE progress and development of the Polish outbreak have been watched by the German public with great and absorbing interest; and I think it my duty to lay before your Lordship what seem to me the prevalent views on the subject. And first, I should state that that class of democratic politicians, all-powerful in the period of 1848–50, who fought for every liberty irrespective of its conditions as affecting international relations, is at the present time reduced to a very small number in Germany. In Berlin, perhaps, the fraction of ultra-progressists, led by M. Waldeck, may still preserve some remnants of that enthusiasm which hails the assertion of its rights by an oppressed people as a fit object of public support from brethren in other lands: but the great majority of Prussian as of German party in general looks at politics in a more national aspect; and thus whilst ready to admit that the Russian administration in Poland has dealt hardly with the Polish nationality, it coolly calculates the effect of the present movement upon the development of Germany. The National Verein, by its organisation, has tended materially to this change in the state of German public opinion; and its leaders having had in previous years more than one occasion of referring publicly to the Polish question, have never hesitated to declare that whatever might have been the original cause of the partition of Poland, the deed itself having been accomplished, was not now to be altered. Relying on Prussia as the power that was one day to lead regenerated Germany, they denied the right of the Poles to hope that Posen should ever form part again of a non-German territory.

It is quite clear, however, that the holding of this opinion does not exclude a strong belief in the impolicy of affording to Russia direct assistance in putting down the Polish movement; and so soon as rumour established the fact that Prussia and Russia had signed a Convention conceding to the latter the right of remaining in arms in pursuit of insurgents on a strip of frontier extending fifteen miles into Prussia, there was but one voice amongst the liberal press and liberal men to the effect that the policy which dictated that concession was of a dubious and unsatisfactory character. When rumour went so far as to affirm the existence of a formal alliance between the two Powers for the suppression of the Polish movement, there was but one voice to affirm that if it were so, this was a bad and incorrect policy; and no doubt such a policy would be rejected by the Prussian Chamber, with all Germany to support its protest.



The liberal leaders in Germany are, however, not without anxiety as to the state of Poland, which they describe as disturbed by a double revolutionary movement. The party at present in arms is that of the middle classes and small landed proprietors, impatient of oppression and panting for revenge of its sufferings. That party is not likely, they think, to succeed; though, in the movement which it has made, the weakness of Russia has been conspicuously exposed. Another party, at the head of which stands Count Wielopolski, meditates the regeneration of Poland under a King, who shall be the present Grand Duke Constantine. It is affirmed that the high personage just mentioned is cognizant of the sympathies and desires in his favour, and that certain measures, such as the re-establishment of the use of the Polish language in Government orders and administrative acts, were forerunners of the proposed change. This party, according to the views of most of the German liberal leaders, is the really dangerous one for Prussia, and one which may, after the present movement is put down, cause Germany a great deal of trouble.

As regards Posen, it is the general belief here, in spite of M. von Bismarck's pretended knowledge of ramifications of insurgent plans in that province — a pretence which is meant to excuse the display of military force and justify the military re-organisation measure — it is the general belief that no movement is intended; but that, on the contrary, Posen will be kept quiet as a safe refuge for the malecontents of Poland in the event of a failure of their enterprise, as it is at present a refuge for their wives and children, and depôt for their spare treasure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. A. CROWE.

No. 63.

*Mr. Murray to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 7).

My Lord,

*Dresden, February 20, 1863.*

I HAVE forwarded to your Lordship by this messenger a despatch sent to me under flying seal by Her Majesty's Consul-General at Leipzig, in which he details the prevalent views of the German public on the subject of the Polish insurrection. Mr. Crowe has, doubtless, at Leipzig better opportunities for ascertaining the sentiments and objects of the National Verein and of the extreme Liberal party than I have in this capital. That they should view with dissatisfaction a direct interference on the part of Prussia to assist Russia in putting down the insurrection is perfectly natural, and is accordingly set forth in all the organs of the press which represent their sentiments; but it certainly argues very little in favour of their liberal principles if (as Mr. Crowe represents them), „they have never hesitated to declare that whatever might have been the original cause of the partition of Poland, the deed itself having been accomplished, is not now to be altered“; and if „they deny the right of the Poles to hope that Posen should ever again form part of a non-German territory“. A party adopting a programme so selfish, illiberal,

and inconsistent as this, is certainly most unfit to set itself up as the champion of liberty and progress in Central Europe. Whatever may be the opinion entertained of the Convention said to have been signed between Russia and Prussia, there is no doubt that the latter is obliged in self-defence to concentrate a considerable military force on the Polish frontier. „Jam proximus ardet Ucalegon“; and recent accounts describe Posen as being by no means so quiet or safe as it was supposed to be.

The Liberal leaders in Germany are represented in Mr. Crowe's despatch as limiting the present insurrectionary movement in Poland „to the middle classes and small landed proprietors“; but this limitation is no longer correct, for your Lordship must be, ere this, aware that independently of the students and the clergy, great numbers of the Poles of the higher classes from London, from Paris, and other parts of Europe, have for some time past been flocking to the scene of action.

It now appears that the outbreak, precipitated by the harsh measures accompanying the recruitment, took the leaders of both parties by surprise; so that if, on the one hand, the plans of the revolutionists were not matured, on the other, the dispersal of the Russian troops at the time, and the state of the roads rendering the movement of troops, otherwise than by railway, almost impracticable, showed that they were equally unprepared for so early an insurrection.

What ground the German Liberals have for attributing to Marquis Wielopolski the project of establishing a Polish monarchy under the Grand Duke Constantine, I have no means of ascertaining.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CH. A. MURRAY.

No. 64.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 87. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, February 18, 1863.*

AFTER the Emperor had spoken as reported in my previous despatch No. 86 of this date, His Imperial Majesty made particular inquiries as to the health of Her Majesty the Queen, and asked several questions respecting the approaching marriage of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. His Imperial Majesty then made some general observations on the important political questions of the day. He said nothing that betrayed the existence of the least difference of opinion between himself and Count Rechberg; on the contrary, every expression of His Imperial Majesty went to prove that he attended closely to the affairs connected with the Foreign Department, and that His Imperial Majesty and his Minister were perfectly agreed, and I was anxious to satisfy myself on this point, as I had heard rumours of some differences of opinion existing between them.

With respect to the late ministerial difficulties at Constantinople, the Emperor endeavoured to make great allowances for the inexperience of the Sultan. His Imperial Majesty thought he meant well, but that he was especially ill-served in the Provinces, and that if reforms were not speedily introduced there serious troubles would arise. He alluded to the Principalities and to the arms question, and spoke with great satisfaction of the good understanding which generally prevailed between his Agents and those of Her Majesty in Turkey, and of his earnest wish that Austria and England may continue to pursue a common policy in the East. His Imperial Majesty spoke of the difficulty of obtaining any co-operation from the French Government, and of their more than doubtful proceedings at Constantinople on the question of sending a Turkish Commissioner to Bucharest.

With regard to Poland, the Emperor seemed to think the movement would not be soon put down. The Russian Government had certainly collected a large force, but it could not be employed in masses: he thought their object was to drive the rebels together, so that a blow might be struck at once; that up to the present time the rebels were dispersed, and acting in so many places that it was impossible to divide the troops sufficiently to attack them with any certainty of success. Much time, he feared, would be still required before the insurrection was quelled.

I congratulated His Imperial Majesty on the comparatively quiet state of Galicia. His Majesty said the rural population were behaving very well there; he should be much gratified if they continued to do so, and that no augmentation of troops were required: but the fever might spread, and greater precaution become necessary.

His Imperial Majesty thought the effect of the insurrection in Poland would be felt in Servia and Moldo-Wallachia, and might perhaps have a beneficial influence in showing that Russia had her hands full and could assist nobody at this moment, and that, consequently, these small vassal States of Turkey, who were looking to Russia for a signal to revolt, might be disappointed this time; but he still feared matters were so far advanced that early danger was to be apprehended.

His Imperial Majesty alluded to the large Prussian force that had been collected and called into activity, but made no remarks on the Military Convention lately concluded between Prussia and Russia, and was cautious in giving any opinions, being apparently under the impression that some embarrassing communication on the subject was likely soon to be made to the Imperial Government from Prussia or Russia, or perhaps from both.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

†† No. 65.

*Sir A. Malet to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 20. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Frankfort, February 20, 1863.*

[M. DE DALWIGK was good enough yesterday to let me read a despatch just received from the Hesse-Darmstadt Representative at Vienna, from which I quote the following passage relating to the Convention between Russia and Prussia for suppression of the Polish insurrection: —

„I have just been allowed to see an official telegram from St. Petersburg, with details of the Convention, in which I find the following paragraph:

„In the interest of the service of the Post Office, Customs, and Deposits of Public Funds, the forces of either State shall be authorised to pursue insurgent bands on the territory of the neighbouring Kingdom or Empire (as the case may be), until they meet with a sufficient force of that State on which the operation takes place]<sup>“1</sup>.

I may very confidently assure your Lordship that the conduct of Prussia in respect to the Polish insurrection is generally condemned in Germany.

Had the Prussian Government confined itself to securing tranquility in Posen, no grounds for censuring such precaution could have been found; but M. de Bismarck is accused of thrusting unsolicited and, in fact, unwelcome assistance on the Russian Government, and the cry of reprobation is all but universal.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 66.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 90. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 20, 1863.*

THE following statement, which I have directly from a member of the Left Centre of the Second Chamber, who was himself present at the private meeting of the fraction at which the information was communicated, is not a little characteristic of the unguarded language in which the Minister President sometimes indulges, and of the strange footing upon which he has placed himself with some of the most prominent members of the Opposition that is so hostile to him.

My informant told me that M. de Bismarck had, at the Crown Prince's ball last Saturday, in a conversation with M. Behrend, one of the leading spokesmen of the Opposition, declared that the objects of the Convention concluded with Russia was twofold: — 1. To establish a belt of territory composed of three German miles (fifteen En-

<sup>1</sup> The first three paragraphs are not in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

glish) of Prussian territory, and of a like number of miles of Russo-Polish territory, upon which the troops of the two Contracting Parties might indiscriminately act against the insurgents. 2. In the event of the insurrection growing to unmanageable proportions, to allow of the Prussians marching into the Kingdom of Poland, and occupying it militarily.

With regard to the latter stipulation M. de Bismarck added, „If this eventuality takes place, it is not unlikely that a permanent occupation would be the result. I know the terrain at St. Petersburg very well, and I have reason to think that Russia would not at all be unwilling to get rid of Poland if it were only placed in safe hands. In such an event Poland, however, would not be governed as a province of Prussia, but be erected into a separate kingdom, joined with Prussia by a personal union only“.

The statement so made was announced to the member of the Left Centre by its President, M. Bockum-Dollfs, in a private meeting of the fraction held last night.

It was resolved that measures should be taken to prevent its getting prematurely into publicity, probably with a view to encourage the Minister President in making more disclosures of this kind. The prevailing opinion, however, seemed to be to disbelieve the statement made by M. de Bismarck as to the provisions of the Convention; and the idea entertained was, that he had meant it either as a feeler to the supposed ambition of the Liberal party, or as a snare by which he might entrap them to a violent attack upon a man of straw, and then hold them up to ridicule for this attack.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

†† No. 67.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 92).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 21, 1863.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 43 of the 18th instant, instructing me to endeavour to procure a copy of the Military Convention lately concluded between Prussia and Russia, I have the honour to inform you that M. de Bismarck says he will communicate the Convention to me as soon as he shall receive the consent of Russia to its being made public, [for which he has applied]<sup>1</sup>. In a conversation which I had with him yesterday, I observed that, with a view to the interest of Prussia, the least possible delay should take place in the publication of the Convention, if it only contains the provisions which he represents it to do; for it is now generally believed that Prussia has entered into arrangements with Russia for mutually assisting each other in repressing all popular movements within their respective territories, and this suspicion has created a most unfavourable feeling towards Prussia throughout Western Europe.

His Excellency replied that a portion of the English and French Press, hostile to Prussia, and the whole Press of Denmark and Austria, had seized upon the Convention

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

to calumniate Prussia; but whoever would consider the circumstances dispassionately and impartially would easily satisfy himself that the Prussian Government had done no more than was necessary for the maintenance of tranquility, and the protection of the population on a frontier which was 1,500 miles in length. With respect to the English Press, I said, if he would look back into the files of the „Times“, he would find that there was no feeling of hostility to Prussia in England, and that if the language of the Press had within a late period ceased to be that of sympathy and approval, he must seek some other cause for the change than unfriendly feelings in England towards the Prussian nation.

He then went on to explain to me that the insurrection in Russian-Poland had been principally promoted by the smaller gentry, who all had dependents attached to their houses and farms, whom they easily induced to take part in enterprises against the Government; and who, when they had thus raised a small band of armed men, force the peasantry to join them; and it was to prevent the proceedings of these persons being extended into the Polish provinces of Prussia, or a similar course being followed by the small landed proprietors and gentry of these provinces, that the Convention had been entered into, while it was hoped that by energetic action on the part of the authorities, the commerce of Prussia, with the interior of Poland, might be protected from the depredations of Russian-Polish insurgents hovering on the frontier.

The Government had, in the first place, he said, entered into the Convention as a necessary measure of defence, but they also saw in it a legitimate means of protecting the interests of Prussian traders with Poland. I replied that those were the common-place arguments used by all Governments intervening in the affairs of other States, and they would have been equally applicable if Her Majesty's Government had interfered in the American civil war on the pretence that it was necessary to secure Canada against future aggression, and to protect British commerce and industry against the evils to which the war was certain to subject them; but it would be difficult for his Excellency to prove that what was unnecessary in Galicia was unavoidable in Prussia.

To this he answered that the massacre of 1,000 of the gentry by the peasantry [which the Austrian Government had permitted]<sup>1</sup> in Galicia in 1848, had greatly diminished the probability of any insurrectionary movements there, as the dangerous class of the population had been nearly exterminated, and neither the great nobles nor the peasantry were disposed to incur risks and make sacrifices for the restoration of Polish nationality.

He said that the number of troops concentrated on the frontier has been greatly exaggerated; for, though some of the Reserves had been called out, none of the corps had been placed on a war footing, either with respect to men, horses, or guns; and after providing garrisons for the towns and fortresses, the troops at the disposal of General Werther could only enable him to station 12,000 men on the Northern, and 8,000 on the Silesian frontier, for service in the field, which was a very moderate force for the duty to be performed. He said also that the Prussian commanding officers had orders not to act on Russian territory beyond a day's march from the frontier, and that Russian troops would only cross the frontier while in actual conflict with armed insurgents.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

He explained further, that the principal advantage which Prussia gained from the Convention was, that bands could not be collected on the frontier for the invasion of the Prussian territories, or if insurgents in these territories were driven across the frontier they could not be rallied or reinforced in the kingdom, for a renewed attack on the Prussian troops; and in answer to an inquiry which I made of him with respect to Russian insurgents who might be captured in Prussia, he said they would be given up to the Russian authorities, in conformity with the stipulations of Conventions of long standing, which had been renewed in 1857. He said these Conventions had been suspended in 1853, but that the number of Russian deserters and other persons crossing the frontier illegally, from criminal or other causes, became so great an inconvenience that it had been found necessary to renew the Conventions in the interest of public order in the frontier districts.

He said that portions of the frontier of many miles in extent could only be watched, according to present arrangements, by a single battalion, and that a brigade would be stationed in the North to the east of Gumbinnen to protect a *haras* of 1,000 horses kept near the frontier for the use of the various breeding establishments through Eastern Prussia.

During our conversation on this subject, it appeared to me that M. de Bismarck was greatly annoyed at the reprobation with which the Convention has been received in Prussia and in Europe, and with the distrust of the Prussian Government to which it has given rise; and though on previous occasions he always spoke of the probability of the Russian army in Poland proving too weak to suppress the insurrection, he yesterday represented the principal forces of the insurgents to have been already defeated and dispersed, and those remaining in arms to consist merely of small scattered bands of men who are afraid to return to their homes, but who, though unable to offer any serious resistance to regular troops, might keep up for some time a state of brigandage in Poland, similar to that prevailing in the Neapolitan Provinces of the Kingdom of Italy.

M. de Thile, the Under-Secretary of State, represents the Convention to refer solely to the action of the military authorities on the frontier; and as I have said to him that M. de Bismarck had spoken to me of the possibility of Prussia taking active measures in the interior of the kingdom for the suppression of the insurrection, he answered he could not say what M. de Bismarck's intentions might be, and whether he contemplated entering into another Convention with Russia; but that he could assure me the Convention which had been actually signed contained no provisions for such an eventuality.

I understand also from the Austrian Minister that M. de Thile has held the same language to him.

It is not, however, to be forgotten that the Feudal party with whom M. de Bismarck is acting are most anxious for a close union with Russia, in the hope that the alliance of the three Northern Powers, which was broken up by the Crimean war, may be eventually re-established.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.



No. 68.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 95. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 21, 1863.*

THE French Ambassador received yesterday a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys relative to the affairs of Poland and the Convention lately concluded between Russia and Prussia, with the substance of which M. de Talleyrand has been good enough to make me acquainted.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expresses himself in general terms and with some reserve, but he intimates nevertheless that a Prussian intervention in Poland would not fail to raise serious questions for the consideration of the Great Powers, and he observes that the solidarity with Russia which Prussia has apparently assumed for a suppression of a local insurrection, which has hitherto been confined to the territories of Russia, must necessarily create a solidarity of feelings and sympathies among all branches of the Polish nation, of a nature to produce the very evils to avert which M. de Bismarck represents the Convention to have been concluded.

M. de Talleyrand is not, I believe, instructed to make any official communication to the Prussian Government on this subject..

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 69.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 97).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 21, 1863.*

THE policy of the Government in regard to Poland has almost exclusively occupied the attention of the Chamber and the Press during the course of the present week.

In reply to the interpellation of the Polish fraction, a translation of which was inclosed in my despatch No 79 of the 14th instant, M. de Bismarck, in the sitting of the Chamber held on the 16th, read out a written declaration, translation of which is herewith transmitted.

This declaration, as your Lordship will perceive, having left matters much where they were before, and not having thrown the expected light upon the engagements entered into with Russia, the party of progress brought forward a further interpellation, in which the question whether a Convention had been concluded was categorically asked. To the question so put, the Government refused to vouchsafe an answer; but the House nevertheless voted that a debate should take place on the subject, in order to enable it to record its opinion on the supposed policy of the Government.



I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a report of this debate drawn up by Mr. Morier, and I request your Lordship's attention to the abstract therein given of the speech of M. Waldeck, first, because it has excited special attention, and has highly exasperated the [organs both official and] semi-official of the Government; and secondly, because it fairly represents the feeling of a great portion of the Liberal party in regard to the proposed intervention.

To mark still more its sense of what the exigencies of the present moment demand, the Party of Progress has drawn up a resolution to the effect that „the House do declare that the interests of Prussia require that the Government should abstain from rendering any assistance, or showing any favour either to the Russian Government or to the insurgents, and that consequently neither of the parties engaged be admitted upon Prussian territory without being previously disarmed“.

This Resolution has been submitted to a Committee of twenty-one members, and will be brought before the House as soon as the Committee have drawn up their report upon it.

The language of the Liberal Press is unanimous in condemning the policy of the Government, but it is so much an echo of what has been said in the Chamber that a reproduction of it would only be a repetition of what is given in the inclosed report.

A circular addressed by the President of Police at Breslau to the Silesian Press is not uninteresting as showing the possible proportions which the intervention may take. It warns the newspapers against giving any indications of the movements of the troops, saying that all the advantages of sudden concentrations would be thereby lost, „whether such would be required for the defence of the frontier or of direct action in the neighbouring State ('zu einem directen auftreten im Auslande')“.

It is further worthy of notice, in connection with this subject, that Thorn and other important towns situated in the Polish districts have sent up deputations, principally composed of Germans, to protest against the rumours put about to the effect that the districts from which they come were disturbed, or that the inhabitants apprehended danger.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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† Inclosure 1 in No. 69.

*Ministerial Reply to the Interpellation of the Polish Fraction respecting the Proclamation of the President and the Military Governor of the Grand Duchy of Posen.*

(Translation).

THE Government reply to the interpellation addressed to them by a „No“, to the first question, and by a „Yes“, to the second<sup>1</sup>. They approve of the Proclamation both

<sup>1</sup> The two questions were — first, whether a new kind of Administration, mixed civil and military, had been introduced in Posen; and, secondly, whether the Government approved of the Proclamation.

as regards its form and as regards its contents, and they will avail themselves of the occasion which the interpellation affords them to declare what is the attitude they propose to assume towards the insurrection that has broken out in Poland.

This insurrection has assumed proportions in parts of the kingdom, and especially along the Prussian frontier, the importance of which extends beyond the limits of the Kingdom of Poland. The incontestable object of the movement is the restoration of an independent Polish State, as nearly as possible co-extensive with the former one. Now, even if this object did not necessarily imply a craving after Prussian territory, the Government would, nevertheless, be not only justified, but in duty bound, to consider how far the attempt to overturn the relations of the neighbouring State, as by Treaty established, might re-act upon the interests which Prussia has at stake, and what steps might be necessary to safeguard these interests.

As any consideration of this kind would undoubtedly lead to the conviction that a realization of the objects aimed at by the Polish insurrection would threaten, if not the territorial possessions, at least the interests and security of the Prussian State, the duty of the Government clearly is to oppose itself to the movement, without waiting that it should assume larger proportions, and so necessitate increased sacrifices to put it down. The Government must expect that the Polish insurrection, although at present only directed against the Government of the neighbouring State, and without necessarily being ultimately successful, will yet, during its continuance, draw the interests of Prussia into a state of fellow-feeling with it („Mitleidenschaft“), the evil consequences of which will be the more sensible the longer the insurrection lasts. We have official proofs in our possession of the endeavours made to prepare the insurrection on Prussian soil, so that should a favourable opportunity present itself, it may at once be called into activity.

It is true that the Government feels sure of the fidelity and devotion to order of the great majority of the Polish subjects of His Majesty, but even in the Kingdom of Poland the instances have been few of the burgher and peasant populations giving a voluntary support to the insurrection. It is around the „noyau“ furnished by the foreign emissaries and returned emigrants that the small nobility, assisted by a portion of the clergy, has gathered with its numerous followers, servants, and labourers, and these elements have been sufficiently strong to give up to anarchy large districts, in which the life and property of the inhabitants are left at the mercy of every act of violence, and the peaceful citizens are forced by threats to serve the purposes of the insurrection.

If a similar state of things, to the same extent at least, is not likely to be introduced amongst us, it is nevertheless the duty of the Government to give timely protection to the subjects of His Majesty against dangers to which they might be exposed by violence or temptation. To fulfil this duty to its utmost extent will be the endeavour of the Government, whilst they are at the same time determined, where the public order may seem to be threatened, to avail themselves immediately, for its restoration, of all the means at their disposal.

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† Inclosure 2 in No. 69.

*Report of Debates in the Prussian Chamber on the Polish Question, on the  
18th February, 1863.*

THE following interpellation was addressed to the Government in the sitting of the 18th: —

„Has a Convention been concluded between the King's Government and the Imperial Cabinet of Russia for the suppression of the insurrection in Poland; and if so, what are its contents?“

The President of the Chamber having called upon the Minister President to reply to this question, M. de Bismarck rose and said that the Government did not intend to reply to it. Whereupon M. de Unruh observed that notwithstanding the refusal of the Government to answer the interpellation, he would move that a debate be opened on the subject, as it was one of such importance that the opinion of the House in reference to it ought to be placed on record. According to the trustworthy information of the local papers and to the reports given by members of that House, living contiguous to the districts concerned, it appeared that no movement of any sort of consequence had manifested itself in any portion of the Polish possessions of Prussia, notwithstanding which two entire army corps had called in their reserves, which, according to the new organization of the army, was equivalent to being put on a war footing, and it was rumoured that two more would follow their example. This would be equivalent to the mobilisation of half the military forces of Prussia, and he would ask the House what possible purpose such armaments could serve? Was the step taken because of the imminent danger of the Polish provinces of Russia setting up their independence and taking a threatening attitude towards Prussia? It was clear that, at present at least, there was no sort of probability of such an issue. Or was it an act of political friendship towards Russia? The speaker then went on to review the relations that had subsisted between Russia and Prussia since the wars of the Empire, and enumerated the various unfriendly acts of which the latter had to complain, deducing therefrom that it had never been the policy of Russia to see a great and strong Prussia grow up by her side, and that a subserviency of Prussian interests to those of her Imperial neighbour was from every point of view the most fatal error that a Prussian statesman could commit. He then adverted to the special dangers attaching to a policy of this kind in connection with the Polish question, as involving the hostility of France and England, and concluded by saying that he could not bring himself to believe that it was the intention of the Government to take their proposed measures on the ground of the so-called „solidarity of Conservative interests“, which was nothing but a league of absolute Governments against the liberties of their peoples, nor would he believe that the Government were looking out for foreign broils to get out of their home difficulties. If, however, an aggressive policy of any of the kinds described were to actuate the Government, he had the full confidence that the Chamber would not vote one thaler in support of it.

M. de Bismarck said he would be delighted to take lessons in Prussian policy from the wider experience and deeper knowledge of the gentleman who had just sat down, but he

would be obliged to him to afford him the opportunity of taking them in private, or, at least, in some less public place than the Chamber. It was easy to bandy about strong expressions respecting the foreign policy of the Government; but he thought that publicity and the effect produced in foreign countries should prescribe limits to the abuse lavished on one's own Ministers. As regarded the armaments to which allusion had been made he denied that any portion of the army had been mobilized. Not a single extra horse had been bought for the Artillery and Cavalry. All that had been done was to call in the reserves of the Infantry. It was no business of his to enter into an academic dissertation on the foreign policy of Prussia; and his position as foreign Minister prevented him from expressing sympathies or antipathies for any foreign Cabinet. He could not, therefore, follow M. de Unruh in his retrospective review of the relations between Russia and Prussia; but he could tell the House that the Government were not carrying out a Russian but a Prussian policy, and that its object was to protect the King's subjects against the dangers of insurrection. It had been hinted by the last speaker that threats had been made or advice offered to the Government in reference to their attitude in regard to the insurrection. The Government had received nothing of the sort, and did not intend to receive anything of the sort.

*M. Waldeck.* — The Minister President has vouchsafed to give us a few particulars about the military preparations actually made; but he has maintained silence as to whether or not a Convention has been concluded with Russia. This silence can only mean that such a Convention has been concluded, for otherwise he would, if not out of respect for us, at least out of respect to the country and to Europe, have answered our interpellation with the simple „no“, which alone would be compatible with the honour and dignity of Prussia. A Convention to assist such a State as Russia in putting down her dissaffected subjects was a something so monstrous that it was difficult to find the proper category amongst public acts wherein to range it. I could not for one moment be classed with a Treaty for assisting an allied State in defending itself against foreign foes. It was nothing more nor less than the sending over of gendarmes and armed police to a country whose existence had hitherto depended alone on police and gendarmes. And this was a part to be undertaken by a state that pretended to at the head of German civilization! The man whose face did not flush with shame at such a thought was not worthy to be a Prussian or a German. (Loud cheering from the great body of the House, and groans from the Government eleven). The party to which the Minister President belongs is that which, in opposition to the votes of the Chamber in 1854, endeavoured to force the country into active co-operation with Russia during the Crimean war; this, at least was a policy that could be defended on political grounds; but in what political dictionary could the right term be found for a police intervention in behalf of a foreign State? The character of the present insurrection had been correctly described by the first speaker: it was not an organized revolt for political purposes, but a cry of anguish raised from an oppressed country. Could it for one moment be supposed that the unhappy creatures who fled to the woods and the desert places for refuge against a brutal tyranny were likely to make an aggressive movement against the Prussian frontier. Our safety against such dangers must be sought in the contrast afforded by our own administration of our Po-

lish provinces as compared with Russian rule, and not in aiding and abetting that system of Government.

The Speaker then turned to the position assumed by the Government in reference to the interpellation. The Government treats us, he said, in regard to foreign matters as it did in reference to internal concerns. When we refused certain items of the Budget the Ministry told us, „We will incur the expenditure all the same“. When, in reference to our foreign policy we ask whether a Convention, which may lead forth our children to an unjust war and take our earnings from our pockets, has been concluded, we are told, „This is no concern of yours; we will not show you the Convention“. It is, then, so insignificant a thing that our children should be led forth to do hangman duties to an absolute Government? Not in the interest of Prussia, let it be clearly understood, is this work to be done, but in the interest of absolutism, as such. The only parallel for it is to be found in the sale during the last century, by the Elector of Hesse, of his troops to the British Government for putting down the revolted American States; but the day for a policy of this kind is passed, and Kings can no longer treat the lives of their subjects as private property to be employed no matter on what frivolous and quixotic adventures. An intervention on our part — let us not disguise the fact from ourselves — would be damned by the whole civilized world. Austria condemns it, England openly condemns it, France rejoices at the opportunity afforded her of making herself popular at our expense. Even in Russia the principles upon which such an intervention would be based have of late come into discredit, and the Emperor Alexander has himself endeavoured to adopt a more liberal policy. It is true that in so doing he has incurred the heavy displeasure of those Prussian admirers of Russia to whom the Minister President belongs. Who knows? It is, perhaps, to bribe Russia back to her old faith that the present assistance is offered to her. There was a policy which Prussia might have followed; she might in a friendly manner have offered her advice to Russia, and warned her of the dangers she incurred by abandoning the road of legality and ordering the barbarous conscription which has called forth the present rebellion; and more than any other State Prussia might have expected that from her such a warning would not have been in vain. But a sound foreign policy of this sort is as little to be expected from the present Ministry as a sound internal policy. The Minister President has protested against heaping abuse upon the Government in the face of Europe. But I deny that this is what we are doing. To point out the faults committed by the Government is not to heap abuse upon it, and the course we are following will strengthen and not weaken the State. What we do is to show to Europe that if the Prussian Government is on the wrong path, the Prussian people at least will not encourage it along this path. This is our business here this day, and if the Minister-President will not lay the Convention before us, and if its contents are such as the papers describe them, we shall at least, by what we have said to-day, have protested by anticipation against it as against the interests of Prussia, as opposed to the principles of international relations, and as unparalleled in the annals of history. (Loud and prolonged cheering).

*M. de Bismarck* in reply said that the speaker who had just sat down had declared that a simple „No“ was the only reply to the interpellation that would have been com-

patible with the honour of Prussia. He (M. de Bismarck) thought he knew quite as well as M. Waldeck what was due to the honour of Prussia, and would take the opportunity of recalling the statement of a great English statesman to the effect that the worst of all monopolies was the pretended exclusive possession of political insight and virtue. In conclusion, he denied the authenticity of a letter that had appeared in the „Czas“ newspaper, purporting to be addressed by a person in the Chancery of the Grand Duke Constantine to the Russian Legation here, and in which the offers of Prussian assistance were treated very cavalierly, and described as forced upon the Russian Government.

A few more less important speeches having been delivered, the closing of the debate was moved and carried.

No. 70.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 102).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 22, 1863.*

THE King having granted me the honour of a private audience this morning, I availed myself of the opportunity to say that His Majesty had doubtless observed how greatly public opinion in England and France had been excited by the Military Convention lately concluded between Prussia and Russia, to which he replied that when the Convention was made public it would be seen that too much importance had been attached to it.

The King said that three considerations had satisfied him of the necessity of the Convention. During the events of 1830 and 1831, though almost all the nobles of the Duchy of Posen had joined the ranks of the insurgents in the kingdom, the people of the Grand Duchy had remained loyal to Prussia; but the defeated Poles having sought refuge in Prussia, the Prussian Government had to incur a serious expenditure in providing for their maintenance during a long period in the country, and for their eventual removal. The Convention, therefore, was in the first place intended to prevent the recurrence of such an eventuality.

In 1848 the illusions of the Prussian Government as to the loyalty of the lower orders in Posen were destroyed by the insurrection which then took place, while the continued hostility of the nobles to their connection with Prussia was recently manifested by the convocation of a meeting at Posen for the purpose of discussing the expediency of declining to be present at His Majesty's coronation. The Convention was therefore necessary in the second place as a precautionary measure against an outbreak in favour of the insurgents in Poland, with whom, there could be no doubt, the whole population of Polish Prussia would be ready to unite if they saw the slightest prospect of doing so with success.

The third reason, however, was the most important, namely, self-protection; and it was equally the duty and the interest of Prussia to do everything in her power to prevent the re-establishment of an independent Polish Kingdom, for if the Polish nation could



reconstitute themselves as an independent State, which it is believed that Austria is disposed to encourage them to do, if she can place an Archduke at its head, the existence of Prussia would be seriously menaced, as the first efforts of the new State would be to recover Danzig, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal consequences to Prussia were too evident to require him to point them out. Prussia had therefore determined not to give an indirect support to the present insurrection by permitting her territory to become an asylum for the defeated insurgents of the kingdom; and the moral effect of the Convention would probably be alone sufficient to protect her frontier.

I replied that if I understood His Majesty aright, the Convention had only reference to action on the frontier, but that His Majesty must be aware there was an impression among the public that it provided for a more decided intervention in the contest between the Emperor of Russia and his Polish subjects, and I asked if I might assure your Lordship that this impression was unfounded. The King said that he had never acknowledged the principle of non-intervention, as understood by Her Majesty's Government, and he would not therefore require to excuse himself if he had infringed it; but the Convention was one of an entirely defensive character, and could not be objected to as authorizing Prussian intervention in the affairs of Poland. He must, however, he said, decline for the present acquainting me with the precise terms of its provisions.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN

No. 71.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 26).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, February 17, 1863.*

HAVING observed an assertion in some foreign journals that the Swedish Diet had made a demonstration in favour of Poland, I had the honour to state that nothing of the kind appears to have taken place beyond some casual observations in the Burgher Chamber sympathizing with the Poles, but which led to no tangible result.

At the same time, there can be no doubt that the general feeling here is strongly on the Polish side, whether as pro-Liberal or as anti-Russian; and your Lordship may possibly recollect my mentioning, in the early part of last year, an observation made to me by the King, that, were he King of Prussia, he would offer his sword to the Polish cause.

Count Manderström, on the other hand, once remarked to me that he considered the restoration of Poland to be undesirable for the general interest of Europe, on account of the perturbatory nature of the Poles, whom his Excellency seemed to look upon as incorrigible European „mauvais coucheurs“, an opinion which history, perhaps, partially sustains.

It is, however, I presume, always to be borne in mind that Polish independence was crushed just as an attempt was being made to reform Polish institutions, and, con-

sequently, that it must be impossible to say how far political reformation might not have corrected moral imperfection; while the very possibility of such amelioration may have instigated the partitioners to act upon the principle that there was no time to lose.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

† No. 72.

*Mr. West to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 41).

My Lord,

*Turin, February 21, 1863.*

I ASKED Count Pasolini, at an interview which I had with his Excellency this day, whether the Italian Government intended to take any measures to prevent meetings and demonstrations in favour of Poland from taking place.

He replied that the course which had been pursued with respect to the meeting lately held at Genoa was that which would be followed in similar cases. A Constitutional Government could not prevent public meetings from being held, or the sympathies of the people for any particular cause from being publicly expressed; but what it could prevent, and what it would prevent, was to open collections of money or arms for purposes avowedly directed against a friendly Power, and the law provided for this.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 73.

*Draft of Note proposed to be addressed to Berlin respecting the Polish Insurrection: —*  
*(Communicated to Earl Russell by Baron Gros, February 24, 1863).*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, a reçu l'ordre d'entrer avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse dans de franches explications, au sujet de l'arrangement conclu entre les Cabinets de Berlin et de St. Pétersbourg à l'occasion des troubles survenus dans le Royaume de Pologne, et, à cet effet, il a été chargé d'adresser à son Excellence M. de Bismarck-Schönhausen la communication suivante.

Les mesures adoptées par le Gouvernement Russe pour opérer le recrutement en Pologne ayant amené une résistance qui a donné lieu à des conflits sur plusieurs points, la Cour de France observait avec un douloureux intérêt des événements si regrettables.

Il était d'autant plus à désirer qu'aucun incident ne vînt aggraver cette lutte que le pays, livré à un état de malaise évident, renfermait déjà de nombreux éléments d'agitation et de désordre.



Il importait, dans de telles circonstances, d'éviter toute manifestation de nature à exciter les esprits dans les autres Provinces Polonaises, et à changer le caractère jusqu'alors purement local de l'insurrection.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français n'a donc pas appris sans inquiétude que le Cabinet de Berlin avait signé avec celui de St. Pétersbourg une Convention par laquelle la Cour de Prusse consent à laisser pénétrer sur son territoire les troupes Russes qui jugeraient à propos de suivre les bandes armées réduites à y chercher un refuge, et s'engage elle-même à repousser sur le territoire Russe, jusqu'à la rencontre d'une force nationale suffisante, les insurgés qui se trouveraient devant les troupes Prussiennes. En effet, la lutte, concentrée encore dans le Royaume de Pologne, peut être ainsi portée, d'un instant à l'autre, dans les provinces Polonaises de la Prusse ouvertes aux soldats Russes, et la Prusse peut de son côté se voir entraînée à prendre part aux opérations militaires en cours d'exécution de l'autre côté de sa frontière.

Un semblable accord n'a pas seulement pour conséquence d'étendre le théâtre des hostilités; il crée une situation nouvelle, et transforme un incident des affaires de Pologne en une question Européenne.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est loin de méconnaître que la Cour de Prusse, en raison de voisinage, avait des devoirs internationaux à remplir envers la Russie en présence des événements actuels. Il n'aurait pas eu le droit de s'étonner des mesures de précaution et de surveillance qu'elle aurait cru devoir prendre pour assurer l'inviolabilité de la frontière commune, et mettre obstacle à toute contrebande de guerre. Mais une opération même limitée, que ne justifiait d'ailleurs aucun symptôme menaçant dans les Provinces Polonaises de la Monarchie Prussienne, dépasse les obligations tracées au Cabinet de Berlin par le droit public; elle semble procéder de la pensée préconçue d'une solidarité politique que les Traités Européens n'ont pas établie en réglant le sort de la Pologne, et dont les intérêts généraux pourraient avoir à souffrir.

Aussi l'opinion publique s'en est-elle vivement émue, et l'inquiétude qu'elle en a ressentie n'aura point échappé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français considère de son côté comme un devoir envers lui-même et envers l'Europe de signaler à la Cour de Berlin les préoccupations causées par les arrangements qu'elle a conclus avec le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et il aime à croire que ces observations, inspirées par le désir sincère d'écarter tout sujet de malentendu, seront accueillies avec le même sentiment de confiance bienveillante qui les a dictées.

Le Soussigné, &c.

No. 74.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Baron Gros. — (Communicated to Earl Russell by Baron Gros, February 24).*

(Confidentielle).

M. le Baron,

*Paris, le 21 Février, 1863.*

EN vous invitant, par ma dépêche en date de ce jour sous le No. 22, à proposer au Gouvernement Anglais une démarche commune auprès du Cabinet de Berlin, je vous

indique sommairement les considérations générales qui la conseillent aux deux Puissances, ainsi que les raisons qui nous portent à désirer que l'Autriche y prête son concours. Je tiens à aborder ici un ordre d'idées plus confidentiel dans lequel vous pourrez vous placer également avec le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat en dehors de la communication que vous êtes chargé de lui faire.

Nous n'avons rien à apprendre au Cabinet Anglais sur les inconvénients que la situation de la Pologne présente pour l'Europe. L'opinion de l'Angleterre est certainement formée comme la nôtre. L'expérience a ratifié les jugements portés au nom du droit public. Le temps n'a pas fait disparaître la question Polonaise. Toujours prompt à renaître avec chaque génération, elle est une source permanente de difficultés. A un état perpétuel de malaise succèdent périodiquement des commotions qui font inutilement verser le sang, et qui mettent aux plus pénibles épreuves les rapports des Cabinets. Nous en avons de nouveau l'exemple dans les troubles que les arrangements conclus entre la Prusse et la Russie sont venus aggraver encore.

Nous constatons, toutefois, avec satisfaction que les deux Cours n'ont pas rallié l'Autriche à ces stipulations. Jusqu'à ce jour, les trois Puissances copartageantes, sans y mettre une ardeur égale, avaient suivi à l'égard de la Pologne une politique à peu près semblable dans ses effets. Leur accord avait été constant, et cette entente renouvelée sous tant de formes et à tant d'époques différentes, était le principal obstacle à l'influence que la France et l'Angleterre cherchaient à exercer en faveur de la Pologne. Aujourd'hui l'Autriche, guidée par un sentiment plus vrai de ses intérêts et obéissant à une politique plus libérale, demeure étrangère à ce concert. Elle prend les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir le calme et l'ordre en Galicie, et pour remplir ses devoirs de voisinage envers le Gouvernement Russe; mais elle s'abstient de faire cause commune avec les deux autres Puissances. Elle y trouve des avantages évidents, notamment celui d'affermir la tranquillité chez elle. D'autre part, l'opinion publique lui tient déjà compte de cette attitude équitable et prudente, en la mettant en parallèle avec celle de la Prusse. En Allemagne et en Europe, comme en Autriche même, le Cabinet de Vienne en retirera le bénéfice. Nous sommes donc fondés à espérer qu'il ne s'écartera pas de cette ligne de conduite, et nous avons, de notre côté, un intérêt manifeste à seconder ses dispositions à se détacher d'une alliance qui, dans le passé, a été si gênante pour l'action diplomatique de la France et de l'Angleterre dans cette partie du Continent.

Les conjonctions ne laissent d'ailleurs entrevoir aucun incident, aucun intérêt puissant qui doivent modifier son attitude. La lutte ne présente pas encore un caractère bien marqué, et il est difficile d'en apprécier exactement la portée. En ce qui nous concerne, nous faisons des vœux pour que la modération et la sagesse l'emportent sur toutes les excitations, de quelque côté qu'elles viennent, et c'est en ce sens que nous continuerons d'user de nos conseils et d'employer nos efforts. Nous ne saurions, il est vrai, fermer les yeux sur les développements que l'insurrection a pris depuis quelques jours, et sur l'ébranlement que la Convention de St. Pétersbourg a imprimé aux esprits. Il est donc possible que les événements militaires acquièrent plus d'importance, et au nombre des hypothèses que l'état des choses autorise on peut certainement admettre celle d'une revendication des droits consacrés par les Traités de 1815. Mais dans cette éventualité même, je ne vois

pour l'Autriche aucune raison de cesser de suivre la politique indépendante qu'elle a embrassée vis-à-vis de la Prusse et de la Russie dans les affaires de Pologne.

C'est la Russie principalement, M. le Baron, ou pour mieux dire presque exclusivement, qui se trouverait en cause dans le cas que nous prévoyons. C'est, en effet, l'état de Pologne Russe qui est surtout sur la raison de ce malaise, et des complications trop fréquentes qui préoccupent encore aujourd'hui les Cabinets. Sur ce terrain, la Russie depuis 1831 s'est placée entièrement en dehors des stipulations du Congrès de Vienne. La souveraineté de cette Puissance s'exerce contrairement au titre en vertu duquel les Provinces Polonaises ont été rattachées à l'Empire Russe. L'Autriche s'est écartée sans doute, elle aussi de ces actes dans l'affaire de Cracovie. Mais l'incorporation de ce pays au territoire Autrichien n'a été que la conséquence en quelque sort inévitable des changements apportés à la position de la Pologne Russe. Le Cabinet de Vienne n'en retire aucun avantage auquel il ne pût facilement renoncer le jour où les circonstances s'y prêteraient. Ce retour aux Traités n'aurait rien d'embarrassant pour sa politique; il peut l'envisager sans difficulté avec nous et ne saurait, ce nous semble, y trouver un motif d'abandonner la voie dans laquelle il est entré en se plaçant en dehors des arrangements conclus à St. Pétersbourg.

Il nous importe, dans tous les cas, M. le Baron, de ne rien négliger pour associer le Cabinet de Vienne à notre manière de voir, et pour rompre cette solidarité fâcheuse qui existe, depuis un siècle, entre trois Puissances dans la question Polonaise. Le concours de l'Autriche à la communication que nous proposons de faire à Berlin serait un premier gage obtenu, et, à tous égards, cette démarche serait de nature à exercer une influence heureuse sur les événements.

Je ne vous parle point, M. le Baron, des autres considérations qui, indépendamment de ces raisons d'intérêt général, peuvent agir sur les déterminations du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Pour lui comme pour nous, la politique que nous indiquons n'a rien que de conforme à des sentiments anciens et à des obligations morales envers l'opinion. Je m'en suis ouvert avec Lord Cowley: son impression personnelle-m'a paru favorable à l'entente que nous désirons établir, et je me plais à espérer que Lord Russell se montrera disposé à faire un premier pas vers ce but en adhérant à notre proposition.

Vous êtes autorisé à lui donner lecture de cette dépêche à titre confidentiel.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé)

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 75.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 221).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 23, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS assures me that there is no truth in the report alluded to in my despatch No. 214 of yesterday's date, that a corps of observation was to be

assembled at Nancy. I said that I was happy to hear it, as such a measure must have produced a similar concentration of Prussian troops on the other side of the Rhine, and these displays, without absolute necessity, had better be avoided.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

†† No. 76.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(No. 226).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 23, 1863.*

I CALLED this afternoon on M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and read to him your Lordship's despatch [No 271] of the 21st instant, stating that Her Majesty's Government entertained precisely the same views with the French Government, as communicated to your Lordship by Baron Gros, with respect to the Convention relative to Poland signed between Prussia and Russia.

[<sup>1</sup> M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that Count Goltz had just left him, after attempting to extenuate the importance of the Convention. For this purpose he had communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys confidentially the text of it. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had replied that it was not to the more or less stringent nature of the stipulations that he looked, but to the whole principle involved in the Convention, which he considered to be politically immoral.

His Excellency proceeded to say, that since he had last seen me he had been occupied in drawing up instructions for Baron Gros, in the sense of the conversation which he had held with me, and the substance of which is reported in my confidential despatch No. 207 of the 20th instant. These instructions, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, having received the Emperor's sanction, would be sent off to-night. They desired Baron Gros to propose that separate, but as far as possible identic, notes, should be addressed by the Imperial and Her Majesty's Government to the Cabinet of Berlin, and in order to save time the draft of such a note as the French thought would answer the purpose will be transmitted to Baron Gros, for your Lordship's consideration. He need hardly add, that he should be ready to adopt any modifications, not altering the sense of it, which Her Majesty's Government might propose, and equally ready to consider more important alterations.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys sent for these papers, and read them to me. They consist of a despatch inclosing the draft of note, of the draft itself, and of a confidential despatch, recommending that the two Governments should endeavour to enlist the Austrian Government to act in concert with them. The general tenour of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' arguments is in unison with those employed by his Excellency in his conversation with me, though considerably modified in tone, and the note is very inconclusive.

<sup>1</sup> The paragraphs in parenthesis are not in the Parl. Paper. (Edit).

On my remarking that the note seemed to me to arrive at no conclusion, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he had left it purposely vague in order to be more sure of inducing the Austrian Government to join it. What he desired above all things was to establish in a public manner that the coalition against the liberties of Poland was broken up. This would be attained could Austria be induced to take a step in common with Great Britain and France. The object was more likely to be effected by cautious proceeding, but Austria once engaged with the two other Powers, must follow whither they might lead. How far they might be able to go, what good they might be enabled to effect, must mainly depend on the march of events. For the moment a beginning would suffice.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to say that he should communicate confidentially to the Austrian Government the proposals which he was about to make to Her Majesty's Government, so that no time might be lost in putting them into execution should Her Majesty's Government agree to them. In that case a simple telegraphic message to Vienna would enable the Representatives of the two Powers to convert the confidential communication into an official proposal.

I inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he contemplated taking any step at St. Petersburg.

His Excellency replied that it might become necessary later, but that the position of Russia was essentially different from that of Prussia. Russia was engaged in putting down an insurrection within her own dominions, and might not look so scrupulously to the means she employed; whereas the act of Prussia was a voluntary immission in proceedings of repression in another country, Prussia herself being in perfect tranquility.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys again dwelt on the value which the Emperor attached to acting in this question in concert with Her Majesty's Government; but his Excellency added, that even should he fail in obtaining that concert, he should not regret having made the attempt, since he was sure that good would result from it eventually].

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 77.

*Mr. Morier to Earl Russell. — (Received February 24).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, February 24, 1863.*

DANTZIG and Thorn newspapers confirm the news that certain Poles who were proceeding to Poland with foreign passports have been arrested on Prussian territory by Prussian authorities, and delivered to Russian military. Rumour that Prussian troops have crossed the frontier not confirmed. Lowther has gone to Strelitz with Sir Andrew.

No. 78.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 288).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 25, 1863.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 221 of the 23rd instant; and I have to express to you my approval of the language which you held to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the supposed intention on the part of the Emperor of the French to assemble a corps of observation at Nancy.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 79.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 25).*

(No. 229. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 24, 1863.*

I MET the Prussian Ambassador again last night, and had some further conversation with him on the state of his relations with this Government.

He said that he had received instructions by telegraph to assure M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the insurrection in Russian Poland was so far compressed that there would be no occasion for acting on the stipulations of the Convention signed between Russia and Prussia at St. Petersburg. „In fact“, said Count Goltz, „it may be considered as a dead letter („une lettre morte“).“

The conversation which I had had in the morning with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the general tone of public feeling, led me to observe to Count Goltz that although it was something to have this assurance, yet I did not think it would be sufficient to calm the irritation to which the signature of the Convention had given rise. So long as M. de Bismarck remained in office I felt sure that the relations of Prussia with this Government would not be on a satisfactory footing. That gentleman could not condemn his own acts, whereas another Government succeeding him might declare that the Convention would not have been signed had they been in office; and that although they might not think it right to advise the King absolutely to annul it, it would not be acted upon. It was a condemnation of the principle of the Convention which this Government desired.

Count Goltz replied that he would state to me in strict confidence that he had informed M. de Bismarck of this feeling respecting himself; but he added that that gentleman could not be guided in his conduct by external considerations only. The internal state of Prussia must be borne in mind, and it was impossible that M. de Bismarck should abandon the King in the midst of the struggle between His Majesty and his Chambers. M. de Bismarck could only be succeeded by the Liberal party, which would bring Prussia to ruin.

It was no business of mine to animadvert on the internal state of Prussia, or I should have remarked to Count Goltz that M. de Bismarck's continuance in office was more likely to bring his country to ruin than his retirement.

Count Goltz then adverted to reports which he had heard that a joint step was about to be taken at Berlin by the British and French Governments. He asked if these reports were true. I replied that it was true that certain proposals had been made from hence to Her Majesty's Government, the result of which I did not know. He inquired whether those proposals included the Russian as well as the Prussian Government in the step suggested. I answered in the negative. The questions having been put to me I thought it better, without giving undue information, to state the simple truth.

Count Goltz then suddenly changed his tone. He said that since the beginning of this affair he had endeavoured to be as conciliatory as possible; but that if his Sovereign was to be threate(ne)d or insulted, he should adopt a very different line of conduct, that his Sovereign's honour must be respected, &c.

I said that I would strongly recommend him not to change his line of conduct, if he desired the prolongation of amicable relations with this Government. There was no question of insulting or threatening his Sovereign, but there was a strong feeling that public morality had been insulted by the acts of the Prussian Government. Count Goltz had himself expressed disapprobation of the Convention; why, then, not continue to aid in palliating the bad effects to which it had given rise?

Count Goltz, who had become more calm, argued that it was the strict right of any two Governments to enter into engagements of the nature of those complained of; and I replied that there were many things which one might have a right to do, but which prudence would counsel one not to do, and that it was often safer to listen to prudence than to right.

Count Goltz then entered into a long disquisition to prove that the Polish insurrection was the result of a too liberal treatment on the part of the Russian Government; that the more liberty the Poles acquired, the more ungovernable they would become: but these are matters on which I need not trouble your Lordship, my sole object being to keep you informed of the state of affairs here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 80.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 26).*

(No. 234. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 25, 1863.*

IT would seem as if Baron Budberg had some information of the overtures addressed by the French Government to Her Majesty's Government and that of Austria, for he is endeavouring to forestall a coalition against his Government. He gives out, therefore.



that any act of clemency, however extended, or any concession to the Poles not incompatible with the safety of Russia, if asked for by France alone, will be cheerfully granted by his Government, but that the smallest demand made by two or more Powers collectively will be resisted.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 81.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 26).*

(No. 235. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 25, 1863.*

THE relations which exist between the Polish insurgents and their countrymen in Paris cause a constant correspondence between them, which is of course at the mercy of the French Police; and I understand that the letters of the last few days from the former are very desponding, that they complain of the little sympathy evinced for them by the rural population, and of the want of arms and ammunition which had been promised, but which do not reach them.

It is curious that all this information should be regularly given by the police to the Russian Ambassador.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 82.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 26).*

(No. 238. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 25, 1863.*

GREAT as, I cannot doubt, is the value attached by the Emperor to an understanding with Her Majesty's Government upon all great political questions, I almost question whether, with regard to the present crisis in Poland, there is not a greater desire in His Majesty's mind to bring the Austrian Government to his views. Certain it is that great efforts are making in this direction.

I understand that previous to the conversation which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys the day before yesterday, and which is recounted in my despatch No. 226 of that date, his Excellency had seen Prince Metternich, and had laid before him a general summary of the views of the Imperial Government. Commencing by a flattering approbation of the correct attitude assumed by the Austrian Government since the commencement of the Polish insurrection, and contrasting that attitude in eulogistic terms with the conduct



of the Prussian Government, M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to express the hope that the Austrian Government would join in the remonstrances which he had proposed to Her Majesty's Government to address simultaneously with France to the Cabinet of Berlin, with reference to the Convention signed at St. Petersburg. Should, however, the Austrian Government hesitate to take this step, there was another to which he felt confident they could not object, namely, to claim of Russia, in concurrence with Great Britain and France, a fair execution of the Treaties of 1815, in regard to the Kingdom of Poland. Austria would, perhaps, feel that a reference to the Treaties of 1815 might involve the question of Cracow; but what to Austria would be the loss of Cracow in comparison to the advantage of an alliance with Great Britain and France, based on the observance of the existing Treaties? It would be easy for Austria to show that the seizure of Cracow was at the time a political and strategical necessity forced upon her to prevent its appropriation by Russia; equally easy for her to declare now, that the danger having passed away, she willingly restored to Cracow its former independence. There remained the possibility of a refusal on the part of Russia to listen to the just claim of the three Powers, supposing them to determine on making it. In that case, Austria would hardly abdicate her place as a great continental and military Power, but would be ready to join in enforcing on Russia the just observance of her engagements. Great Britain might not be willing to furnish troops, but she might afford naval assistance.

The information which I have thus conveyed to your Lordship proceeds from a confidential, though reliable source. What I have to state further has been recounted to me by one of the actors themselves.

The day following the interview between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Prince Metternich, M. de Bourqueney, who, as your Lordship knows, represented the Emperor for a considerable time at Vienna, was requested by His Majesty to see the Prince, and to represent to him more fully the views of the Imperial Government. M. de Bourqueney undertook the mission on the condition that he was not to be called upon to give any personal opinion to bias that of Prince Metternich; and he made this reserve because he felt that he had been the means, while at Vienna, of engaging Austria in a policy which, from not having been followed out consistently, had led to all her misfortunes since.

M. de Bourqueney found Prince Metternich in great embarrassment. The Prince said that being in Paris and drawing all his inspirations from thence, he mistrusted his own judgment; that he saw that his Government was about to be placed in a very perplexing and a very serious position, and that they would have to choose between a frank alliance with Great Britain and France, or a renewal of their ancient relations with Russia and Prussia. Stand between the two, Austria could not. It might be some satisfaction to Austria to find the Emperor of the French courting an alliance which he had so violently broken through a few years ago, but Prince Metternich could not forget that the price of this alliance must be the abandonment of territory, however small and perhaps useless (meaning Cracow), and that it might hereafter involve the province of Galicia; for Poland once in possession of constitutional liberty, there was no saying what the eventual consequences might be — whether Russia would be able to maintain her rule, or whether

Poland might not recover her complete independence, in which case Galicia and Posen must revert to her.

On the other hand, the danger to Austria of refusing the French proposals, though of a different nature, were as great, and perhaps more imminent. France could make the best terms she could with Russia in favour of the Poles, at a price, perhaps, of Austrian interests in Germany and in the East.

Placed between these difficulties Prince Metternich said that, without concealing any of them from his own Government, he had recommended an acquiescence in the policy of France. What his Government might decide he could not say. Of one thing he was certain, that their decision would greatly depend upon the attitude taken by Her Majesty's Government, and if advice was to be given he hoped that it would proceed from London rather than from Paris. Whatever cause of complaint Austria might conceive herself to have against the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards herself, she knew that it was a Government to be depended upon. She could not feel the same security in regard to France.

M. de Bourqueney, after weighing with Prince Metternich the reasons which on either side might influence the decision of the Austrian Government, said that he could offer no opinion as to the course which they should follow; but he would venture to offer one bit of advice, — let not the Austrian Government take the first step without being prepared, if called upon, to take the last. A refusal to commence would be far less dangerous to her amicable relations with France than a refusal to go on when the action should be once engaged.

I look upon M. de Bourqueney's advice to be sound.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 83.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 26).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, February 26, 1863, 1 p. m.*

IN the instructions which you may send me to-night, be so good as to inform me whether the despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, a draft of which is inclosed in your private letter, is actually sent, or whether you ask the assent of the French Government to it.

Metternich was also desired to express the wish of his Government not to be pressed to join England and France in any step which they may take. He was informed that the project of note had already been sent to Vienna to be communicated confidentially to the Austrian Government.

I saw Drouyn de Lhuys last night. He had had a long conversation with the Prussian Ambassador, who had assured him that the Convention could not be enforced. Although

his Excellency seemed of opinion that the note should nevertheless be sent to Berlin, his tone was upon the whole more moderate.

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No. 84.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 26, 1863.*

THE despatch has not yet been sent, and will be sent to Paris before it is sent to Berlin.

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No. 85.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received February 26).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, February 26, 1863.*

THE French Ambassador has communicated to Count Rechberg proposed identic note to be presented at Berlin by France, England, and Austria, on late Military Convention between Prussia and Russia.

Austria declines to join. Will continue her present policy as to Poland. Says the difference between her position and that of the Western Powers renders it impossible for her to act otherwise.

Though disapproving Prussian intervention in present case, she cannot agree to a general principle of non-intervention.

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No. 86.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 26).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, February 26, 1863.*

IN to-day's sitting, Bismarck denied that your Lordship's statements, as reported in the papers, correctly described the provisions of the Convention, as every transgression of the Prussian frontier by Russian troops requires the consent of a Prussian Authority.

The Minister of the Interior, in reference to the Poles arrested at Thorn, said they had not been delivered up to the Russians in virtue of Extradition Treaties, but only expelled from Prussia across the Russian frontier.

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No. 87.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 27).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, February 27, 1863.*

NO ratifications of the Convention have yet been exchanged, and the negotiations for drawing up the instructions necessary for its being put into execution were suspended a week ago, in consequence of the improved position of the Russian army in Poland, and the apparent security of the Prussian provinces and frontier. There is no probability, therefore, of the Convention being carried into effect. Your Lordship may rely on the correctness of this information.

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No. 88.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 27).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, February 27, 1863, 11. 40 a. m.*

AM I to act upon the draft of the despatch to me inclosed in your private letter of Wednesday?

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No. 89.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 27, 1863.*

DO not act on the draft till further orders.

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No. 90.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 27, 1863.*

DO you know whether the Convention communicated to the Emperor contained a clause empowering Russian troops, with consent of Prussian Government, to pursue insurgents on Prussian territory, and Prussian troops to do the like on Russian territory, and making such consent necessary previous to each case of pursuit?

Answer this before 4 or half-past four o'clock.

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## No. 91.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 27).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, February 27, 1863, 3. 30 p. m.*

THERE is a clause, I believe, to the following effect: — Upon each occurrence, the Generals Commanding-in-chief, or the local authorities, must reciprocally ask permission to pass the frontier. The permission, it is said, will be granted; but whether by the Generals or local authorities, or whether reference is to be made to the Government, is not explicitly stated.

## No. 92.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 27, 1863.*

I HAVE received the following figures from Sir A. Buchanan: —

„No ratifications of the Convention have yet been exchanged, and the negotiation(s) for drawing up the instructions necessary for its being put in (to) execution were suspended a week ago, in consequence of the improved position of the Russian army in Poland, and the apparent security of the Prussian Provinces and frontier.

„There is no probability, therefore, of the Convention being carried into effect. Your Lordship may rely on the correctness of this information“.

## No. 93.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received February 27).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, February 27, 1863.*

THE Prussian Government are greatly embarrassed by the Convention, and the difficulty of getting rid of it without humiliation.

Bismarck gave me this morning long confidential explanations of the circumstances which led to its signature, and read to me its provisions, which he maintained contained no obligations, their whole importance depending on instructions to be subsequently agreed on.

The Convention also authorized either party to abrogate it when he thinks fit. The King cannot, however, humiliate himself before his people at the dictation of foreign Powers. The Russian Minister was present when a part of these explanations were given, which Bismarck said I must consider as strictly confidential.

My telegram was therefore prepared in the hope that it might be used to-night in the House of Commons.

## No. 94.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 27, 1863.*

I HAVE received the following figures from Sir A. Buchanan: —

„Prussian Government are greatly embarrassed by the Convention, and the difficulty of getting rid of it without humiliation.

„Bismarek gave me more long explanations of circumstances which led to its signature, and read its provisions, which he maintained contained no obligation(s), their whole importance depending on instructions to be subsequently agreed on.

„The Convention also authorizes either party to abrogate it when he thinks fit. The King cannot, however, humiliate himself before his people at the dictation of foreign Powers. Russian Minister was present when(a) part of these explanations were given, which Bismarek said I must consider as strictly confidential.

„My telegram was prepared in the hope that it would be used to-night in the House of Commons“.

## No. 95.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 28).*

(No. 247. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 27, 1863.*

BARON BUDBERG had an audience of the Emperor the day before yesterday, with reference to the Polish question, and his Excellency has since expressed himself to be satisfied with his Majesty's language towards him.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys, this afternoon, whether he could tell me what had caused the Russian Ambassador's satisfaction.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that Baron Budberg having some days ago expressed a desire to see the Emperor, he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) had arranged an audience for him; that he had previously settled with the Emperor the general tone of the observations which his Majesty should make, and that he was convinced the Emperor had not departed from it.

Baron Budberg, however, on calling upon him the following day to communicate some despatches from His Government, complaining of the attitude of the Imperial Government, had, in reply to this remarks, observed that they went far beyond the Emperor's views.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, it appears, had said to Baron Budberg that so long the Polish question had been confined to the efforts of the Russian Government to quell an insurrection, the French Government had not felt themselves authorized to interfere; but that the signature of such a Convention as that concluded at St. Petersburg had entirely

altered the nature of the question, and had brought it within the pale of European discussion. To this argument M. de Budberg had objected, as exceeding the Emperor's opinion.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys describes himself to have answered Baron Budberg with some warmth, that he recommended him not to fall into the same error into which one of his predecessors had fallen, and had greatly contributed thereby to the Crimean war.

That gentleman (M. de Kisseleff) had constantly misled his Government by assuring them that the Emperor held one language and his Ministers another.

„Take care“, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, „that you do not make a similar mistake now. The Emperor entertains the opinions which I have expressed to you more positively even than I do“.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

† No. 96.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 28).*

(No. 249).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 27, 1863.*

I SAW M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon. He expressed himself to be anxious for the reply of Her Majesty's Government to the proposals which Baron Gros had been charged to make to them with reference to the Convention signed at St. Petersburg.

He said that he had seen both the Russian and Prussian Ambassadors; that both evinced alarm at the present aspect of affairs, and had deprecated any collective step on the part of other Powers. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, on the contrary, has argued that it was far better for both the Russian and Prussian Governments, that if other Powers agreed in condemning their acts, that agreement should be signified to them simultaneously, and in the same terms. There was, however, no intention of doing this in an offensive manner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 97.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 28).*

(No. 250).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 27, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS either does not know, or will not admit that he knows, the refusal of the Austrian Government to enter into any joint action with the French Government with reference to the Polish question. He informed me, this afternoon, that

the Duc de Grammont had apprized him, by telegraph, that the French proposal had been received, and would be taken into immediate consideration by the Cabinet of Vienna.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 98.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 28).*

(No. 255. Secret).

My Lord,

*Paris, February 27, 1863.*

THE Emperor has seen Prince Metternich, and the Prince tells me confidentially that he has no doubt that the Polish question has reawakened in His Majesty's mind vague ideas of territorial changes to the profit of France.

His Majesty told the Prince that his desire was to establish an ultimate understanding with Austria. Upon what question? asked the Prince. Upon all, replied His Majesty. The Prince rejoined that since the Emperor's accession to power such had also been the desire of Austria, with that profit to her he would ask His Majesty to say. And now again it seemed to him very much the same thing, — in order to have the friendship of France everything must be done for the advantage of France.

The Emperor combated this argument. He professed himself to be ready to aid Austria in her policy, whether in Germany or in the East. There was nothing, His Majesty said, they might not do together. The friendship of England, though valuable and necessary to him, was too platonic. France and England might, no doubt, have settled any question, but he could never induce the British Government to enter into his views. Russia, again, was too weak. Why could not France and Austria understand each other? It would be an advantage to both.

Yes, said Prince Metternich, but to be paid for by some immediate sacrifice on our part. You would always save us by abstracting something from us for your own benefit.

I asked the Prince whether any definite or tangible scheme had been broached. He said No; that the Emperor had confined himself to generalities, but that the independence of Poland was what he was aiming at. He had told His Majesty that no doubt were the insurrection to continue and end in the reconstruction of a Kingdom of Poland, Austria would have to deal with that Kingdom, and probably be obliged to make a cession of Galicia and Cracow; but matters were not yet advanced so far. Why then, should Austria be called upon to make any immediate sacrifice, or why should she enter at present into engagements for the future?

This conversation is important as showing the restless nature of the Emperor's mind when circumstances arise to rouse it from its dormant state. Prince Metternich has no doubt that floating visions of the frontier of the Rhine are mixed up with vague ideas



of Polish independence, though it does not appear that his Majesty allowed any expression to escape him, for which he could be fairly called to account.

I beg your Lordship to consider this despatch as secret.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 99.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 28, 1863.*

THE answers to the despatches sent to Baron Gros will go to-night.

No. 100.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received February 28).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, February 28, 1863, 12. 30 a. m.*

If the Petersburg Convention is not yet ratified, I venture to think that there is an honourable arrangement for all parties. Prussia and Russia may declare, either spontaneously or in answer to enquiries, that circumstances having changed, they do not consider it necessary to proceed further in their negotiations. May I speak in this sense to French Government?

No. 101.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, February 28, 1863.*

YOU may speak to French Government respecting Petersburg Convention in the sense you propose.

No. 102.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 306. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 28, 1863.*

THE despatch of which the inclosed is a copy was put into my hands on the 24th instant, by Baron Gros <sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> No. 74.

It is of the most confidential nature; but I could not enable your Excellency to understand my reply without placing a copy of the despatch itself in your hands.

In the description given by M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the Polish question, Her Majesty's Government fully agree. It is a question which, as he says, oscillates between a state of constant uneasiness and one of violent disturbance.

It is true, also, that the recent Convention between Prussia and Russia appears to revive this question as one to be discussed between the European Powers. Prussia has, apparently without any necessity, engaged herself to afford facilities to Russia on Prussian territory, and thus indirectly takes part in the war.

Her Majesty's Government taking this view, had prepared a despatch which was ready for transmission when the communication from the French Government reached them. A copy of that despatch is inclosed. Her Majesty's Government have, however, thought it prudent to point out in that despatch a mode of escape for Prussia from the consequences of her hasty act. There is some reason to hope, from communications received here and at Paris, that the Prusso-Russian Convention will be set aside, or at all events will not be executed; and it is desirable to give Prussia this way of repairing the error she has committed.

Passing on to Austria, Her Majesty's Government rejoice with the Emperor's Government at the attitude taken by Austria. It separates her from the other two Powers, who with her were sharers in the partition of Poland. Her position is wise and prudent; but as it is wise and prudent, and as it is at the same time liable to misconstruction by Russia, it behoves England and France not to press Austria too far, nor to try to engage her in measures which might create for her future embarrassment.

Her Majesty's Government will be, however, ready to ask Austria, as well as other Powers parties to the Treaty of Vienna, to concur in the steps which Great Britain and France are about to take at St. Petersburg.

With regard to Cracow it is not probable that Austria would at the present moment take a step so decided as to re-establish that Republic. She would think she could not do so without some danger of creating thereby a centre of action for extreme parties.

There remains the great question of all, that of the relations between Russia and the Kingdom of Poland; and Her Majesty's Government concur in the general view taken by the Government of the Emperor of the position of Russia in Poland.

With regard to Prussia it is to be observed that the Duchy of Posen is becoming gradually more or less Germanized; nearly half the population and more than half the property are German. Dantzic is still more German in character, and the complaints of the Polish population of the Duchy of Posen are not so much that they do not enjoy the rights conferred upon them by the Treaty of Vienna, as that of the German population is gradually getting possession of the soil.

With regard to Austria it may be observed that she has no immediate fears of danger from her Polish subjects. The Roman Catholic Church forms a religious tie between them and the Austrian Government; the functions of the Diet of Galicia and the position of Galician deputies in the Reichsrath create a political bond of union between Galicia and Austria, and the Polish usages are respected in Galicia.

The state of things is different in the Kingdom of Poland. But if England and France shall determine to interfere by advice at St. Petersburg, care must be used to frame their representation in such a manner as to create a likelihood that some good result would thereby be obtained. The Governments of England and France agree in opinion that the engagements of the Treaty of Vienna with respect to the Kingdom of Poland have not been fulfilled by Russia. A simple and peremptory demand that those engagements should be carried into effect would probably tend only to a renewal of former controversies without producing any result advantageous to Poland. A reference, however, to those Treaty engagements must necessarily be the foundation upon which to rest any representation to Russia.

Combining the obligations of the Treaty of Vienna with reasons of expediency and a due regard to the welfare of Poland, considerations might be submitted to the Russian Government which, without wounding its pride or creating needless irritation, might lead that Government to reflections and to conclusions the result of which might be beneficial to Russia, to Poland, and to the rest of Europe.

The matter and the manner of such representations require to be carefully weighed, and Her Majesty's Government are engaged in considering the terms of a despatch to be addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and to be communicated to Prince Gortchakoff. Her Majesty's Government will send a copy of this despatch to your Excellency, and will be happy to communicate with the Government of France upon a subject of such great and general and pressing importance.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 103.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 87. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 19, 1863.*

THE military recruitment attempted in Poland is acknowledged on all hands to be an oppressive, and by most to be an impolitic, measure; but there has been considerable dispute as to whether it is, in the strict and technical sense of the term, illegal. By some, the present system is believed to have been substituted for the previous enactment of 1859 by competent authority, in due form of law. I have been assured by persons here, whom I believed to be well informed, that the measure had actually passed through the Council of State previous to the arrival at Warsaw of Marquis Wielopolski. I fear that I may even have imparted to your Lordship an erroneous impression on this subject.

I had yesterday some confidential conversation with M. Lenski, the new Secretary of State for Poland, whose acquaintance I have only recently made. His Excellency told me that the system of military recruitment in Poland under the Emperor Nicholas had been, virtually, entirely arbitrary. The military authorities took whom they pleased, and

this system gave rise to corruption and oppression; in fact, it caused a positive progressive diminution of the population of the country. After the war the subject was warmly taken up at Warsaw; and in conformity with the pressing representations of persons interested in the welfare of the country, the Law of 1859 was framed, which was tantamount to the introduction of the Continental system of humane, equal, and discriminating military conscription. This law had not, however (according to M. Lenski), been formally published or inserted in the official collection of the Polish Statutes. From 1856 to 1863, there was no military levy. When the levy for 1863 became necessary, it was found that none of the preliminary measures had been taken. The population had not been divided into its proper categories. A great deal of statistical labour remained to be done. His Excellency did not deny, too, that there was a political object. In short, it was determined that the Law of 1859 should be suspended, and that the old system should be carried into effect once more, with certain modifications. The question had, however, been treated entirely as one of military administration. It had not been debated in the Council of State. Marquis Wielopolski had assented to it. He (M. Lenski) was not competent to affirm whether the course followed was technically and strictly legal or not. The Council of State was a new body; it had not passed the Law of 1859, which had remained in a manner incomplete. Whether the assent of the Council of State to the suspension of that law was necessary or not, might be considered an open question. I must, however, add, in justice to M. Lenski, that it was not difficult to discover that he regretted the measure of military recruitment.

I think there can be no doubt that if the measure of recruitment was not sanctioned in the Council of State, it was virtually illegal, as well as oppressive; for surely if the Council of State be seriously constituted for the good of the country, its functions must extend to the organisation of the civil basis of the army, as well as to other objects of public interest. The discipline and organization of the troops once embodied, may fall within the exclusive scope of the executive military department; but the levy of the men cannot be regarded as a professional detail: it is a matter most important to the whole industrial welfare of a community — a question essentially civil and social, as well as military. The conscription is, perhaps, the heaviest tax which can be imposed on the whole body of a nation, a tax on life and labour.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

†† No. 104.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 88. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 19, 1863.*

I TOOK occasion to speak to Prince Gortchakoff this forenoon on the affairs of Poland.

[<sup>1</sup> The Vice-Chancellor said that he learned from Baron Brunnow that Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to encourage the discussion of this question in Parliament]. His Excellency [then] qualified the insurrection very much as we see it described in the official newspapers here, and, I may add, very much as it appears to Her Majesty's Consul at Warsaw — as a movement of the very poorest order of nobility, of the artisans in the towns, and of the standing cosmopolitan revolutionary conspiracy abroad. He said that not one single landed proprietor of any importance had joined the revolt, the socialist character of which was proved by the proclamation of the Committee at Warsaw, which gave the peasantry full property in their holdings. The peasantry, according to Prince Gortchakoff, had remained favourable to Government, and that disposition could at any moment be converted into the most active support, if the Imperial Government held out the least hope of a confiscation of the land in their favour, or even ceased to enforce the rights of the proprietor. The Vice-Chancellor added, most emphatically, that the Emperor had never, since the beginning of the outbreak, been moved to the least feeling of an impatient nature. Not a word of incrimination against the Poles had ever passed His Majesty's lips, even when his soldiers had been massacred, whom he regarded as his children. His Majesty's sentiments and intentions regarding Poland remained unaltered. No doubt the difficulties of the case were very great, and one of the greatest was the pusillanimity of the moderate party, which dared not give the Government any active support. The Vice-Chancellor saw nothing for it but to resume and carry on the same course of conciliatory policy when this sanguinary interval had passed away. [<sup>1</sup> Prince Gortchakoff concluded by saying, as is common with Russians of tolerably liberal sentiments, that if this were merely a question of the Kingdom of Poland as now constituted, he would let it be gone — it was a burden to Russia: but the revolutionary party only used the present kingdom as a basis; their avowed aim was the recovery of Poland in its former limits, — Poland to the Dwina, — that is, the dismemberment of Russia. I fancy, however, that the Prince spoke quite unofficially and unadvisedly in qualifying the Kingdom of Poland so slightly. He might not like to be reminded of the unguarded utterance of a sentiment which is prevalent among his countrymen. His Excellency made no allusion to the recruitment, which was the proximate cause, and partly a justification, of the resistance to Government, and I saw no use in raising a controversy on that subject].

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

†† No. 105.

(No. 95).

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 21, 1863.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF spoke to me this forenoon respecting the affairs of Poland, recapitulating nearly the same observations which were reported to your Lordship

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).

in my despatch [No. 88] of the 19th instant, respecting the character of the insurrection, the barbarities practised by the rebels, and the benevolent policy of the Emperor.

I remarked to the Vice-Chancellor that I made no doubt of the good intentions of His Imperial Majesty, who was, I believed, firmly bent upon establishing a just and humane Government among his Polish subjects. Moreover, ever since I had made the acquaintance of Marquis Wielopolski, I had been firmly persuaded of the sincerity and patriotism of that statesman, and all my aspirations were for his success in the arduous task of improvement and conciliation which he had undertaken. Nevertheless, I did not like to leave him, the Vice-Chancellor, as he had voluntarily raised the subject, under the impression that I thought the conduct of the Russian Government had been wise or just in the matter of the military recruitment. I could not but regret and condemn that measure in the interest of the Russian Government itself.

The Vice-Chancellor replied with promptitude, „I regret it too“; and then his Excellency went on to explain and extenuate the course pursued, which he said had no other view than to clear off a number of ill-disposed persons and open a fairer path to the peaceful realization of the administrative reforms projected by the Emperor. His Excellency added that the measure of the military recruitment had originated with Marquis Wielopolski.

I said I had understood that the Marquis had approved of the measure or assented to it. I was surprised to learn that he had suggested it.

He was the first adviser of it, the Vice-Chancellor replied. [<sup>1</sup> His Excellency then informed me that the position of Marquis Wielopolski was seriously menaced, and that he had great difficulty in sustaining the Polish Minister].

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

†† No. 106.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 96. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 21, 1863.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF spoke to me spontaneously this morning concerning the recent engagement between the Russian and Prussian Governments for the suppression of the revolt in Poland. The Vice-Chancellor observed that the greatest exaggerations and misapprehensions prevailed on this subject in Germany. The Agreement signed by him with the Prussian Military Agent (for Convention he would not call it) had no political character or significance whatever; it was simply an arrangement for the maintenance of security on the borders of the two countries. The insurgents were in the habit of falling on the Custom-house stations and other localities where public funds were deposited. It was necessary that the Agents of Government should be enabled to withdraw with their

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).

funds from threatened posts to place of safety, if necessary even on foreign territory. Such a liberty was assured for them; and if they were pursued by the rebels, the latter in their turn would be followed by the Russian troops over the frontier until they fell in with an armed force of Prussians.

I asked Prince Gortchakoff whether the Agreement secured to each of the Contracting Parties generally the right of penetrating into the territory of the other in the course of these operations.

The Vice-Chancellor replied rather vaguely, and seemed to wish to attach the right of traversing the frontiers particularly to the designs of the insurgents against the revenue stations. He did not offer to show me the Convention; but he said that the Emperor had desired to have it published, and if this had not been done it was owing to objections in another quarter. There was reason to hope that the Agreement might never be carried into effect, for the forces of the revolt were gradually drawing from the Prussian frontier to that of Austria. His Excellency added that the prevailing disorders had given an immense impulse to contraband trade, and that the Minister of Finance was already crying out loudly.

I did not continue the conversation. I make it a rule never to originate any discussion on Polish affairs with the Minister. I think it most prudent to await the orders of Her Majesty's Government. [<sup>1</sup>Nor have I spoken to Count de Redern, my new Prussian colleague, on the subject. He observes a stiff reserve even towards his German colleagues, and I do not yet possess any intimacy with him].

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

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No. 107.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 103).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 22, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a file of the official newspaper from the 2/14 to the 10/22 instant, containing intelligence respecting the operations of the insurgents and the Imperial troops in Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

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No. 108.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(No. 53).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 2, 1863.*

HER Majesty's Government view with the deepest concern the state of things now existing in the Kingdom of Poland. They see there, on the one side, a large mass of the

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).



population in open insurrection against the Government; and, on the other, a vast military force employed in putting that insurrection down. The natural and probable result of such a contest must be expected to be the success of the military forces. But that success, if it is to be achieved by a series of bloody conflicts, must be attended by a lamentable effusion of blood, by a deplorable sacrifice of life, by wide-spread desolation, and by impoverishment and ruin, which it would take a long course of years to repair.

Moreover, the acts of violence and destruction on both sides, which are sure to accompany such a struggle, must engender mutual hatreds and resentments, which will embitter, for generations to come, the relations between the Russian Government and the Polish race.

Yet, however much Her Majesty's Government might lament the existence of such a miserable state of things in a foreign country, they would not, perhaps, deem it expedient to give formal expression of their sentiments, were it not that there are peculiarities in the present state of things in Poland which take them out of the usual and ordinary condition of such affairs.

The Kingdom of Poland was constituted, and placed in connection with the Russian Empire by the Treaty of 1815, to which Great Britain was a Contracting Party. The present disastrous state of things is to be traced to the fact that Poland is not in the condition in which the stipulations of that Treaty require that it should be placed.

Neither is Poland in the condition in which it was placed by the Emperor Alexander I, by whom that Treaty was made.

During his reign a National Diet sat at Warsaw, and the Poles of the Kingdom of Poland enjoyed privileges fitted to secure their political welfare.

Since 1832, however, a state of uneasiness and discontent has been succeeded from time to time by violent commotion and a useless effusion of blood.

Her Majesty's Government are aware that the immediate cause of the present insurrection was the conscription lately enforced upon the Polish population; but that measure itself is understood to have been levelled at the deeply-rooted discontent prevailing among the Poles in consequence of the political condition of the Kingdom of Poland.

The proprietors of land and the middle classes in the towns bore that condition with impatience; and if the peasantry were not equally disaffected they gave little support or strength to the Russian Government.

Great Britain, therefore, as a Party to the Treaty of 1815, and as a Power deeply interested in the tranquillity of Europe, deems itself entitled to express its opinion upon the events now taking place, and is anxious to do so in the most friendly spirit towards Russia, and with a sincere desire to promote the interest of all the parties concerned. Why should not His Imperial Majesty, whose benevolence is generally and cheerfully acknowledged, put an end at once to this bloody conflict by proclaiming mercifully an immediate and unconditional amnesty to his revolted Polish subjects, and at the same time announce his intention to replace without delay his Kingdom of Poland in possession of the political and civil privileges which were granted to it by the Emperor Alexander I. in execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1815?



If this were done, a National Diet and a National Administration would, in all probability, content the Poles, and satisfy European opinion.

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff and give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

† No. 109.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 13).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, February 20, 1863.*

ON the 17th instant I had the honour to forward to your Lordship per post a translation of an order by the Military Chief of the Warsaw Department, promulgating certain rules to be adopted by the inhabitants of the town of Warsaw, as well as conveying threats in cases of non-compliance with the same.

The publication of these rules caused the greatest terror amongst the inhabitants, many of whom were firmly convinced that it was the intention of the Government to give the town over to the troops to pillage in case of any disturbance arising, and the barbarities committed by the troops in some country towns and villages assisted in keeping up the anxiety. In the meantime, my Lord, the National Committee had issued an order of the day, under date of the 14th February, calling upon the youths under 18 years of age to attend diligently to their studies, as the only means of preparing themselves to render good service to the country; also warning the workmen not to allow themselves to be enrolled except by persons acting under the orders of and with a proper commission from, the national authorities, desiring them not to leave town on any pretext except under the orders of the enrolling officer, as otherwise they were liable to become the victims of spies, &c., concluding with the following paragraph: —

“As the sudden flight of many officials of the conqueror to the citadel, and the continuance of oppressive regulations, may give an opportunity to Muscovite agents to avail themselves of the natural disposition of the inhabitants to produce demonstrations, especially under the prevailing opinion that their city is likely to be exposed to the same fate that has befallen other towns which have been pillaged, the inhabitants are particularly desired to avoid any kind of demonstration, as these would only serve as an excuse to the oppressors, and to the traitor Wielopolski, for fresh rigours. The inhabitants will be informed by proclamation whenever their services are required, but at present the cause of their country can be best served by the most peaceable demeanour; this must not, however, prevent them from preparing arms and ammunition, which may be necessary alike to defend the independence of their country or their own homes, should they be assailed by the enemy”.

These two proclamations appear, my Lord, to have been issued by the two parties under a mutual fear, and as it was a fact that many Russian officers had removed their

families into the citadel, the report was more readily credited that, in case of disturbance, the town would be pillaged, than might otherwise have been the case; moreover, an outbreak in Warsaw itself had been announced as probable towards the end of this present month, which has tended to keep up a state of anxious expectation amongst all parties.

Fortunately, my Lord, hitherto no demonstration has taken place in this town, but should such occur I fear that the strongest measures will be taken to put it down, and that much blood will be shed in the attempt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

†† No. 110.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 15).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, February 23, 1863.*

SO many reports having been spread of the excesses and cruelty of the Russian troops engaged in the suppression of the outbreak in this kingdom, and it being so difficult to arrive at the truth of these statements from the exaggerated reports generally in circulation, I beg leave to forward to your Lordship a copy of a statement that has been given me from a reliable source of an attack made by a detachment of troops on the mansion of Count Poletylo, a member of the Council of State of the kingdom, situated in in the Government of Lublin, from which it appears that, without the slightest opposition being offered to the troops, the mansion was stormed, and the inhabitants most barbarously treated.

I must apologize to your Lordship for sending so verbose a document as the enclosed statement, but [<sup>1</sup>having received it from a friend of Count Poletylo], I have considered it better to forward it to your Lordship in the form in which it was given me. I beg also to state to your Lordship that, on the matter being reported to the Grand Duke, his Imperial Highness immediately ordered an inquiry into the affair, the result of which has not been made public; but I am informed, on official authority, that the military report of the transaction does not attempt to deny the excesses committed, but states, in justification, that shots were fired at the troops, both from the mansion and a public-house near at hand. Whether, my Lord, this statement may be correct or not, it appears, at all events, that no attempts were made by the officers in command of the troops to prevent the excesses committed by them in the house of a member of the Government.

I may also mention to your Lordship that it is reported, on good authority, that on the estates of the Count Constantine Zamoyski the most serious injury has been done by the troops, and amongst other valuables destroyed, it is mentioned that a portion of the family papers and documents extending over many years have been burnt, whilst it does not appear that any insurgents were on the premises destroyed.

<sup>1</sup> The words in parenthesis are not in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

Many other cases of pillage and burning by the troops are mentioned, but it would be only wearying to your Lordship to send *ex parte* statements; as yet I have not heard of any excesses committed by the insurgents beyond appropriating arms, food, and horses, of which they have been in need.

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† Inclosure in No. 110.

*Report of Attack on the Mansion of Count Poletylo.*

LE Comte Léopold Poletylo, membre du Conseil d'Etat dans le Royaume de Pologne, après avoir ramené sa femme à Nice, qui y est allée pour cause de santé, est revenu s'établir dans sa terre de Woislawice, dans le Gouvernement de Lublin, auprès de ses deux fils en bas âge, avec la ferme intention d'attendre les événements qui se préparaient.

L'insurrection éclata, et il persista dans le principe qu'il avait toujours franchement énoncé, que ce mouvement ne pouvait avoir d'autres résultats que d'amener des répressions et des calamités au pays. Pas un de ses employés ni de ses domestiques ne marcha à l'insurrection, et sur son territoire il n'y a eu ni conflit ni même rassemblements.

Le 12 du mois de Février se réunirent chez lui pour fêter le jour de naissance de son fils aîné âgé de cinq ans, son beau-frère M. Titus Woyciechowski, avec son fils Joseph Woyciechowski, le ci-devant Colonel des Grenadiers de la Garde Polonaise Dunin, le ci-devant Major de l'armée Polonaise Kunn. Ces messieurs, heureux de se voir réunis s'entretenaient, en prenant leur café et fumant leurs cigares, des événements du jour; quand à 3½ de l'après midi le régisseur de la terre Salkowski vint annoncer qu'un détachement de troupes, qui se composait de trois compagnies d'Infanterie, d'un escadron de Lanciers, de deux canons, et de quelques Cosaques, avaient fait une visite domiciliaire du Château de Rakolupy, appartenant au Comte Aurèle Poletylo, qu'ils marchaient sur Woyslawice et arriveraient dans une demi-heure.

Ces messieurs se consultèrent sur le parti à prendre. Il aurait été facile d'éviter la rencontre des troupes, car le tems était plus que suffisant; mais les deux vieux militaires décidèrent qu'on pouvait très calmement les attendre, vu que ce n'était pas une horde de Tatares mais des troupes régulières commandées par des Chefs civilisés, des hommes d'honneur qui rempliraient la visite domiciliaire, et ne trouvant rien quitteraient la place.

On devisait là-dessus, quand on entendit dans la lointaine des coups de feu, et deux coups de canon tirés dans la petite ville de Woyslawice, située à un quart de lieue du château. Ces coups de feu tuèrent quatre hommes inoffensifs et en blessèrent quelques autres.

Alors on vit des fenêtres du château quelques Cosaques allant au galop sur le chemin dans la direction d'Uhair, et quelque temps après on vit des Tirailleurs se développer et marcher sur le château, où les balles commencèrent déjà à arriver et brisaient les fenêtres. Suivait la masse d'Infanterie, qui cerna le château. On mit les canons en position à 150 pas, et c'est là aussi que se tinrent les officiers, tandis que l'Infanterie s'ap-

procha du château et brisa les fenêtres avec les crosses. Le Comte Poletylo voulut par trois fois aller au-devant des troupes pour traiter avec le commandant de l'expédition, et préserver les habitants du château et ses hôtes d'un danger imminent, mais il fut toujours retenu par son beau-frère Woyciechowski, qui lui fit remarquer qu'il n'y avait à qui parler, vu qu'aucun officier, même subalterne, ne paraissait.

Alors commença un carnage effroyable qu'on ne peut raconter sans horreur.

Les soldats ayant brisé les fenêtres se mirent à tirer presque à bout portant sans avoir blessé personne jusque là, mais quand ils entrèrent dans le vestibule et commencèrent à massacrer les domestiques à coups de baïonnette et de crosse, le Comte Poletylo, persuadé qu'il n'avait plus qu'à compter ses jours que par minutes prit congé de son beau-frère Woyciechowski et de ses hôtes, et en disant que son devoir était de mourir auprès de ses enfants, il y trouva ses deux fils, Madame Dunin sa tante, et trois femmes de service agenouillées; il en fit autant, et pendant une heure et demie tant que dura le carnage il passa ce tems à prier en attendant la mort. Le Comte, ses enfants et les femmes qui l'entouraient furent sauvés comme par miracle, car la porte de la Chambre où ils se trouvaient n'était qu'entrebaillée, et tout à côté les soldats avaient tiré dans tous les sens et ont brisé toutes les portes.

Vers six heures du soir le feu cessa, et le Comte en quittant sa retraite apprit et trouva ce qui suit.

M. Woyciechowski et son fils Joseph se retirèrent dans le cabinet du Comte, et comme on commença de mitrailler le château, les biscayens qui traversèrent les fenêtres tirèrent sur Joseph Woyciechowski, âgé de 24 ans, jeune homme brillant, et contusionnèrent son père. Le Major Kunn et le Colonel Dunin attendaient les assassins dans des pièces séparées.

Le Major Kunn fut assailli par une masse de baïonnettes qu'il écartait de ses mains, et alors deux balles lui enlevèrent deux doigts à chaque main; ensuite il reçut quelques coups de baïonnette dans la poitrine et une masse de coups de crosse sur tout le corps. Les soldats victorieux emmenèrent ce prisonnier et le conduisirent vers un officier, auquel il demanda à être pansé, car il perdait beaucoup de sang; mais l'officier Russe lui répondit qu'il y avait des médecins, des chirurgiens, et des pansements, mais que c'était pour panser les soldats et non ceux qui étaient les ennemis de la nation Russe, et il finit par lui donner un coup de sabre à la figure.

Le Colonel Dunin, âgé de 70 ans, les bras croisés, assis calmement sur un canapé du salon, attendait l'attaque, quand la porte s'ouvrit, cinq fantassins tirèrent à la fois sur lui. Il eut cinq blessures; une balle frisa le crâne et le blessa, deux balles traversèrent le cou, deux chevrotines vinrent se loger dans la mâchoire. Ensuite les soldats se ruèrent sur lui, et il fut blessé à la main en repoussant les baïonnettes. Il voulut arrêter la fureur de ces assassins, et il leur fit observer qu'ils devaient le ménager comme vieillard et ancien militaire; pour réponse il reçut des injures et des coups de crosse. Alors les soldats, en le soutenant, parce qu'il faiblissait en perdant beaucoup de sang, l'amenèrent au Major commandant le détachement, qui se tenait impassible près des canons, au milieu de cette scène de carnage. Le Colonel Dunin adressa la parole au Major en ces

termes, „Vous êtes soldat, et vous n'avez pas honte d'exterminer ainsi des gens sans armes et qui ne peuvent pas se défendre“.

Le Major lui répondit qu'on avait tiré 100 coups de feu du château et qu'alors il avait fait attaquer. Le Colonel Dunin lui dit à ceci: „C'est un infâme mensonge. Je suis un ancien Colonel de la Garde des Grenadiers, Aide-de-camp du Général de Division Zymi(r)ski; je suis décoré: eh bien! je vous jure sur mes cheveux gris, je vous donne ma parole d'honneur de soldat, que depuis les événements il n'y a pas eu un seul insurgé dans le château, et qu'il n'y a pas une seule arme dans la maison, ni fusil, ni revolver, ni sabre — en un mot rien. Du reste je suis entre vos mains; faites faire une visite domiciliaire, et si vous trouvez autre chose que quelques canifs et des couteaux de table, vous me ferez fusiller“. A cela le Major lui dit: „Mais qu'est-ce que vous me racontez, quand j'ai vu un individu dans la cour tirer sur moi-même à vingt pas“.

Le Colonel Dunin lui répondit: „Comment osez-vous faire un pareil mensonge? Mais, mon Dieu, quel Chef êtes-vous, et comment n'avez-vous pas fait saisir cet homme dans une cour remplie de soldats?“

Le Major Russe comprit qu'il avait dit une bétise, se tut, et à un signal donné le feu cessa; à un second signal les soldats reprirent leurs rangs: or ce n'est pas par la fureur de soldats insubordonnés, mais bien par l'ordre des Chefs, que le crime a été commis.

Ensuite le Major fit appeler le Maire du village, et remit à sa surveillance les blessés, à la suite de quoi il dit aux soldats qu'ils s'étaient comportés courageusement en héros, il alla souper à un quart de lieue de là, et le lendemain il retourna après cette glorieuse équipée à Krasnystaw.

Il y a eu six morts, quatre à la ville de Woyslawice, et deux au château — M. Joseph Woyciechowski et un domestique; en outre il y a eu au château neuf blessés et roués de coups de crosses, qui ont été onze heures sans être pansés, vu qu'il n'y avait pas de médecins ou autres secours à leur donner sur les lieux.

Le sac de la maison a été complet. Le rez de chaussée a été mis en pièces, meubles, glaces, porcelaines. tout a été brisé; on mettait le linge en lambeaux. On a enlevé les bijoux de la Comtesse, on a retiré de la poche du Colonel Dunin 12.000 florins, on a pris à une femme de chambre 3.000 florins d'épargnes en lettres de gage, au Contrôleur Gorchowski 12.000 florins dans le même genre de papier, qui constituait tout son avoir, le résultat des épargnes faites pendant une longue série d'années.

Nous ne sommes pas encore parvenus à apprendre le nom du Major Russe qui a commandé cette campagne, mais nous sommes à même de citer le nom du Colonel Baumgartner, Commandant Militaire du district de Krasnystaw, qui ayant à combattre une bande d'insurgés de 2.000 hommes à quatre lieues de là, à Dubienka, se contenta d'envoyer une colonne mobile à Woyslawice pour égorger un Conseiller d'Etat et ses hôtes, tous hommes inoffensifs et sans armes.

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No. 111.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 16).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, February 21, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that considerable commotion has been produced in official circles here by the arrival of Count Alexander Adlerberg, Aide-de-camp to His Majesty the Emperor, from St. Petersburg.

His Excellency, who was accompanied by Colonel Loen, Prussian Military Attaché at St. Petersburg, merely stayed two days here, and then returned to St. Petersburg. The Staff of the Grand Duke declare the visit to have been a confidential mission from the Emperor to the Grand Duke, and rumours exist (the truth of which I am unable to guarantee to your Lordship) that the object of the mission was to endeavour to induce the Grand Duke to leave Warsaw, at least for some time, and until affairs are more settled in this Kingdom, and that it was proposed, in case His Imperial Highness consented, to appoint General Berg to the head of the administration of the Kingdom *ad interim*.

Other reports state that the visit was for the purpose of consulting with the Grand Duke as to the proper person to be placed in command of the army in Poland in the place of General Baron Ramsay, who it is stated is about to retire from the command on account of ill-health.

The former was most probably the real object of the mission, but I have every reason to believe His Imperial Highness objected most strongly to abandon his position here unless ordered to do so; and it is to be hoped, in the interest of this kingdom, that His Imperial Highness will be able to resist the pressure applied by the ultra-Russian party, and to maintain his position here as the head of the Government.

I beg also to mention to your Lordship that a Prussian officer, Colonel Treskow, has been appointed here as Military Commissioner with the Russian army in the kingdom. The Colonel is accompanied by a second officer, Captain de Verdi, and both of these officers are now residing in this town. I beg further to report that Colonel the Baron Weimarn has been appointed to a similar position with the Prussian troops on the frontier, his residence being at the town of Thorn.

In conclusion, my Lord, I have the honour to report that information has been received here, the accuracy of which I am unable to guarantee, that the Polish frontier town of Dobrzyn, opposite the Prussian station of Gollub, was occupied on the morning of the 19th instant for some hours by a Prussian force, in the belief that an attack on the Russian Custom-house there was projected by the insurgents.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

EDWD. STANTON.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 17).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, February 25, 1863.*

THE extreme difficulty of procuring really reliable information on the state of events in the disturbed districts of this kingdom, coupled with the mass of false and exaggerated reports that are promulgated by both parties, render it almost impossible for me to convey to your Lordship more than my own impressions on the important events of which this country is now the scene.

Judging from all these reports, it appears, my Lord, that the insurrection continues to have its principal scene of action in the south-eastern portion of the kingdom, where the band commanded by Langiewicz, although it has been several times in collision with the troops, has nevertheless succeeded in keeping possession of a considerable tract of country, and hitherto in maintaining its communications with the Austrian frontier, so as to be able to retire into that country should events render such a step necessary. No very considerable force appears, however, my Lord, as yet to have acted against this band, and the nature of the country in that locality renders it better adapted to partisan warfare than is the case in the other districts of the kingdom.

The most serious check the insurgents have lately received occurred in the neighbourhood of the town of Miechow, near the Galician frontier, and not far from Cracow, where a considerable band was assembled, under the command of one Kurowski. The military authorities of the kingdom had prepared a combined movement from three different points to act against this band, to reoccupy the south-west portion of the kingdom, where the frontier posts had fallen into the hands of the insurgents, and to drive these towards the Prussian frontier.

The insurgents having probably received notice of the march of the several columns, and hearing at the same time that the garrison of the town of Miechow was very much weakened, seized the opportunity to attack the town, and avoiding the columns sent against them, made an attack early on the morning of the 17th instant. The garrison were, however, on the alert, and after a struggle of some hours' duration, the insurgents were repulsed with heavy loss, the remnant of the band escaping across the Austrian frontier. A considerable portion of the town was destroyed, and reports state that several of the inhabitants, including the Mayor of the town, were massacred by the troops after the action.

The insurgents suffered also another serious loss at Rudka, on the River Bug, on the 17th instant, where two bands are reported to have been destroyed, with a loss of 400 in killed.

These reverses do not, however, my Lord, appear to discourage the insurgents, and fresh bands are formed in various parts of the kingdom as soon as the troops are withdrawn, and a system of warfare most harassing to the troops appears to have now been adopted; the insurgents endeavouring to avoid regular operations against their enemy, and confining themselves to desultory warfare.



On the 22nd instant His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke received a report that a band had been attacked and dispersed near the town of Isbiea, not far from the Prussian frontier, and that papers were captured which established the fact that this band had been organized by Mieroslawski in person, who was stated also to have been present at the commencement of the affair, but to have left immediately in the direction of the Prussian frontier.

It is, my Lord, a fact worthy of note that, notwithstanding the disasters that have already befallen so many bands of insurgents, and the severe losses they have sustained, the insurrection is still far from being suppressed; and that fresh victims appear ready to sacrifice themselves to keep alive the embers of revolt throughout the kingdom. And I am firmly impressed that the belief still exists amongst their leaders that the insurrection may be shortly extended to the other Polish provinces of Russia, in which case the difficulties of the troops will be very much increased, and the probabilities of an early suppression of the revolt diminished. Nor, my Lord, does this belief appear to be quite without foundation, as reports have just arrived here that in some parts of Lithuania bands have commenced to form, comprising, amongst their numbers, some small landowners and peasants; but hitherto within the kingdom, as far at least, my Lord, as I am able to judge, this latter class has not shown any disposition to join the ranks of the insurrection, but I imagine their attitude must not be attributed to any great feeling of loyalty to the Russian Government, but to their conviction that at present, at least, the Government is the stronger of the two parties, and, therefore, that it is safer for them to remain quiet. How long this feeling may last it is not easy to foretell; but it cannot be doubted that every effort will be used by the Revolutionary party to induce them to join their ranks.

The position of the Polish nobility continues to be one of the utmost difficulty, and the pressure brought to bear on them, as a class, to induce them to join the movement becomes daily more difficult to be resisted. A paper purporting to be a programme of the moderate party has been promulgated, which calls upon the insurgents to disperse and to return to their homes, as at present it is impossible for them to obtain any permanent advantage over the superior forces of the Russian Empire, and stating that it is the duty of the aristocracy of the kingdom to abstain from taking part in the insurrection, so as to be in a position to act as mediator between the Government and the insurgents.

Hitherto, my Lord, the students of the several schools in Warsaw have refrained from joining the national ranks, but it is thought by many that this is merely in accordance with the decision of the revolutionary leaders, and that the time is not far distant when these also will join the insurgents.

The great difficulty in the way of success to the Polish cause is the want of proper arms and ammunition, and the impossibilities they suffer under of receiving the necessary supplies of these; but the sympathies shown throughout Europe for their cause since the commencement of the present outbreak, and the hopes conceived of diplomatic intervention in their favour, have undoubtedly, my Lord, contributed much to keep up the spirit and determination which animates the insurgents, and which makes them court



death in an unequal struggle for freedom, rather than submit to the oppressions of the Russian dominion.

In conclusion, my Lord, I may mention that the chief engineer of the Russian railways in the kingdom has been arrested in this town, and the police authorities believe him to have been the chief of the National Committee in Warsaw itself. No papers were, however, discovered on him, or in his possession, containing any proof of such having been the case, and it is stated that the arrest was made in consequence of information received from abroad.

I may also mention to your Lordship that the authorities pretend to have captured valuable papers in several parts of the kingdom, but whether there is any truth in these statements I am unable to state.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

No. 113.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 100).

My Lord,

*Vienna, February 21, 1863.*

WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 98 of this day, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Rechberg has not received any account of a decisive engagement between the Russian troops and the insurgents in Poland; but the impression of the last intelligence which has reached him from Warsaw is, that the armed insurrection cannot last very long. He thinks the Russian forces will soon have the upper hand, and says the real difficulties of the Government will then begin. How will they deal with Poland? What will they do to try and create a feeling of confidence in that kingdom?

His Excellency does not pretend to suggest anything to Russia, but he is more confirmed each day in the conviction that the policy of Austria has been successful, and that to follow in the same course is the best chance of insuring a continuance of tranquility in Galicia. Many refugees have crossed over and caused trouble at Cracow, Lemberg, and elsewhere; the Austrian Government also have been unable to stop many of their own people from joining the insurgents, but still they have used their best endeavours to prevent it, and have laboured with one object in view—that of seeking to allay the spirit of disaffection by removing all just cause of complaint. They have regretted the opposite policy pursued by the Prussian Government, and the conclusion of the Military Convention with Russia, because they consider it calculated to excite, and not to subdue, the feeling of Polish nationality in the Grand Duchy of Posen, where, up to the time of the

breaking out of the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland, there had been no serious cause of apprehension.

Count Rechberg told me that Russia had made no proposal to Austria to enter into engagements similar to those lately concluded with Prussia, but that Baron Werther, the Prussian Minister at this Court, had, at the time of negotiation, sounded him on the subject, and that he at once refused to entertain the project. He observed to me that it would have been the height of imprudence for Austria to listen to a proposition of the kind and that a general cry of discontent throughout Galicia would have been its inevitable and immediate consequence. His Excellency then said it had been reported to him that M. de Bismarck had pressed the conclusion of the Convention with much more ardour than the Russian Government, or than pleased Prince Gortchakoff, who; moreover, had been greatly annoyed at the suggestion that a Prussian corps d'armée should be marched into the Kingdom of Poland if the Emperor of Russia desired it. The Prince, it was said, was quite unprepared for so startling a proposal, and at St. Petersburg it was not considered to be serious, as the Russian Government did not believe that a Prussian corps d'armée could be so easily or readily mobilized.

Count Rechberg mentioned to me further, that he had sent for the Russian Minister yesterday in order to express to him the regret of the Imperial Government that some Galician peasants had lately crossed into Russian territory and plundered a Custom-house station that had been abandoned by the authorities. He informed M. Balabine that the people who had been guilty of this proceeding would be tried by the ordinary tribunals and punished, and that the stolen property would be restored. After making this statement to the Russian Minister, Count Rechberg said that on his part he had to complain of the conduct of an officer of Cossacks, who, a few days ago, accompanied by ten men, and without any previous communication, had marched across the frontier some eight or ten miles to an Austrian village called Ulanow, and demanded the extradition of two priests supposed to have taken refuge there. No sooner were the Cossacks seen approaching the village then the toscin was sounded, the villagers collected, and the local authorities compelled the officer and his men to withdraw at once.

After stating the occurrence to M. Balabine, Count Rechberg observed that he must protest against this act of aggression on the territory of Austria, but that as he was convinced the Russian Government would disapprove of the irregularity which has been committed, he should not take any more serious step in the matter, relying on them to issue such orders as would prevent the recurrence of any similar proceeding.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

†† No. 114.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 105. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, February 26, 1863.*

HAVING heard that the Duc de Grammont had communicated to Count Rechberg a project of a note to be presented at Berlin on the affairs of Poland and the policy which had been pursued by Prussia with respect to the present insurrection, I called on his Excellency this afternoon, when he gave me [<sup>1</sup>confidentially] the following account of the French proposition, [<sup>1</sup>the main features of which have been already forwarded to your Lordship by telegraph, as recorded in my despatch No. 104 of this day].

Count Rechberg asked me first of all if I had no communication to make to him. I replied that your Lordship had not written to me respecting this project, and that the only thing I could tell him was that I received a telegram a few days ago, by which I learned that Her Majesty's Government considered that Austria had acted wisely in declining the Prussian overtures respecting Poland.

His Excellency then proceeded to say that the project of note transmitted from Paris was drawn up in very courteous terms, but that it was impossible for Austria to identify herself with it, notwithstanding her earnest wish to unite with England and France; that she had refused Prussia to join in the Military Convention concluded with Russia for the suppression of the insurrection in Poland, and had taken a line of her own, of complete independence, which he thought was the best calculated to protect her interests and advance those of the peace of Europe, and while she maintained all her international engagements, she reserved to herself the right of changing her position if it might hereafter become advisable to do so. That by acceding to the proposed identic note, it would be said of Austria that she adopted a policy of non-intervention, which it was her determination not to do. She would maintain, on the contrary, complete liberty of action, and would not bind herself to any general principle such as that implied in the proposed note. His Excellency said that if it was proposed to restore to Poland the engagements taken by the Powers in 1815, why should not all the other stipulations of that time be insisted on? [<sup>1</sup>If he were to listen to the Catholic Party here he should have to advise the Emperor to espouse the cause of the Poles, who had been partly goaded into insurrection by religious persecution; but the policy of the Government would not be influenced by such proceedings and acts of intolerance, and, much as he disapproved the policy unadvisedly and hastily adopted by Prussia, he could not agree to one in complete opposition to it. Austrian interests required abstention from all interference at the present moment, but a case might arise in which intervention would be advantageous to her, and therefore she was resolved to maintain her entire liberty to act according to circumstances, and to avoid binding herself to any principle whatever.

For instance, said Count Rechberg, we are pursuing a principle of neutrality with regard to this Polish affair, because we consider it in the true interest of Austria; but

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

we cannot invoke it as a principle, because we should then have to disapprove the French occupation of Rome, which we may do in the abstract, but the presence of French troops there is a security for the Pope, whom we are desirous to preserve on his throne; Austria, therefore, unwillingly agrees to the occupation as a matter of necessity<sup>1</sup>].

His Excellency has addressed a despatch to Prince Metternich, in which he develops the reasons of the Austrian Cabinet for declining the French proposal. It will be sent to-morrow to Paris, and the same messenger will be the bearer of a copy of it which Count Apponyi will communicate to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

†† No. 115.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 112. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 27, 1863.*

M. DE BISMARCK having promised last night to give me some information on the subject of the Russo Prussian Convention if I would call upon him at an early hour this morning, I waited upon his Excellency [<sup>1</sup>before I had time to make myself acquainted with the correspondence on Polish affairs communicated to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 45 of the 25th instant, which I had the honour of receiving to-day].

His Excellency had also promised to ascertain from the Russian Minister whether he had any objection to the text of the Convention being communicated to me, [<sup>1</sup>and I have reason to believe M. d'Oubril was in his Excellency's cabinet when I was announced to him].

Our conversation began by my inquiring whether he was prepared to communicate the Convention to me, and by his replying that he could not do so without M. d'Oubril's consent, but that he would read its provisions to me [<sup>1</sup>confidentially] after explaining the circumstances which had led to its being entered into.

He said, when the insurrection broke out, the Prussian Government had reason to believe that the Russian troops in Poland did not exceed 60,000 men, though represented to amount to 100,000; and it was, therefore, thought advisable to send an officer to Warsaw to ascertain how far the military authorities possessed the means of suppressing the insurrection, and to enter into such arrangements with them as might be expedient for preserving tranquillity in the Prussian frontier districts, where great alarm had existed before the arrival of the troops which had been since sent there for the protection of the inhabitants.

<sup>1</sup> The words in parenthesis are omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

M. de Raneh, therefore, an officer known to the Grand Duke Constantine, had been sent to Warsaw for this purpose. [1As there was reason, however, to apprehend that a great majority of the civil functionaries in Poland were hostile to Russian rule], it was deemed advisable to send another officer through St. Petersburg to Warsaw, who, after concert with the Russian Government, could communicate more officiently with the authorities at Warsaw; [1and this arrangement, M. de Bismarek said, had been the more necessary, as the Grand Duke Constantine was supposed to be in a state of nervous excitement, which made it doubtful how far even His Imperial Highness's judgment as to what might be expedient could be depended upon]. General Alvensleben had, therefore, been sent to St. Petersburg, and on his arrival there the Russian Government had proposed that the two Governments should enter into the Convention which was subsequently signed by him and Prince Gortshakoff, but which, as no ratifications of it had yet been exchanged, could still only be regarded as a proposed Convention, and as such could not be communicated to a foreign Minister.

Having made these preliminary observations, M. de Bismarek read to me from a German text, which he translated into French, what he represented to be the contents of the Convention. He said it was of an informal character, was not divided into Articles, and was to the following effect: — That disturbances having broken out in the Kingdom of Poland which might endanger property and tranquillity in the frontier Provinces of Prussia, it was agreed between the two Governments that the troops of either should be authorized, on the requisition of the military authorities of the other, to cross the frontier, and, in case of necessity, should be permitted to pursue insurgents into the territory of the other; and it was further stipulated that either of the Contracting Parties should at any time be at liberty to terminate this Agreement.

Its other clauses, M. de Bismarek said, provided that officers should reside at the respective head-quarters of the two Governments, in order to carry on the correspondence which would be necessary between them.

The Convention, therefore, was not only incomplete from no ratifications having been exchanged, but as its existence also depended on the will of either of the Contracting Parties, it could not be considered a binding engagement.

[1However, when it arrived at Berlin, the King was of opinion that its provisions contained more than was absolutely necessary for the protection of the Prussian frontiers, but M. de Bismarek induced His Majesty to waive this objection to it, as he would have discouraged the Russian Government by disavowing what General Alvensleben had signed, while its provisions were all susceptible of being limited or modified by the instructions to be given to the officers on the frontier, to whom it was unnecessary to communicate the Convention itself. It had then been proposed that the Russian officers should receive instructions only to cross the frontier when in actual conflict with an enemy, and only to a distance from which they could return the same day: and subsequently all negotiations as to these instructions had been suspended, as about a week ago the Russian Government had intimated that their troops had become masters of the insurrection,

1 Omitted in Parl. Paper (Edit.).

and the Prussian Government had found that the arrival of their forces on the frontier, and the general effect of the exaggerated reports which had been circulated with respect to the Convention, had prevented any movements or disturbances in the Provinces of Prussia. There was not any probability, therefore, M. de Bismarck said, of anything further being done for carrying the Convention into effect, and the English and French Governments had been fighting with a shadow.

I replied that if their conflict had been with a shadow, I was glad to learn the result had been to cause its disappearance, and I inquired whether the Convention contained any clause requiring its ratification, and expressed some surprise that I should be expected to believe that General Alvensleben had signed so important a document without instructions from his Government.

The first enquiry M. de Bismarck answered evasively, saying, that of course it could not have been intended that the King should be bound by the signature of a General, until he had ratified it; and he intimated, or rather insinuated, that the ratification had been withheld because the instructions of the officers on the frontier would contain all that the Government accepted of the Convention: and, as to the authority which the General had for signing it, he replied, that he could not tell me how he had been authorized to do so, but from the manner in which he spoke I am inclined to believe there is some truth in a report that his instructions emanated from the Military Cabinet of the King.

He then observed that the reception which the Convention had met with in France and England has proved that Prussia can place little confidence in the friendship of her allies, and more particularly in that of France, where there is evidently a desire to fix a quarrel upon her. To this I replied that he could not expect that if Russia failed in suppressing the insurrection, Europe would leave Prussia to deal with Poland as she might think fit; and that if the Convention was as innocent as he conceived it to be, the Prussian Government had themselves caused it to be looked upon with suspicion, independently of the actual tendency of its provisions, by their refusal to communicate it to their allies, and that if he wished to prevent any serious remonstrance against it, he should lose no time in stating officially what he had said to me.

He replied that the King could not, however, abrogate the Convention at the dictation of foreign Powers, and that if any demand of the kind were made, His Majesty would decline to answer it.

M. de Bismarck said he hoped, however, that he had satisfied me confidentially that the Convention would not be carried into effect. I suggested, therefore, that he should authorize me to state this to your Lordship, as a debate would take place to-night in the House of Commons on Polish affairs, and it might greatly improve the position of the Prussian Government if Her Majesty's Government could affirm that the Convention would not be acted on; and I drew up the telegram which I forwarded to your Lordship to-day, in Cypher A, and asked him if he would authorize me to forward it to your Lordship in his name.

He said he could not do so without the sanction of the King; but he proposed that M. d'Oubril, who had announced himself towards the end of our conversation, should be

called in, and after reading it to him he proposed that I should forward it to your Lordship as information from myself, on which I could rely. This course was accordingly adopted.

He then repeated concisely to M. d'Oubril part of the explanations which he had given to me, in which M. d'Oubril appeared to concur; and on my asking if I might report to your Lordship all he had said to me, he replied, Certainly, provided it is not to be published in a Blue Book.

I have troubled your Lordship with this long report in the hope that it may convey some idea to you of the special pleading with which M. de Bismarck is endeavouring to satisfy himself and others that the engagements to which he has been imprudent enough to commit himself have never actually been in existence<sup>1</sup>.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 116.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 114).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 27, 1863.*

WITH reference to Lord Bloomfield's despatch No. 100 of the 21st instant, in which he speaks of M. de Bismarck having pressed the Russian Government to enter into the Russo-Prussian Convention, I have to observe that the same opinion is entertained by the public at Berlin, though M. de Bismarck stated to me to-day that the proposal for the Convention came from St. Petersburg. He did not, however, I think, say this in the presence of M. d'Oubril.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 117.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 116).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 27, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Königsberg, relative to the arrest by Prussian authorities of two young men, sons of Polish emigrants born abroad, who were travelling through the country without passports.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

† Inclosure in No. 117.

*Consul Hertslet to Sir A. Buchanan.*

Your Excellency,

*Königsberg, February 26, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I have abstained from reporting any movements of the Prussian military towards our Polish borders, because all such movements have appeared in the public papers as rapidly as I could possibly have reported them.

In all, I believe, about 12,000 men have marched to cover the borders from Neidenburg to Eydtkuhnen, and are gradually being replaced at the different garrison towns by troops from other places.

The first panical excitement as to the safety of the railroad from this place to St. Petersburg has quite subsided, and the bankers have even gold sent to them by the St. Petersburg railway as usual.

I have, however, now the honour to report that on the 21st instant two young gentlemen, sons of Polish emigrants, named Eugen von Jovanoki, born at Nice and educated at the Ecole Militaire at Cunece, apparently 21 to 22 years of age, and Jacob von Nowodworski, born at Paris, apparently about 20 years of age, were arrested by the police at this place for having no passports, and not being able to give any satisfactory account of themselves, on the suspicion of their being Polish emissaries; and the matter is, I hear, given over to the Solicitor-General („Staats-Anwalt“) to bring them to trial on the charge of high treason. One of them is said to have been with Garibaldi during his last expedition.

Should the trial take place on the charge of high treason against the State of Prussia, with regard to Posen, it will doubtless last some time, and be difficult to condemn them from want of evidence; but should they be delivered up to Russia, it is probable that they will be at once shot.

The French Consular official here has likewise informed the Ambassador of the Emperor of the French at Berlin of the case.

Another Pole has been arrested, but on a charge of theft.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. J. HERTSLET.

†† No. 118.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 121).

My Lord,

*Berlin, February 28, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a précis of the debates upon the Polish question drawn up by Mr. Morier.



[<sup>1</sup>The violent scene between the Minister President and the Vice-President of the Chamber, which formed a principal episode of these debates, has naturally tended to increase in no small degree the bitter feelings already existing between the Government and the House.

The question as to how far the Ministers who are not members of the Legislature are subject to the authority of the Presidents of either House, has before now led to discussion, and a difference of opinions prevails upon the subject. By common consent, however, occasions that might bring this question prominently forward, and necessitate an attempt to solve it, have as a rule been avoided.

It was an unfortunate aggravation of the present crisis that M. de Bismarck should have chosen the present occasion to give the strongest possible expression to the view that the President's jurisdiction does not extend to the Ministerial benches].

On the important point relative to the arrest and extradition of the four Poles at Thorn, the explanations given by Count Eulenburg are highly unsatisfactory; and the extenuation attempted by drawing a distinction between their formal extradition and their expulsion from Prussian territory across the Russian frontier, *i. e.*, into the hands of Russian soldiers, caused great indignation in the House.

The division on the various Resolutions before the House took place this morning; and by a majority of 246 against 57, the House expressed an opinion equivalent to a strong censure of the Convention with Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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†† Inclosure in No. 118.

*Précis of the Debates on the Polish Question in the Prussian Chamber, on the 26th and 27th February, 1863.*

THE following is the Resolution proposed by the majority of the Committee, and which formed the subject of debate: —

„The House declares that the interest of Prussia requires that, in face of the revolt that has broken out in the Kingdom of Poland, the Government should not afford assistance or favour either to the Russian Government or to the insurgents, and, consequently, that it should allow neither of the contending parties to come upon Prussian soil without at the same time being disarmed“.

As an amendment to the above, the following Resolution was proposed by M. Bonin in the name of the minority of the Committee: —

„The interest of Prussia requires that, in face of the insurrection that has broken out in the Kingdom of Poland, the Government should confine itself to such measures only as are required for the defence of the frontier, and should avoid any interference

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

beyond that point; and, consequently, that it should not allow of any armed persons coming upon Prussian soil, without at the same time disarming them“.

As sub-amendment to the above, Baron Vincke proposed the following: —

„That the interest of Prussia, in the face of the insurrection which has broken out in the Kingdom of Poland, requires that the Government should not allow Russian troops to come upon Prussian soil in pursuit of Polish insurgents“.

*M. de Sybel* in moving the Resolution, referred briefly to the circumstances under which Prussia had become possessed of portions of Poland. Her present title was a valid one, *de jure* and *de facto*. She had made it good by the improvement and civilization of the country, through German industry and German capital. What, therefore, he added, we desire for our Polish fellow-citizens, is a humane and just Government; but, at the same time, we desire that the German inhabitants of what was formerly Poland should know that, for their protection, and for their maintenance as belonging to the Prussian State, the entire Prussian people is ready to stand good. With consciences so clear, with a position so well-defined, and differing so essentially from that occupied by Russia, it is evidently our business to protest against a policy which, without any natural necessity, runs counter to our most important interest, namely, that of preserving peace for our Prussian territory.

The speaker then went on to show how, without any necessity, the Government had delivered over a large portion of the fatherland to all the horrors of a barbarous war, had undertaken a joint responsibility for Russian misdeeds, and changed the Polish into an European question. Further, how this policy had been followed up without any prospect of compensation, and at the expense of hundreds of thousands, without the consent of the Chamber. In doing so, the Government had once more given proofs of that which was the essence of its being, viz., contempt for rights; and had shown that it could neither live nor die without breaking the laws of the country.

*M. de Gottberg* defended the Government. *MM. von Rönne* and *Roessell* attacked it.

*Count Eulenburg*, in the absence of *M. de Bismarck*, defended the Government, and said, in reply to one of the former speakers, that it was no unusual thing for the Government to show confidentially to a foreign Government a Convention which they had not laid before the House. With reference to the Poles who were arrested at Thorn, he would give the following explanations: — They had not been delivered up („ausgeliefert“) in the sense of the Extradition Treaties; but having been arrested at the station at Thorn on their way from the West, and having been found possessed of no other legitimations than old Russian passports no longer available, they had been expelled („ausgewiesen“) across the Russian frontier, according to existing cartel provisions. (Great sensation and murmurs). Well, gentlemen, continued *Count Eulenburg*, I can only refer you to Article XXIII of the Cartel Convention, according to which you will see that every individual belonging to the Russian Empire not provided with proper papers can be expelled by us, and must be received by Russia. In virtue of the above paragraph, the four individuals in question have now been expelled.

*Dr. Becker* argued in a long speech that an independent Polish Kingdom would be a better neighbour for Germany than Russia, though he would not give up to such a king-

dom the ports of Dantzic and Elbing, or a single acre that had been fairly reclaimed by Prussian industry. He spoke strongly and indignantly against the former partitions of Poland.

*Count Eulenburg*, with reference to the supposed entrance of Russian troops into Poland, read a telegram from the Landrath of Strasburg in West Prussia, to the effect that some outposts had been pushed on in the night of the 18th of July upon the bridge of Drewinz, which belongs to Gollub (a Prussian town), and joins that place with Dobrzyn, a Russian town, because both towns were threatened with a band of insurgents which expected reinforcements from Gollub. The town of Dobrzyn had never been occupied by Russian troops; the pushing forward of outposts had been rendered necessary by local circumstances which strongly favoured an attack of the town, denuded as it was of Russian military.

*Minister President von Bismarck* recapitulates the course taken by the various debates held in the House respecting the Polish question, from the first interpellation of MM. Hautall, Kautak and Co. to the present Resolution, in order to prove a revolutionary tendency to sympathize with the Polish insurrection. The interests of the country had thereby been sacrificed to party interests, and German speakers had expressed themselves in an unheard-of manner. M. Waldeck had compared the calling in of Prussian reserves to the sale of Hessian troops to the British Government. M. de Unruh, amidst the applause of the House, had declared that if from the present acts of the Government foreign complications arose, the Chamber would refuse to the King the means necessary for the defence of the country. Now, was not this equivalent to saying to foreign countries, Now is your opportunity; come on! for Prussia is defenceless. (Oh! Oh! and strong marks of dissent [<sup>1</sup>unmistakeably designed to protest against the misrepresentation of what M. de Unruh had said]). I am glad to see, gentlemen, that you are still capable of indignation on such a subject. (Great sensation, and loud cries of „Order“).

*Vice-President Behrend*. — I must request the House to be quiet. The Minister President has the right to express his pleasure at what the House may think or do. A call for order is here out of place.

*M. de Bismarck*. — I will not here touch upon the question of whether the Ministers can be called to order, but if the question is again mooted I shall reserve to myself to speak upon it. Gentlemen, the threat to make Prussia blameless was expressed by that same M. de Unruh whose name is associated with the refusal to pay taxes in 1848. (A violent scene here ensued; cries of order from all sides of the House; members rising from their seats and groaning).

The President having rung his bell and restored partial order, said: I must here observe to the Minister President that the last statement made by him stands in no sort of relation to the subject under discussion.

*M. de Bismarck*. — I cannot admit the right of the President to call me to order. I have not the honour to belong to this Assembly. I have had nothing to do with making the rules of this House; I have not assisted in electing the President. The disciplinary power of the President is limited by these boards (striking the front of the Mini-

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

sterial tribune). My superior is alone His Majesty the King; I do not speak in virtue of the rules of your House, but in virtue of the authority given to me by His Majesty. You have not got the right to interrupt me.

*Vice-President Behrend.* — I had not disputed the Minister President's right to speak, nor, according, to the Constitution, can I dispute this right. But according to the rules of the House, the disciplinary power of the President is limited only by the four walls of the House, and this power I shall most undoubtedly use. (Loud cheers).

*M. de Bismarck.* — This is a view which, on the part of the Ministry, I must repudiate. To resume then, M. de Unruh, whose name is associated with the refusal to pay taxes in 1848 — — (renewed disturbance and cries of „Adjourn“).

*Vice-President Behrend.* — If the Minister President repeats observations which I have declared not to belong to the subject, I shall most certainly use my right to adjourn the House.

*M. de Bismarck.* — I cannot prevent the President adjourning the House, and as I have twice repeated what I meant to say I am satisfied. (Renewed disorder; the President rings his bell). This threat to lay Prussia defenceless is an unfortunate one, all the more so that with this tendency the names connected with 1848 again become prominent. You are asked by your Resolution to express your sympathy with the insurrection under Mieroslawski. I have nothing to do with the intentions of the persons who have brought forward this Resolution, but the practical result of it will undoubtedly be to identify the House with the Polish insurrection. The Report of the Committee is based upon a set of proofs in reference to the contents of the Convention derived from lies and misstatements taken from the newspapers, and the reporter has conjured up from these an imaginary belt of 500 square miles of Prussian territory given up to Russian occupation. This is a mere foolish phantasy. (Oh! Oh!) On the contrary, the Convention secures Prussia against a danger of this sort. By it, Russian military are not allowed to cross the Prussian frontier without our sanction. From the exaggerations, the lies, the misrepresentations of the Press, has arisen the bad impression made by the Convention abroad, and these misrepresentations form the material of the present debate. But this debate I can tell you will have no practical result, not even that of causing an embarrassment to the Ministry unless it be the inconvenience of a waste of their time. If the object of the Resolution therefore has been to shake the position of the Government it will fail in its object, and all that will be obtained will be to prove before the whole country that you take part with the Polish insurrection.

*M. de Säuger,* for the Bonin amendment.

*M. de Bismarck,* in reply to an observation of this speaker, again repeated that „each act of transgression of the Russian or Prussian frontier required the express sanction of the other party in each individual case“.

[<sup>1</sup> *M. Twisten,* in a long and eloquent speech, defended the Resolution against the attacks of M. de Bismarck. It was a melancholy fact that the strictures of foreign Governments upon our own were justifiable, but it was nevertheless a fact, and it was necessary to show the honour of the Government for the time being was not identical with

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

the honour of the country. M. de Bismarck has treated what was known of the Convention as the fond imagination of the newspapers; but instead of doing this he ought either to have called his own Ambassador in London to account, or have given Lord Russell the lie.

M. de Bismarck would defend Lord Russell, for whom he had a personal regard (ironical cheers), against the charge of having told a lie. He (Lord Russell) had himself said that he had not seen the Convention, and in such matters everything depended on the wording. If the statements recorded in the papers as made by Lord Russell are those that were really made by him, then they do not correctly describe the facts of the case, and he (M. de Bismarck) could only deduce afresh the moral that it was imprudent to talk about things which one did not know<sup>1</sup>.

A motion for the adjournment was then moved and carried.

*Sitting of Friday the 27th.*

A further amendment was moved by M. Bockum-Dolffs, supported by the party of Progress and the Left Centre. It only involved a slight alteration of the Resolution before the House. It was as follows: —

„That the interest of Prussia requires that the Government, in face of the insurrection that has broken out in Poland, should not assist or favour either of the contending parties, or allow armed persons to touch the Prussian soil without at the same time disarming them“.

Baron Vincke, in a brilliant speech, attacked, as is his wont, both the Government and the House. After dissecting the speeches made in favour of the Resolution, he attacked the Government, and in an eloquent outburst showed how impossible it would be for a country like Prussia to pass safely through a great external crisis unless the policy of its Government had the enthusiastic approval of the whole country. He spoke in a very unfriendly manner of the Poles, and of their dangerous character as a revolutionary element in Europe, and approved of strong measures being taken by the Prussian Government against the present insurrection. He did not approve, however, of the opening up of the Prussian frontier to Russian troops, and had accordingly, in his amendment, confined himself to this one point. As the sum total of his views, he would conclude by saying that the right policy for the Government was to favour Russia to the utmost in putting down the insurrection, short of the entrance of Russian troops into Prussia or of Prussian troops into Russia.

The debate was then continued to a very great length; the two most remarkable speeches being those of MM. de Bonin and Schulze-Delitsch. The former spoke in favour of his amendment, and having been the President of the Province of Posen under the Liberal Ministry, he was able from personal knowledge to show the unwiseness of the Convention in regard to the practical interests of that province.

The debate was adjourned at a late hour, and resumed this morning. The results of the divisions were as follows: —

For the Bonin amendment, 72; against it, 229. For the Bockum-Dolffs amendment, 246; against it, 57.

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<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

† No. 119.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(No. 48).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 2, 1863.*

THE Convention which has been concluded between Russia and Prussia, relating to the affairs of Poland, has caused considerable uneasiness in this country.

The Powers of Europe were disposed to be neutral in the contest between the Russian Government and the Polish insurgents.

Prussia has departed from this course.

My inquiries, as well as a despatch from Lord Napier, have led me to believe that the Convention contains, —

1. An agreement that Russian troops, upon crossing the frontier of Prussia, shall not be disarmed, as would be required according to international usage, but shall be allowed to retain their arms, and to remain, and to act as an armed body in Prussian territory.

2. A permission for Russian troops to pursue and capture Polish insurgents on Prussian territory.

Count Bernstorff defended this Convention, and declared that it was not an engagement invoking intervention in the contest between Russia and the Poles.

But it is clear that if Russian troops are to be at liberty to follow and attack the Polish insurgents in Prussian territory, the Prussian Government makes itself a party to the war now raging in Poland.

If Great Britain were to allow a Federal ship-of-war to attack a Confederate ship in British waters, Great Britain would become a party to the war between the Federal Government of the United States and the Confederate.

It is obvious that by this Convention Prussia engages to become a party in the war against the Poles without any apparent necessity for so doing. For Her Majesty's Government have not heard that any disaffection prevails in the Polish provinces of Prussia.

It is but too probable that this Convention will irritate the Polish subjects of Prussia, tend to excite disaffection where it has not hitherto existed, and thus extend the insurrection.

Upon viewing this Convention in all its aspects, therefore, Her Majesty's Government are forced to arrive at the conclusion that it is an act of intervention which is not justified by necessity; which will tend to alienate the affections of the Polish subjects of the King of Prussia; and which, indirectly, gives support and countenance to the arbitrary conscription of Warsaw.

You will read this despatch to M. Bismarck, and you will ask for a copy of the Convention between Prussia and Russia.

It is possible that the Governments of Prussia and Russia, aware of the objections

to which this Convention is liable, and seeing the ill consequences it may produce, may be disposed to cancel it, or to put an end to its operation.

In that case you will inform me what steps have been taken with that view.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

† No. 120.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(No. 50).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 2, 1863*

I HAVE extracted the following Articles from the Cartel Convention between Prussia and Russia signed at Berlin on the 8th of August, 1857, and ratified on the 4th of September following: —

„The present Convention, which shall be put into execution four weeks after the exchange of ratifications, shall apply: —

„(a). To all individuals who shall desert the active service of their respective armies, &c.

„(b). To all individuals who according to the laws of the State which they have left, either with or without the intention of returning thither, shall be subject, even at a future time, to military service“.

I wish you to inform me whether this Cartel Convention is still in force, and whether it is acted upon by the two Governments.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 121.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 260).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 1, 1863.*

THE Imperial Government have been so anxiously expecting your Lordship's reply to the proposal made from hence that identic notes should be addressed by the two Governments to the Cabinet of Berlin with reference to the Prusso-Russian Convention lately signed at St. Petersburg, that I lost no time in communicating to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 306 of yesterday's date, inclosing copy of the despatch which your Lordship proposes to address to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Although your Lordship's despatch does not explicitly state that Her Majesty's Government decline to participate in the measure suggested in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch of the 21st ultimo to Baron Gros, it is presumed that this participation is declined.



M. Drouyn de Lhuys, while noting with satisfaction that your Lordship's despatch expressed very much all that a more formal document could have said, added that he must still record his regret that his proposal should not have been agreed to. He went through the reasons which had induced him to think that a step taken in common between the two Governments would have been advisable.

The signature, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, between the Russian and Prussian Governments of an instrument, whether a Convention or a Protocol mattered not, relating to the affairs of Poland, was an international act of which other Powers had a right to take cognizance, and to comment upon. This right had been exercised by France as far back as the 18th ultimo, when he had addressed a despatch to the Emperor's Ambassador at Berlin in much the same terms as your Lordship now proposes to address Her Majesty's Ambassador. But that which could with right be done singly, could be done with equal right collectively, while it stood to reason that the greater the number of Powers possessing the same opinion, and conveying that opinion simultaneously to another Power, the greater would be the impression produced. Moreover, when two or more Powers agreed to give an opinion, union constituted their force, and they were enabled to express themselves in more friendly and conciliatory terms. In framing the project of note which had been submitted to Her Majesty's Government, he had taken care to combine in it the sentiments which the newspapers had reported your Lordship to have expressed in public relative to the Polish question, with the declarations made by Count Reehberg in despatches read to him by the Austrian Ambassador. Participating in both the one and the other he had hoped that no objection would have existed to a combined representation of them at Berlin by the three Cabinets. He had wished that this representation should have been made at Berlin in the first instance, because although the Convention was no doubt the joint work of Russia and Prussia, it was Prussia alone who, under the circumstances, exposed herself to the charge of intervention: but in order also that the Russian Government might know the sentiments of the three Powers, whom he had wished to see united on the occasion, he should have proposed to inform Prince Gortchakoff of the step taken by them at Berlin.

So much for the question more immediately at issue; but he must confess that political reasons on a more extended field had also weighed with him. It had been his object again to establish a community of action between Great Britain and France in the defence of right; to have cemented the alliance begun on the great Eastern question, in that which perhaps was of the next greatest importance, the question of Poland. He had wished to remind not only Russia, but the Powers in general, that whatever might be the relations, even amounting to cordiality, between France and Russia, those relations would never prevent a perfect understanding between Her Majesty's and the Imperial Government on matters, however intimately connected with Russia, on which the two Governments might think alike. Had such an understanding been established between them, they might have asked the co-operation of Austria with every chance of success; and (which he sincerely trusted might not prove the case) if events should become more complicated, he need hardly say that an alliance of England, France, and Austria would



have been strong enough to have successfully vindicated the cause which had brought them together.

"This explanation of my policy I will myself convey in a day or two to Baron Gros", said M. Drouyn de Lhuys; "in the meantime you will oblige me by telling Lord Russell that while admitting that Her Majesty's Government may have weighty reasons for declining the proposals which I made to him, I cannot regret the less the determination to which they have come".

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he would still send the note which he had projected. He replied that he would take the Emperor's orders; but that as he had already written to Berlin in the same sense as your Lordship, he saw no object in repeating singly observations already made.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 122.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 261. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 1, 1863.*

THE Russian and Prussian Ambassadors were both at my house last night, and both spoke to me on the subject of the present crisis in Poland, and of the diplomatic complications arising out of it. I mention this that your Lordship may not think that I interfere unnecessarily in this discussion.

Baron Budberg said that he had no objection to state to me confidentially, though he would not say as much to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that he regretted the signature of the Act of St. Petersburg, which, however, was not a Convention properly so called, but rather a Protocol. There was no obligation to act upon it. It was an arrangement signed between Prince Gortchakoff and General Alvensleben. I asked whether, such being the case, it did not enable the Sovereigns or Governments of Russia and Prussia to set it aside as informal.

Baron Budberg replied, that Prince Gortchakoff having signed it on the part of Russia, his conduct could hardly be disavowed. He went on to say that the importance of this document had been greatly exaggerated; that he had shown it to the Emperor, who had admitted that it was quite harmless ("qu'il n'y avait pas de quoi fouetter un chat"). I remarked that however true this definition of it might be (I had not seen the document, and therefore I should not give any opinion about it), it seemed to me to have savoured of great imprudence to have made any arrangement with Prussia at all. The Russian Government ought to have been well aware of the susceptibility of other countries with regard to all questions connected with Poland. At all events they must now see the fault which had been committed by the condemnation which had been called forth. The Emperor, M. de Budberg answered, had made similar observations to him.

With regard to the future, M. de Budberg said, that he had recommended his Government, and he thought that his recommendation would be acted upon, to issue without loss of time a proclamation setting forth what was the actual position of Russian Poland, what had been done by the Russian Government for her welfare and prosperity, and what further reforms were contemplated; and stating the Emperor Alexander's intention to grant a complete amnesty for the past.

M. de Budberg's tone was temperate and conciliatory, and he said that Prince Gortchakoff was gratified by the language which Lord Napier had held to him in your Lordship's name.

The Prussian Ambassador also remarked that his Government were under deep obligations to Her Majesty's Government for the calmness with which this exciting question had been considered, and for the friendly desire evinced to enable his Government to make an honourable retreat from their difficulties.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 123.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

(No. 262. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 1, 1863.*

THE answer of the Austrian Government to the late proposal of the French Government in regard to Poland arrived here this morning. Prince Metternich, who will not communicate it to M. Drouyn de Lhuys until to-morrow, has permitted me to read it, but I have not time to do more than give a very rapid summary of it.

Count Rechberg adverts to the difference of the position between Austria and between England and France, in a question relating to Poland. He states that by the attitude assumed by Austria, contrasted with the conduct of the Russian and Prussian Governments, it is sufficiently shown that the Austrian Government do not approve of the Act signed at St. Petersburg, but that since the Austrian Government were asked to participate in that act, and declined, they can hardly now in fairness express a blame, however carefully worded, which they did not express when the proposal was made to them. Count Rechberg states further that M. Drouyn de Lhuys' projected note covers a declaration against intervention, which the Austrian Government would never accept. They have always contended for the right of intervention, provided the State to which the intervention applies acquiesces in it. From this policy they cannot depart. But there are other considerations which weigh with Count Rechberg in the decision to which he has come. Were Austria to join in the proposed measure, her intentions might be misinterpreted, and she might be raising expectations not only in Poland but in Galicia, which, at present, at least, are not likely to be realised. She might be laying the seeds of revolution within her own dominions.

Count Reehberg expresses the hope that his motives in declining the French proposals will be fairly appreciated. He tenders his thanks for the confidence which dictated them, and he acknowledges the value of the alliance which is offered him. Finally, he somewhat vaguely hints that if events progress, and Austria sees the necessity for it, she will be ready to consult with England and France as to the policy which it may be advisable to adopt. The phrase appears to me to imply that she would then be willing to make sacrifices or even to go to war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

†† No. 124.

*Baron Gros to Earl Russell. — (Received March 2).*

*Londres, le 2 Mars, 1863.*

LE Baron Gros a l'honneur de présenter ses compliments empressés à Lord Russell, et il lui envoie, ci-jointe, copie des deux documents relatifs aux affaires de Pologne dont il lui a donné connaissance le 24 du mois dernier.

[<sup>1</sup>Quant à la dépêche relative aux mêmes événements, et dont Lord Russell a pris également connaissance ce même jour, le Baron Gros prie son Excellence de lui permettre de lui rappeler que cette dépêche n'avait qu'un caractère purement confidentiel].

<sup>†</sup> Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Baron Gros.*

M. le Baron,

*Paris, 21 Février, 1863.*

LA dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire vous a fait connaître les observations que la Convention conclue entre la Prusse et la Russie a suggéré au Gouvernement de l'Empereur. Les troubles suscités par le recrutement opéré en Pologne en dehors des conditions ordinaires devaient nécessairement attirer notre attention.

Les douloureux incidents de la résistance des populations à une mesure d'administration intérieure ne pourraient toutefois être envisagés que d'un point de vue d'humanité. Mais l'arrangement signé à Pétersbourg est venu inopinément donner à cette crise un caractère politique sur lequel il appartient, sans nul doute, aux Cabinets de porter un jugement.

J'ai indiqué à M. le Baron de Talleyrand l'ordre d'idées dans lequel il doit se placer avec le Cabinet de Berlin. D'un autre côté, la vivacité du sentiment public en Angleterre, les déclarations anciennes du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et les principes de sa politique, m'autorisent à penser que le langage tracé à Sir Andrew Buchanan

<sup>1</sup> The second paragraph is not in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

sera en parfait accord avec celui que tiendra le Ministre de l'Empereur. Mais je me demande si l'expresssion orale de notre manière de voir est en rapport avec la gravité de l'acte que nous avons à apprécier, et s'il ne serait pas nécessaire de donner à la manifestation de notre opinion une forme moins fugitive et plus déterminée. Ne pourrions-nous pas, par exemple, combiner les termes d'une communication identique destinée à être remise simultanément au Cabinet de Berlin et qui serait ensuite portée à la connaissance de celui de St. Pétersbourg?

Il me semble, d'ailleurs, M. le Baron, qu'une démarche de cette nature pourrait obtenir également le concours du Gouvernement Autrichien. Le Cabinet de Londres est renseigné comme nous sur l'attitude adoptée par l'Autriche. Il sait qu'elle a suivi une ligne de conduite différente de celle de la Prusse. Il y a lieu de présumer que le Cabinet de Vienne n'envisage pas autrement que nous une Convention dont la seule nouvelle a notablement accru l'agitation en Pologne et dont la mise en vigueur ne peut que l'augmenter. Il aurait, à tous égards, intérêt à en décliner plus complètement encore la solidarité en s'associant à nos appréciations. Il donnerait ainsi à l'opinion publique une satisfaction qui ne pourrait que contribuer au maintien de la tranquillité en Gallicie.

Si, comme je l'espère, M. le Baron, Lord Russell approuvait cette idée, il ne nous resterait plus qu'à nous entendre sur la teneur de la communication que nous aurions à adresser au Cabinet de Berlin. Afin de vous fixer sur l'esprit dans lequel elle pourrait, selon nous, être conçue, je vous envoie ci-joint copie d'un projet de note auquel, au surplus, nous serions prêts à faire subir toutes les modifications qui seraient jugées convenables.

Je vous invite à donner lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Russell. Vous voudrez bien lui dire que j'écris dans le même sens à Vienne, et je vous serai obligé de me faire connaître le plus tôt possible les intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé)

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

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† Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

*Draft of Note to the Prussian Government.*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, a reçu l'ordre d'entrer avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse dans de franches explications au sujet de l'arrangement conclu entre les Cabinets de Berlin et de St. Pétersbourg à l'occasion des troubles survenus dans le Royaume de Pologne, et, à cet effet, il a été chargé d'adresser à son Excellence M. de Bismarck-Schönhausen la communication suivante.

Les mesures adoptées par le Gouvernement Russe pour opérer le recrutement en Pologne ayant amené une résistance qui a donné lieu à des conflits sur plusieurs points, la Cour de France observait avec un douloureux intérêt des événements si regrettables. Il était d'autant plus à désirer qu'aucun incident ne vînt aggraver cette lutte que le pays, livré à un état de malaise évident, renfermait déjà de nombreux éléments d'agitation et

de désordre. Il importait, dans de telles circonstances, d'éviter toute manifestation de nature à exciter les esprits dans les autres provinces et à changer le caractère jusqu'alors purement local de l'insurrection.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français n'a donc pas appris sans inquiétude que le Cabinet de Berlin avait signé avec celui de St. Pétersbourg une Convention par laquelle la Cour de Prusse consent à laisser pénétrer sur son territoire les troupes Russes qui jugeraient à propos de suivre les bandes armées réduites à y chercher un refuge, et s'engage elle-même à repousser sur le territoire Russe, jusqu'à la rencontre d'une force nationale suffisante, les insurgés qui se trouveraient devant les troupes Prussiennes. En effet, la lutte, concentrée encore dans le Royaume de Pologne, peut être ainsi portée d'un instant à l'autre dans les provinces Polonaises de la Prusse ouvert(e)s aux soldats Russes, et la Prusse peut, de son côté, se voir entraînée à prendre part aux opérations militaires en cours d'exécution de l'autre côté de sa frontière.

Un semblable accord n'a pas seulement pour conséquence d'étendre le théâtre des hostilités; il crée une situation nouvelle et transforme un incident des affaires de Pologne en une question Européenne. Le Gouvernement Impérial est loin de méconnaître que la Cour de Prusse, en raison du voisinage, avait des devoirs internationaux à remplir envers la Russie en présence des événements actuels. Il n'aurait pas eu le droit de s'étonner des mesures de précaution et de surveillance qu'elle aurait cru devoir prendre pour assurer l'inviolabilité de la frontière commune et mettre obstacle à toute contrebande de guerre. Mais une opération, même limitée, que ne justifiait d'ailleurs aucun symptôme menaçant dans les provinces Polonaises de la Monarchie Prussienne, dépasse les obligations tracées au Cabinet de Berlin par le droit public: elle semble procéder de la pensée préconçue d'une solidarité politique que les Traités Européens n'ont pas établie en réglant le sort de la Pologne et dont les intérêts généraux pourraient avoir à souffrir.

Aussi l'opinion publique s'en est elle vivement émue, et l'inquiétude qu'elle en a ressentie n'aura point échappé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français considère, de son côté, comme un devoir envers lui-même et envers l'Europe de signaler à la Cour de Berlin les préoccupations causées par les arrangements qu'elle a conclus avec le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et il aime à croire que ces observations, inspirées par le désir sincère d'écarter tout sujet de malentendu, seront accueillies avec le même sentiment de confiance bienveillante qui les a dictées.

Le Soussigné, &c.

<sup>†</sup>No. 125.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 308).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 2, 1863.*

HER Majesty's Government have received from Baron Gros a project of note to be addressed by the French Ambassador at Berlin to the Prussian Government, with refe-

rence to the Convention in regard to Poland lately entered into between Prussia and Russia.

I had already prepared a despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, which embodies the same views of the Convention between Russia and Prussia as those contained in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' note; and I have now to instruct your Excellency to communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a copy of that despatch<sup>1</sup>, which was transmitted to you in my despatch [No. 306] of the 28th ultimo.

Her Majesty's Government are happy to find that so great a conformity prevails between the views of the Governments of England and of France on the subject.

I also inclose a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which your Excellency will likewise communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Her Majesty's Government would be glad to find that the Imperial Government had written in a similar sense to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

RUSSELL.

No. 126.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. -- (Received March 3).*

(No. 265. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 2, 1863.*

IT having been reported that the Emperor had addressed an autograph letter to the Emperor of Russia, with reference to the present state of Poland, I inquired yesterday of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether there was any truth in the statement. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he, at all events, knew nothing of it, but that the Emperor had some short time back written to the Duc de Montebello, recommending him to call the serious attention of the Russian Government to the complications which might arise from the events which were passing in Poland. M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave me to understand that the letter, though very friendly in its tone, hinted at the possibility of the amicable relations which the Emperor desired to see maintained between the two Governments, being disturbed, should nothing be done to ameliorate the state of the Poles; but another account given me of the substance of the letter does not show it in so favourable a light.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 119.

*Count Rechberg to Prince Metternich.*

*Vienne, le 27 Février, 1863.*

M. LE DUC DE GRAMMONT a été chargé il y a quelque(s) jours de me faire connaître l'impression produite sur M. Drouyn de Lhuys par la communication que vous lui aviez faite de ma dépêche du 11 de ce mois, relative au troubles de Pologne.

Le langage de l'Ambassadeur a entièrement confirmé les rapports que votre Altesse m'a adressés sur le même sujet. Nous avons reconnu avec une sincère satisfaction que le Gouvernement Français rendait pleine justice à l'attitude de réserve et de prudente modération prise par l'Autriche en présence des événements déplorables qui se passaient dans le voisinage immédiat de ses frontières. En même temps, le Duc de Grammont ne nous dissimulait pas le jugement sévère que portait son Gouvernement sur la Convention conclue entre la Prusse et la Russie. Par l(e) contraste qu'il établissait entre l'attitude de l'Autriche et celle de la Prusse, le Gouvernement Français semblait apprécier très favorablement notre politique et admettre que nous étions parvenus à concilier heureusement le soin de nos intérêts avec l'accomplissement de nos devoirs internationaux.

Ces éloges, auxquels nous avons été très sensibles, nous permettent de croire que le Cabinet des Tuileries se rend parfaitement compte des difficultés particulières de notre situation vis-à-vis du mouvement insurrectionnel qui a éclaté dans le Royaume de Pologne. C'est au point de vue de ces difficultés et des obligations qu'elles nous imposent qu'il faut se placer, si on veut juger équitablement la ligne de conduite que nous nous sommes tracée et dont nous ne saurions dévier aujourd'hui sans nous créer de véritables dangers.

Nous sommes persuadés que le Gouvernement Français ne peut fermer les yeux à l'évidence de cette considération, et qu'il comprendra donc l'hésitation bien naturelle avec laquelle nous avons accueilli la nouvelle et importante communication que le Duc de Grammont vient de me faire.

Persuadé que le Cabinet de Vienne approuve tout aussi peu que celui de Paris la Convention de St. Petersburg, M. Drouyn de Lhuys nous propose d'adresser à Berlin une communication identique et simultanée qui aurait pour but de manifester notre opinion d'une manière plus déterminée. Pareille proposition a été fait(e) au Cabinet de Londres. Un projet de note nous a été remis par l'Ambassadeur de France, qui a présenté à l'appui de sa démarche plusieurs considérations sur lesquelles je reviendra(i) tout à l'heure.

Je joins ici copie du projet de note en question. Je puis donc me dispenser d'analyser ici cette pièce, sur laquelle j'appelle toute l'attention de votre Altesse.

Nous nous empressons de rendre hommage à la modération et à la convenance parfaite de langage que le Gouvernement Français propose de tenir à Berlin. Sous le rapport de la forme nous n'aurions aucune objection à élever contre les idées Françaises. C'est uniquement, comme je l'ai déjà dit, sous le point de vue de la position de l'Autriche, des principes généraux de sa politique, et de ses intérêts spéciaux dans la question Polonaise, que nous trouvons difficile de nous associer à la démarche projetée.



Nous n'avons pas hésité à trouver inopportune et regrettable la Convention signée entre les deux Cours de Berlin et de St. Pétersbourg.

L'attitude que nous avons prise nous-mêmes prouve ce fait jusqu'à l'évidence. Mais nous avons dû nous demander si en élevant la voix à Berlin pour y blâmer plus explicitement cette Convention, nous resterions conséquents avec les principes que nous avons toujours proclamés. Bien que le projet de note évite de se prononcer catégoriquement à ce sujet, il est évident qu'il tend à défendre, au moins implicitement, ce qu'on appelle le principe de non-intervention. Or, nous avons en toute occasion hautement protesté contre l'application de ce principe dans les relations internationales.

Nous avons toujours soutenu que l'intervention était en fait une question d'opportunité, mais en principe un droit légitime, dès que l'intervention s'effectuerait avec le libre consentement du Gouvernement chez lequel elle avait lieu. Nous avons souvent plaidé cette thèse lorsque des motifs d'opportunité nous ont fait renoncer à l'exercice d'un droit que nous n'avons cessé de revendiquer. C'est encore en vertu de ce droit que nous reconnaissons comme parfaitement légitime la présence à Rome des troupes Françaises. Nous aurions donc mauvaise grâce à venir aujourd'hui faire des représentations contre l'usage d'un droit que nous nous sommes réservé à nous-mêmes dans plus d'une occasion.

Si nous passons maintenant aux intérêts spéciaux de l'Autriche dans la question Polonaise nous y trouvons des raisons puissantes qui nous engagent à ne point nous départir de notre attitude actuelle. Aussi longtemps que la tranquillité se maintient sur notre territoire, nous ne comptons nullement aller au delà des mesures de précaution adopté(e)s au premier moment. Nous ne voulons pas augmenter encore l'importance que le mouvement Polonais prend aux yeux de l'Europe, en offrant à la Russie pour le réprimer un concours plus actif que celui qui nous est imposé par nos obligations internationales. Mais, d'un autre côté, nous ne pouvons reconnaître les éléments révolutionnaires qui sont à l'oeuvre, et qui n'attendent qu'un moment propice pour étendre en Galicie les troubles concentrés jusqu'ici dans les provinces de la Pologne Russe. Malgré le calme et la sagesse dont les sujets Polonais de l'Empereur ont fait preuve et que nous nous plaisons à reconnaître hautement, nous ne pouvons pas encourager, même indirectement, certaines aspirations nationales incompatibles avec le maintien de notre domination. La France et l'Angleterre ne sont point retenues par de semblables considérations. Elles peuvent sans danger imminent pour elles-mêmes manifester des sympathies que la loi de nos intérêts nous défend d'exprimer. Si ces deux puissances veulent envisager impartialement notre situation, elles reconnaîtront sans peine que nous ne pouvons nous placer actuellement sur la même ligne qu'elles à l'égard de la Pologne sans compromettre tous les fruits que nous avons retirés de notre attitude réservée. Il ne faut pas exalter des espérances qu'on ne compte pas satisfaire, et si l'on ne veut pas avoir à réprimer des impatiences il ne faut rien faire pour les exciter. Il serait par trop imprudent de mettre à l'épreuve les esprits en Galicie, en faisant luire pour notre part aux yeux des Polonais des perspectives bien différentes de la réalité.

Quelqu'adoucisse que soit par la forme la démonstration que le Gouvernement Français nous propose de faire à Berlin, ce ne serait pas moins une manifestation dont le contrecoup dépasserait infiniment la mesure de nos intentions, et, comme je l'ai dit, tout à



l'heure, nous ne voulons rien faire qui puisse provoquer des agitations que nous serions obligés de comprimer ensuite par des actes que nous avons évité(s) jusqu'ici et qu'on nous sait tout de gré d'avoir évités.

J'ajouterai enfin qu'après nous être bornés à décliner purement et simplement les ouvertures qui nous ont été faites de Berlin pour nous engager à participer à la Convention de St. Pétersbourg, il nous paraîtrait peu convenable de revenir aujourd'hui sur ce sujet en prononçant un blâme que nous ne nous sommes pas crus autorisés à exprimer dans le premier moment d'une manière aussi formelle.

Les vues que je viens de développer répondent également aux observations confidentielles que le Duc de Grammont a été chargé de me présenter. Elles portaient en effet principalement sur les avantages que l'Autriche a déjà recueillis, et peut recueillir encore, de sa conduite envers les Polonais comparée à celle de la Prusse et de la Russie. Nous le répétons encore; si les sujets Polonais de l'Empereur notre auguste maître apprécient les bienfaits réels dont ils jouissent, c'est à la condition de ne pas trouver d'encouragement à des illusions dont le vain prestige les rendrait insensibles aux bénéfices qu'ils retirent de leur situation actuelle. Nous éprouverions donc une répugnance insurmontable à soulever prématurément des questions, des éventualités, que les événements ne nous paraissent pas encore devoir rapprocher de nous. La dépêche dont l'Ambassadeur de France a bien voulu me donner confidentiellement lecture, laisse entrevoir la possibilité de rappeler le Gouvernement Russe à l'observation des stipulations de 1815 à l'égard du Royaume de Pologne. Il nous semble qu'une pareille démarche entraînerait des conséquences peut être plus graves que les complications provenant de l'état actuel de la Pologne Russe. Il est douteux que la Cour de St. Pétersbourg soit disposé(e) à bien accueillir des représentations amicales et une invitation plus sérieuse serait une mesure d'une si grande portée qu'on ne saurait la prendre sans la soumettre aux plus mûres délibérations.

Nous croyons donc superflu d'examiner ici une éventualité à laquelle M. Drouyn de Lhuys lui même, si nous l'avons bien compris, ne fait qu'une allusion assez rapide. Nous pouvons ajouter d'ailleurs qu'un retour à la stricte exécution des Traités est un principe dont nous avons toujours proclamé les avantages. Mais pour en recueillir les fruits, il nous semble qu'une application générale de ce principe serait nécessaire et qu'il ne faudrait point se borner aux seules stipulations de 1815 concernant la Pologne.

Nous ne voulons pas du reste nous étendre sur un sujet aussi délicat. Ainsi que le dit M. Drouyn de Lhuys, la proposition qu'il nous transmet laisse entièrement de côté les éventualités. J'ai cru devoir examiner consciencieusement les avantages et les inconvénient(s) du concours qui est demandé à l'Autriche. J'ai soumis les résultats de cet examen à l'appréciation de l'Empereur en demandant ses ordres pour la réponse que je devais donner au Duc de Grammont. Sa Majesté est restée convaincue que l'attitude prise jusqu'ici par le Gouvernement Impérial dans la question Polonaise était celle qui répondait le mieux aux intérêts de l'Empire et qu'il ne fallait pas s'écarter d'une ligne de conduite dont on n'avait eu qu'à se louer.

En informant l'Ambassadeur de France de la détermination de l'Empereur j'ai ajouté que le Gouvernement Impérial laissait échapper avec un véritable regret une occa-

sion de manifester avec éclat son désir de marcher d'accord avec la France et l'Angleterre dans les grandes questions de la politique Européenne. Votre Altesse voudra bien exprimer de son côté à M. Drouyn de Lhuys le même sentiment, et lui faire savoir tout le prix que nous attacherions à voir cette entente s'établir sur un terrain plus favorable à une action commune.

Bien que des intérêts essentiels nous empêchent dans cette circonstance de prouver notre bonne volonté, nous espérons que la sincérité et la loyauté de notre langage porteront la conviction dans l'esprit du Ministre.

Nous accueillons toujours avec empressement l'occasion d'un échange d'idées qui a du moins pour résultat de consolider la confiance réciproque, base nécessaire d'une entente solide.

Recevez, &c.

No. 128.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 4).*

(No. 276. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 3, 1863.*

A FEW remarks on the different phases which have marked in this capital the development of what I will briefly denominate the Polish Question, may not be out of place.

From the moment when, twelve months ago, an insurrectionary spirit began to show itself in Russian Poland, to the moment when the signature at St. Petersburg of the Russo-Prussian Convention became known, the attitude of the Emperor, of his Government, his press, and of people generally, had been one of comparative apathy. There had been a general and very strong feeling that the Poles had forfeited all right to French sympathy by their inertness during the Crimean war; and neither the overt acts of the Russian authorities in Poland, nor the indignant but somewhat selfish remonstrances of the Polish party in Paris, had elicited more than assurances of commiseration for the Poles, and of regret that Russia should not treat them better.

I say selfish, because I cannot help entertaining a strong feeling that much mischief has been done by refugees, some possessed of considerable wealth, and others living at all events in comparative comfort, who excite from hence their fellow-countrymen to revolt, without ever paying the consequences in their own persons.

Even the last act of the Russian authorities, the forced conscription, met with no rebuke from hence, and so late as on the discussion of the Polish question by the Legislative Body, the French Government maintained this attitude of silence. M. Billault's declaration in the name of the Government will still be present to your Lordship's mind; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as your Lordship will recollect, stated to me about the same time that the Emperor, without being under any engagement either one way or the other, would take no step which would militate against the friendly feelings which His Majesty entertained for the Emperor of Russia.

The knowledge, however, of the act signed at St. Petersburg changed the current of the Emperor's ideas. The participation of Prussia in that act, in presence of the neutrality of France, became an offence; the language of the Government changed, the press took it up, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was known to be occupied about it, a general feeling of excitement and doubt seized upon the public, war was seen in the distance, public securities fell, the Minister of Finance protested, subscriptions were publicly opened in favour of the Polish cause, and during a few days everything denoted an approaching crisis.

But even during this period of feverish impatience, the share which the Russian Government had taken in the act which had provoked it, excited but little notice. It was Prussia alone that had done the wrong; Russia had, not unnaturally, profited by all the means she could, *per fas et nefas*, dispose of to suppress an insurrection raging in one of her provinces. Such was the language of the Imperial Government. The acts of Russia which had lighted the flame of insurrection were completely lost sight of.

In this state of affairs, overtures were made to Her Majesty's Government and to the Austrian Government by the Government of the Emperor. To the overtures themselves I need not allude further. They have been totally unsuccessful as far as Austria is concerned. They have not been replied to by Her Majesty's Government as the Imperial Government had hoped and expected. There is, therefore, considerable disappointment; but this disappointment is chiefly shown at present by allusions to the selfish policy of Great Britain, — always exciting others to acts from the perils of which she shrinks, but the benefits of which she hopes to reap.

I need hardly tell your Lordship that such language is not held to me, but I know that it is the general tone both in Imperial and official circles, and that it is founded on the supposition which it is impossible to eradicate from any Frenchman, that the press in England represents the opinion of the Government, and as the press was violent in its tone against Prussia, it is assumed that the feeling of the Government was equally strong, and that the Imperial Government had therefore a right to expect a more cordial acquiescence in their proposals. But they forget, as it suits them to forget, that if they are to take the press as the exponent of the feelings of Her Majesty's Government with respect to Prussia they must equally admit its authority when speaking of Russia.

The time, however, which has been consumed in these negotiations has had its tranquillising effect. People begin to see that the storm is likely to blow over, and since, as I have before said, there is no real sympathy for the Poles at the bottom of the excitement we have witnessed, it is probable that with common prudence on the part of the Prussian and Russian Governments, this incident may die a natural death. Still, with a people so impressionable as the French, the flame may be re-kindled at any moment. The cause of Poland is one on which all persons would unite and which the clergy would support, and, should the insurrection continue and spread, a feeling may arise which the Emperor may find it difficult to control. As it is I am assured by those who ought to know, that the late excitement has been fictitious, that is, caused entirely by the press, and that it is confined solely to Paris. I am told that the return to the subscription list is nil.

My previous correspondence will have informed your Lordship of the avowed motives of the Emperor in endeavouring to establish an alliance between Great Britain, France, and Austria. Were there any unavowed objects to be attained? Was the recognition of the Kingdom of Poland to be accompanied by that „remaniement de la carte d'Europe“ of which the Emperor has so often spoken?

It is probable that this idea is always more or less present in His Majesty's imagination, and that, if he saw his way safely to the Rhine, to the Rhine he would go. But he could hardly hope to make England and Austria aiders and abettors in such a scheme. On the other hand he may count much on the chapter of accidents, and hope that a great political move once begun may ultimately give him some profit, if not all he could desire.

It is not for me to dwell on the advantages or disadvantages of such an alliance as the late French proposals advocate, nor is it necessary since Austria refuses to join it; but I may venture to express the hope that Her Majesty's Government will endeavour to maintain such a good understanding with France on this great question of the day as may be necessary to prevent her seeking an alliance with Russia, for Her Majesty's Government may be assured that the alternative occupies the Emperor's thoughts.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

†† No. 129.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 4).*

(No. 278).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 3, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, although very unwell, was good enough to see me this afternoon, and I communicated to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch [No. 308] of yesterday's date, together with the instructions which your Lordship has addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin and St. Petersburg with reference to the act lately signed at St. Petersburg, and to the general state of the Polish question.

On inquiring whether his Excellency would send a despatch to St. Petersburg in a sense similar to that adopted by your Lordship, he replied that he had already written to the Duc de Montebello his opinion of the Convention, and of the state of affairs in Poland, but he had made no reference to the Treaties of 1815. [<sup>1</sup>This might still be done, and he saw no objection to it, but he must take the Emperor's orders before giving me a positive answer. I hope to have it to-morrow.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed a very strong opinion that the Treaties of 1815 were the least that could now be demanded of Russia. He appears to have received reports from various quarters unfavourable to the Russian cause.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The words in parenthesis are not in the Parliamentary Paper. (Edit.).

† No. 130.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 4).*

(No. 279).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 3, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS expresses himself to be satisfied with the reply of the Austrian Government to the proposal that Austria should join England and France in addressing a note to the Cabinet of Berlin on the subject of the Russo-Prussian Convention. He seemed to admit the impossibility of the Austrian Government now blaming an act in which they had been asked to participate, but which they had not blamed when they declined to take part in it.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

† No. 131.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Magenis<sup>1</sup>.*

(No. 12).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 4, 1863.*

HER Majesty's Government being deeply affected by the deplorable acts of violence of which Poland is now the scene, and having reflected on the causes of these calamities, have addressed the accompanying despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

You are instructed to read this despatch and its inclosure to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at.....

You will state at the same time that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government a communication of similar views by the Representatives at St. Petersburg of the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of June 1815, would tend to the cessation of bloodshed, and to the enjoyment by the people of Poland of those rights which were promised to them at Vienna, and which have been so long withheld from them.

The peace of Europe would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be best assured by restoring to the Poles the privileges of a National Diet and a National Administration; and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, hope that the Government of..... will concur in making to the Government of Russia a representation which has for its objects the interests of humanity and security of the peace of Europe, and which cannot give any just offence to the Russian Government.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

<sup>1</sup> Similar despatches were addressed to Lord Bloomfield, Sir A. Buchanan, Sir J. Hudson, Sir J. Crampton, Mr. Jerningham, and Mr. Lytton.

## No. 132.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 4).*

(Telegraphic).

(Confidential).

*Paris, March 4, 1863, 4 p. m.*

ORDERS were sent yesterday by Zamoyski, in the name of the Polish Committee sitting at Paris, to raise the standard of revolt everywhere. The people of Galicia and Posen are called upon to cross the frontier to assist their brethren, but to be careful not to commit any acts of rebellion against their own Sovereigns.

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## No. 133.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 4).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 4, 1863, 5.30 p. m.*

COPIES of your despatches will be sent to the French Representatives at Berlin and St. Petersburg, with the observation that they agree with the instructions which those Representatives have already received, and that they are to continue to hold the language prescribed to them.

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## No. 134.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 4).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, March 4, 1863, 5 p. m.*

I HAVE been for two hours with M. de Bismarck, to whom I have read your Lordship's despatch No. 48. He says Convention does not provide that Russian troops forced to cross the frontier shall be allowed to keep their arms, and that the interpretation of the clause as to permission of troops to pursue insurgents across the frontier was under negotiation when it was found unnecessary to give effect to it.

He says, Count Bernstorff was never instructed to make any communication on the subject to Her Majesty's Government, though, having been made acquainted with the first steps in the negotiation with Russia, he may have considered himself authorized to make confidential communications to your Lordship respecting it on his own responsibility.

He maintains that Prussia has acted entirely on the defensive, and that Her Majesty's Government cannot expect the Prussian Government to communicate a document which is incomplete, and only forms one step in a negotiation, and to which no practical effect has yet been given.

I am to see him again on Friday after he has seen the King, and he may possibly address a despatch to Bernstorff which may prove satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

A band of 600 Poles having crossed from Posen into the Kingdom on the 1st, and having been driven back by the Russians, were captured by Prussian troops after some fighting. The Russian troops did not cross the frontier.

† No. 135.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 333).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 5, 1863.*

ALTHOUGH Baron Gros stated to me on the 24th ultimo the substance of the despatch which I now send you, he did not give me a copy of it till the 2nd instant.

[<sup>1</sup>I have already written to you respecting the proposed identic note, a copy of which accompanied my despatch No. 306 of the 28th ultimo].

But there remain some facts and some remarks relating to the conduct of Austria which I have not yet communicated.

Before Her Majesty's Government had had any time to consider the French proposal of the 21st of February, and indeed almost at the same time that it arrived in this country, I received an intimation from Count Apponyi that his Government desired that no proposition of concert on Polish affairs should be made to them by France and Great Britain.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, came to the consideration of the subject, impressed with the conviction that Austria would not join in the proposed identic note. Her Majesty's Government thought also that, seeing her reluctance, it would be very unwise to urge her to a course she was unwilling to adopt.

Our impressions on this subject have been confirmed by a despatch from Count Rechberg to Prince Metternich, which Count Apponyi read to me yesterday.

It is an answer to the French proposal. Mingled with some scruples against the principle of non-intervention, which belong to the traditional policy of Austria, are considerations which flow naturally from the position of Austria. The Cabinet of Vienna does not like to give even an appearance of encouragement to Polish insurrection, lest the lesson should cross the frontier, and the example be repeated in Galicia. The freedom of France and England from apprehensions of this kind is dwelt upon with marked distinctness.

The inference to be drawn from this despatch is rather that Austria does not see her way clearly in the path pointed out to her by the French Government, than that she is altogether averse to the policy of which an outline is presented to her.

Possibly, and indeed probably, the line to be adopted by the Emperor of Austria will draw gradually nearer to that of England and France.

With respect to the Prusso-Russian Convention, its importance appears to be gradually diminishing. Count Bismarck, in reading it to Sir Andrew Buchanan, pointed out

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

that no Russian troops could pursue insurgents across the Prussian frontier without the special permission or invitation of a Prussian officer. It is, of course, in the power of the Prussian Government to instruct its officers not to give that permission or invitation.

Prince Gortchakoff, on his side, declares to Lord Napier that the chief motive for agreeing to the Convention was that insurgents often cross the frontier to seize a Custom-house and carry off the money found in its chest. In such cases it may be convenient to call upon an armed body from the other side to retake the Custom-house and recapture the treasure.

While the two Contracting Powers are thus endeavouring to diminish the gravity and scope of the Convention, the events of the insurrection seem to be carrying the war away from the Prussian and nearer to the Austrian frontier.

It appears, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government, that as the Convention is falling quietly into insignificance, and in fact sinking to nothing, it is fortunate that the Governments of France and England have not roused in the Prussian Government a spirit of offended dignity, and thus created obstacles to their own success by presenting formally an identic note requiring a formal reply.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the next step to be taken is to invite all the chief Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna to concur in advising Russia to recur to the stipulations, and to revert to the policy, of the Treaty of Vienna in regard to Poland.

A copy of a communication intended for this purpose is inclosed in the present despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

† No. 136.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(Nr. 55).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 6, 1863.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch [No. 112. Confidential] of the 27th ultimo, reporting the language of M. de Bismarck with regard to the Convention on Polish affairs between Prussia and Russia.

Her Majesty's Government wish to know whether they are to conclude that the Convention will not be ratified.

Why should not the Prussian Government drop an agreement for which no necessity appears to exist, and which will be considered throughout Europe as a mark of subserviency to Russia?

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.



† No. 137.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 6).*

(No. 123).

My Lord,

Berlin, March 3, 1863.

M. DE BISMARCK informed me this evening that 600 well-armed Poles, of whom 100 were Lancers, having been organized near Radlevo, in the Grand Duchy of Posen, by a Count Poninsky, crossed the frontier into Poland on the 1st instant, but were driven back into the Grand Duchy, where they were met yesterday by Prussian troops, and having refused to lay down their arms, were captured and disarmed after a short resistance, during which, according to a telegraphic despatch, a Prussian officer was wounded and some of the insurgents were killed.

The Russian troops did not cross the frontier.

The insurgent band is said to have consisted almost entirely of the dependents and servants of Prussian landed proprietors.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 138.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 6).*

(No. 124).

My Lord,

Berlin, March 4, 1863.

WITH reference to my despatch [No. 106] of the 26th ultimo, inclosing the translation of a memorial from the merchants of Stettin to the Prussian Government as to the effects which the events in Poland may have upon their interests, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the translation of an answer to them from M. de Bismarck, which was published in last night's „Gazette“.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† Inclosure in No. 138.

*M. de Bismarck's Answer to the Representatives of the Stettin Merchants.*

(Translation).

Berlin, March 1, 1863.

THE representations addressed by the heads of the Stettin mercantile body to the Minister for Commerce and Industry, with the object of calling the attention of the Government to the extensive commercial interests which are exposed to danger by the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland, have been by the Minister aforesaid handed over to me. The same thing has been done by the representations of the elders of the Mer-

cantile Corporation of Dantzic and of the Chamber of Commerce of Posen, in which latter special attention is called to the injury that has accrued or might accrue to those interests in consequence of the agreement with the Russian Government. These representations afford me the opportunity, of which I gladly avail myself, to give to the gentlemen who have drawn them up, the direct assurance that the importance and extent of the interests which they plead for are well known to the Government; that I have had the opportunity, as Representative of His Majesty at the Court of St. Petersburg, thoroughly to appreciate them; and that during the critical events of the last two years in the Kingdom of Poland, the safeguarding of those interests both at St. Petersburg and Warsaw has been an object of solicitous attention on the part of the King's Government. It is superfluous to state that in the recent negotiations with Russia, as well as in the other measures taken for the protection of our frontiers and for the security of neighbourly relations, the interests of the Prussian mercantile body, as well as of the Prussian subjects generally, have been specially kept in view. The more threatening the aspect of affairs in Poland became in consequence of the insurrectionary movements, the more the King's Government felt bound to hold fast by the view that the quickest possible restoration of a state of legal order in the Kingdom of Poland was the only road that could lead to the security of the persons and property of His Majesty's subjects on Prussian territory.

If the importance of our late arrangements with the Imperial Government of Russia has been distorted, their tendency exaggerated, and their objects placed in a false light, and if the excitement on both sides of the frontier has thereby been unnecessarily increased, and the irritation against Prussia and her inhabitants been unnecessarily intensified, the Government cannot shut their eyes to the conviction that the interests of the country have in consequence been in various ways seriously injured. These exaggerations, which the Government had no legal means to prevent, have been set going by the press, and have been materially increased by the debates in the Chamber of Representatives on the Polish question.

(Signed) BISMARCK.

No. 139.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 6).*

(No. 284. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 4, 1863.*

INFORMATION was brought to me this afternoon, which I lost no time in transmitting to your Lordship by telegraph, that the Polish Committee in Paris, of which Count André Zamoyski is the organ, had yesterday resolved on recommending that the insurrection in Poland should become general; that the aristocracy should take part in it, and that the inhabitants of Galicia and the Duchy of Posen, of Polish race, should be invited to cross the frontier in aid of their brethren, but that it should be strictly im-

pressed on the latter to commit no act of insubordination towards their own authorities, which would give those authorities pretext for interference.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 140.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 6).*

(No. 285. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 4, 1863.*

I LEARN from a confidential source that the despatch addressed to St. Petersburg by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, with reference to Polish affairs, to be communicated to Prince Gortchakoff, after giving an historical summary of the Polish question, concluded with this phrase: —

„Le Gouvernement Russe ne doit pas ignorer que l'insurrection de la Pologne, en se prolongeant, met nos relations politiques à l'épreuve la plus périlleuse qu'elles puissent traverser“.

The rest of the despatch was very friendly, but the Duc de Montebello, on receiving it, was so alarmed by the last phrase that he asked by telegraph permission to suppress it. The permission was refused.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

† No. 141.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 6).*

(No. 286).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 4, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having requested to see me I waited upon his Excellency this afternoon.

He said that he had communicated to the Emperor the papers of which, by your Lordship's directions, I had left copies with him yesterday, and that he had received His Majesty's orders to state that, while regretting that the identic note which His Majesty had desired that the Representatives of the two Governments should have presented at Berlin had not been agreed to by Her Majesty's Government, His Majesty recognized with satisfaction that the opinion expressed in your Lordship's despatch to Sir Andrew Buchanan, respecting the Convention of St. Petersburg, coincided with that which he himself entertained of that act.

Copies of that despatch, and of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Napier, his Excellency added, would be sent to the French Ambassadors at Berlin and St. Petersburg,

and they would be invited, in remarking to them that the language of Her Majesty's Government was in general harmony with the language prescribed to them, to continue to act upon the instructions which they had received.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said further, that he should send to the Emperor's Representatives at Berlin and St. Petersburg, a despatch narrating the communications which had passed between the Imperial Government and that of Her Majesty, with reference to the project of an identic note, together with a copy of the projected note.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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† No. 142.

*Mr. Grey to Earl Russell. — (Received March 7).*

(No. 7).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 6, 1863.*

I SAW M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon, and although not instructed to do so by your Lordship I informed his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the next step to be taken in the Polish question would be to invite the chief Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna to concur in advising Russia to recur to the stipulations, and to revert to the policy, of the Treaty of Vienna in regard to Poland.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he would take the Emperor's orders on this subject at the Council which is to be held to-morrow.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. G. GREY.

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No. 143.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 8).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 8, 1863.*

I HAVE read to Count Rechberg your Lordship's despatch No. 55, and its inclosure, No. 53, to Lord Napier. His Excellency wished for copies, in order to take the Emperor's orders respecting this communication on Polish affairs. May I give them to him?

He hears from Prussian Minister that his Government decline to join in the recommendation at St. Petersburg. I doubt Austria's supporting Her Majesty's Government as desired.

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No. 144.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, March 9, 1863.*

YES; you may give the copies mentioned in telegram of yesterday.

No. 145.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 113).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 27, 1863.*

THE Emperor sent Count Alexander Adlerberg to Warsaw recently on a confidential mission, to sound, it was reported, the Grand Duke in regard to the nomination of General Berg as Military Commander-in-chief in the kingdom. Count Adlerberg returned, it seems, with a negative on the part of His Imperial Highness. General Berg will not be nominated to the post in question, which will be filled, as is to-day reported, by General Sumarokoff. General Berg was lately Governor-General of Finland, where his administration was highly unpopular. He had formerly the reputation of being an intelligent and cultivated officer; his recent course has been feeble and reactionary. He is of advanced age, and his health is seriously impaired. It is, perhaps, fortunate for Poland, as well as for himself, that General Berg has not been nominated to such an arduous office. General Sumarokoff commanded a division of the Russian Guards in the late war which was never brought before the enemy. He appears to be a person of a polite and gentle character in his social relations; he has, however, some appearance of bodily infirmity, and I never heard that there was anything in his ability or experience which could fit him for high responsible employment.

His appointment will, at least, not inspire the apprehension of a sanguinary or oppressive regimen, such as would probably have been inaugurated by the savage Mouravieff, who had been spoken of for the same command.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 146.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 114. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 27, 1863.*

THE Prussian Minister spoke to me yesterday spontaneously concerning the recent Arrangement or Convention between his Government and that of Russia regulating the mutual aid to be afforded by the two countries for the suppression of the insurrection

in Poland, or, as Prince Gortchakoff has it, for the pacification of their frontiers. Count Redern stated that he had taken no active part in the negotiation of these engagements, which had been prescribed by the Cabinet of Berlin, and had been carried on exclusively by General Alvensleben. I might have heard a secret Article spoken of; that Article merely stipulated that the two Governments should afford each other information respecting the course of events. Why such a provision should be couched in a Secret Article he could not divine; he believed, moreover, that the Treaty would never be carried into effect at all. Count Redern did not, however, give me any distinct account of the tenour of the Treaty, the text of which has not been imparted to any one here.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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## No. 147.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 115. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 28, 1863.*

THE text of the Treaty recently concluded between Prussia and Russia in respect to Polish affairs has been longer reserved than I expected. Had I anticipated that so great a mystery would be kept up about it I would have endeavoured to place it before your Lordship by application to some confidential source. I was prevented doing so by the reflection that any pains or money which I might expend for that purpose might be frustrated by the publication of the Act in question in the German newspapers, perhaps before it reached your Lordship from this quarter.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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## No. 148.

*Sir H. Howard to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 52. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Hanover, March 7, 1863.*

I LEARNT to-day from M. Armand, the French Chargé d'Affaires, that he had within the last few days received a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, stating that as the British and Austrian Governments had declined to take any collective steps with France in respect to the Convention concluded by Prussia with Russia concerning the insurrection in Poland, the French Government, not wishing to act singly in this matter, proposed remaining passive.

Not having seen the despatch itself, I am unable to judge of its tone; but if it is to be inferred from M. Armand's report, it would appear to betray some mortification at

the proposal of France for identic action in this matter by the British, Austrian, and French Governments not having been accepted.

M. Armand remarked at the same time upon the efforts which he alleged had been made by the English press to embroil France with Prussia on this question. I replied that, as he must be well aware, Her Majesty's Government had no control over the English press, and that the fact of their having given the preference to the milder form of separate representations over that of identic notes, proved that they wished to avoid any rupture on the part of the Western Powers with Prussia, and to afford the latter every opportunity of backing, with as little loss of dignity as possible, out of the very unfortunate Convention into which she had entered with Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY F. HOWARD.

†† No. 149.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 126).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 5, 1863.*

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 48 of the 2nd instant was delivered to me on the morning of the 4th, by the messenger Blackwood; and I lost no time in seeking an interview with M. de Bismarek, and reading it to his Excellency. When I had finished, M. de Bismarek asked whether I would give him a copy of the despatch; and on my replying that I was not instructed to do so, he proceeded to make some observations on its contents. He said that your Lordship spoke in one place of the events occurring in Poland as a contest between the Russian Government and Polish insurgents; and in another, as a war against the Poles, in which you accuse Prussia of having engaged to take a part; but in his opinion, the measures which the Russian Government are employing to suppress the insurrection cannot be properly described as a war in which two nations are engaged; and Prussia could not therefore have been said to have become a party to a war between Russia and Poland, if her troops had been ordered to act in concert with those of Russia on the frontier in the event of an insurrection having broken out in her own territory.

I replied that I did not see how the name given to the conflict could in any way affect the responsibility which Prussia would in such a case have assumed.

His Excellency went on to discuss the paragraph in the despatch in which your Lordship states that you had reason to believe that the Convention signed by Prussia and Russia contains an agreement that Russian troops upon crossing the frontier of Prussia shall not be disarmed, as would be required according to international usage, but shall be allowed to retain their arms, and to remain and act as an armed body in Prussian territory. M. de Bismarek said there was no such engagement in the Convention. Your Lordship, however, will probably consider that it is included in the stipulation mentioned by

your Lordship, and which his Excellency admits that the Convention does contain, that Russian troops shall be permitted to pursue and capture Polish insurgents in Prussian territory. The interpretation of that stipulation, however, had been, he said, under negotiation; and it was to have been restricted and defined by instructions to be given to the military frontier authorities, when it was decided that it would not be necessary for the troops of either Government to cross the frontier at all, and that no instructions on the subject should be prepared. The Convention might therefore, he said, be looked upon as a dead letter, as the instructions necessary for carrying it into effect had never been drawn up; [<sup>1</sup>and though Count Bernstorff may have defended it as if it were actually in force, his Excellency had not been instructed to do so, and could merely have made, on his own responsibility, confidential and imperfect communications to your Lordship founded on his knowledge of the first steps in the negotiations with which he had been made acquainted].

Your Lordship's observation that if Russian troops are to be at liberty to follow and attack Polish insurgents in Prussia, the Prussian Government makes itself a party to the war now raging in Poland, M. de Bismarck met by a denial that Russian troops have ever been allowed to do so; but he said, nevertheless, considering the reasons which the Prussian Government had at one time for fearing that the Prussian territory would be violated by the insurgents, and that Prussian subjects would be incited to revolt, he could not admit that the case of Russian troops acting in the manner contemplated by the Convention against insurgents in the Prussian frontier districts could be looked upon in the same light as a Federal ship of war attacking a Confederate ship in British waters; for any permission granted to Russian troops to cross the frontier into Prussia, or for Prussian troops to cross into Russia, would have been given solely for the protection of Prussian territory and of Prussian property, and for a purely defensive purpose, in the event of an insurrection existing on both sides of the frontier, as there was every reason to apprehend would have been the case before Prussian troops could have reached the frontier districts in sufficient number to provide for their security. I could not, of course, admit the distinction which M. de Bismarck wished thus to establish, as the motive for permitting an act cannot affect the character of its consequences; but M. de Bismarck maintained that considering the position of the Prussian Government, it could not fairly be said that they would have given, by carrying out the stipulations of the Convention, indirect support and countenance, as alleged by your Lordship, to the arbitrary conscription of Warsaw, for they could not have neglected to take such measures as they might have considered necessary, under the circumstances, for the safety and protection of their own territory.

As to the request which I had been instructed to make to him for a copy of the Convention, his Excellency observed that he could not understand upon what grounds Her Majesty's Government could consider themselves justified in expecting the Prussian Government to communicate to them a copy of an incomplete document, which only formed, as he had already explained to me [<sup>1</sup>confidentially last week], the first step in a negotiation now suspended, and which must remain entirely inoperative unless it were ren-

<sup>1</sup> The words in parenthesis are not in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).



dered effective by instructions which had to be agreed upon, and which will not now be drawn up, as circumstances have rendered them unnecessary. It was, therefore, a Convention of which no ratifications had been exchanged, and it was not intended that it should be ratified.

M. de Bismarck then repeated what he had formerly said to me [confidentially], as reported in my confidential despatch No. 112 of the 27th instant, viz., that the Convention merely states that as the insurrection which has broken out in the Kingdom of Poland threatens public and private property and the peace of the neighbouring Provinces of Prussia, it has been agreed between the two Governments that assistance may be afforded to each other, and their troops be authorized to cross the frontier on the demand of either Government, and in cases of necessity, and that this agreement shall only last while both Governments shall deem it expedient.

His Excellency said that the proposal to enter into the Convention was forwarded by telegraph from St. Petersburg by General Alvensleben, who received authority on the same manner to sign it. That the King had at first hesitated to authorize its signature, as His Majesty considered the agreement of too elastic a nature, until it was suggested to him that the character of the engagement would entirely depend upon the instructions to the frontier and military authorities, which must be agreed upon with the Russian Government before the Convention could be carried into effect, as to the circumstances in which, and the distance to which, the frontier could be crossed by the troops of either party, and therefore on His Majesty's own appreciation of the cases of necessity in which Russians should be permitted to do so at all. His Excellency said that negotiations having been consequently opened for preparing such instructions, the Russian Government proposed that their troops should be allowed to cross the frontier when in actual conflict and in sight of an enemy, and to a distance from which they could return within the same day. His Excellency, however, did not explain to me by what authority permission to cross was to be given in such cases, observing, however, that arrangements for this purpose would have depended on the danger threatened in each district; but he said that even this restricted authority had never been conceded, and no action by Russian troops on Prussian territory, as far as he was aware, had ever taken place, although accidental cases may have occurred, but if so this may have happened in Austrian as well as in Prussian Poland, nor had any occupation of Russian territory by Prussian troops ever taken place, although it had been attempted to represent as such the occupation of the bridge belonging to Prussia which connects the Prussian town Gollub, near Kulm, with a Russian town on the opposite side of the River Drewentz, when it was believed that insurgents in possession of the Russian town were about to make an irruption into Prussia.

M. de Bismarck stated, however, that there have been several cases in which Russian Custom-house guards, when assailed by the insurgents, have crossed with the Custom-house chest into Prussia, and have been allowed to return without being deprived of their arms, not, however, in virtue of the Convention, but as a mere act of courtesy on the part of the King.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 150.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 127).

My Lord,

Berlin, March 7, 1863.

I HAVE spoken to M. de Bismarck on the subject of the Cartel Convention signed between Prussia and Russia in August 1857, and ratified on the 4th of September following, to which your Lordship refers in your Lordship's No. 50 of the 2nd instant, and his Excellency has informed me that the Convention is still in force, and is frequently acted upon by both Governments.

He said that Article B. is not properly rendered in the translation quoted in your Lordship's despatch, and that its last phrase should be translated „or may be subject even at a future time to military service“, instead of „shall be“, and that its application to Prussian subjects is thus so general, that when he was Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, he frequently obtained under it the extradition of fraudulent debtors who had endeavoured to escape from their Prussian creditors by passing into Russia.

M. de Bismarck also stated that in one year between the date when the former Convention terminated and that of 1857 was concluded, 30.000 men, principally persons liable to the Prussian military conscription, crossed the frontier, and that their presence became a serious embarrassment to the Government.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 151.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 129. Confidential).

My Lord,

Berlin, March 7, 1863.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 127 of this date on the subject of the representations which have been addressed by Her Majesty's Government to that of Prussia, relative to the affairs of Poland, I may mention that M. de Bismarck observed to me during my conversation with his Excellency yesterday, that the policy of Her Majesty's Government might lead to France having ere long 100.000 men at her orders on the Vistula, for if ever Poland became independent her army would be always at the disposal of the French Government; and he repeated an opinion which he had expressed before, that the abandonment of Poland by Russia, and the withdrawal of her troops beyond the Bug, is not an impossible eventuality, or one which would be unpopular with a great majority of Russians.

Without entering into this view of what may occur hereafter, I reminded his Excellency that he had himself told me that a state of brigandage might be kept up for a long time in Poland, as even those persons who had been forced to take part in the insurrection would be afraid to return to their homes; and I said if Prussia had no higher

motive, her own interest alone should induce her to concur with Her Majesty's Government in recommending the Russian Government to publish an immediate amnesty, which, according to his own showing, would be the means of re-establishing peace in Poland, and securing Prussia against a great danger, for if the insurrection became more general and an outbreak took place in the Prussian Polish Provinces, circumstances might arise in which Prussia would find herself opposed to France in a contest in which she could expect no support or assistance from England.

His Excellency seemed to think that public opinion on this subject might undergo some change in England, if the country were convinced, as he appeared himself to be, that France either sought a subservient ally in Poland, or wished to use the cause of that country as a means by which to extend her own frontier to the Rhine; but I endeavoured to prove to him that the present outburst of public feeling is no ephemeral emotion, but arises from the deep-seated conviction in the minds of the British people that Poland has been most cruelly wronged, and from a long-cherished desire to see her wrongs redressed, which will effectually preclude the possibility of any British Government ever opposing measures ostensibly undertaken for that purpose, however much there may be reason to suspect that the ulterior object of the author of such measures may not be of a nature to meet with the sympathy or approval of Great Britain.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 152.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 131. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 7, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have read to M. de Bismarck the draft of my despatch [No. 126] of the 5th instant, and that his Excellency has acknowledged it to be a correct report of the language which he held to me at my interview with him on the preceding day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 153.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 133. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 7, 1863.*

DURING my conversation with M. de Bismarck yesterday, I asked him if he had read the whole Convention with Russia to me last week, and if it contained no clause about the use of Prussian railways by Russian troops.

He replied that it contained no such clause; adding that last week he had read to me the German text of the draft of the Convention as proposed by General Alvensleben, and to satisfy me entirely, he would now read to me [confidentially] the Convention itself, which had been signed by that officer and Prince Gortchakoff at St. Petersburg.

He then produced and read it; and as far as I can judge of a document which has not been actually in my hands, I believe it to contain no other stipulations than those which he had already mentioned.

It is clear to me, however, as there is no clause relative to the exchange of ratifications, and as it merely concludes with the words „that this arrangement shall only remain in force as long as the two Governments may think expedient“, that it was never intended that any regular ratifications should be exchanged.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 154.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 134).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 7, 1863.*

IN conformity with your Lordship's instructions I yesterday read to M. de Bismarck your Lordship's despatch [No. 56] of the 4th instant, and also the copy which it contained of a despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, [No. 53] of the 2nd instant, which records the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the events now passing in Poland, and suggests measures which they conceive should be adopted by Russia and the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna of June 1815, with a view to the cessation of bloodshed in Poland, and to the enjoyment by the Polish nation of the rights promised to them at Vienna, but hitherto withheld.

I, at the same time, asked M. de Bismarck what answer I should give to the hope expressed in your Lordship's despatch that the Prussian Government will concur with that of Her Majesty in making representations to the Government of Russia, which have for their object the interests of humanity and the security of the peace of Europe, and his Excellency said he would reply to your Lordship's despatch through Count Bernstorff.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 155.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 135).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 7, 1863.*

WITH reference to the arrest of two young men, born in France of Polish parents, on their way to Poland without proper passports, reported in my despatch [No. 116] of

the 27th instant, I understand that they have claimed French protection, and that the French Ambassador having consequently interfered in their favour, an inquiry has been instituted as to their nationality, which, it is hoped, will result in their not being delivered up to the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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No. 156.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 136).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 7, 1863.*

M. DE BISMARCK was obliged to terminate my interview with him yesterday somewhat abruptly, in order that he might attend a Cabinet Council; and I could only, therefore, address to him very hurriedly the question contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 55 of the 4th instant, as to whether Her Majesty's Government may conclude that the Convention with Russia on Polish affairs will not be ratified, and I said that my despatch No. 126 of the 5th instant, which I had read to him, might, perhaps, be considered a satisfactory answer to your Lordship's inquiry.

I had no time to press him for a further answer, but as I read to him the last paragraph in your Lordship's despatch, he said that the taunt of subserviency to Russia with which it concludes was not justified by the circumstances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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No. 157.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 137. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 7, 1863.*

THE French Ambassador has informed me that he had an interview with M. de Bismarck on the 4th instant, when he offered to read to him the draft of the identic note which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had proposed that Her Majesty's Government and that of Austria should join the French Government in addressing to Prussia respecting the Convention lately concluded between the Prussian and Russian Governments, and that he had given, as his reason for doing so, a wish to satisfy M. de Bismarck that there was nothing unfriendly in the proposed note.

M. de Bismarck, who has also mentioned this circumstance to me, spoke of the note as a despatch to M. de Talleyrand, and of M. de Talleyrand as having represented the

French Government to have been in reality more disposed than that of Her Majesty to avoid giving offence to Prussia.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 158.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 114. Secret and Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 5, 1863*

COUNT RECHBERG has read to me a letter addressed to him a few days ago by the son of General Dembinski, who played a remarkable part in the Hungarian insurrection, requesting a private interview with his Excellency, and he informed me that he had immediately received him.

Count Rechberg said that M. Dembinski had placed in his hands a letter from his father, and observed that if his Excellency would entertain the project therein submitted, he had a further one to deliver, which contained a full and detailed statement of the General's plan.

This letter, Count Rechberg told me, contained nothing more nor less than the proposition that Austria should side with the Polish insurrection; and General Dembinski announced at the same time his intention to enter into communication with the movement party in Hungary, and to endeavour to induce them to support the Poles with men and money.

Count Rechberg hesitated when he read the first words of this letter whether he should not have the bearer of such treacherous communications arrested, but he felt this ought not to be under the circumstances, and informed young Dembinski that he would hold no communication with him on the subject of his plan. He refused to receive the second letter, and the interview ended.

His Excellency observed to me that he should have probably declined receiving a communication from any other of the Generals who commanded against Austria during the Hungarian war, but that Dembinski had acted honourably when oppose to them, and had always refused to burn and destroy villages, and commit other horrors that were ordered by M. Kossuth and the Provisional Government, and that he had always acted as a gentleman, and given many proofs of a humane and just disposition.

Count Rechberg, as your Lordship may imagine, was not a little surprised at a proposition of this nature, and he fears that there is already active connivance on the part of the French Government in the Polish insurrection.

He suspects that this Dembinski project has been concocted at the Palais Royal, and is in connection with other schemes reported to exist at Paris, for the formation of Venice into a free port, the restoration of Galicia to Poland, where a Secundo Geniture under Russia is contemplated, and, in fact, a complete project of frontier rectification,

His Excellency observed that if Austria were to cede Galicia, she would lose one of the best nurseries for her army, for the peasants were amongst the most loyal of the Emperor's subjects, and had, in moments of difficulty, been always foremost in contributing to the defence of the interests of the Empire.

Having asked Count Rechberg whether he really believed in the existence of these wild schemes at Paris, he said they must have some foundation, for the „France“ had been traced as the source of these publications.

Since writing the foregoing, I have again seen Count Rechberg, who informed me that he has had a visit from a married daughter of General Dembinski, a charming young woman, who made a most pathetic appeal to him in favour of the Polish cause, and had prayed him not to reject the proposed identic communication which the French Government had suggested. His Excellency seemed persuaded this lady had been sent from Paris, and said she seemed to possess every qualifications as an emissary in the cause of Polish nationality.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 159.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 115).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 5, 1863.*

I INQUIRED to-day of Count Rechberg if he had received any information from London or Paris on the subject of his communication of the last week, reported in my despatch No. 105 of the 26th ultimo, as to the French project of identic action on the part of Austria, England, and France in the Polish question. His Excellency replied that he had nothing whatever from London, but that a telegram had arrived last night from Prince Metternich to the effect that the Austrian answer had been well received, and that the explanation of the policy of the Imperial Government which had been forwarded from here by the Duc de Grammont had also produced a good effect, and that he believed the French Government were disposed to take a more moderate view of the question of interference in the affairs of Poland than was the case last week.

Count Rechberg said that he understood a confidential communication had been made to the Emperor Napoleon from St. Petersburg, to the effect that the Russian Government must refuse to listen to any proposal whatever that partook of a collective character, but that the Emperor Alexander would not be indisposed to entertain suggestions as to Poland that may be addressed to him by France alone.

His Excellency said also that he had a visit yesterday from the Russian Minister, who had expressed satisfaction at hearing that Austria had declined the project of an identic note or of the collective action of the three Powers at the present moment. M. de Balabine added that when the insurrection was quelled he had every reason to believe

that it was the Emperor's intention to grant large concessions to Poland, and to make the amnesty that would be published general.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 160.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 9).*

(No. 117. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 5, 1863*

I HAVE been greatly surprised to observe it stated in Sir Andrew Buchanan's despatch No. 102 of the 22nd ultimo, copy of which was inclosed in your Lordship's No. 47, that the King of Prussia had stated to Her Majesty's Ambassador that one of the reasons which had induced him to enter into the Convention with Russia was to prevent the re-establishment of an independent Polish Kingdom under the auspices of Austria.

I am at a loss to imagine where such a thought can have originated, for no project of this kind exists at Vienna. Neither the Emperor Francis Joseph nor his Government entertain this wild scheme. They deplore the existence of the present insurrection, they consider that the conduct of Russia may have produced it, but they have no such projects as that alluded to by the King of Prussia, and I apprehend that it must have been suggested to His Majesty with the sole sinister object of exciting unjust and unfounded suspicion against Austria.

If Austria ever entertained such a plan she knows it would be unattainable without a war, and war is the thing which above all others she desires to avoid. Her army has been reduced, and is barely sufficient for the defence of her dominions, and is certainly in no way calculated to enter upon a war of aggression; besides, her whole object at this moment is retrenchment of her expenses with the view of restoring her finances to a healthy condition. It is true that wild politicians here have said that the sympathies of Poland are with Austria, and therefore every opportunity should be taken to improve this feeling as against Russia, and it has been reported that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian and the Archduke Charles Louis, the brothers of the Emperor, were destined to come forward in the Polish cause; but I may safely assure your Lordship that no serious person at Vienna believes that a plan for the restoration of the Polish Kingdom under an Archduke now exists or has existed during the reign of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

I have inquired incidentally of Baron Werther, the Prussian Minister at this Court, if he believed that there was any foundation whatever for a report existing at Berlin that Austria was agitating for the re-establishment of the Polish Kingdom. His Excellency replied that he certainly had never written anything of the kind to his Government, and that he could not understand where such a foolish story can have originated.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.



No. 161.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 10).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, March 10, 1863.*

THE King has requested me to convey to the Queen His Majesty's thanks for the conciliatory and friendly conduct of Her Majesty's Government during the late discussions at Paris on Polish affairs, and for the moderation with which the French Government, under the influence of Her Majesty's Government, have hitherto acted. The King said he entirely understood the remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government, and that all would be satisfactorily arranged. He is still anxious, however, as to the eventual policy of the Emperor of the French.

†† No. 162.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received March 10).*

(No. 33).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, March 4, 1869 (sic).*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of an account of a numerous and enthusiastic meeting held at the Exchange on the 2nd instant in favour of Poland, at which members of the Noble, Burgher, and Peasant Chambers were present, and when the strongest resolutions were passed, the proceedings terminating by a subscription, which is to remain open for further contributions.

[<sup>1</sup>Your Lordship will observe the bitter sarcasm which was cast at the Government of Prussia.

M. Dashkoff, my Russian colleague, who is a gentleman of the highest respectability, excuses the exceptional recruiting in Poland, upon the ground that the conscripts placed upon the lists of the police were known to be preparing for insurrection.

M. Dashkoff accounts for the attitude of the Prussian Government by the supposition that they fear the state of feeling in Posen.

Having had the honour of meeting Prince Oscar yesterday at the diplomatic dinner at the Queen Dowager's, His Royal Highness expressed to me his belief in the formidable nature of the Polish insurrection, and his strong opinion of the ill-advised policy of Prussia.

In the course of conversation Prince Oscar had the goodness to mention that he intended writing to the Prince of Wales, to congratulate His Royal Highness upon His marriage.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM].

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

† Inclosure in No. 162.

*Extract from the „Nya Dagligt Allehanda“ of March 3, 1863.*

(Translation).

**THE Meeting in Behalf of the Poles.**—The public meeting held yesterday, at half-past 6 in the evening, in the lower hall of the Exchange, to decide on some becoming expression of sympathy with the noble and unfortunate Polish people, whose cause preoccupies at present the thoughts of every noble-minded person in the civilised world, was as fully attended by representatives of all classes of the community as the large hall was capable of containing.

The meeting was opened by „Auditor“<sup>1</sup> Blanche, at whose invitation Baron A. C. Raab was named Chairman.

Besides Baron Raab, there were three other members of the House of Nobles present who spoke, namely, Baron Hugo Hamilton, Mr. P. R. Tersmeden, Mr. E. Von Quanten; and two members of the Citizen-Chamber, District-Judge Carlén and „Auditor“ Blanche; as well as three members of the Peasant Chamber, Uhr, Rosenberg, and Per. Nils-son of Espö.

Besides these speakers, all of whom belonged to the Diet, there was also the editor of the „Afton-bladet“ newspaper, Mr. Sohlman.

We publish in another part of our impression the different speeches in the order in which they were made.

All expressed the liveliest and deepest interest in the Polish nation of martyrs („martyr-folk“), and all met with the strongest support from the audience, who gave way to their feelings in loud and frequently repeated cheers, an applause which really became stormy when anathemas were launched against the barbarous hordes of Russia and the shabby conduct of Prussia, „whose hospitality to the Poles took the form of rounds of ballcartridge“.

During the meeting a telegram was received from Norrköping expressive of the lively interest taken in the unfortunate Poles by persons there assembled.

On Baron Hamilton's motion the following Resolution was passed as representing the general sentiments of the meeting, — a Resolution to be communicated by telegraph to Prince Czartoriski, the Chief of the Polish Emigration Society resident at Paris: —

„That this meeting desires to express, as far as lies within its power, its warm sympathy with the unmerited sufferings of the Polish people, a nation as noble as it is unfortunate, and to record its opinions, —

„1st. That the people of Poland have been treated in a manner utterly at variance with all the laws of nations, since they have been deceitfully attacked by their powerful neighbours, and their country has been divided among the latter.

„2nd. That the protest of the Polish people against such violence, a protest dating back nearly a hundred years, and their repeated efforts to regain their national indepen-

<sup>1</sup> „Auditor“ signifies a law officer attached to a regiment, whose duty it is to preside at court-martials.

dence, cannot be confounded with an ordinary attempt at insurrection, but are fully justifiable in the sight of God and man.

„3rd. That, consequently, the Polish strife for freedom which has now commenced is, in our opinion, entirely justified by circumstances, especially in view of the manner in which the conscription lately ordered to take place has been carried out, since that conscription was made use of as a means of seizing and expatriating the flower of the youth of Poland, who were left no other choice than cowardly to submit to this measure of violence, or courageously fall on the field of honour.

„4th. That we cannot sufficiently lament that the other nations of Europe have not long since lent their assistance to restore the nationality of the Polish people, and that we cannot do otherwise than express our most serious condemnation of every attempt which may be made by a foreign Government to support in the battle of freedom which has now commenced those enemies by which Poland has been hitherto over-matched.

„That, on this account, we desire that the people of Poland may obtain the assistance of the Almighty in the contest once more renewed to effect the independence of their country, that they may finally be victorious, and that they may attain their national liberty and the blessings of independence“.

The President then reverted to a proposal made in the course of the discussion that, the meeting should give utterance to the wish that the above expression of opinion might be the first link in the chain of similar expressions from all towns and parts of the country, and that the latter should thus consider the Resolutions the meeting had formed as an invitation to them to follow its example.

After determining to open a subscription in support of the Polish patriots, and to place lists in all the bookseller's shops for the purpose of receiving signatures for that object, the proceedings terminated with loud and repeated cheers of „Long live the Poles!“

A collection was then opened on the spot with a subscription of 500 rix-dollars from the President of the Peasant-Chamber, Nils Larpon of Tullus, which, with other contributions, amounted to 1.000 rix-dollars, when the meeting separated a little before 9 o'clock in the evening.

No. 163.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 11).*

(  
Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 11, 1863.*

RUMOURS from Paris as to development of the Polish question cause serious alarm to the Austrian Government. Count Rechberg has telegraphed for Prince Metternich. His Highness is expected at Vienna this week. Several emissaries from Paris have arrived at Cracow.

No. 164.

*Mr. Layard to M. Gonzalez.*

MR. LAYARD presents his compliments to M. Gonzalez, and has the honour to acquaint him that he has reported to Earl Russell the conversation which he had with M. Gonzalez on the 9th instant, and that Lord Russell has desired that M. Gonzalez should be informed that Sir John Crampton will receive instructions as to the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Poland.

*Foreign Office, March 11, 1863.*

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† No. 165.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(No. 57).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 11, 1863.*

AS it appears by your Excellency's despatch No. 126 of the 5th instant that the so-called Convention between Prussia and Russia, relative to the suppression of the insurrection in Poland, is now a dead letter, (and) as no instructions have been issued under it, you can no longer ask for a copy of it.

That direction was issued on the supposition that the Convention would be ratified, and that instructions would be issued for carrying it into effect.

The crossing the frontier with money from unprotected and insulated Custom-houses, without any formal Convention, must be considered as too unimportant to deserve serious notice.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 166.

*Mr. Grey to Earl Russell.*

Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 12, 1863, 5.45 p. m.*

AFTER a long conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I quite understand the alarm of the Austrian Government as to the development of the Polish question, as mentioned in Lord Bloomfield's telegram. His Excellency entered into a long dissertation to show the advantage which would result to Europe from the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland. He said the Emperor could not forget the traditional sympathy of France for the suffering Poles. The language to be held by M. Billault in the Senate, on the presentation of the petition on Saturday next, would express clearly the feelings of the Government, and the order of the day would be voted on the understanding that it implied approval of the past, and confidence in the future policy of the Government.

French agents at foreign Courts, parties to the Treaty of Vienna, are instructed to state that France will be ready to join in a collective representation to Russia, which would have far more force than isolated representations. He says that France has already made her representation, and he professes to regard the Russian answer as unsatisfactory, and as promising nothing.

He thinks the Polish insurrection is really gaining ground morally, i. e., that a more influential class are becoming imbued with a revolutionary spirit.

He professes to be ignorant of the cause of Prince Metternich's departure, which, I believe, will be to-night or to-morrow morning.

It is too late to write this evening; details by messenger to-morrow.

No. 167.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 12).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 12, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG answers my communication on Poland by referring to his despatch to Prince Metternich, already known to your Lordship, as basis of present Austrian policy.

Instructions to Count Apponyi in this sense leave Vienna to-day.

His Excellency will write to St. Petersburg in general terms, representing propriety of making concessions to Poland.

No. 168.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 13, 7.45 p. m.).*

(Telegraphic).

*Warsaw, March 13, 1863.*

THE Secret Committee resigned. Langiewicz appointed Dictator with, it is said, two advisers.

Tendered resignation of the Archbishop as Counsellor of State refused.

No. 169.

*Mr. Grey to Earl Russell. — (Received March 13).*

(No. 17).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 12, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me to-day that the discussion in the Senate upon the petition in favour of Poland, will take place on Saturday next, not to-day, as I inadvertently stated to your Lordship in a former despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. GREY.

†† No. 170.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 14).*

(No. 143).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 12, 1863.*

THE „Staats-Anzeiger“ of this day's date contains an official contradiction of various statements made with reference to the Russian Convention in the „Opinion Nationale“, the „Moniteur“, and other less important papers. In the concluding paragraph of this article it is stated that England alone has chosen the form of a despatch to bring her objections to the Convention in a friendly manner to the notice of the Prussian Government, and that as regards verbal „representations, which, besides France, Austria and other Governments are supposed to have made“, the Berlin Cabinet knows nothing.

The wording of this paragraph in the original leaves it in doubt whether the writer means to deny that verbal representations have been made by Austria, France, and other States, or to admit that France has made verbal representations, and to apply his negation only to Austria and the other Governments.

[<sup>1</sup> A translation of this article by Mr. Grosvenor, is herewith enclosed].

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 170.

*Extract from the „Staats-Anzeiger“ of March 12, 1863.*

(Translation).

THE „Opinion Nationale“ has published a Warsaw correspondence which gives as authentic, information respecting the Convention entered into on February the 8th between Russia and Prussia.

According to this journal it consisted of —

1. A Military Convention of fourteen Articles.
2. Seven additional Articles providing for intervention.
3. An eventual Convention of twenty and more Articles concerning further measures arising from intervention and external eventualities.

The „Moniteur“, at the commencement of its bulletin of the 7th of March, states that an interpellation, to be made to the Prussian Envoy at the Diet was under the consideration of those members of it whose policy coincided with that of Austria, having for object to show the evil consequences which would arise to the Diet from the Prussian and Russian Convention.

In close connection with this news is a statement from Vienna correspondents, that Austria, with reference to Article XI of the Federal Act, and Article XXXVI of the Fi-

<sup>1</sup> The last paragraph and the inclosure are not in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

nal Act, has remonstrated verbally in Berlin against the Prussian and Russian Convention, because the safety of the Diet was thereby endangered. Further, that Baden and Bavaria had made known in Berlin that their views were similar to those of Austria as regarded the Convention, and all the remaining Confederate States who are threatened by an invasion from France on the Rhine took similar steps. As such reports, especially those of the French press, in no wise calculated to calm people's minds, are zealously spread abroad by the German press, and more particularly by the organs of the Prussian Opposition, we are authorized to state that they are one and all fictitious.

This statement would scarcely be necessary for an unprejudiced reader as regards the above, the „Opinion Nationale“ and the „Moniteur“.

But with regard to the third of the above notices respecting the representations presumed to have been made in Berlin by a large number of foreign Governments, we must expressly remark that only one great Power, namely England, has chosen the form of a despatch, which was read here, to express in a friendly manner her objections against the Convention; and that further, with regard to verbal communications which, besides France, Austria and other German and non-German States are supposed to have made here in reference to the Convention with Russia, these are quite unknown to the Prussian Government.

No. 171.

*Mr. Grey to Earl Russell. — (Received March 14).*

(No. 19. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 12, 1863.*

I INFORMED your Lordship by telegraph this afternoon of the principal heads of a conversation which I had to-day with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. I will now endeavour to relate what took place in greater detail, merely premising that the impression left upon me by his Excellency's language has not been modified by time and reflection. What M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, he said distinctly, and as if he had prepared all he had to say beforehand. Indeed, he told me in so many words that he had; for as I was leaving, he referred to some notes which he had by his side classed under the names of the various Missions, which he read half-aloud, and then told me that on his audience-days he always had his dossier ready, and that he had now nothing more to say to me.

The conversation began by a reference to Prince Metternich's departure for Vienna, which I at the time believed to have taken place this morning. M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that the Prince was going to-night or to-morrow morning to Vienna to be present at a great carousal about to be given there, and professed to know no other reason, though at the same time he asked me, with a smile, if that reason was not enough for me. I took care to give no hint that I knew anything as to the cause of the Prince's journey to Vienna, and only said I thought that as the carousal was not to be held till the 18th, that reason seemed hardly to account for the Prince's departure to-day. On this

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said his Highness certainly would have time to attend to other matters besides the carousal, and in the present state of affairs it was not to be wondered at that his Government should wish to have some personal communication with him. I naturally inquired whether anything new had occurred with regard to the Polish question.

His Excellency replied that since he had last seen me, and since I had made the communication to him which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 7 of the 6th instant to your Lordship, he had addressed a confidential despatch to the French Representatives at the Courts of the various Powers which had been parties to the Treaty of Vienna, in which he instructed them to inform the Governments to which they were respectively accredited that France would be ready to join in a collective representation to Russia, framed in conciliatory terms, but expressing firmly the advice that Russia should observe the stipulations of the Treaty of 1815 in regard to Poland. In giving these instructions to the French Diplomatic Agents, M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed them confidentially that he believed it to be the intention of the British Government to advise the chief Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna to make separate representations to Russia in the same sense; but his Excellency said he had not advised a similar course, because, in the first place, isolated representations never could have the force of a collective one, and because France had already made her own separate remonstrance at St. Petersburg.

I asked how the Russian Government had received it, but M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not give me any positive answer. I understood him to say that the Russian Government would listen to no remonstrance and would „promise nothing“. „Was there no hope“, I asked, „of their granting an amnesty hereafter?“ There had been some hope of this held out, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, but this was not enough to satisfy the Poles or Europe. The only way to settle this Polish question, once for all, was by a general union of all the Powers who, as parties to the Treaty of Vienna, had a voice in the matter. It was, his Excellency said, very unfortunate, and he could not help regretting it, that England had not consented to unite with France in the course of policy which he had suggested in the first instance, when advantage might well have been taken of „an incident“ to make a strong representation upon the whole subject.

To this I rejoined that it was rather considered a matter of congratulation than otherwise, by Her Majesty's Government, that that „incident“ had not been taken advantage of, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys had proposed; the result of the course followed by Her Majesty's Government had been that the Convention had been more or less disavowed by both Russia and Prussia, and that neither with one nor the other had a spirit of offended dignity been roused, as might have happened had an identic note been addressed to them by England and France. The consequence of the course of policy proposed by the French Government might have been war, and the object of Her Majesty's Government was to avert such a calamity. The same danger, I said, I thought might attend a collective note presented to the Russian Government by the chief Powers of Europe.

To this M. Drouyn de Lhuys could not assent. If single or isolated representations were made, the Russian Government might take offence or seem to do so, but the case would be very different if the representation were made collectively. „Quand on est seul



on ne se fâche pas contre tous à la fois". Besides, his Excellency went on, why are we bound to assume that war must be the natural and necessary consequence of an identic note? After the presentation of such a note, there would be diplomatic correspondence and negotiation, and why should not that lead to a peaceful solution? Before the Crimean war there was a long interchange of diplomatic correspondence before the sword was drawn.

But, I said, the sword was drawn, and the very argument your Excellency uses shows the danger of the course you proposed.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys again expressed his regret that England had not united with France in the first instance; but „that question“, said his Excellency, „is over (vidée et terminée)“, let us speak of it no more“.

The conversation then passed by a natural transition to the impending discussion in the Senate on the petition to be presented in favour of Poland. I said I had heard that the Government had decided on moving the order of the day, which I believed was tantamount to the rejection of the petition? His Excellency said it was quite true that the order of the day would be moved, but the sense of that motion must not be misunderstood. If the Senate voted that the petition should be referred to the Government („le renvoi de la pétition au Gouvernement“), they said, in fact, to the Government, „You have not taken the subject matter of the petition sufficiently into consideration, and we invite you to give it more attention“. But in voting the order of the day they would say, „We approve of the past, and we have confidence in the future policy of the Government in this matter“. „And“, M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to say, „there will be no mistake on this point. M. Billault, who will be the exponent of the views of the Government, has already concerted with me the tenour of the language he is to hold. It is impossible for the Emperor to forget the traditional policy of France in regard to Poland. The sympathy of this Country has always been with Poland, and the iniquitous partition of that Kingdom has always been looked upon here with reprobation. But the partition of Poland was not only a wicked act, but a most impolitic one. The existence of the Kingdom of Poland was a security for Turkey, for Germany, and for Austria especially; it was a bulwark against Russia, and a safeguard for Europe. Since the partition it has been the source of constant trouble to Europe, and a centre for revolutionary intrigue. These evils we might have remedied, and who knows whether we have not now lost an opportunity?“

His Excellency's language was so decided, and pointed so clearly to the existence of an idea in his mind that the reconstitution of the Kingdom of Poland was not impossible, that I asked him what Austria would say to such a solution of the present troubles.

To this M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave no answer, beyond saying that it might not be a disadvantage to Austria to have the Kingdom of Poland between her and Russia. But, he said, it would not be a loss to Russia to be rid of the constant source of internal trouble which the present state of Poland must always create. „And were I Emperor of Russia“, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, „I would far rather establish an independent kingdom in my Polish dominions than, at the demand of Europe, give them a Constitution and national institutions which the rest of my subjects did not enjoy. The latter would

not unreasonably ask. If rebellious subjects are to be thus favoured, why are we, who have always been loyal, to be worse off?"

I ought to have mentioned before, that in canvassing the results which might have ensued had England and France united in the course of Policy he at first proposed, M. Drouyn de Lhuys spoke of the difficulties which would attend an armed intervention in Poland. The operations of England would, he said, of course, have been principally naval, but for France there would have been the difficulty of reaching the scene of action, and arriving in Poland. „But“, he said, „it would never have come to that: England and France together can make themselves listen to, and Russia would have yielded what we required“.

Such, my Lord, is the sense of the language held to me to-day by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. I think I have reported it faithfully, and I have only to add, that at the time it created a strong impression in my mind — an impression which the reflection of some hours has not changed — that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs was speaking under the influence of keen disappointment at not having succeeded in engaging Great Britain in a course of action the material advantages of which might have fallen to the share of France. He regrets the loss of the opportunity which was offered by the St. Petersburg Convention, which he said, in so many words, was „un incident duquel nous aurions dû profiter“.

Whether he has given up all hope of any other „incident“ arising which might restore the opportunity thus lost is not for me to say. But I think it clear that M. Drouyn de Lhuys does not anticipate a speedy termination to the insurrection. On the contrary, he said it was spreading in a moral point of view. Influential persons who had hitherto stood aloof were now showing symptoms of disaffection to Russia; and his Excellency quoted, as an instance of this, the fact that the Polish members of the Council, and among them the Archbishop of Warsaw, a man remarkable for his good sense and moderation, had resigned.

The Proclamation, too, of Langiewiez, he said, was singularly temperate; and on the whole his Excellency said he thought a moral change was taking place in the character of the insurrection, which might be very serious to the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. G. GREY.

No. 172.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March —).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 15, 1863, 11.30 a. m.*

DEBATE on Poland put off until Tuesday.

No. 173.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 118. Secret and Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 3, 1863.*

The Imperial Cabinet are naturally very anxious respecting the attitude likely to be assumed by England, France, and even Italy, on the question of the insurrectionary movement in Poland. I avail myself of this occasion to lay before your Lordship a few particulars of what has passed on that subject, as I am well assured, between the French and Russian Governments.

On the 25th ultimo Baron Budberg had an interview with the Emperor Napoleon during which His Majesty reminded the Russian Ambassador of the apprehensions which he had expressed to the Emperor of Russia, to the effect that the Polish question might one day become the delicate point in their relations. He said that, impelled by the unanimity of public opinion in France and abroad, he was unable to stem the current, which was carrying him away in a direction opposed to his political and personal sentiments towards the Emperor Alexander. He only asked that his task might be facilitated „by disengaging his attitude“ („qu'on lui facilitât la tâche en dégageant son attitude“). His Majesty added that the insurrection once put down, a Proclamation enumerating the reforms already accomplished, and giving assurances of their being preserved, notwithstanding the rising, together with a resolution to exercise every possible degree of clemency, would certainly attain that object.

Baron Budberg considered that these preliminary and friendly confidences, destitute as they were of an official character, justified him in offering assurances to the effect desired by the Emperor, who several times insisted on the necessity of a prompt issue.

Prince Gortchakoff has approved the language held by the Ambassador in a cyphered telegram of the 26th ultimo, in which his Excellency says that Poland is certainly the touch-stone of the value of the Russian alliance with Napoleon. He instructed Baron Budberg to say that his august master remained firm in the confidence which he placed in the French Sovereign; and that, on his side, „Napoleon may reckon, on every occasion, on the sentiments of the Emperor“ („Napoléon peut compter en toute occasion sur les sentiments de l'Empereur“).

The Prince, in that despatch, considers that the work of repression had made considerable progress, and entertains the hope of a speedy submission to the Imperial forces.

The Emperor, he tells Baron Budberg, is determined to keep in the path of reform („maintenir les réformes“); and the rebellion once quenched, „the clemency which is in the heart of our august master, will certainly be largely applied („dans les limites du possible“), and will be all the more extensive if the attitude of foreign Cabinets gives rise to no appearance of pressure from without“.

Assurances in the above sense are to be given by Baron Budberg to the Emperor of the French.

With reference to the sympathy shown towards Poland in Italy, the Imperial Government have been informed by M. Skariatine, their Agent at Naples, that the Italian

Democratic party are anxious to see the insurrection spread into Hungary and the Danubian Principalities, which would give them a better chance of succeeding in their projects in regard to Rome. The petition addressed to the Parliament of Turin by a Neapolitan Committee asking for the formation of a volunteer corps for the suppression of brigandage, and the enlistments attempted in Lombardy under the same plea, have, in the opinion of the Russian Agent at Naples, no other object than that of preparing for the anticipated consequences of the Polish outbreak.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 174.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 121. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 3, 1863.*

I HAD occasion to see Prince Gortchakoff this forenoon, when his Excellency spontaneously spoke to me concerning the affairs of Poland. He told me that the French Government had made an overture in London and at Vienna with a view to exerting a common pressure on the Cabinet of Berlin, in regard to the recent engagements between Russia and Prussia for the suppression of the Polish insurrection. His Excellency added that the overtures of France had met with no success in either quarter. The Austrian Government had returned a decided negative. Her Majesty's Government had shown their usual practical good sense in dealing with the question. The Vice-Chancellor then showed me part of a long letter which he had addressed to Baron Budberg, and which I presume to constitute the basis on which the Russian Ambassador is to found his verbal communications with the French Government, should such occur on this question. In this letter the Prince speaks with some resentment of the tone of the French press, and qualifies the Polish insurrection in the old way as a revolutionary explosion of a socialist character fomented by the instigations of foreign emissaries. He makes no allusion to outraged nationality, broken engagements, or the recent provocation of the recruitment. He declares, however, that the intentions of the Emperor are merciful, and that His Majesty will persevere in the conciliatory policy previously commenced.

I did not gather from that portion of the letter which I heard whether it was an answer to a communication addressed to the Russian Government from Paris; but it may probably be so if I am correct in stating that the Emperor of the French had previously personally expressed his sentiments to the Russian Ambassador in Paris on Polish affairs.

The Vice-Chancellor continued to descant at some length on the unprovoked and flagitious character of the Polish revolt, and on the barbarities practised by the rebels on the Russian soldiers who fell into their hands. His Excellency expressed the regret with which he had heard of the violence used by the troops at the residence of Count Poleytylo, a member of the Government, but attributed them to acts of hostility used towards the troops by some persons at the château or in its vicinity.

I did not enter into any controversy beyond affirming that the system of recruitment recently put in force was an arbitrary and impolitic measure.

In this sentiment the Vice-Chancellor, as usual, agreed with me, but with some extenuations.

From the general tone of the Vice-Chancellor I gathered that the Russian Government have been extremely apprehensive of remonstrances on the part of the Western Powers; that every effort will be made to quench the insurrection with promptitude in order to avoid that contingency; and that the Imperial Government have a stronger feeling of resentment against France than towards England in relation to this affair. Among the Russians connected with Court and Government, however, I think the feeling is stronger against England than France, because the denunciations in Parliament have been so conspicuous and unanimous, while the secret movements of diplomacy in which France is more active and threatening are not known to the public.

Before leaving the Vice-Chancellor I remarked to him that I learned from Berlin that the Prussian Ministers only awaited the assent of Russia to publish the recent Military Convention.

His Excellency replied rather evasively on this point; but he said, generally, that all he wanted was to please the Cabinet of Berlin: the arrangement was not a formal diplomatic document; it had never been ratified; it was never intended to be ratified; it would never be executed. As far as he was concerned, it might be regarded as a dead letter. It was no use talking of a thing which had in a manner lapsed and ceased to exist.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

P. S. — I think it right to submit to your Lordship that Prince Gortchakoff gave a very confidential character to his language on this occasion, and specially to the communication to me of his letter to Baron Budberg.

N.

No. 175.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 124).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 5, 1863.*

I HAD some conversation yesterday evening about Polish affairs with the French Ambassador. I said to his Excellency that I had not been charged as yet to make any communication to the Russian Government on the subject. I supposed that his Excellency had not been directed to do so either. I heard that the Emperor of the French had spoken to Baron Budberg, and the affairs of Poland had been matter of conversation between your Lordship and Baron Brunnow. I presumed that the two Governments had preferred to make their sentiments known to the Representatives of Russia at our respective capitals, instead of conveying them to the Imperial Cabinet through his Excellency and myself.

The Duke de Montebello admitted that the Emperor of the French had expressed his views to Baron Budberg on this question. His Excellency's language seemed to imply that he had not been instructed to address Prince Gortchakoff in the same sense. The Ambassador stated that he had received no intelligence from home of the proposal made by France to England and Austria to make a joint remonstrance to the Imperial Cabinet. His Excellency informed me that Prince Gortchakoff had distinctly assured him that the Emperor would use a generous clemency in dealing with his revolted subjects in Poland, and would persevere in the reforming and conciliatory policy commenced before the insurrection.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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†† No. 176.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 125).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 5, 1863.*

I ASKED the French Ambassador to-day whether Prince Gortchakoff had shown him the text of the recent Convention between Russia and Prussia for the suppression of the Polish insurrection, or, as they say here, for the pacification of the frontiers.

The Duke de Montebello replied, that he had seen the Convention, which was framed very much in the sense previously stated by Prince Gortchakoff. The „Secret Article“ merely bound the Contracting Parties to a mutual communication of intelligence respecting the progress of the movement.

I have not pressed Prince Gortchakoff to show me the Convention, as I do not like to expose myself to a refusal, <sup>1</sup> and I shall not mention to the Vice-Chancellor that I know that the French Ambassador has seen it, for the Vice-Chancellor is very jealous of any correspondence between me and my French colleague.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER].

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No. 177.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 126. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 7, 1863.*

I LEARN from Russian sources that the authorities in Moldavia have taken measures for the removal of the Polish refugees in that province.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in Parliamentary Paper. (Edit.).

The Russian Consul-General at Bucharest reports that he learns from his Austrian colleague that the Austrian Government will prevent the transmit of revolutionary agents through their territory towards Galicia and the Kingdom of Poland.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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No. 178.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16)*

(No. 130. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 8, 1863.*

I AM assured that Prince Gortchakoff has received information, from a source which he considers trustworthy, that Menotti, the son of Garibaldi, has left Italy for England, with the view of going to Poland and taking an active part in this insurrection.

Of the accuracy of the information given to the Prince, I am unable to judge; but it is probable that the fear of the increased enthusiasm which would be imparted to the Poles by the presence among them of one bearing the name of the Italian hero, and the apprehension which must result to the Russian Government from such demonstrations as that which lately took place at Florence, will have the effect of inducing the Government to strain every nerve to suppress the rebellion with all possible despatch.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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† No. 179.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 18).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, March 4, 1863.*

THE revolutionary movement in this kingdom, which has now been in active operation for six weeks, appears, notwithstanding the unequal nature of the contest, to become more and more formidable, and, instead of being crushed or suppressed by the military forces brought against it, had succeeded in maintaining itself in every part of the kingdom, if not in gaining advantage over the Imperial troops.

The bulletins of the operations of the troops published by the Government are of so meagre a nature that it is quite impossible from them to form any correct judgment of the plan of the campaign, if, indeed, any real plan exists, and at the same time the information contained in these bulletins appears so improbable that one may be permitted to doubt their correctness.

The Government of Radom continues to be the scene of the principle operations, and the insurgents in that district, commanded by Langiewicz, although constantly repor-

ted dispersed and destroyed, reappear in undiminished numbers, at a short distance from the scene of their reported destruction, and by their activity and the ability with which they are handled, harass the troops sent against them most severely; and although unable to make any impression against the troops by acting in mass, the insurgents may, nevertheless, by continuing this partisan system of warfare, and by avoiding any general engagement, keep the whole Russian army in the kingdom in a constant state of suspense and preparation, and prevent anything approaching to a settlement of the question for some time to come.

The last official bulletin published declared that Langiewicz's band had been routed, and himself wounded, in a action near the town of Włoszczowa, situated about midway between the Warsaw and Vienna Railway and the old post-road to Cracow, and nearly equidistant from the towns of Kielce and Chenstochowa; it also mentioned that numbers of prisoners were brought in by the peasants, and that some parties had even surrendered themselves to the troops. What amount of truth there may be in this report, my Lord, it is impossible for me to judge; but later information states that this Chief now occupies the ground in the neighbourhood of Vycow, lately held by the band under Kurowski, that was so severely handled in the attack on the town of Miechow; and this position, which is close to the Austrian frontier, gives him the opportunity of receiving such supplies as can be smuggled across the frontier, as well as allowing him a retreat if pressed. The military authorities appeared at last to be fully alive to the importance of crushing this band, and it is believed that a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 men are now engaged in the operations undertaken for this purpose.

Very little is as yet known here of the movements of Miero(s)lawski, but there appears to be no doubt that he has been in the Kingdom, and it is believed he is now preparing a force to operate near the Lithuanian frontier, and that he will take the command of all the bands formed on the right bank of the Vistula.

Although, my Lord, it is almost impossible to suppose that the Poles can succeed, if left to their own unaided strength, in gaining any decisive advantage over the Imperial forces, it is now evident that even with the very small means at their disposal they can dispute the possession of the country with them; and the fact that an army numbering at the lowest estimate about 80,000 men, well armed and equipped, and composed of old and disciplined troops, has been unable to put down an outbreak that commenced with such small means at its disposal, is most remarkable, and proves that, however deficient the insurgents may be in warlike stores and materials, they are at all events imbued with such a spirit of determination that the best efforts of a large and well-organized force will be required to regain the complete mastery of the country.

Hitherto the efforts of the insurgents appear to have been devoted chiefly to interrupting the railway communications of the Kingdom, and at the same time, by forming bands in all parts of the country, to forcing the Russian to concentrate their scattered detachments under the fear of having them destroyed in detail, and so to leave the resources of a large extent of country available for the support of the various bands; and that their policy has succeeded so far is incontestable, and although some severe losses have been experienced by them, their numbers, judging from all accounts, are now grea-



ter than they have been at any previous period, and, indeed, more men appear to be forthcoming than there are arms to place in their hands.

The pressure applied by the Revolutionary Committee on the nobles and others from the Moderate party is now, my Lord, so great that the utmost firmness is required by them to resist joining the movement openly, and although it may be too much to say that the Government wishes to drive this party into active opposition, still no effort has been made to gain their support, nor have the slightest overtures been made by the Government to any prominent member of this party.

It was hoped and believed by many persons that the anniversary of the [ascension] of the Emperor (the 3rd March) would be made the occasion of offering a general amnesty, but no such boon was accorded; and I cannot help mentioning to your Lordship as a significant fact, that although the Polish Members of the Council of State, and among them the Count Poletylo, whose mansion was pillaged by the troops some short time since, attended the levee held by the Grand Duke on that occasion, notwithstanding the most violent opposition of many even of the Moderate party, not the slightest notice was taken of these gentlemen by His Imperial Highness.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

†† No. 180.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 19).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, March 7, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine has been appointed to the command of the army in the Kingdom of Poland, in addition to his functions as Viceroy, and that His Imperial Highness has taken over the command from General Baron Ramsay, who retires from active service.

[<sup>1</sup> I am unable to give your Lordship any positive detail of the composition or numbers of the army under His Imperial Highness' command, as this is kept in close secret, but I may mention that in conversation with myself, a few days ago, His Imperial Highness stated that he had not troops enough in the kingdom for the work required; that he had only about 60.000 men available, and that 10.000 of these were required for the garrisons of the fortresses, but I presume the garrison of Warsaw, which amounts to about 20.000 men, is not included in these numbers, which are very much less than the strength of the army is generally believed to be, and does not agree with the number that should be present, provided the various divisions serving in the kingdom are nearly up to their full strength].

The troops at present available, serving in Poland, as far as I can judge, are the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Divisions, the 3rd Division of Guards Infantry, two regi-

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

ments of Grenadiers of the Guard, and half of the 2nd Infantry Division, five regiments of Regular Cavalry, two of these belonging to the Guard, and eight or ten regiments of Cossacks.

The Artillery attached to these troops would amount to five brigades of Foot Artillery, besides Horse Artillery.

This would make a total of about 70.000 Infantry, 3.000 to 4.000 Regular Cavalry, and from 6.000 do 8.000 Cossacks, with about 120 guns, and from 3.000 do 4.000 Artillerymen, besides the companies of Sappers, Invalids, and others detached for special service.

In addition to this army in the kingdom, the forces stationed in the Governments of Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia, must amount to about 50.000 men, who may also be considered as more or less engaged in the suppression of the present outbreak.

This imposing force would appear to be more than sufficient to quell an insurrection that cannot number more than 20.000 men in the field, and these not half armed, and without depôts or magazines to supply their wants; and the only manner in which I can account to your Lordship for the very slight impression that has as yet been made on the insurgents by this army, is from the desire of the Government to hold every town of any importance within the kingdom, so as to prevent the insurgents from being able to occupy these, and establishing the head-quarters of a Provisional Government in them, and that the garrisons required for this purpose absorb so large a portion of the force that the remainder is not sufficient to allow of the necessary moveable columns being formed to follow the movements of the insurgents in all parts of the kingdom.

It is stated that the remainder of the Division of Grenadiers (about 5.000 men) is *en route* to reinforce the army in the kingdom.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† No. 181.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 20).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, March 9, 1863.*

THE official Gazette of this town of the 6th instant published instructions to the Military Chiefs of the different districts of the kingdom, to form amongst the peasants of the different villages a sort of rural police, who would have the power of examining any person either residing in, or passing through, the village to which they belong, as well as of arresting armed men or others belonging to insurgent bands or marauders, and I have the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship a translation of the document in question.

This Ordinance appears to me, my Lord, to contain in it much more than is conveyed by the actual wording, and I am of opinion it must be considered as a blow aimed at the whole of the landowners of the kingdom, as the power placed by it in the

hands of the peasants (a totally uneducated class), of arresting all insurgents without demanding that any proof should be required to justify the arrest, cannot be otherwise than a most dangerous weapon in their hands; and, although the third clause of the Ordinance enacts that the Communal Chiefs, peasants bailiffs, and elders are to take care that no excesses are committed by the peasants when apprehending insurgents, and that those who infringe this rule are to be severely punished, it is barely possible that, if carried out at all, such a law can avoid giving the occasion for the gratification of every kind of personal vengeance and spite; and it is much to be feared that in some few parts of the kingdom, scenes similar to those that occurred in Galicia in 1846, may be the result of such a measure.

A proclamation of a similar description, but still stronger, and speaking more directly to the interests of the peasants, has been published in Lithuania by the Governor-General, General Nazimow, a translation of which I also take the liberty of forwarding to your Lordship.

It is impossible for me as yet to report to your Lordship what may be the result of this measure on the nobles and others of the Moderate party, or how far the Government may succeed in exciting the peasantry within the Kingdom of Poland against the insurrection; but I do not anticipate that the Government will derive in general much assistance from this class, for, although in some parts of the kingdom the peasants may be hostile to the Polish party, it does not appear that in general they have been disposed to lend assistance, or give information, to the troops acting against their countrymen; and many persons capable of judging are inclined to the belief that, if they saw any prospect of getting rid of the Russian troops for good, or of permanent success to the insurrection, the peasants would, as a class, rally to the ranks of the national forces, and that the neutrality they show at present is more to be attributed to their natural Conservative tendencies and prudence, [rather] than to any favourable feeling towards the Russians themselves.

The Moderate party, also, though sorely pressed by the importunities of the Insurgent Committees, and, at the same time, so utterly ignored by the Government, have, I believe, my Lord, sufficient tact to perceive that, at any rate, this is not the moment to throw themselves into the movement; and that, so long as the insurrection is conducted by a Secret Committee, composed of unknown persons, and without any regularly organized system or programme, they would be uselessly sacrificing themselves for an undeveloped object, and would lose the hold they now possess over their countrymen, and thereby become incapable of rendering efficient service in the event of foreign intervention in favour of their country, or of liberal institutions being granted them by the Emperor of Russia. Should, however, my Lord, the present movement give an opportunity to the insurgents of proclaiming a Provisional Government, directed by persons of substance and position, with any reasonable prospect of endurance, it cannot be doubted that the Moderate party would gladly seize the opportunity of declaring its allegiance, if only to show to the rest of Europe that the present insurrection is indeed a thoroughly national movement.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

EDWD. STANTON.

†Inclosure 1 in No. 181.

*Extract from the Warsaw „Official Gazette“ of March 6, 1863.*

THE Chief of the Staff has communicated the following instructions to the Military Chiefs: —

His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke, having received information that the peasant class testify to their loyalty, and generally give assistance to the troops, as by their allegiance they are bound to do, and that they spare no efforts to restore tranquillity and the authority of the law — disturbed by the enemies of their country and of all order, has been pleased to approve of the following regulations being issued, for the purpose of defining the assistance required from them, and to prevent its degenerating into vexations injurious to peace and property: —

1. The village authorities are to employ village watchmen for the purpose of examining all persons, either residing in or merely passing the village.

2. The peasants, elders, and bailiffs, are to apprehend all armed individuals and persons belonging to insurgent bands, as well as marauders. For this purpose they are to employ the necessary number of peasants, with a view of conveying the persons apprehended to the nearest military station.

3. The Communal Chiefs, Peasant-Bailiffs, and Elders, are instructed to take care that the peasants do not commit excesses when apprehending insurgents, and that this be done without violence or arbitrary acts.

Persons infringing this rule are to be severely punished.

The Minister of the Interior having received a copy of these instructions from the Chief of the Staff has communicated the same to the several Civil Governors.

†Inclosure 2 in No. 181.

*Proclamation by General Nazimow.*

TO all the Town and Country Communes, and to all the inhabitants of the Governments of Wilna, Kowno, Grodno, and Minsk.

By my Proclamation of the 16th ultimo you have been informed of the occurrence of disturbances in different places in the Kingdom of Poland; and I took that opportunity to remind all classes of inhabitants living in the provinces placed by His Majesty the Emperor under my authority, of the duties required by their allegiance, and begged of them to give their assistance in protecting this country from the incursions of bands of rebels from that kingdom.

Since that time some of these men have succeeded in entering the Government of Grodno. These men, who, having raised the standard of rebellion in the kingdom, had commenced their enterprise by nightly murder and pillage, and by destruction of the means of communication which have been made for the public good, — these men have fled to the forests before the troops that are engaged in their pursuit, and not only do

they propagate sedition in places unoccupied by troops, but they seek to create confusion and disorder throughout the country by means of emissaries.

I address you once more, inhabitants of this province, and I appeal to your loyalty, to the obligations incumbent on you by your oath of allegiance; you are bound by that oath to resist every attempt that may be made to induce you to co-operate with these mad undertakings, to yield obedience to the legitimate authorities, and to assist them in preserving the peace. Remember that these men are sure to meet their deserved punishment; their efforts will prove insufficient to resist our troops, who will shortly give up the remnants of these bands into the hands of justice. Remember this, that even one moment of thoughtlessness may prove sufficient to expose you to the penalty of the law, and to destroy your own prosperity and that of your families.

I give you all notice hereby, that I have commanded all the civil and military authorities acting under my orders to impress on their minds that it is their duty to put an end to, and punish with the utmost severity, any attempt at disorder in any of the districts committed to my government.

I address myself chiefly to you, peasants of Wilna, Kowno, Grodno, and Minsk, reminding you of the freedom from serfdom bestowed on you by the Emperor. The time has not yet elapsed when you are to enjoy the full benefit of that enactment, which opens to you the enjoyment of civil rights and of material prosperity: and it is attempted to coax you into acts of ungratefulness and insubordination against the very Sovereign to whom you are indebted for all these favours.

You may prove the fruitlessness of any such attempt by seizing at once every individual who should presume to tempt you, and by delivering him over to the nearest authority to be treated according to law, by assisting in preserving order and peace in the country, as by this means alone you may secure for your own interest the speedy conclusion of the proceedings of those Commissions which are to determine finally your interest in the land, and which cannot proceed with their business when the country is disturbed.

I make all the communes responsible for the security of the public communications, and desire them to provide for the safety of all civil and military functionaries who happen to be within their territory, or have to pass through them on duty, or who may be attacked by rebels or conspirators.

All town and village authorities are to attend to these their duties, and in cases of neglect they are to be subjected to the penalty of partners in guilt, whenever such neglect shall have occurred from some criminal motive.

*Wilna, February 7, 1863.*

General Aide-de-camp,  
(Signed) NAZIMOW.

† No. 182.

(No. 21). *Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

My Lord,

*Warsaw, March 11, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the whole of the unofficial members of the Council of State of this kingdom, at present in Warsaw, have resigned

their appointments as members of that Council; the reason assigned for this step being the Ordinance promulgated by the Government on the 6th instant, calling upon the peasants to assist in re-establishing order, and empowering them to examine or arrest all persons passing through or residing in their villages; a translation of which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship with my despatch of the 9th instant.

This step on the part of noblemen and gentlemen who had only accepted their nominations to the Council after much pressing, and against their own inclinations, but in the hope of being able to confer some benefit on their country by their adherence to the Government, is now hardly to be wondered at, as since the commencement of the outbreak they have not been consulted either in Council or individually as to the measures most likely to restore tranquillity, but, on the contrary, have been treated by the Government with an almost studied indifference; and as this last Ordinance has so much the appearance of a desire on the part of the Government to excite the animosities of the peasants against their class, it could, my Lord, I imagine, hardly be expected that they should continue to belong to an Administration that adopts such measures, as by their continuing in this, the chief Council of the kingdom, they would tacitly give their sanction to the various acts of the Government.

The Council of State of the kingdom, therefore, at present consists only of *ex officio* members and some few Polish gentlemen, who at the present moment are absent from the country, and who may probably follow the example of the other independent members, and thus, my Lord, the concessions lately accorded by the Emperor to this kingdom have become little better than a dead letter, and the breach between the Governors and the governed still wider than it was even at the time of granting these reforms in the administration of the kingdom.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

†† No. 183.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 22).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, March 11, 1863.*

THE last reports, both official and otherwise, establish the fact that the insurgent Chief Langiewicz has his head-quarters at present at the village of Goszeza, close to the Galician frontier, and at a very short distance from Cracow, and although his force was reported on the 2nd instant in the Government Gazette to have been totally dispersed, the same journal on the 9th instant stated that the remnants of the bands, to the number of 6,000, were assembled at Scala, for the purpose of re-organization.

It is almost impossible, my Lord, from the conflicting statements, to ascertain correctly the nature or result of the late engagements between the troops and this leader, but from the admitted fact of his being still in the neighbourhood of the scene of these actions, with such an imposing force as 6,000 men under his orders, it is evident that

whatever success the troops may have had over the insurgents, it was very far from being complete, and that no attempt has been made to pursue these bands reported as defeated and dispersed.

It is now reported to be the intention of the Russian Government to mass a considerable force near the Austrian territory, so as to establish a cordon along that frontier of the kingdom; and as it is undoubted that both men and material have hitherto reached the insurgents by this frontier, it will be a serious blow to them should their communications with Galicia be cut off.

[<sup>1</sup>I am unable to state to your Lordship whether the force in question will be of such a strength as to warrant the suggestion that its presence there may be considered as a menace to Austria].

From the Grand Duchy of Posen several bands have attempted to join the insurgents within the kingdom, and although it is stated that the number of Prussian troops massed on the frontier is very considerable, it appears these bands succeeded in crossing the boundary, but being met by Russian troops on Polish territory were dispersed with heavy loss.

As yet the reports from Lithuania and the Provinces on the east of the kingdom do not appear to be very encouraging for the insurgents, but it is established beyond a doubt that bands do exist in these Provinces, although it is doubtful whether the insurrection will spread there; but in a few days information of a decisive character may be expected from that quarter.

In conclusion, my Lord, I may mention that I have every reason to believe that, within the last few days, the leading members of the Moderate party have been in communication with the revolutionary leaders, with a view to co-operation in the movement, and it is even rumoured that the latter are prepared to resign their power as soon as any persons of sufficient position to command general respect will openly avow themselves as the leaders of the movement; but under existing circumstances, it can hardly be expected of any persons of rank in the kingdom openly to declare themselves, as without arms, depôts, or organization, or even a single town or place of importance within the kingdom, in which to establish a Provisional Government, such a declaration would be only handing themselves over to immediate destruction; but these negotiations are naturally conducted with so much secrecy that I am unable to give your Lordship any positive information on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† No. 184.

(No. 122). *Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 8, 1863.*

[<sup>1</sup>WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 121 of this day], I have the honour to inform your Lordship that in obedience to your instructions

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).



I have just read to Count Rechberg your Lordship's despatch [No. 55] of the 4th instant, and also your Lordship's despatch [No. 53] of the 2nd instant addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

His Excellency said that he did not think the Imperial Government, much as they desire to act with Her Majesty's Government, and adapt their policy to ours, could undertake to address a communication to the Russian Government in the sense of your Lordship's despatch, but that he would lose no time in taking the Emperor's orders respecting the answer to be returned to London, and he requested me to leave the despatches with him. I replied that I had only been directed to read these despatches to his Excellency, but I would immediately apply by telegraph for authority to meet his wishes.

His Excellency then observed that the movement in Poland, which the Russian Government had hoped to have mastered by this time, was as far as ever from being extinguished, and that their position had become more critical as the insurgents now felt increased confidence in the sympathies of foreign Powers. He added that he doubted if the establishment of a National Representation in the Kingdom of Poland would advance the object of peace, for it was impossible to say to what extent Polish aspirations would not reach if the restoration of their nationality were seriously supported from abroad. He thought a system of Provincial Diets could be usefully adapted to Poland; but that Russia would never agree to the re-establishment of a national army, or of a system of finance separate from that of the Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 185.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 132).

My Lord,

Vienna, March 12, 1863.

IN conformity with the authority conveyed in your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant, I sent on the same day to Count Rechberg copies of your Lordship's despatches No. 55 to me, and No. 53 to Lord Napier, on the affairs of Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

<sup>†</sup> No. 186.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 133).

My Lord,

Vienna, March 12, 1863.

COUNT RECHBERG sent for me yesterday and allowed me to read the draft of a despatch that he purposed sending to Count Apponyi by the present messenger, in ans-



wer to the communication which I made to his Excellency on the affairs of Poland as reported in my [despatches No. 122 of the 8th instant, and No. 132 of to-day].

This despatch will be communicated to your Lordship by the Austrian Ambassador. It contains nothing that indicates any prospect of a departure from the policy which the Imperial Government decided to follow at the outset of the insurrection in Poland, and the despatch addressed at the time to Prince Metternich, a copy of which was sent to Count Apponyi and communicated to your Lordship, is taken as the basis of the policy of the Austrian Government in this question.

Count Rechberg states that Austria must retain her present attitude of reserve, that she cannot deviate from the policy laid down in the despatch to Prince Metternich. His Excellency considers that Austria has not failed to fulfil her international obligations. She has not been unmindful of the cause of humanity nor neglected the true interests of Europe. She desires the maintenance of peace, and is essentially interested in the restoration of order in Poland. She does not consider that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government will be attended with success at St. Petersburg, and cannot follow England and France in the policy which they are disposed to pursue in the Polish question.

The foregoing is the outline of Count Rechberg's despatch, and it is useless for me to enter into further details respecting it, as it will be placed in your Lordship's hands almost as soon as this reaches you.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 187.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 134).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 12, 1863.*

THE Duc de Gramont mentioned to me yesterday that he had just received by post the orders of his Government to support a communication which I should shortly be instructed to make to the Austrian Government, proposing that they should join in addressing an identical note to the Russian Government, urging the restoration to the Kingdom of Poland of the political and civil privileges granted to it by the Emperor Alexander I.

The French Ambassador added that he understood a similar communication would be addressed by Her Majesty's Government to all the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Vienna of 1815.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 188.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 135. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 12, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 133 of this day, that Count Rechberg made several observations to me yesterday on the subject of Poland which it is my duty to report to your Lordship, but which his Excellency requested might be considered as strictly confidential.

The drift of these observations was to show that it was impossible for Austria to join in the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

He said, however, that he should write to St. Petersburg, and suggest the propriety of meeting the exigencies of the time by some concessions to public feeling in Poland which would remove the present causes of discontent; that he could do no more than this, and that he much doubted, even if the communication of Her Majesty's Government at St. Petersburg were backed by Austria, whether anything would be thus gained to the Polish cause, for arguments coming from Austria would have no weight at St. Petersburg, and do more harm than good.

The bare thought of re-establishing Poland according to the Treaties of 1815 was, moreover, he said, a very serious question for Austria, as it naturally involved that of Cracow, and she certainly had no intention of trying to cut her own throat by supporting a project which might prove itself a first step towards losing Galicia, one of her best provinces; for the simple execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna of the 9th of June, 1815, would not satisfy the Poles of the present day. As soon as they obtained all that had been granted or intended by the Emperor Alexander I, they would clamour for more, and would not rest until the Kingdom of Poland were restored to its ancient limits.

Now all this, he remarked, could not be effected without a general European war, and he asked me whether England was prepared for such a contingency. I replied, that at present there was no question of our taking up arms for the Poles; what we wanted was peaceful negotiation, and that we thought Austria would go with us under such circumstances. Count Rechberg replied that England and Austria had certainly one common object at heart — the maintenance of peace, and that it was his earnest desire to struggle on with us for this purpose: but were the advantages we sought to secure for Poland obtainable without a European war? He thought not, and Austria certainly had no wish to embark in one with the certainty of losing her Province of Galicia. Nations, he said, do not generally seek a war for the purpose of losing by it, which would be an infallible result to Austria, — in a war for Polish interests.

Count Rechberg went on to say that much excitement prevails at Paris on the Polish question; it was acquiring great importance: he had reason to believe that Russia would not entertain our representations, that the French Government were already aware of the intention of the Russian Government, but had been told by Baron Budberg that any proposition coming single-handed from France might be listened to at St. Petersburg;

and his Excellency added, the Russian Ambassador had made this statement at Paris, in order not to break up a confidential understanding with France, with a view to their common interest in the East.

In making this Polish proposition, observed Count Rechberg, you should consider what it leads to. The main-springs of the insurrection are at Paris; every proposition made to the French Government is immediately made known to the Polish Committee and thence sent to Poland; and the last information forwarded from thence, and backed also with some authority, has been, that if the insurgents can hold on three months longer France will take the field for them.

What was the object of France at this moment? Confusion in Europe. She saw in this Polish question a pretext for creating a disturbance which would justify her in making an armed movement that might lead to a war on the Rhine. Prussia would lose her Rhenish provinces, and be indemnified by an annexation in Germany. To these ends is M. de Bismarck's policy leading his country, said Count Rechberg: he therefore thought it behoved Austria and England well to consider how far it might be prudent to push this Polish question; neither had any objects of ambition to gratify, both were anxious for peace, both sympathized in the sufferings of the Poles, but they differed as to the means of insuring a relief of these sufferings.

Count Rechberg said that he was most anxious to come to an understanding with your Lordship not only as to the Polish, but as to other European questions, and he thinks that England and Austria are both equally interested in arresting the realization of the French Emperor's project for the rectification of the map of Europe.

So much alarmed had he been by the last accounts from Paris, that he had desired Prince Metternich to come to Vienna, in order that he might have the advantage of personal intercourse with him, and decide with him on the course which it will be most advisable for Austria to follow under present circumstances.

Your Lordship will be able to judge from this confidential conversation, which I had yesterday with Count Rechberg, of the impressions produced on his mind by the state of the political horizon, and it is evident that he desires above all things to avoid taking any step connected with the Polish question tending to a departure from the policy he has laid down for Austria, in the wisdom of which he has the fullest confidence; that he thinks Russia will decline to accede to our proposition, and that without an European war Poland is not likely to gain what she wants, and that it is not in the interest of Austria to raise any question that may involve her in hostilities. Therefore she would prefer a mild representation at St. Petersburg, because she considers it the form best calculated to secure for Poland all that can be obtainable under the circumstances and without an European war.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

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*Count Rechberg to Count Apponyi (Communicated to Earl Russell by Count Apponyi, March 16).*

M. le Comte,

Vienne, le 12 Mars, 1863.

LORD BLOOMFIELD a été chargé par son Gouvernement de me communiquer une dépêche que Lord Russell a adressée à Lord Napier, en date du 2 de ce mois.

Dans cette pièce le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat déclare que le Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique est profondément affecté de l'état de choses actuel en Pologne. Il déplore les conflits sanglants entre la force armée et les insurgés, et fait observer qu'une pareille lutte engendrera des haines et des ressentiments qui envenimeront pour longtemps les relations du Gouvernement Russe avec la race Polonaise. Tout en regrettant ces faits, le Gouvernement Britannique ne se croirait peut-être pas appelé à exprimer ses sentiments si les affaires de Pologne ne se trouvaient pas placées dans certaines conditions particulières.

Lord Russell remarque que le Royaume de Pologne a été constitué et uni à l'Empire de Russie par les Traités de 1815, où la Grande Bretagne était partie contractante. Selon le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat le désastreux état de choses actuel provient de ce que la Pologne n'est point placée dans les conditions auxquelles les stipulations de ces Traités lui donnaient droit. La Pologne ne se trouve pas non plus dans les conditions que lui avaient faites l'Empereur Alexandre I. Sous son règne une Diète Nationale siégeait à Varsovie, et les Polonais du Royaume jouissaient de privilèges propres à assurer leur bien-être politique. Mais depuis 1832 règne un état de malaise et de mécontentement auquel succèdent de tems en tems des commotions violentes et une effusion de sang inutile.

Attribuant l'insurrection à ces causes, le Gouvernement Anglais, comme partie contractante des Traités de 1815, et comme Puissance vivement intéressée à la tranquillité de l'Europe, se croit autorisé à exprimer son opinion sur les événements qui se passent en Pologne. En conséquence, le Gouvernement Britannique se demande pourquoi Sa Majesté l'Empereur Alexandre, dont les sentiments généreux sont si connus, ne mett(r)ait pas aussitôt fin à ce conflit sanglant en proclamant une amnestie immédiate et sans conditions, et en annonçant en même temps son intention de replacer, sans délai, le Royaume de Pologne en possession des privilèges politiques et civiles qui lui furent accordés par l'Empereur Alexandre I, en exécution des stipulations de 1815.

Lord Russell termine sa dépêche en disant qu'une Diète et une Administration Nationales contenteraient selon toute probabilité les Polonais, et satisferaient l'opinion de l'Europe.

Telle est, M. le Comte, l'analyse fidèle de cette pièce importante. En me la communiquant, Lord Bloomfield m'a également donné connaissance d'une dépêche qui lui était adressée par Lord Russell, et dans laquelle sa Seigneurie exprime l'espoir que le Gouvernement Impérial fera auprès de celui de Russie une demande analogue. Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat est d'avis que si toutes les Puissances qui ont participé aux Traités de 1815 exprimaient des vues pareilles à St. Pétersbourg, cet acte contribuerait à arrêter l'effusion de sang et à assurer au peuple Polonais la jouissance des droits qui lui avaient

été promis à Vienne, et qui lui ont été retirés depuis si longtemps. En rendant aux Polonais une Diète et une Administration Nationale, l'Europe y trouverait, selon le Gouvernement Britannique, une garantie de paix.

Sans vouloir discuter les vues du Cabinet Anglais, et l'opportunité de la mesure à laquelle il nous propose de nous associer j'ai dû, après avoir pris les ordres de l'Empereur notre auguste Maître, exprimer à Lord Bloomfield le regret du Gouvernement Impérial de ne pouvoir offrir à l'Angleterre une co-opération pareille à celle qui nous était demandée. Les motifs qui doivent dieter au Gouvernement Impérial cette détermination sont aussi évidents qu'impérieux; nous sommes donc persuadés qu'ils seront appréciés par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

En effet, votre Excellence sait que le Gouvernement Français nous a invités, il y a peu de temps, à nous joindre à une démarche qu'il comptait faire à Berlin au sujet des affaires de Pologne. Je vous ai communiqué, M. le Comte, notre réponse au Cabinet des Tuileries, et vous avez été autorisé à donner confidentiellement connaissance à Lord Russell de la dépêche que nous avons adressée au Prince Metternich en date du 27 Février.

Nous croyons avoir fait suffisamment ressortir dans cette pièce les raisons qui imposent à l'Autriche une attitude de prudence et de réserve toute particulière en présence des événements dont la Pologne est le théâtre. Je ne pourrais que me répéter si je voulais reproduire ici tous les arguments que nous avons fait valoir pour prouver au Gouvernement Français l'impossibilité absolue pour l'Autriche de dévier en quoi que ce soit de la ligne de conduite qu'elle a suivie jusqu'ici avec l'approbation générale de l'Europe. Nous croyons avoir tenu compte à la fois des prescriptions de l'humanité et de nos obligations internationales. Nous nous flattons de contribuer ainsi par notre attitude à tout ce que peuvent exiger les intérêts de l'Europe et de la tranquillité générale. L'Autriche a d'ailleurs à sauvegarder des intérêts spéciaux, trop gravement engagés dans tout ce qui touche à la Pologne pour que nous puissions suivre l'Angleterre et la France dans toutes leurs manifestations en faveur de la nationalité Polonaise.

Je ne puis encore que m'en référer, à cet égard, à ce que j'ai écrit au Prince Metternich dans la dépêche citée plus haut. Toutes les objections fondées sur cet ordre d'idées s'appliquent avec non moins de force à la démarche que Lord Russell nous propose aujourd'hui de faire. Sa Seigneurie ne pourra donc pas s'étonner si nous persévérons de notre côté à ne pas nous départir de l'attitude que nous nous sommes tracé(e) tout d'abord.

Je crois cependant devoir ajouter encore ici une autre observation. Personne n'est plus intéressé que nous à voir finir un état de choses déplorable qui est une menace continuelle pour la sécurité de notre propre territoire. Mais l'expérience du passé, les événements de 1831, et les aspirations bien connues des meneurs du mouvement Polonais, nous font douter que les mesures dont Lord Russell recommande l'adoption au Gouvernement de l'Empereur Alexandre suffisent pour pacifier entièrement la Pologne, contenter ses habitants, et satisfaire les désirs de ceux qui ont aujourd'hui les armes à la main.

Votre Excellence voudra bien s'exprimer dans ce sens envers le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, et pourra même donner lecture à sa Seigneurie de la présente dépêche.

(Signé) RECHBERG.

No. 190.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 145. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 14, 1863.*

SOME days ago, M. de Bismarck, in speaking to me at an evening party of the Russian Government, said it was composed of men of different opinions, some being anxious to maintain the political traditions of the preceding reign, while others, with Prince Gortchakoff as their leader, desired a closer intimacy with France as a means of promoting the interests and forwarding the views of Russia in the East, and this party would probably be found willing to secure the favour of the Emperor Napoleon by concessions to Polish nationality. Prince Gortchakoff had, therefore, he said, received General Alvensleben very coldly on his late mission to Russia, and it had only been in consequence of the orders of the Emperor that his Excellency had consented to treat with him.

M. de Bismarck stated also that he had reason to believe, not only from the diplomatic correspondence of his Department, but also from information which had reached Berlin from St. Petersburg through that of the Court, that the Emperor had become lately dissatisfied with the policy of the Vice-Chancellor, and that his removal from office had been seriously thought of.

As this language appeared to me inconsistent with what M. de Bismarck had formerly told me as to the conclusion of the Russo-Prussian Convention having been suggested by the Russian Government, I requested his Excellency yesterday to explain to me how such a suggestion could have come from there if Prince Gortchakoff had been so little disposed to listen to the overtures, whatever they may have been, which had been made to his Excellency by General Alvensleben.

After some conversation, during which his Excellency's explanations did not appear to me to make the matter much clearer, he said that the instructions which he gave to General Alvensleben were to put himself into communication with the Russian Government, and to ascertain how they intended to meet the insurrection, and the means which they possessed for its suppression, and to inquire whether they had an entire confidence in the policy of the Grand Duke Constantine and the Marquis of Wielopolski; and to assure them at the same time of the intention of the Prussian Government to take precautionary measures to prevent an outbreak in their own territory, and their readiness to act in concert with the Russian Government with a view to prevent any support or assistance being offered to the insurgents in Poland from the Polish provinces of Prussia.

These were, his Excellency said, the only instructions given to General Alvensleben, but the King had also written a private letter by that officer to the Emperor Alexander with the contents of which he affected to be unacquainted.

When General Alvensleben, therefore, arrived at St. Petersburg, the Vice-Chancellor finding that the opinions of the Prussian Cabinet with respect to Poland were entirely different from his own, met their overtures unfavourably.

The Emperor, however, took a different view of the case, and when General Alvensleben was received by him, he desired him to see Prince Gortchakoff again, and his

Excellency, whose opinions had apparently undergone an entire change during the interval, requested him to embody in a Convention any proposals which he might have to make for the co-operation on the frontier of the authorities and of the troops of the two Governments, and as General Alvensleben excused himself from doing so from his being unaccustomed to write French, the Convention, as it was subsequently signed, was drawn up in the Russian Foreign Office, and General Alvensleben communicated its contents by telegraph in a German translation to the Prussian Government.

M. de Bismarck thus wished me to understand, as far as I could judge from his language, that the Emperor Alexander himself had been, to a certain extent, the author of the Convention, which, he repeated, as he had formerly said, the Prussian Government had hesitated to approve, and only authorized its signature from an unwillingness to discourage the Emperor in his determination to suppress the insurrection, and that they might not forward the policy of those members of the Russian Government whose views they believed to be opposed to the interests of Prussia.

The Convention was, however, he said, no sooner signed than Prince Gortchakoff endeavoured to render it unpopular as offensive to the dignity of the Russian nation, and as placing Russia, in some degree, in the humiliating position towards Prussia which Austria had occupied towards Russia during the Hungarian war. A negotiation was therefore begun to modify it and to restrict its application until it finally became entirely inoperative, as far as the principle of the frontier being crossed by the troops of either Government was in question.

These details may not now have much interest, but they tend to show that M. de Bismarck had been, as he, indeed, still is, under some apprehension that the Russian Government may be disposed to grant concessions to Poland, such as his Excellency fears will lead eventually, if not immediately, to the independence of the country, and thus create what he considers will be great danger for Prussia.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

†† No. 191.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 146. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 14, 1863.*

I INQUIRED of M. de Bismarck yesterday whether he had replied through Count Bernstorff to your Lordship's despatch [No. 56] of the 4th instant relative to the affairs of Poland, which I read to him last week, and whether Her Majesty's Government might hope that their representations at St. Petersburg would be supported by the Government of His Prussian Majesty.

M. de Bismarck said that he had not addressed any communication to Count Bernstorff in reply to your Lordship's despatch, and what he had already said to me with reference to the position of Prussia towards Poland, and the dangerous neighbour which



an independent Polish State must prove to Prussia, ought to have satisfied me that the Prussian Government could not urge Russia to adopt measures of which the inevitable tendency would be to re-establish the nationality of Poland, and oblige Prussia to add 100,000 men to her army. He said that the concessions which Her Majesty's Government recommended the Emperor of Russia to grant to his Polish subjects would not satisfy them; and whatever they might obtain now would be used as a means of arriving at eventual independence, and of endeavouring to wrest their Polish provinces from Russia, Anstria, and Prussia. Her Majesty's Government could not, therefore, expect Prussia to join them in measures which she believed would lead to such a result.

[<sup>1</sup>I quoted, in reply to M. de Bismarck, the numerous examples afforded by the history of the last thirty years, in which grievances redressed have rendered the people of insubordinate provinces loyal and contented subjects; but his Excellency maintained that there were peculiarities in the case of Poland, and in the character of her nobles, which precluded all hope of their submitting, without coercion, to the sovereignty of Russia, and which, in the event of their independence, would make them the allies and the soldiers of France; and he expressed some apprehension lest your Lordship should find Prince Gortchakoff only too well disposed to listen to advice, by following which he would gratify the Emperor of the French, and lay the foundation of that alliance between France and Russia which he is believed to desire. To these observations I replied that the danger against which M. de Bismarck seemed anxious to guard was a remote one, and that it might be wiser for him to provide for a more immediate one, to which a prolongation of the insurrection in Poland would only too probably expose his country; and I inquired whether I was to understand that the opinions of the Prussian Government on this subject would lead them to use their influence at St. Petersburg to prevent the success of the representations addressed by Her Majesty's Government to that of the Emperor. His Excellency replied that I had no right to draw such a conclusion from the confidential opinions he had been expressing to me, or to expect an answer to such a question. I fear, however, he could not have given me a satisfactory one.

I have reason to believe that he entertains considerable apprehensions as to what may be the policy of France during the next few months; and while it is said here that the Emperor of the French has lately spoken of the King of Prussia as so wary (*„prévoyant“*) that nothing must be done to alarm him, His Majesty has himself observed to me that he is far from being without anxiety as to the intentions of the Emperor, and that he fears the present bearing of the French Government is too quiet to be trusted.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN].

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<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).



†† No. 192.

(No. 148). *Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 14, 1863.*

IN my despatch [No. 124] of the 4th instant, I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention to a correspondence that had taken place between the Stettin Chamber of Commerce and M. de Bismarck, and I transmitted to your Lordship the answer returned by his Excellency to the representations made by that body in reference to the dangers with which the mercantile interests of the Kingdom were threatened by the Russian Convention.

This reply of the Foreign Minister not being deemed satisfactory, a further communication was addressed on the 6th instant by the Stettin Chamber of Commerce directly to M. de Bismarck, to which his Excellency replied by a short note, of which a translation is herewith inclosed.

[<sup>1</sup>The undoubtedly ironical tone which runs through this document has not tended to improve the popularity of the Government amongst the mercantile classes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN].

† Inclosure in No. 192.

*M. de Bismarck's Second Answer to the Stettin Chamber of Commerce.*

(Translation).

*Berlin, March 7, 1863,*

I HAVE learnt with lively interest, from their further communications of the 6th instant, what are the views of the gentlemen at the head of the Stettin mercantile body upon the state of our foreign relations. If I must refuse myself the pleasure of discussing the subject with them in the way of further correspondence, I am yet glad of the opportunity once more to assure them that the satisfactory state of our relations with all foreign Powers affords no grounds for the fears expressed by them of further complications.

It, moreover, appears to me that it would be in the interest of the commercial body, were the gentlemen at the head of the mercantile corporations to oppose themselves to every attempt to excite and spread unfounded apprehensions of this nature. In conclusion, however, I may assure the gentlemen in question that the contents of their communication have been appreciated by Her Majesty's Government in proportion to their importance.

(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

† No. 193.

(No. 149). *Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 14, 1863.*

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch [No. 57] of the 11th instant, informing me that, as the so-called Convention between Russia and Prussia relative to the

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).

suppression of the insurrection in Poland is now a dead letter, and as no instructions have been issued under it, I can no longer ask for a copy of it; and that I had been instructed to do so on the supposition that the Convention would be ratified, and that instructions would be issued for carrying it into effect.

I have made M. de Bismarck acquainted with this decision of Her Majesty's Government, and of the reasons on which it is founded; and his Excellency again stated that no authority had been given or would be given for Russian troops to act on Prussian territory, or for Prussian troops to cross into Russia.

I do not believe that either Government has declared the Convention or Agreement to have terminated, and therefore while the insurrection in Poland lasts, the communications which would doubtless have taken place between the two Governments, had there been no Convention, may be said to take place under its provisions as long as it has not been officially cancelled.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 194.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 292).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 15, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Marseilles, giving an account of a popular demonstration in favour of Poland, which took place there on Monday last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 194.

*Consul Mark to Earl Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Marseilles, March 11, 1863.*

ON Monday night between 9 and 10 o'clock, 3.000 or 4.000 persons collected from different parts of the town, assembled in front of the residence of M. de Boukharine, the Russian Consul-General, to make a manifestation of their sentiments in favour of Poland and the Poles. Amidst many cries of „Vive la Pologne“, &c., an attempt was made to tear down the Russian coat-of-arms from M. Boukharine's balcony; it failed, however, and the police arrested half-a-dozen persons, and quietly dispersed the remainder.

The following day there were the usual statements circulating about town that the police themselves had arranged the whole affair. According to another version, the priests planned the whole.

From all I can learn, it appears to have been a foolish affair altogether, though the papers will doubtless make the most of it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. MARK

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No. 195.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 294. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 15, 1863.*

GENERAL KLUKNOWSKY, who since the Revolution of 1830 has lived in Paris, and is now above 80 years old, set out for Cracow a week ago. Before going he called on Count Walewski, and promised to make him a faithful report of the state of affairs in Poland.

He has written once since. He had been to the head-quarters of Langiewicz, and the following is the report he made: —

The utmost order, discipline, and enthusiasm, mixed with resignation and religious excitement, prevails there. Every man is ready to die at his post. The force consists of one battalion of Zouaves, four of Chasseurs, two of Faucheurs, with 200 Hulans and four guns, two iron and two brass. There are besides a large number of recruits in process of organization, with plenty of arms for them. The position which Langiewicz occupies is a good one, and cannot be attacked in its rear. Noble and peasant are learning their military duties side by side.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 196.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 297).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 15, 1863,*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the Report made yesterday to the Senate by M. Larabit, in the Name of the Committee of Petitions appointed to report upon those addressed to that body in favour of Poland.

The discussion of this Report is fixed for Tuesday next.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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## Inclosure in No. 196.

*Report presented to the Senate by the Committee of Petitions.*

Messieurs les Sénateurs,

VOTRE première Commission des Pétitions a été saisie de toutes les pétitions adressées au Sénat en faveur de la Pologne.

Le première, No. 38, signée par vingt-neuf réfugiés Polonais, vous est parvenue avant l'insurrection actuelle.

Les autres pétitions sont récentes; une d'elles, sous le No. 219, est envoyée par un Polonais négociant, domicilié à Mamers (Sarthe); les pétitions Nos. 343, 345, 406, 417, 418, sont identiques et signées par cinq cent trente-sept habitants de Paris, sur douze feuilles séparées; les premiers signataires de ces pétitions sont principalement des ouvriers typographes ou fondeurs en caractères.

Les réfugiés rappellent les services rendus par la Pologne à la France et à l'Europe civilisée, ils rappellent le sang des Polonais mêlé à celui de nos soldats; ils supplient la France d'aider la Pologne à secouer ses fers.

Le pétitionnaire de Mamers reproche à la France son inertie.

La pétition des cinq cent trente-sept ouvriers de Paris applaudit à la lutte héroïque d'une nation martyre; ils s'indignent des massacres commis par les soldats Russes sur les hommes, les femmes et les enfants. Puisque les Prussiens aident les Russes, nous devons, disent-ils, aider les Polonais. L'indignation des pétitionnaires va jusqu'à demander la guerre; ils disent que le pays est prêt à tous les sacrifices; ils demandent à la France de 1863 plus de vigueur qu'en 1830 et 1848; sans se préoccuper des Traités et des obligations qu'ils imposent, ils expriment le vœu du rétablissement de la Pologne dans l'intégrité de son territoire.

La pétition No. 421, arrivée hier de Napoléonville (Morbihan), est signée par trente-deux pétitionnaires, principalement prêtres ou instituteurs; ils protestent contre le premier partage de la Pologne; ils disent que les Bretons sont prêts, comme soldats et Catholiques, à défendre le droit contre une grande injustice.

C'est encore demander la guerre.

Le Sénat ne peut accepter une telle responsabilité; il sait que l'ardeur Française se jetterait au besoin avec générosité dans les hasards de la guerre, pour secourir la noble nation Polonaise; mais il désire que la Pologne soit protégée, sans exposer l'Europe à tous les malheurs d'une guerre générale.

Les autres pétitions n'ont pas le même caractère.

La pétition No. 375, adressée au Sénat par trente et un habitants de Paris, quelques-uns sculpteurs ou architectes, les autres négociants ou propriétaires, s'appui(e) surtout sur les sentiments religieux qui unissent la Pologne et la France; les pétitionnaires expriment la plus grande confiance dans le Gouvernement Impérial et dans le Sénat; ils ne veulent pas aborder les questions politiques: c'est comme Chrétiens et Catholiques qu'ils élèvent la voix au nom de l'humanité, de la civilisation, et de la fraternité religieuse.

La pétition No. 376, signée par douze habitants de Paris, sans qualifications, mais avec les adresses de quelques-uns, s'appuie sur vos sentiments d'humanité et vous prie d'intervenir pour que justice soit faite des scènes qui se passent en Pologne et qui sont indignes du dix-neuvième siècle.

La pétition No. 344 est plus précise et mérite l'attention particulière du Sénat.

Elle est signée par plusieurs membres de l'Académie Française et d'autres classes de l'Institut; par plusieurs prêtres éminents; par deux anciens Ministres du dernier Gouvernement; par plusieurs membres des anciennes Assemblées politiques et même du Corps Législatif actuel.

Beaucoup d'opinions et d'influences diverses rattachent ainsi à cette pétition.

La pétition numérotée 407 est signée par le fils d'un ancien pair de France décédé; il s'associe à celle des Académiciens et des Députés.

Ces pétitionnaires rappellent l'attachement traditionnel de la France pour la Pologne, resserré souvent par la confraternité des armes et par les rudes épreuves supportées en commun, à une époque de grandeurs et de revers. Ils s'affligent des infortunes qui ne cessent de peser sur une nation de héros, périodiquement poussée au désespoir; ils s'indignent des exécutions en masse, des villes rasées, incendiées ou pillées; ils répètent, avec une admiration qui passera dans l'histoire, que les habitants d'une ville ayant été sommés de faire sortir les femmes et les enfants, la population avait répondu: „Dans ce pays, les épouses périssent avec leur maris et les enfants expirent auprès de leurs parents“. (Sensation).

Les pétitionnaires font analyse des Traités qui promettaient à la Pologne une représentation et des institutions nationales; ils en demandent l'exécution en invoquant la justice, la politique, l'humanité, et la sécurité de l'avenir.

Messieurs les Sénateurs, toutes ces pétitions, à des points de vue divers, ont attiré l'attention très sérieuse de la Commission. La discussion à laquelle elles ont donné lieu peut se résumer ainsi: —

Le partage de la Pologne est un fait jugé par l'histoire; il date de la vieillesse de Louis XV et d'une époque de malheureuse décadence de la diplomatie Française; ce partage a été blâmé par l'Impératrice Marie-Thérèse d'Autriche elle-même<sup>1</sup>; il a été une source d'embarras dans la politique Européenne.

Dans ses jours de force et de grandeur, la France ne l'aurait jamais permis; elle ne peut en être responsable.

La faute n'en est pas même aux Souverains actuels des trois Etats copartageants; mais ils ont au moins le devoir de gouverner les Provinces qui leur sont échues avec justice et humanité, de manière à ne pas troubler l'ordre public Européen.

Après deux guerres glorieuses soutenues contre deux de ces Puissances, l'Empereur des Français est devenu pour elles un allié sincère; il n'a pas attendu les pétitions pour

<sup>1</sup> Au bas de la Convention signée entre l'Impératrice de Russie et le Roi de Prusse, le 17 Février, 1772, pour le partage de la Pologne, on lit cette déclaration de l'Impératrice-Reine Marie-Thérèse d'Autriche à la date du 4 Mars, 1772: „Placet, puisque tant et de savants personnages veulent qu'il en soit ainsi; mais, longtemps après ma mort, on verra ce qui résulte d'avoir ainsi foulé aux pieds tout ce que jusqu'à présent on a toujours tenu pour juste et pour sacré“.

adresser des représentations amicales à la Russie, avec l'espoir de faire tourner au profit de la Pologne l'influence qu'il a conquise par la loyauté de sa politique.

Sans prétendre établir ici une comparaison complète entre les procédés des Puissances copartageantes, il est permis de dire que les Traités n'ont pas été exécutés par elles dans le même esprit.

L'Autriche est entrée récemment dans une voie libérale; elle traite avec ménagement la Galicie, dont elle n'est d'ailleurs séparée par aucune dissidence religieuse; elle respecte son autonomie et ses lois: aussi le Gouvernement Autrichien montre-t-il aujourd'hui une certaine sympathie pour les Polonais persécutés; il accepte le principe de non-intervention.

La Prusse a respecté aussi la religion des Catholiques Polonais; elle étend au Grand Duché de Posen le bénéfice de ses nouvelles institutions. Si, dans une Convention récente, son Gouvernement a paru s'écarter du principe de non-intervention, il est permis de croire qu'il y est en ce moment ramené par le sentiment de la vieille Prusse elle-même et par les représentations diplomatiques.

Quand à la Russie, elle n'avait obtenu, en 1815, l'annexion du Duché de Varsovie que sous la condition de lui laisser son autonomie, avec une représentation et des institutions nationales: tels sont les termes des Traités; mais les promesses de l'Empereur Alexandre I ont été oubliées; une insurrection formidable a eu lieu en 1830 et 1831, et l'Empereur Nicolas, pendant vingt-cinq ans, a mis une dure opiniâtreté à traiter les Polonais comme des révoltés de la veille; pendant vingt-cinq ans, sa politique semble s'être attachée à leur enlever leur religion, leur langue, et leur nationalité.

L'Empereur Alexandre II, mieux éclairé sur la situation et animé des sentiments plus modérés, a promis des concessions; mais elles sont si lentes et si faibles que les Polonais se sont découragés et ont été poussés au désespoir; l'année dernière, ils se réunissaient sans armes pour prier; des massacres ont eu lieu autour des églises et même au pied des autels. La réconciliation est devenue plus difficile que jamais sous un pareil régime.

L'assimilation ne s'est même pas faite pour les provinces réunies à l'Empire Russe depuis près d'un siècle; car l'insurrection actuelle paraît s'être propagée avec rapidité dans la Lithuanie.

Indépendamment de l'antipathie séculaire qui existe entre les Russes et les Polonais, qui tend sans cesse à troubler l'Europe, et qui ne pourrait s'adoucir que par un régime plus habile et plus libéral, quelle est la cause actuelle des insurrections? En 1862, c'était l'obstacle opposé aux prières publiques; aujourd'hui, c'est un mode arbitraire de recrutement pour l'armée, tellement odieux qu'il a été qualifié de proscription par le Ministre d'un pays voisin.

En France, une égalité parfaite pour le recrutement de l'armée règne entre toutes les familles et toutes les opinions; le tirage au sort, dans toute sa sincérité, désigne seul les conscrits destinés à faire partie de notre armée, pour un temps déterminé par la loi. En Russie, au contraire, dans les provinces Polonaises, des agents subalternes désignent arbitrairement les jeunes gens que le recrutement doit enlever; on s'empare, sans les prévenir, par la force, et souvent pendant la nuit, des jeunes gens les plus dévoués

à leur patrie, des jeunes gens les plus attachés à leur religion. et surtout de ceux qu'on a vus s'associer aux prières publiques pour la Pologne.

Pour quelles destinations les enlève-t-on ainsi à leurs travaux, à leur familles? Est-ce pour les incorporer dans une armée nationale; pour défendre les lois et la patrie? Non! c'est pour les exiler, à toujours peut-être, dans les contrées les plus éloignées, presque inconnues à l'Europe civilisée; c'est souvent pour les exposer aux tourments les plus durs de la Sibérie.

Est-il donc étonnant que les jeunes Polonais, ainsi enlevés et menacés, se dérobent à un recrutement aussi cruel, et se jettent dans les bois, dans les marais, pour s'échapper d'abord, et bientôt pour se réunir et se défendre contre les soldats Russes qui les poursuivent en les fusillant?

Telles sont, il faut le reconnaître, les causes principales et les plus récentes de cette vaste insurrection qui paraît se répandre dans la vieille Pologne, aussi bien que dans le Royaume de Varsovie.

La France, si souvent agitée par les révolutions, ne les excite nulle part. Nous n'avons pas à rechercher quelle sera l'issue de l'insurrection actuelle, ni quelles sont ses forces et ses chances, encore moins si elle obéit à un centre d'action étranger; le sentiment de la France, comme celui de l'Europe, c'est le sentiment de l'humanité, c'est le sentiment de la justice pour tous; c'est le vœu de la paix qui en est la conséquence. En France, il y a encore une cause supérieure de sympathie et de reconnaissance pour les Polonais; c'est le souvenir de la fraternité des champs de bataille.

Le Gouvernement Russe sait que le Gouvernement Français n'a jamais encouragé le soulèvement de la Pologne. Pendant les deux longues campagnes de Crimée, dans lesquelles l'armée Française a lutté contre les éléments, contre toutes les forces des armes Russes, l'Empereur des Français n'a pas cherché à se créer en Pologne le secours d'une puissante diversion; il voulait sauvegarder l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, soutenir le faible contre le fort, et raffermir l'équilibre de l'Europe, loin de le troubler.

Aujourd'hui encore, il veut la paix; mais avec la France, il s'afflige d'une lutte sanglante qui, en offensant l'humanité, menace sérieusement la tranquillité de l'Europe.

L'émotion est universelle: l'Angleterre s'indigne et semble vouloir, par des excitations plus ou moins sincères, nous pousser à une guerre, où son Gouvernement ne nous suivrait pas (mouvement marqué d'assentiment); l'Italie s'agite pour la Pologne; l'Autriche garde une attitude digne, et, jusqu'à un certain point, sympathique; enfin, la nation Prussienne s'émeut à son tour, et détourne son Gouvernement d'une mesure inattendue qui soulevait en Europe de légitimes protestations.

Si l'Empereur Alexandre I avait vécu, la Pologne jouirait sans doute, dans une large mesure, des institutions nationales qui lui avaient été promises; sa religion, son autonomie, sa langue même n'auraient pas été menacées; l'insurrection de 1830 et celles qui l'ont suivie n'auraient pas eu lieu.

Messieurs les Sénateurs, avant de formuler ses conclusions, la première Commission des Pétitions a voulu entendre les organes du Gouvernement, et savoir d'eux quel était l'état des négociations entamées.

Le Ministre sans portefeuille, qui s'est rendu dans son sein, lui a fait un exposé complet de la situation et de ses difficultés. Bien avant les pétitions, le Gouvernement s'occupait avec une sincère sympathie et une active sollicitude du sort de la Pologne; il a fait à la Russie des représentations amicales et réitérées.

La Convention du 8 Février entre la Prusse et la Russie, qui avait le caractère d'un fait international, nous a permis de prendre une attitude plus précise.

La France a, en conséquence, proposé à l'Angleterre et à l'Autriche une action simultanée près du Cabinet de Berlin. Cette offre n'a pas été agréée par le Cabinet Britannique, mais des communications isolées ont été faites, et il y a lieu de croire que la Convention du 8 Février n'aura pas de suite.

Le Ministre a accompagné ces déclarations, sur l'état des négociations ainsi entamé(e)s, de détails et d'explications qu'il lui appartiendra de reproduire devant le Sénat.

Il nous suffit de dire qu'il est résulté pour la Commission de tout ce qu'elle a entendu, que, dans cette circonstance, comme toujours, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur s'est efforcé de concilier les légitimes aspirations des peuples avec le respect des Traités.

La presse Anglaise et les meetings agitent l'opinion, et accablent la Russie de leurs sévérités et de leur indignation; il ne craindraient pas de soulever l'Europe; mais le Gouvernement Anglais, loin de subir ces entraînements, n'a pas même admis jusqu'ici l'action commune des Puissances, et une motion présentée au Parlement en faveur de la Pologne a été retirée après les explications du Premier Ministre de la Reine.

L'Empereur Alexandre II est en voie d'accomplir une oeuvre très-libérale pour ses sujets Russes; la force des choses et le sentiment de la civilisation Européenne l'amèneront inévitablement à une politique plus généreuse envers la Pologne, comme il l'ont amené à préparer l'abolition du servage.

Personne ne peut douter de la vive sympathie de Napoléon III pour la Pologne; cette noble cause excite aussi le plus vif intérêt dans le Sénat, où tant de souvenirs glorieux sont religieusement conservés: mais le Prince auquel la France a confié ses destinées n'est pas de ceux dont on ait besoin de stimuler l'énergie; il a montré plus d'une fois qu'il ne recule pas au besoin devant une guerre juste et nécessaire: les campagnes de Crimée et d'Italie sont là pour le prouver.

Ayons donc confiance, MM. les Sénateurs, dans la politique loyale et ferme de notre Gouvernement.

En résumé, les pétitions qui vous demandent la guerre ne tendraient à rien moins qu'à une croisade Française pour la reconstitution de la Pologne.

Comme corps politique, le Sénat ne peut pas s'associer à de tels voeux.

Quand à l'action diplomatique que réclament d'autres pétitions, il a été établi pour la Commission, comme il le sera pour vous, que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur en avait pris la généreuse initiative, et qu'il continue à l'exercer dans la mesure que comportent de telles négociations et les Traités existants.

Dans cette situation, en présence des négociations qui sont ouvertes, votre première Commission, éclairée par les communications qu'elle a reçues, et convaincue que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur fait et fera tout ce qu'il est juste, possible et politique de faire pour la cause de la Pologne, estime qu'un renvoi aux Ministres n'est ni nécessaire ni ju-



stifié; en conséquence, à une forte majorité, elle propose au Sénat de s'en remettre à la sagesse de l'Empereur et de passer à l'ordre du jour. (Marques d'approbation sur plusieurs bancs).

No. 197.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 298. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 15, 1863.*

I UNDERSTAND that the effect made in general upon the Senate by the Report on the petitions presented in favour of Poland, inclosed in copy in my preceding despatch, is one of alarm, though I am also informed that a greater sympathy for the cause of the Poles is visible in that body than was the case when the question was first agitated.

Mr. Grey, in his confidential despatch No. 19 of the 12th instant, has explained to your Lordship the difference between referring a petition to the Government, and moving the order of the day upon it. The course to be taken with regard to the petitions respecting Poland was, I am told, the subject of discussion in the Council of Ministers some days ago: the more violent partisans of the Polish cause supporting a reference to the Government, which, as Mr. Grey explains, would have been tantamount to an expression of opinion that the Government had not done enough in the matter; the others advocating the milder course, which was adopted, of passing to the order of the day, thus approving what had been done, and leaving the question in the hands of the Government for the future.

It is probable that if the former course had been taken, the Report would have been both less voluminous and less categorical in its terms, but as the Government preferred the approbation of the Senate, shown by passing to the order of the day, it was urged that the Report must be fuller, more circumstantial, and more energetic than it otherwise need have been.

If the Report could be considered simply as the opinion of the Committee appointed to consider the prayer of the petitioners, less weight would attach than under the circumstances is really due to it. For the interference of the Government in the manner in which I have described proves the influence which the Government must have been enabled to exercise over this Committee, and when I add that the draft of the Report was seen and approved by the Emperor, the sentiments which it conveys gain vastly in importance.

Thus your Lordship cannot remark with the same indifference the insinuations levied against the presumed selfish policy of Great Britain, which pervades this document, as if such insinuations had been the simple ebullition of angry but mistaken feelings to which the members of any public Assembly are liable. Nor can the paragraph beginning „Personne ne peut douter“, pass with as little notice as if it had not been under the Emperor's eyes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 198.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(No. 299).

My Lord,

Paris, March 15, 1863.

I CALLED this afternoon on M. Drouyn de Lhuys; but his Excellency was not at home. He has since been good enough to pay me a visit, but has left me but little time to report to your Lordship what passed between us.

I will merely observe that his language was more calm than it appears to have been when his Excellency spoke to Mr. Grey on the 12th instant, and that he seems still desirous of acting in concert with Her Majesty's Government. He expressed approbation of your Lordship's attempt to induce the Powers parties to the Treaty of Vienna to make a representation to the Russian Government, though he doubted either Austria, Prussia or Spain adopting the proposal. He agreed with your Lordship that the question of the St. Petersburg Convention had been settled in a manner which permitted Her Majesty's and the Imperial Government to let it drop. He expressed satisfaction at Prince Metternich's visit to Vienna, inasmuch as he trusted that it would lead the Austrian Government to declare themselves more positively one way or other. He said that the answer from St. Petersburg to the first remonstrances of the French Government had been most unsatisfactory, the Russian Government going no further than to declare that when the insurrection should be put down, the Czar would grant a complete amnesty and maintain the concessions made to the Poles during his reign — concessions which M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed had admitted the perpetration of the acts which had led to the present insurrection.

Speaking of the debate which was to take place in the Senate, his Excellency said that M. Billault's language would be moderate, though full of sympathy for the Poles. A certain number of diplomatic papers to illustrate what had passed between the French and other Governments with reference to this question would be published; but every care had been taken to eliminate from them anything which might possibly give offence.

On my alluding to the somewhat warlike tone of the Report of the Committee of Enquiry to the Senate, his Excellency expressed regret at it, and assured me that, as far as he knew war was not in the Emperor's thoughts. His Excellency blamed also the allusion made in the Report to Great Britain.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 199.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

Foreign Office, March 16, 1863, 6 p. m.

I HAVE received the following figures from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna:—

„Prince Metternich's visit tends to confirm attitude of Austrian Government on the Polish question. Rechberg is very anxious respecting the projects of France. Russia has not yet succeeded in making the least impression on the insurrection: want of discipline in army increases difficulty“.

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No. 200.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 16).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 16, 1863.*

PRINCE METTERNICH'S visit tends to confirm attitude of Austrian Government in Polish question. Count Rechberg is very anxious respecting projects of France. Russia has not yet succeeded in making the least impression on insurrection. Want of discipline in her army increases difficulty.

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No. 201.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, March 16, 1863,*

LET me know as soon as possible what has passed between you and Prince Gortchakoff in regard to my despatch respecting Poland, No. 53 of March 2, which was sent to you by messenger Blackwood.

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No. 202.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 17).*

(Telegraphic).

*St. Petersburg, March 16, 1863, 10.40 p. m.*

REPLY by messenger Blackwood will arrive Wednesday. Despatch received in friendly spirit. Suggestions of Her Majesty's Government declined, but clemency promised, and perseverance in liberal policy.

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†† No. 203.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received March 17).*

(No 34).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, March 10, 1863.*

REFERRING to my despatch [No. 33] of the 4th instant, relative to a meeting in favour of Poland held at the Exchange, I have the honour to state that Count Manderström has

observed to me that he did not look upon that assemblage as of much importance, since sympathy with Poland was already known to be strong and general, as indeed it seemed to be almost everywhere.

His Excellency further observed, that he considered the best thing for Poland would be an early suppression of the insurrection, since it could hardly make permanent head against Russia, and since, while the Emperor could scarcely be expected to treat with armed rebellion, the longer it lasted the more His Majesty would be irritated, and opposed to ulterior concessions.

[<sup>1</sup>With respect to Prussia, Count Manderström appeared to regard that Government as having almost taken leave of its senses, and as being well-nigh bent on committing the greatest possible blunders, both foreign and domestic.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM].

† No. 204.

*Admiral Harris to Earl Russell. — (Received March 17).*

(No. 40).

My Lord,

*Berne, March 14, 1863.*

THE ill-judged and tyrannical act of conscription in Poland by the Russian Government, for political purposes, has roused indignation and sympathy in Switzerland as elsewhere.

The Central Committee of the Helvetian Club have issued a circular, calling on their fellow-citizens to supply arms and money to the Poles; but except at St. Gall, where a small amount of subscription was raised, I have not heard of any meetings in their favour.

[<sup>1</sup>The „Helvetia“ has lost much of its prestige from its intermeddling with the Governments of the Cantons, and endeavouring to push democracy to its utmost limits.

In Bale Campagne, where a „Constituante“ is occupied in revising the Constitution, it has been decided that all laws are to be submitted to a popular vote, thus reducing their Representatives to a nonentity. In Argovie a Resolution of a similar nature was only negatived by a vote of 79 to 77.

It is impossible not to foresee that here lays a rock ahead of the prosperity of this country. The mania for revising the Cantonal Constitutions keeps society in a ferment, placing the ignorant and illiterate at the mercy of party Chiefs, agitating for their own purposes on the first question that comes to hand.

In the meantime, where these agitations occur measures of real utility are at a stand, and the refinements of civilization in arts, sciences, and social intercourse receive a permanent check].

As far as I can ascertain the report in the London papers of Menotti Garibaldi ha-

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).

ving passed through this city, on his way to Poland, is untrue. It is equally incorrect that any number of Swiss have started to fight for the Poles.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 205.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 17).*

(No. 300).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 16, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the „Moniteur“ of this day, the Diplomatic papers presented to the Senate by the orders of the Emperor.

I have, &c.

(For Earl Cowley)

(Signed) J. W. ELLIS.

Inclosure in No. 205.

*Extract from the „Moniteur“ of March 16, 1863.*

Les documents diplomatiques suivants ont été distribués ce matin à MM. les Sénateurs: —

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Comte Walewski, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Londres.*

M. le Comte,

*Paris, le 26 Mars, 1855.*

PAR les notes de Vienne et par le Traité du 2 Décembre, les Puissances alliées se sont expressement réservé la faculté de mettre des conditions particulières au rétablissement de la paix, en sus des quatre garanties qui doivent en former la base. Ces conditions supplémentaires auraient le même but d'intérêt Européen que les garanties elles-mêmes et contribueraient à consolider les résultats acquis.

Si tel doit être, en effet, le caractère essentiel des clauses additionnelles que nous aurons le droit de formuler, il en est une qui me paraîtrait parfaitement répondre à l'objet que nous nous sommes proposé. Nous avons pris les armes pour interdire à la Russie l'interprétation abusive de ses Traités avec la Porte. Mais ces Traités ne sont pas les seuls dont nous fussions autorisés à reprocher l'infraction à cette Puissance. Des arrangements plus généraux, auxquels l'Europe a souscrit comme nous, ont été violés par le Gouvernement Russe. Comme nous, l'Europe a déploré l'atteinte qu'ils ont subie et elle ne pourra, nous le croyons, qu'applaudir à nos efforts pour obtenir le redressement de griefs qui sont aussi les siens.

Deux grandes questions de territoire occupèrent les Puissances représentées au Congrès de Vienne en 1814: celle de la Saxe et celle de la Pologne. Les vœux de la France n'étaient pas douteux, et il est de notoriété que l'Angleterre les partageait. Si l'Autriche

ne défendit pas le maintien du Duché de Varsovie avec autant de fermeté que l'existence du Royaume de Saxe, elle resta cependant unie aux Cabinets de Paris et de Londres, afin de résister aux prétentions qui s'étaient coalisées pour l'incorporation sans réserve de la Saxe dans la Prusse et de la Pologne dans la Russie. Les conditions qui furent faites à l'Empereur Alexandre, quand l'Europe consentit à la réunion de la plus grande partie du Duché de Varsovie à l'Empire Russe sous le nom de Royaume de Pologne, avaient donc un caractère strictement obligatoire. Elles constituaient pour les Cabinets une compensation nécessaire à une acquisition qui donnait à la Russie des positions formidables au coeur de l'Europe Centrale. Ces obligations contractées par Alexandre I, et inscrites dans les Traités de Vienne, l'Empereur Nicolas s'en est délié en 1831, sans tenir compte des protestations de la France et de l'Angleterre.

Pour notre part, M. le Comte, nous nous croyons pleinement fondés à rappeler aujourd'hui ce souvenir. Si la France a accepté et respecté scrupuleusement, dans leurs stipulations les plus onéreuses pour elle, les Traités de 1815, elle avait le droit d'espérer qu'ils seraient de même observés, d'autre part, dans les dispositions qui pouvaient lui être favorables. L'Empereur, en se déclarant, à cet égard, solidaire des Gouvernements qui ont précédé le sien, et résolu à tenir les engagements qu'ils lui ont légués, n'a pas renoncé au bénéfice des protestations qu'ils ont fait entendre lorsque ces engagements ont été méconnus par la Russie.

Nous ne doutons pas que l'Angleterre, qui s'est associée naguère à ces protestations ne reconnaisse la légitimité et l'opportunité des démarches que nous pourrions faire en commun dans les Conférences pour obtenir sur ce point la satisfaction qui lui est due comme à nous, et que l'opinion Anglaise a toujours réclamée avec une si grande énergie. D'autre part, les Cabinets Allemands sont assez éclairés aujourd'hui sur le danger des agrandissements démesurés de la Russie pour apprécier les avantages Européens du rétablissement des Traités qui lui interdisent de posséder le Royaume de Pologne autrement que comme un Etat distinct. Quand la question a été soulevée en 1831, personne n'a cru devoir troubler la paix pour demander une réparation immédiate; aucun Gouvernement n'a rien fait depuis pour créer une situation qui pût, au prix du repos général, fournir l'occasion de l'exiger; mais puisque la Russie elle-même a de plein gré rompu cette paix au maintien de laquelle nous avons sacrifié de justes griefs, puisqu'elle nous a forcés à prendre les armes pour empêcher de sa part une nouvelle violation du droit, le moment nous semble venu de se rappeler les engagements qu'elle avait pris avec l'Europe relativement au Royaume de Pologne, et dont elle s'est affranchie.

La faculté de poser des conditions particulières nous permettrait d'introduire au moment opportun cette légitime prétention dans les Conférences de Vienne. Je désirerais savoir si Lord Clarendon partage notre opinion sur l'intérêt qu'aurait la remise en vigueur des arrangements dont il s'agit pour la stabilité même de la paix future. Je vous invite donc à pressentir et à me faire connaître quelles sont à ce sujet les dispositions du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé)

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*M. le Comte Walewski au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.*

M. le Ministre,

*Londres, le 28 Mars, 1855.*

J'AI entretenu le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat du contenu de la dépêche de votre Excellence sous la date du 26 Mars. J'ai fait remarquer que si, dans une négociation Européenne ayant pour but le rétablissement de la paix avec la Russie, il n'était nullement fait mention de l'infraction aux Traités dont le Gouvernement Russe s'était rendu coupable en assimilant le Royaume de Pologne à l'Empire de Russie — infraction contre laquelle nous avons protesté — on pourrait considérer notre silence comme une sanction implicite et comme une renonciation à nos protestations précédentes.

Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat a reconnu toute la valeur de cette observation, et il a admis qu'en temps opportun il serait désirable de faire quelque démarche de nature à corroborer l'opinion exprimée précédemment par la France et l'Angleterre sur la conduite tenue par la Russie envers la Pologne en 1831; mais Lord Clarendon, à son tour, m'a fait observer que, dans ce moment, toute tentative ayant pour but d'amener la Russie à remettre les choses en Pologne sur le pied où elles étaient avant 1830 serait inopportune et pourrait avoir des conséquences regrettables. Il ne pense pas d'abord que nous puissions équitablement comprendre l'importante question dont il s'agit dans les conditions particulières que nous nous sommes réservé la faculté de poser en sus des quatre garanties; que s'il se trompait à cet égard, il n'en restait pas moins convaincu qu'en essayant de la faire nous nous attirerions de la part du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg une réponse peu mesurée et de nature à rompre brusquement les négociations. Lord Clarendon ne doute pas que les Plénipotentiaires Russes ne soient très-empressés de saisir un semblable motif de rupture dans l'espoir d'y trouver le moyen de nous séparer de l'Autriche et d'ameuter contre nous l'Allemagne. Mais le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat m'a répété que si une initiative à ce sujet lui paraissait impolitique et impraticable en ce moment, elle pourrait devenir admissible et même très désirable dans une autre circonstance, et qu'alors il serait tout disposé à s'entendre avec le Gouvernement de l'Empereur sur la meilleure marche à suivre et la meilleure forme à adopter en vue de remettre sur le tapis cette importante question.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé)

A. WALEWSKI.

*M. le Comte Walewski, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Comte de Persigny, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Londres.*

M. le Comte,

*Paris, le 15 Septembre, 1855.*

CETTE dépêche a pour but d'appeler votre attention et de vous engager à fixer celle du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sur une question qui excite, à juste titre, la sollicitude de l'Empereur, et à laquelle le Cabinet de Londres ne prend sans doute pas moins d'intérêt. Il s'agit de la Pologne. Je n'en parlerai que dans la mesure pratique

du possible et à un point de vue qui, j'aime à le croire, aura l'assentiment du Gouvernement Anglais.

Au moment où les glorieux succès des armées alliées semblent autoriser l'espérance de voir se rapprocher le terme de la guerre, et lorsqu'en vertu des principes de désintéressement et de loyauté, si hautement proclamés par la France et l'Angleterre dès le début de la lutte, le rétablissement de la paix devra n'apporter aucun changement à l'ensemble des circonscriptions territoriales consacrées par les Traités de Vienne de 1815; en ce moment, dis-je, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, en rappelant avec quel respect scrupuleux la France a constamment observé ces Traités, si onéreux pour elle, se croit justement fondé à demander que d'autres Puissances, pour qui leurs stipulations n'étaient pas moins obligatoires, soient tenues de les respecter et de les exécuter avec la même fidélité.

Parmi ces stipulations, l'Article I du Traité de Vienne du 9 Juin, 1815, en prononçant la réunion du Duché de Varsovie à l'Empire de Russie, régla qu'il y serait lié invariablement par sa Constitution, sous le nom de Royaume de Pologne. Ce n'était là, sans doute, qu'une réparation bien incomplète de l'injustice des partages qui ont anéanti la Pologne. Toutefois, c'était un hommage rendu par la Russie au principe indélébile de la nationalité Polonaise; et le Royaume de Pologne, avec sa Constitution, avec son administration distincte et son armée toute nationale, possédait en réalité des garanties qui manquaient aux autres Provinces démembrées. Ces garanties, et l'ordre de choses qu'elles avaient pour but de protéger, ont disparu en 1831, après la répression de l'insurrection de la Pologne, sous l'influence d'une politique réduite à s'imposer par la force. Contrairement à des promesses et à des assurances formelles de l'Empereur Nicolas, le Royaume de Pologne, incorporé à la Russie, n'a plus été qu'une province de cet empire. Les Traités qui en avaient constitué l'existence politique étaient ouvertement méconnus. Et cependant celui du 9 Juin, 1815, était alors, comme aujourd'hui, un acte essentiellement Européen, par lequel toutes les Parties Contractantes sont liées virtuellement l'une envers l'autre, et chacune d'elles envers toutes. Ni le soulèvement de la Pologne, ni le triomphe de l'armée Russe sur les insurgés n'avaient pu, sous aucun rapport et à aucun titre, dégager la Russie de ses obligations à l'égard des Etats avec la participation et sous la garantie desquels ce Traité fut signé. Le France et l'Angleterre réclamèrent contre une telle infraction au droit public de l'Europe; et si, dans l'intérêt du maintien de la tranquillité générale, elles évitèrent d'en faire un cas de guerre, toutes deux n'en réservèrent qu'avec plus de force les droits pour lesquels elles venaient de protester, en attendant qu'il s'offrît une occasion de les rappeler et de les soutenir avec plus de chances de succès.

Cette occasion peut, M. le Comte, ne pas tarder à naître et le moment est venu de se préparer à faire du rétablissement du Royaume de Pologne, dans les conditions stipulées par le Congrès de Vienne, un des objets essentiels des négociations de la paix, aussitôt quelles deviendront possibles, en même temps qu'une des bases fondamentales de cette paix. Une demande semblable de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre n'aurait assurément rien de nouveau ni d'inattendu: elle ne serait que la conséquence logique des réclamations présentées, à une autre époque, en faveur de la Pologne, et viendrait attester d'une manière encore plus solennelle les grands principes d'équité et d'équilibre poli-



tique qui les unissent et les dirigent. En un mot, la France et l'Angleterre, pour prix de tant et de si douloureux sacrifices déjà faits et qu'elles continuent de faire à la cause de l'indépendance et de la sécurité de l'Europe, ont certainement le droit de vouloir qu'une question qui s'y trouve si essentiellement liée soit ramenée à une solution plus conforme à ces graves intérêts, et je pourrais ajouter, plus conforme aussi à ceux de la Russie, qui verrait ainsi disparaître pour elle une cause incessante de troubles et de fâcheuses complications.

Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur se plaît à espérer que celui de sa Majesté Britannique, envisageant au même point de vue cette importante question, n'appréciera pas moins la nécessité de la comprendre dans les futures négociations de la paix, et n'hésitera point à unir ses efforts aux nôtres pour obtenir le redressement d'un acte contre lequel la conscience des Gouvernements et des peuples n'a cessé de protester, car le temps n'a pu en affaiblir ni l'iniquité ni les funestes conséquences.

Vous voudrez bien donner lecture et laisser copie de cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon et m'informer des dispositions du Cabinet Anglais.

Agrécz, &c.

(Signé)

A. WALEWSKI.

*M. le Comte Walewski à M. le Comte de Persigny, à Londres.*

M. le Comte,

*Paris, le 15 Octobre, 1855.*

LORD COWLEY m'a donné lecture d'une dépêche de son Gouvernement en réponse à celle que je vous avais chargé de remettre aux mains de Lord Clarendon, au sujet de la situation du Royaume de Pologne dans ses rapports avec les Traités qui ont réglé sa condition légale en 1815, et avec les bases éventuelles de la paix future. Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères déclare non seulement que le Cabinet Anglais désirerait comme nous que les obligations contractées par la Russie envers la Pologne fussent remplies, mais qu'il verrait dans l'indépendance même de ce pays la barrière la plus sûre pour l'Europe contre les envahissements de la puissance Russe. La seule question aux yeux du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique serait de savoir si le moment est opportun pour prendre l'engagement de ne traiter avec la Russie qu'à la condition de la remise en vigueur des stipulations qui concernent la Pologne dans les Actes de Vienne. Il conclut que, sans nous lier les mains et sans nous imposer à nous-mêmes une ligne particulière de conduite, il nous suffit de convenir que nous profiterons des événements dans la mesure du possible, en faveur de la Pologne.

J'ai dit à Lord Cowley que j'étais d'autant plus disposé à donner mon entier assentiment aux vues du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique qu'elles me paraissaient absolument conformes à celles que nous avons nous-mêmes émises dans les communications que nous lui avons faites. En exposant les considérations générales qui nous ont semblé de nature à intéresser les Puissances alliées au sort de cette partie de la Pologne que des Traités, violés depuis lors, ont conditionnellement attribuée à la Russie, nous

n'avons point eu l'intention de proposer au Cabinet Anglais des engagements formels à ce sujet.

Il n'est point davantage entré dans notre pensée de faire de ce qui constituait l'objet de notre communication une condition absolue du rétablissement de la paix avec la Russie.

Nous n'apprécions point autrement que Lord Clarendon la situation dans laquelle nous nous trouvons actuellement placés vis-à-vis de l'Europe et vis-à-vis de nous-mêmes. Nous avons poursuivi jusqu'à présent un but déterminé sur lequel toute notre attention doit demeurer concentrée jusqu'à ce que nous soyons sûrs de l'avoir atteint. A moins d'être amenés par l'opiniâtreté de la Russie à prolonger la guerre et à mettre en avant de plus vastes prétentions pour de plus grands sacrifices, nous devons rester dans les limites de la tâche que nous nous sommes tracée et dans la mesure des exigences qui correspondent logiquement aux efforts que nous aurons dû faire. Mais il nous a paru que nous pouvions, sans en sortir, nous demander dès à présent s'il ne conviendrait pas de faire entrer parmi les intérêts à débattre, lors de la paix future, le retour obligatoire de la Russie à l'observation de ses engagements envers l'Europe par rapport à la Pologne. Dans les notes et dans les actes qui nous lient, soit entre nous, soit avec l'Autriche, il a été catégoriquement admis que nous pourrions, en dehors des principes généraux destinés à servir de point de départ aux négociations, formuler telles conditions particulières qui nous paraîtraient nécessaires dans un intérêt d'équilibre Européen. Rien, à nos yeux, ne saurait mieux répondre à cette pensée que le rétablissement de stipulations Européennes regardées, en 1815, par toutes les Puissances, comme indispensables pour limiter les immenses avantages que l'annexion du Royaume de Pologne assurait à la Russie. Au reste, c'est aux événements qu'il appartient en cela de décider si ce qui est juste et désirable est également possible, et la conduite que nous pouvons avoir à tenir à cet égard demeure nécessairement subordonnée aux circonstances. Nous l'avons toujours compris ainsi. Telle est aussi la conclusion qui ressort de la dépêche que Lord Cowley a été chargé de me communiquer, et nous ne pouvons que nous féliciter de l'accord qui existe entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et nous, relativement à cette importance éventualité.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) A. WALEWSKI.

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*Extrait des Documents communiqués au Parlement Britannique.*

*Le Comte de Clarendon au Vicomte Palmerston.*

Milord,

*Paris, le 15 Avril, 1856.*

DEPUIS le commencement des Conférences je n'ai pas manqué d'avoir présent à l'esprit le profond intérêt que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a toujours éprouvé pour la Pologne, et j'ai voulu porter cette question devant le Congrès, afin d'obtenir quelque manifestation d'opinion ou quelque assurance de la part des Représentants de l'Empereur de Russie que Sa Majesté entend adopter une politique plus conciliante à l'égard de ses sujets Polonais.

Le 9, à la requête du Comte Walewski, j'ai eu une conversation à ce sujet avec le Comte Orloff. J'ai dit que la condition de la Pologne avait été discutée et sa future organisation déterminée par le Congrès de Vienne, et que le Congrès actuel ne pouvait voir la question avec indifférence; que je croyais que les Polonais seraient assez satisfaits si une Constitution nationale leur était rendue, si leur religion était respectée, s'il leur était permis de parler la langue Polonaise, et si leurs enfants étaient élevés dans des écoles Polonaises, au lieu de l'être (et en nombre limité) dans les écoles Russes. Je suggérai en même temps à son Excellence qu'elle devrait donner quelque assurance à cet effet ou se préparer à le déclarer dans sa réponse à une question qui lui serait posée par le Congrès.

Le Comte Orloff me répondit que l'Empereur avait résolu de rendre aux Polonais tout ce dont je venais de parler, mais que cette déclaration ne pouvait être faite au Congrès, parce qu'elle serait mal interprétée en Russie, où l'on penserait que Sa Majesté Impériale avait cédé à une pression étrangère, ce qui lui ôterait le mérite de la spontanéité.

Le Comte Orloff me dit d'une manière amicale: „Dans l'intérêt des Polonais, ne portez pas l'affaire devant le Congrès, car, dans le Congrès, je ne puis rien vous dire, ni y admettre votre droit de m'interroger. Par conséquent, ma réponse serait décourageante pour les Polonais, et l'Empereur jugerait peut-être qu'il serait de sa dignité de retarder ce qu'il compte faire“.

J'ai dit que la question paraissait reposer sur le point de savoir s'il y aurait une déclaration volontaire de la part de l'Empereur au Congrès, ou une proclamation à quelque époque ultérieure, et que je pensais que la première alternative serait un acte plus gracieux et en même temps avantageux à l'Empereur, comme étant une indication pour l'Europe de la politique que Sa Majesté se proposait d'adopter. Je représentai qu'une telle déclaration ne dérogerait pas à la dignité de Sa Majesté, et qu'elle n'entraînerait pas de fausse interprétation.

Le Comte Orloff répondit que, connaissant comme il les connaissait les intentions de l'Empereur à l'égard de la Pologne, il avait résolu de ne pas écrire à sa Majesté à ce sujet, mais qu'il ferait savoir par le télégraphe ce que je lui avais suggéré.

Hier, son Excellence, en réponse à ma question touchant la réponse qu'il avait reçue de St. Pétersbourg, m'a annoncé qu'elle devait décliner de faire aucune déclaration touchant la Pologne. Elle m'a dit qu(e) l'Empereur avait résolu de faire tout ce qui avait été suggéré et que l'amnistie serait large; mais il désirait signaler son couronnement par cet acte et par d'autres actes de grâce, et leur bon effet serait détruit si les intentions de Sa Majesté étaient proclamées d'avance.

Son Excellence a répété que, si je persistais à porter l'affaire devant le Congrès, elle serait contrainte de donner une réponse défavorable et de déclarer que l'intervention étrangère amènerait probablement un ajournement ou une diminution des faveurs que Sa Majesté comptait octroyer à ses sujets Polonais.

Dans ces circonstances, le Comte Walewski et moi nous avons pensé que la marche la plus prudente serait de pas saisir le Congrès de la question.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé)

CLARENDON.

*Le Vicomte Palmerston au Comte de Clarendon.*

Milord,

*Foreign Office, le 17 Avril, 1856.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre dépêche du 15 de ce mois, rapportant vos conversations avec le Comte Walewski et avec le Comte Orloff au sujet de la Pologne, et j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Seigneurie que le Gouvernement de la Reine approuve complètement le marche suivie par vous, tant en discutant la question avec le Comte Orloff qu'en vous abstenant, par suite des déclarations du Comte Orloff, de porter cette question devant le Congrès.

J'ai, &amp;c.

(Signé)

PALMERSTON.

<sup>†</sup> *M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à M. le Baron Talleyrand, Ambassadeur de l'Empereur à Berlin.*

M. le Baron,

*Paris, le 17 Février, 1863.*

LE Gouvernement de l'Empereur s'était renfermé jusqu'ici, à l'égard des troubles survenus en Pologne, dans une réserve dont il n'est sorti un instant que par suite de la nécessité où il s'est trouvé d'exprimer sa première impression devant le Corps Législatif. Nous suivions avec un douloureux intérêt les conflits armés qui se sont produits sur plusieurs points, et nous cherchions, avant tout, à nous rendre un compte exact de la portée de ces événements.

J'étais loin de penser que j'aurais sitôt l'occasion d'examiner avec vous la situation du Cabinet de Berlin dans une question où il ne paraissait point directement intéressé et où aucune considération pressante ne l'invitait à s'engager. Mais il nous appelle lui-même sur ce terrain par l'arrangement qu'il vient de conclure avec la Russie et dont M. l'Ambassadeur de Prusse m'a fait connaître les dispositions.

M. le Comte de Goltz m'a dit, ainsi que M. le Baron de Budberg me l'avait annoncé de son côté, que l'objet de cet Acte était de maintenir la sûreté des relations commerciales et d'empêcher l(e) pillage des caisses de la douane. Les troupes de chacune des deux Puissances, afin d'atteindre ce but, pourront respectivement franchir la frontière commune et poursuivre, au besoin, les bandes armées sur le territoire de l'autre, jusqu'à la rencontre d'une force nationale suffisante. Le bruit public est aujourd'hui que les deux Cabinets se seraient de même entendus pour assurer le passage par les chemins de fer Prussiens aux renforts qui seraient dirigés des provinces Baltiques sur Varsovie; mais la communication de M. de Goltz ne m'autorise point à penser que la Convention signée à St. Pétersbourg renferme une clause de ce genre explicitement formulée.

Sous le prétexte d'intérêt douanier, M. le Baron, il n'est que trop facile de discerner le caractère politique de l'entente établie. La nature en est suffisamment indiquée par la stipulation qui ouvre la frontière aux troupes des deux pays, et qui implique, dans un rayon vaguement défini, une véritable coopération militaire de la Prusse. L'existence même d'un accord écrit à ce sujet est, à elle seule, un événement d'une gravité incontestable,

et, sans entrer dans l'examen des dispositions consenties par le Cabinet de Berlin, je n'ai pu dissimuler à M. l'Ambassadeur de Prusse les observations que me suggérait une résolution si précipitée.

Je me félicitais récemment encore avec M. le Comte de Goltz du calme qui n'avait pas cessé de régner dans le Grand Duché de Posen. Les informations que j'ai reçues depuis lors de notre Consulat de Dantzig, celles que vous m'avez vous-même transmises, ne me signalent aucun symptôme d'agitation dans cette province, et j'ai peine à me rendre compte des considérations qui ont pu déterminer le Cabinet de Berlin à sortir de la neutralité que les circonstances lui permettaient de garder.

L'intérêt de la Prusse était, ce nous semble, de se maintenir dans cette attitude d'observation, tant que d'impérieuses nécessités ne l'obligeraient pas à en prendre une autre. Plus elle eût montré de réserve, plus elle eût réussi à circonscrire et à refouler l'influence que la lutte engagée de l'autre côté de sa frontière serait de nature à exercer sur les populations de la Posnanie.

Quels peuvent être, au contraire, les effets de l'arrangement que le Cabinet de Berlin a conclu, sinon d'agiter les esprits et de susciter des dangers réels là où il n'existait, quant à présent, du moins, aucune difficulté sérieuse?

Mais, à nos yeux, M. le Baron, l'inconvénient le plus grave de la résolution prise par la Prusse, c'est d'évoquer en quelque sorte la question Polonaise elle-même. Jusqu'ici les mouvements qui se sont produits n'ont point été encouragés par les notabilités du pays et de l'émigration; ils n'avaient que le caractère d'un acte de résistance au recrutement ordonné par le Gouvernement Russe; l'insurrection étnit entièrement locale; elle demeurait concentrée dans les provinces du Royaume de Pologne. En intervenant d'une manière plus ou moins directe dans le conflit, le Cabinet de Berlin n'accepte pas seulement la responsabilité des mesures de répression adoptées par la Russie, il réveille l'idée d'une solidarité entre les différent(e)s populations de l'ancienne Pologne. Il semble inviter les membres séparés de cette nation à opposer leur union à celles des Gouvernements, à tenter en un mot une insurrection véritablement nationale, et, en même temps qu'il se jette ainsi gratuitement dans de graves embarras, il crée une situation qui, dès aujourd'hui, est une cause d'inquiétude, et qui peut devenir une source de complications pour les Cabinets.

Le Gouvernement Anglais ne nous a point encore manifesté son sentiment à ce sujet; mais, d'après ce que vous m'avez mandé du langage de M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, je dois supposer que les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique n'apprécieront pas autrement que nous la conduite de la Prusse dans ces conjonctures, et il y a tout lieu de penser que le jugement que nous en portons sera celui de l'opinion publique.

Agréé, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

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*Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Duc de Montebello, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à St. Petersbourg.*

(Extrait).

*Paris, le 13 Février, 1863.*

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, M. le Duc, soit antérieurement aux événements actuels, soit depuis qu'ils se sont produits, a toujours été guidé par le loyal et sincère désir d'épargner au Cabinet Russe, autant qu'il pourrait dépendre de nous, les embarras inhérents aux affaires de Pologne. Loin de surexciter les esprits, nous n'avons rien négligé pour les calmer. Scrupuleusement fidèles aux devoirs d'un Gouvernement régulier, nous nous sommes inspirés surtout des sentiments d'estime et d'amitié qui président depuis plusieurs années aux rapports des deux Cabinets. Mais la question Polonaise a, plus qu'aucune autre en France, le privilège d'éveiller des sympathies également vives dans tous les partis. Il sont, à cet égard, unanimes; le langage des défenseurs les plus zélés des idées monarchiques et religieuses ne diffère que par des nuances de celui des organes les plus avancés de la démocratie. Que pouvons-nous opposer à des publications qui se placent sur le terrain du droit public et qui ne font qu'en revendiquer les principes les plus incontestés? Non-seulement nous sommes désarmés contre de semblables écrits, mais puisant nous-mêmes notre force dans l'opinion, nous sommes obligés de compter avec des sentiments qui sont depuis de longues années ceux du pays.

Les Représentants de l'Europe assemblés au Congrès de Vienne en subissaient l'impression et l'acceptaient dans une certaine mesure, lorsque, cherchant à réparer les maux de la Pologne, l'un des principaux objets de leur sollicitude, ils plaçaient en tête de l'Acte Général destiné à servir de base au nouveau système politique, les stipulations qui y rattachaient le sort de ce pays.

J'ai dit, au reste, à M. l'Ambassadeur de Russie, que nous observerions fidèlement la conduite que nous nous étions tracée; que nous remplirions loyalement les devoirs qui résultent du caractère amical de nos relations avec le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; qu'enfin nous ne cesserions de recommander la modération et de condamner hautement tout ce qui ressemblerait à des procédés ou à des tendances anarchiques et révolutionnaires: mais je n'ai pas caché à M. le Baron de Budberg que, malgré nous, les événements pouvaient devenir de plus en plus embarrassants, que la pression du sentiment public s'imposerait davantage à mesure que les circonstances prendraient plus de gravité, et que nous devions faire des vœux pour que, dans les moyens auxquels le Gouvernement Russe aura recours, rien ne vienne rendre notre position plus difficile vis-à-vis du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, de nous-mêmes, et de l'Europe.

Depuis l'avènement de l'Empereur Alexandre, de grands progrès se sont accomplis en Russie. Nous avons été les premiers à y applaudir et à rendre hommage à une politique libérale. Tout ce qui engageait davantage cette Puissance dans les voies de la civilisation moderne la rapprochait de la France et resserrait les liens des deux pays. Nous nous plaisions également à espérer que pour la Pologne, comme pour la Russie, le nouveau règne serait un règne réparateur. Si les espérances que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a laissé concevoir ne se réalisaient pas; si surtout, dans les graves conjonctures qui se présentent, il se mettait en opposition avec cette opinion publique aussi persévérante que

les malheurs de la Pologne, il se créerait et nous ferait à nous-mêmes une situation pénible sur laquelle j'ai dû particulièrement m'arrêter avec M. le Baron de Budberg. Vous voudrez bien, M. le Duc, prendre vous-même ces considérations pour règle de votre langage auprès de M. le Prince Gortchakoff. Vous ne lui laisserez point ignorer des réflexions dont nous ne pouvons nous défendre, ni l'attitude réservée qu'elles nous imposent, et je me plais à espérer qu'il appréciera la franchise de nos explications.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Duc de Gramont, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Vienne.*

(Extrait).

M. le Duc,

*Paris, le 19 Février, 1863.*

LE Cabinet de Vienne a calculé les dispositions qu'il était amené à prendre d'après les obligations réelles de sa situation en présence des mouvements qui se sont produits dans les provinces Polonaises de la Russie. Cette agitation ne pouvait manquer d'attirer l'attention des populations Galiciennes, d'éveiller même leurs sympathies; mais ces sentiments n'ont provoqué aucun acte d'opposition contre le Gouvernement du pays, ni suscité aucune crainte de manifestations inquiétantes pour l'Autriche. L'intérêt du Cabinet de Vienne était de s'attacher à maintenir à l'insurrection le caractère essentiellement local qu'elle a pris dès le début et conservé jusqu'à présent. Tout en adoptant les mesures qu'il jugeait conformes à ses devoirs internationaux, il avait à éviter d'agiter davantage les esprits en Galicie et d'y faire naître l'idée d'une solidarité des Gouvernements, qui n'aurait d'autre effet peut-être que de généraliser le mouvement des populations. La Cour d'Autriche s'est gardée ainsi de la faute dans laquelle me paraît être tombé le Cabinet de Berlin en signant la Convention de St. Pétersbourg. Elle ne saurait avoir à regretter cette réserve, car au milieu de conjonctures aussi graves et aussi délicates, l'avantage est évidemment pour celui qui conserve la liberté de son jugement et de ses résolutions.

Il est de notoriété que, dans les phases diverses de la question Polonaise, depuis un siècle, l'attitude du Cabinet de Vienne n'a pas été absolument identique à celle de la Russie et de la Prusse. Cette différence n'a point échappé aux populations Polonaises, et elle n'est pas restée sans influence sur leurs dispositions envers l'Autriche.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

*Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Baron Gros, Ambassadeur de sa Majesté à Londres.*

M. le Baron,

*Paris, le 21 Février, 1863.*

LA dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire sous le No. 21 vous a fait connaître les observations que la Convention conclue entre la Prusse et la Russie a suggérées



au Gouvernement de l'Empereur. Les troubles suscités par le recrutement opéré en Pologne, en dehors des conditions ordinaires, devaient nécessairement attirer notre attention. Les douloureux incidents de la résistance des populations à une mesure d'administration intérieure ne pouvaient toutefois être encore envisagés que d'un point de vue d'humanité. Mais l'arrangement signé à St. Pétersbourg est venu inopinément donner à cette crise un caractère politique sur lequel il appartient sans nul doute aux Cabinets de porter un jugement.

J'ai indiqué à M. le Baron de Talleyrand l'ordre d'idées dans lequel il doit se placer avec le Cabinet de Berlin. D'un autre côté, la vivacité du sentiment public en Angleterre, les déclarations anciennes du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et les principes de sa politique, m'autorisent à penser que le langage tracé à Sir Andrew Buchanan sera en parfait accord avec celui que tiendra le Ministre de l'Empereur. Mais je me demande si l'expression orale de notre manière de voir est en rapport avec la gravité de l'acte que nous avons à apprécier, et s'il ne serait pas nécessaire de donner à la manifestation de notre opinion une forme moins fugitive et plus déterminée. Ne pourrions-nous pas, par exemple, combiner les termes d'une communication identique destinée à être remise simultanément au Cabinet de Berlin, et qui serait ensuite portée à la connaissance de celui de St. Pétersbourg.

Il me semble d'ailleurs, M. le Baron, qu'une démarche de cette nature pourrait obtenir également le concours du Gouvernement Autrichien. Le Cabinet de Londres est renseigné comme nous sur l'attitude adoptée par l'Autriche. Il sait qu'elle a suivi une ligne de conduite différente de celle de la Prusse. Il y a lieu de présumer que le Cabinet de Vienne n'envisage pas autrement que nous une Convention dont la seule nouvelle a notablement accru l'agitation en Pologne, et dont la mise en vigueur ne peut que l'augmenter. Il aurait à tous égards intérêt à en décliner plus complètement encore la solidarité en s'associant à nos appréciations. Il donnerait ainsi à l'opinion publique une satisfaction qui contribuerait puissamment au maintien de la tranquillité en Galicie.

Si, comme j'espère, M. le Baron, Lord Russell approuvait cette idée, il ne resterait plus qu'à nous entendre sur la teneur de la communication que nous aurions à adresser au Cabinet de Berlin. Afin de vous fixer sur l'esprit dans lequel elle pourrait, selon nous, être conçue, je vous envoie ci-joint copie d'un projet de note auquel au surplus nous serions prêts à faire subir toutes les modifications qui seraient jugées convenables.

Je vous invite à donner lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Russell.

Vous voudrez bien lui dire que j'écris dans le même sens à Vienne, et je vous serai obligé de me faire connaître le plus tôt possible les intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

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*Projet de Note.*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, a reçu l'ordre d'entrer avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse dans de franches explica-



tions au sujet de l'arrangement conclu entre les Cabinets de Berlin et de St. Pétersbourg à l'occasion des troubles survenus dans le Royaume de Pologne, et, à cet effet, il a été chargé d'adresser à son Excellence M. de Bismarek-Schönhausen la communication suivante:—

Les mesures adoptées par le Gouvernement Russe pour opérer le recrutement en Pologne ayant amené une résistance qui a donné lieu à des conflits sur plusieurs points, la Cour de France observait avec un douloureux intérêt des événements si regrettables. Il était d'autant plus à désirer qu'aucun incident ne vînt aggraver cette lutte que le pays, livré à un état de malaise évident, renfermait déjà de nombreux éléments d'agitation et de désordre: il importait d'éviter toute manifestation de nature à exciter les esprits dans les autres Provinces Polonaises, et à changer le caractère, jusqu'alors purement local, de l'insurrection.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français n'a donc pas appris sans inquiétude que le Cabinet de Berlin avait signé avec celui de St. Pétersbourg une Convention par laquelle la Cour de Prusse consent à laisser pénétrer sur son territoire les troupes Russes qui jugeraient à propos de suivre les bandes armées réduites à y chercher un refuge, et s'engage elle-même à repousser sur le territoire Russe, jusqu'à la rencontre d'une force nationale suffisante, les insurgés qui se trouveraient devant les troupes Prussiennes.

En effet, la lutte concentrée encore dans le Royaume de Pologne peut être ainsi portée, d'un instant à l'autre, dans les provinces Polonaises de la Prusse ouvertes aux soldats Russes, et la Prusse peut, de son côté, se voir entraînée à prendre part aux opérations militaires en cours d'exécution de l'autre côté de sa frontière.

Un semblable accord n'a pas seulement pour conséquence d'étendre le théâtre des hostilités, il crée une situation nouvelle et transforme un incident des affaires de Pologne en une question Européenne.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est loin de méconnaître que la Cour de Prusse, en raison du voisinage, avait des devoirs internationaux à remplir en présence des événements actuels. Il n'aurait pas eu le droit de s'étonner des mesures de précaution et de surveillance qu'elle aurait cru devoir prendre pour assurer l'inviolabilité de la frontière commune et mettre obstacle à toute contrebande de guerre. Mais une co-opération, même limitée que ne justifiait d'ailleurs aucun symptôme menaçant dans les provinces Polonaises de la Monarchie Prussienne, dépasse les obligations tracées au Cabinet de Berlin par le droit public; elle semble procéder de la pensée préconçue d'une solidarité politique que les Traités Européens n'ont pas établie en réglant le sort de la Pologne, et dont les intérêts généraux pourraient avoir à souffrir.

Aussi, l'opinion publique s'en est-elle vivement émue, et l'inquiétude qu'elle en a ressentie n'aura point échappé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur considère, de son côté, comme un devoir envers lui-même et envers l'Europe, de signaler à la Cour de Berlin les préoccupations causées par les arrangements qu'elle a conclus avec le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et il aime à croire que ces observations, inspirées par le sincère désir d'écarter tout sujet de malentendu, seront accueillies avec le même sentiment de confiance bienveillante qui les a dictées.

Le Soussigné, &c.

*Circulaire aux Agents Diplomatiques de l'Empereur.*

Monsieur,

Paris le 1 Mars, 1863.

LORSQUE les troubles actuels ont éclaté en Pologne, ils n'avaient encore que le caractère d'un acte de résistance à une mesure d'administration intérieure prise dans des conditions anormales. L'état de malaise où se trouvait depuis quelque temps le pays augmentait sans doute la gravité et la portée de cette crise. Elle n'en restait pas moins purement locale avant la signature de la Convention conclue entre la Prusse et la Russie. Mais, devenue l'objet d'un Acte international, la question changeait de nature et les Cabinets étaient appelés à apprécier ces arrangements. Nous n'avons pas tardé à être instruits des dispositions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique par les discours des Ministres de la Reine devant le Parlement Anglais, et une communication de la Cour d'Autriche sur son attitude en Galicie nous autorisait à penser que le sentiment de cette Puissance ne s'éloignait pas du nôtre.

Il nous a paru cependant qu'une entente était désirable, préalablement à toute démarche officielle auprès du Gouvernement Prussien. Nous étions persuadés que les observations que les trois Cabinets estimaient légitime et utile de faire parvenir individuellement à Berlin seraient tout aussi légitimes et plus utiles encore si elles y étaient portées simultanément dans des termes semblables; qu'un jugement présenté sous cette forme serait plus autorisé; et qu'enfin la nécessité même d'amener les idées propres à chacune des parties à une expression commune serait une garantie de modération et d'impartialité.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique n'a pas adhéré à la démarche que nous étions disposés à faire. L'Autriche de son côté, tout en adoptant notre manière de voir, ne s'est pas crue fondée à blâmer officiellement une Convention dont elle s'était bornée d'abord à décliner la solidarité. Dans cet état de choses, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur n'a plus aucune suite à donner à une proposition qui supposait un accord. Nous avons, toutefois, des raisons d'espérer que l'effet produit par la signature de la Convention de St. Pétersbourg ne sera pas entièrement perdu, et que les deux Cours Contractantes tiendront compte de l'unanimité des observations que ces arrangements ont soulevées.

En ce qui nous concerne, nous continuerons à suivre ces événements avec le degré d'intérêt qu'ils sont faits pour inspirer. Nos devoirs à cet égard sont conformes à ceux des autres Grandes Puissances placées dans la même position que nous. Les efforts que nous avons tentés pour que toute démarche des Cabinets fût subordonnée à un accord préalable témoignent d'ailleurs des sentiments que nous portons dans une affaire qui n'implique de notre part ni la recherche d'une politique particulière ni une action isolée.

Recevez, &amp;c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

† No. 206.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield*<sup>1</sup>.

(No. — ).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1863.*

I HAD a long and interesting conversation yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador, Count Apponyi.

He brought me the answer of Count Rechberg to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government that Austria should unite with Great Britain in making representations at St. Petersburg in favour of a complete fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Vienna relating to Poland.

Count Rechberg declines to accede to this request, and considers that it would be inconsistent to do so, after declining the proposition of France in regard to the Russo-Prussian Convention.

The policy of Austria, Count Apponyi says, is not to make any agreement with Russia, for that would indispose the Polish subjects of Austria; but neither, on the other hand, to encourage Polish resistance, for that course might extend the flames of insurrection to the Austrian province of Galicia.

In speaking upon the question, Count Apponyi argued that if the Treaty of Vienna were wholly fulfilled, and if a National Diet and a National Administration were established at Warsaw, the Poles would not be satisfied. Their next object would be to restore an independent Kingdom of Poland; but an independent Kingdom of Poland would require the annexation of its ancient provinces, and, if that policy were successful, Galicia would be lost to Austria. No one could expect that Austria would embark in an enterprise which, in its ultimate result, might deprive her of a rich and tranquil province; she could not be an accomplice in the work of dismembering her own dominions.

I told Count Apponyi that I would speak very plainly to him on this subject: — Russia could only govern Poland in one of two ways. The one was that of the Emperor Nicholas, that of keeping her submissive and degraded; extinguishing her language; compelling her by force to change her religion. This mode was repugnant to all received notions of justice and of clemency.

The other was the mode of Alexander I: protecting her from the hatred and revenge of the Russians, by giving her the guarantee of popular institutions and a local administration entirely separate from that of Russia.

Nothing less would suffice. The late conscription was a proof of it. The law of recruitment of 1859 was a fair and just law; but it was wanting in some formality, and when it suited the despotism of Russia to substitute an arbitrary, unjust, and cruel measure for the equal law which had been proclaimed, there was not a moment's hesitation in doing so. I conceived there was no middle line between a system of oppression and a system of free and just government.

I did not deny, I said, that if Poland were to flourish under such a system aspirations of independence would be entertained, and, perhaps, in fifteen or twenty years, might

<sup>1</sup> A similar despatch was addressed to Earl Cowley.

be gratified; but also I was ready to avow, that comparing the two systems, Her Majesty's Government would greatly prefer immediate peace, [with] a bright period of justice, happiness, and freedom, with the prospect of ultimate independence and the restoration of a Kingdom of Poland, to a condemnation of Russian Poland to a dark and sullen period of slavery and submission, to be followed, perhaps at no long interval, by a fresh outbreak of hatred and revenge.

Count Apponyi said he understood my views, but Austria could not, in her position, partake in them.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

RUSSELL.

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† No. 207.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 131).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 9, 1863.*

IN conformity with your Lordship's orders I waited on Prince Gortchakoff this forenoon, and placed in his Excellency's hands your Lordship's despatch [No. 53] of the 2nd instant, embodying the views of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the affairs of Poland.

The Vice-Chancellor first read over your Lordship's despatch in silence. His Excellency then stated that, acting in a spirit of conciliation, he would offer no written reply to the observations of Her Majesty's Government. He would entrust the duty of conveying his sentiments on this occasion to me, and he would request me to show him the draft of my Report before forwarding it to your Lordship. The Vice-Chancellor also stated his wish to be enabled to submit my record of his expression to His Majesty the Emperor along with your Lordship's instruction, in order that His Imperial Majesty might have at once a complete view of this exchange of opinions between the two Governments.

To these proposals on the part of the Vice-Chancellor I acceded.

Prince Gortchakoff then read over your Lordship's despatch aloud.

The first and second paragraphs of your Lordship's despatch affirm the deep concern with which Her Majesty's Government contemplate the deplorable condition of Poland at this conjuncture, and the unsatisfactory result which Her Majesty's Government anticipate from the mere triumph of the Russian forces over the parties in arms against the Imperial authority.

Here the Vice-Chancellor remarked that the concern expressed by Her Majesty's Government was more than shared by the Emperor and his Government. The heart of His Imperial Majesty was painfully affected by the effusion of blood contingent on this unhappy revolt, by the diminution of material welfare which is inseparable from civil commotion, and by the contemplation of resentments which might possibly survive these incidents, but for which the Imperial Government could not hold themselves responsible.

The following paragraphs of your Lordship's instruction define the position of Poland in relation to the stipulations of the Treaties of 1815. On this point the Vice-

Chancellor reserved his opinion for after-statement. His Excellency proceeded at once to the eighth paragraph of the despatch, in which your Lordship affirms that the immediate cause of the present insurrection was the conscription lately enforced upon the Polish population.

The Vice-Chancellor contended that the recent measure of military recruitment was the pretext, not the provocation, of the revolt. The Polish insurrection, said his Excellency, was the result of a conspiracy deeply laid and widely organized in foreign capitals, from which he could not except London. The explosion had merely been accelerated by the military levy. Of the origin, development, and objects of that conspiracy, the Imperial Cabinet had been well informed. It was a democratic and „anti-social“ movement, conceived in the pernicious notions of which Mazzini was the author and the symbol, and in these designs the Poles had been enlisted by flattering their natural illusions, which pointed to very different objects from those which the practical policy of English statesmen regarded — to the severance of Poland from the Russian Crown, to national independence, to the restoration of the limits of 1772. Far from being the cause of the present outbreak, the military recruitment had been undertaken in order to avert it and all the calamities which had ensued upon it, to remove the inveterate promoters of disturbance, and to open a fair course for the benevolent measures projected by the Emperor. The insurrection had only included the mechanics of the towns, the indigent nobles and the rustic clergy. The landed proprietors and great nobility had collected for security under the guns of the citadel of Warsaw; the peasantry were decidedly on the side of Government, moved by a sense of the benefits which the Imperial Government had conferred on their order, and disgusted by the exactions imposed upon them by the roving bands of marauding insurgents. Some of the upper classes might, indeed, join in the patriotic delusions of national restoration in its ancient boundaries, but their eyes only remained sealed to the absurdity of such expectations in consequence of the countenance given to them by foreign Governments. Some of these persons might take part in the movement, but the Governments which afforded such countenance would hereafter regret the results of a policy which could only enlarge the circle of suffering and misfortune.

Reverting to the previous paragraphs of your Lordship's despatch respecting the position of Poland under the Treaties of Vienna, and associating them with the subsequent passages in which your Lordship sets forth the motives and claims of Great Britain to interfere as one of the signing Parties to these engagements, the Vice-Chancellor expressed himself as follows:

Laying open the Treaty of Vienna, his Excellency pointed to that passage in Article I by which it is stipulated that the national institutions to be accorded to the several members of the Polish nation shall be regulated by the form of political existence which their respective Governments shall judge it to be useful and convenient to grant to them.

Here I called the attention of the Vice-Chancellor to the use of the term „representation“, as well as that of „national institutions“.

The Vice-Chancellor resumed. His Excellency remarked that under this Article the Russian Government remained the absolute arbiter of the form in which the representa-

tion and national institutions of Poland should be framed. The Emperor Alexander I, using his indisputable prerogative in a liberal and even in an enthusiastic sense, had, some time after the conclusion of the Treaty referred to, spontaneously granted to the Kingdom of Poland a Representative Constitution which had not proved consistent with the peace and welfare either of Poland or Russia. That Constitution had never been imparted to foreign Powers as involving the execution of international engagements. We all know under what circumstances it had perished. What the Emperor Alexander did in the plenitude of his power, his successor in the exercise of the same power could revoke. The present Emperor, ever faithful to the principles of government which he applied in Russia, had applied these principles in Poland too, and perhaps in a larger measure than had been granted in any other portion of his dominions. The political Constitution proclaimed in Poland in the year 1861 embodied a complete autonomy, — national institutions with a modified representation adapted to the form of political existence in force under the Imperial Government. Poland was now ruled by institutions purely Polish. There was a directing Minister, a Pole, entertaining national sentiments of the most decided character; a Council of Administration composed of Poles; a Council of State containing Poles taken from the several ecclesiastical and civil orders of the community, and embodying some representative elements, in which general laws for the welfare of the kingdom were elaborated; there were Provincial, District, and Municipal Councils in descending order, all purely elective, charged with the local and material interests of the country. This national representation was not cast in the same mould as that which was designed by the Emperor Alexander, or that which existed in England, but it formed, nevertheless, a system of national and representative institutions adapted to the condition of Poland and its relations with Russia. Her Majesty's Government, composed of practical Statesmen, the representatives of a practical nation, would not surely contend that there was only one valid and useful form of political institutions equally applicable to all countries, that, namely, which existed in England, and which was successful there. Nor would Her Majesty's Government, which professed non-intervention as the rule of their foreign policy, deviate from that principle now by interfering in the domestic concerns of another State. The Kingdom of Poland enjoyed an absolute administrative independence. Even the Department for Polish Affairs in the Russian capital had been abolished. The only institution common to the two countries now was the army. The new institutions granted to Poland, alluded to above, opened a wide field of activity and material prosperity to the country. But this was not all. The Imperial Government, in restoring the educational establishments of the kingdom, had offered to the people the resources of intellectual culture and satisfaction. If to these institutions we added the guarantee by which they were all preserved, the personal character of the Emperor, who cherished an equal solicitude for the good of all his subjects, we should have a sufficient security for the future welfare of Poland, though the scheme might exclude that peculiar form of Representative Government applied in Great Britain, and perhaps exclusively appropriate to its condition.

With reference to the rights of England in relation to the affairs of Poland, under the Treaty of Vienna, the Vice-Chancellor remarked that he had little to say on this occasion; that question had been fully and ably discussed in the correspondence which had

passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Imperial Cabinet after the Revolution of 1831. To that correspondence he begged to refer your Lordship.

In regard to the amnesty recommended by Her Majesty's Government, the Vice-Chancellor observed that a prompt and unconditional pardon could not be granted to those who were actually in arms against the authority of the Emperor. The friendly character which Her Majesty's Government had given to their representations justified him, however, in spontaneously stating that it had always been the intention of the Emperor to grant a large measure of amnesty to his revolted subjects after the cessation of resistance, excluding only the principal authors of a movement which had caused so many calamities in the kingdom.

In the course of this conversation I did not consider it to be my duty to enter at large upon any controversial matter with the Vice-Chancellor. I did, however, offer two reflections to his Excellency in the way of reservation, which I trust will be found consistent with the views of Her Majesty's Government.

When the Vice-Chancellor spoke of the plenitude of power which had been exercised by the Emperor Alexander I, and which had been transmitted unimpaired to His Majesty's successor, I remarked that, in my opinion, and in that (I believed) of my Government, the power of the Russian Sovereign in regard to Poland could only be justly exerted within the limits, and in conformity with the prescriptions, of the Treaty of Vienna. When his Excellency appeared to claim the silence of England on the ground of the principle of non-intervention professed by Her Majesty's Government, I contended that this principle could not be invoked here, for Her Majesty's Government did not here raise their voice in a question regarding exclusively the internal concerns of a foreign country, but in a question of an interior nature, with reference to which that foreign country had contracted engagements towards Great Britain; engagements which, in our opinion, had never been annulled.

In commenting upon these observations, Prince Gortchakoff again referred to the terms of the Treaty of Vienna, which had constituted each of the three Powers concerned in Poland, the absolute arbiter of the form of national institutions to be conferred on the portion of that country brought under its sway. His Excellency also reminded me that, desiring to deal with this question in a humane and conciliatory spirit, he had abstained from using the argument which was at his command, the argument of the right of the conqueror. After the insurrection of 1830, any limitation of the absolute authority of Russia which might have previously existed had lapsed. The Poles had engaged in hostilities against Russia. They had been subdued by force of arms. The power of Russia had been established on a new basis.

The Vice-Chancellor concluded by saying that it had been free to him to accept my communication, to reserve the rights of his Sovereign, and to abstain from all discussion on this subject. Her Majesty's Government had, however, unequivocally declared that their communication was conceived in a most friendly spirit towards Russia; accepting this declaration, he had responded to the reflections of your Lordship, and in the course which he had taken he desired that your Lordship would recognize a proof



of the amicable sentiments by which he was animated towards Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 208.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 132. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 10, 1863.*

AFTER seeing Prince Gortchakoff yesterday forenoon in reference to Polish affairs, I called on the French Ambassador and informed him of the step which I had taken by your Lordship's orders, but without communicating to him the text of your Lordship's instruction. I found, however, that his Excellency had already been in possession of your Lordship's despatch for two days past, having received it from Paris. The Duke de Montebello then read me a portion of an instruction which he had received from his Government, which was to be the basis of verbal representations on his part to the Russian Cabinet; the advice of the French Government pointed to the restoration of national representative institutions in Poland, conformable to the spirit of those of 1815, and to the concession of an amnesty to the insurgents. The French letter makes allusion to the overtures of France to the Cabinets of Vienna and London, for a common remonstrance at Berlin, and states that as this proposal had been declined by Her Majesty's Government, the Government of France could not join in the form of representations suggested by your Lordship at St. Petersburg.

The Duke de Montebello called on Prince Gortchakoff after I left him, and offered to the Vice-Chancellor copy of your Lordship's despatch, with which, however, the Vice-Chancellor was already furnished by me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 209.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 136).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 11, 1863.*

IN conformity with Prince Gortchakoff's wishes I submitted the draft of my despatch [No. 131] of the 9th instant, relative to the affairs of Poland, to his Excellency on the evening of the 9th instant. The Vice-Chancellor suggested a few omissions, to which I acceded. The report, as it now stands, contains an authentic record of his Excellency's expressions on this occasion. The despatch, having been copied out, was shown to His Ma-



jesty the Emperor yesterday morning, but I pointed out to Prince Gortchakoff that I was not enabled to furnish his Excellency with a copy of it at present.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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No. 210.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 137).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 11, 1863.*

IN conversation with me last night the Emperor touched, but lightly, on the events of which the Kingdom of Poland is now the scene. His Majesty observed that he feared the interest shown for the insurgents by foreign Governments and nations might draw into the circle of the revolt a certain number of persons of higher class than had previously joined it. Should such be the case, he would deeply regret it, for it would tend to prolong a hopeless struggle, and involve a greater number of persons in misfortune.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER

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No. 211.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 138).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 11, 1863.*

HIS Majesty the Emperor was graciously pleased to thank me yesterday evening for the accuracy (as His Majesty said) with which I had rendered the observations of Prince Gortchakoff on the Polish question, as well as on other occasions. The Emperor added, that he trusted the statements communicated to Her Majesty's Government at the present conjuncture would have a good effect in England.

I thanked the Emperor for his gracious expressions, and remarked that while Prince Gortchakoff used me as the channel of his communications to Her Majesty's Government, I would always endeavour to render exact justice to his Excellency's views.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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† No. 212.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 139).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 11, 1863.*

WHEN Prince Gortchakoff was at my house last evening an opportunity offered itself for the exchange of some reflections on the events now passing in Poland. I took occasion to say to the Prince, that in speaking of an amnesty I did not suppose Her Majesty's Government pointed to a summary and unconditional pardon of all persons in arms against Government, whatever their conduct might be; but surely an offer to receive into the free pardon of the Emperor all persons who should come in by a certain date would give to many an opportunity of withdrawing from the contest, and be worthy the generous character of the Emperor.

The Vice-Chancellor replied that the Government was certainly now in a position to make an overture without any imputation of weakness. He could not say that it would be done, but the expediency of such an act was certainly worthy of consideration.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 213.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18)*

(No. 140. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 11, 1863.*

THE Russian Minister at Rome has hitherto been exerting his influence with the Pope to secure His Holiness' disapproval of the attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy in Poland, but he has now been instructed by telegraph to take no further steps, „as there would be a want of dignity in persevering in a sterile agitation“.

The crimes and misdeeds of the inferior Catholic clergy, M. Kisseleff is told, are equally oppose to religion and to humanity; and the Pope is henceforth to be abandoned to the suggestions of his own conscience.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 214.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 141. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 11, 1863.*

I AM informed on the best authority that the Chief of the Diplomatic Chancery of the Grand Duke Constantine telegraphed yesterday to Prince Gortchakoff that the Russian

position in Poland is getting worse and worse, owing to the agitation produced by the hope of foreign intervention, and by the projected resignation of many of the Imperial functionaries in the Council of State. The anticipated resignation will not be confined to the higher officials, and the nobility are expected to assume an openly hostile attitude.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 215.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 142. Secret).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 11, 1863.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 118 of the 3rd instant, I beg to submit to your Lordship an account of a second interview which Baron Budberg had with the Emperor of the French the day before yesterday, in pursuance, probably, of the instructions telegraphed to his Excellency by Prince Gortchakoff.

I am informed on reliable authority that Baron Budberg found the Emperor very much bent adventurous enterprises („très travaillé dans le sens des entreprises aventurieuses“). The Ambassador strove to bring His Majesty back to a wiser and more moderate policy.

Prince Gortchakoff's telegram, conveying the merciful assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Poland having been laid before the Emperor, produced a favourable impression on His Majesty, who observed that anything that was done in Poland in accordance with the assurances given ought to have a public and dazzling character.

The Emperor further told Baron Budberg that he could not avoid having recourse to diplomatic action.

The Ambassador warned His Majesty that an official representation would not produce the same effect as a friendly and confidential overture made at Paris, and that it could only give rise to an interpretation not contemplated by His Majesty.

The Emperor then promised that M. Billault would not communicate to the Chambers the instructions addressed to the Duke de Montebello, which were to be considered confidential; and that the Minister would be very reserved in the postponed debates in the Senate.

The general impression, Baron Budberg says, is, that while the struggle in Poland lasts, each day increases the danger of a political complication.

In answer to another telegram from Prince Gortchakoff of the 9th instant, Baron Budberg has informed the Foreign Minister that the Emperor Napoleon has no illusions as to the democratic character of the movement in Poland, but that His Majesty did not appear to be sufficiently decided to take no advantage of it.

I have every reason to believe that this Report contains a correct view of the present correspondence between France and Russia on the question of Poland, and that

it has been the object of Prince Gortchakoff to stay the diplomatic intervention of France until his answer to your Lordship's friendly recommendation shall have been made known.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 216.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 156. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 16, 1863.*

I CALLED to day upon M. de Bismarck with a despatch which I had received for him from St. Petersburg, by the messenger Blackwood, and I found the Russian Minister in his waiting-room. When his Excellency received me he said that M. d'Oubril had called to inform him that your Lordship's despatch No. 53 of the 2nd instant to Lord Napier on the affairs of Poland had been favourably received at St. Petersburg, and that the Emperor had been much pleased with the moderation of its language, and the justice done by His Majesty's Government to His Imperial Majesty's desire to promote the welfare of his Polish subjects and to treat the insurgents with clemency; but that His Imperial Majesty could not grant any amnesty until the insurrection had been suppressed. After these observations M. de Bismarck opened the despatch which I had brought to him, which proved to be a report from Count Redern of the result of Lord Napier's late representations to the Russian Government, and his Excellency read it aloud.

It speaks of the Emperor's satisfaction with your Lordship's despatch in the same terms as M. d'Oubril had done, and represents Prince Gortchakoff to have stated to his Lordship that it was impossible for the Imperial Government to grant again privileges to Poland which had been already abused, and which would now have a dangerous influence in Russia itself by exciting impossible expectations among the Russian subjects of the Emperor.

Count Redern also represents Prince Gortchakoff to have said that the insurrection would long since have been suppressed had it not been for the encouragement it has received from the European press; and his report of his Excellency's language in this and in other respects, and more particularly with regard to his Excellency's assurances of the Emperor's intention to act with clemency towards the insurgents, is not very dissimilar to that of Lord Napier. He mentions, however, that the French Ambassador received by the post, some days before the arrival of the messenger Blackwood at St. Petersburg, a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys inclosing a copy of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Napier, with instructions to support it by verbal representations; and Count Redern draws the very natural inference that it was the wish of the French Government to enable Prince Gortchakoff to make himself acquainted with the tenour of your Lordship's despatch before it could be communicated to him officially by Her Majesty's Ambassador.

Count Redern further stated that the Russian Government pretend that the official reports which they receive from Poland represent the insurrection as nearly extinguished; but he observed that such statements are inconsistent with the departure of 12,000 Grenadiers and a corps of Chasseurs for Poland, and an order to call out the reserves of the 4th corps d'armee. He also says that he had an opportunity, at Lord Napier's party on the 10th instant, of conversing with many civil and military functionaries on this subject, and that they all spoke of the insurrection as having assumed most serious proportions, and as if a long time would elapse before it could be entirely suppressed, and a normal state of things be re-established.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

†† No. 217.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 157).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 16, 1863.*

THE Russian Minister stated to me this morning that he had received an official report from Warsaw last night of a body of 1000 insurgents having been attacked and defeated near Plock, with the loss of their leader, and he [pretended] that the only important corps now in arms is that of Langiewiez, which had lately been increased by the „débris“ of others which had been already defeated.

M. d'Oubril said this corps was now moving towards the North-West, and that military measures were being taken for its dispersion, which would, he felt assured, prove successful; and it might therefore be hoped that the insurrection would very soon merely consist of a few bands of outlaws, living upon plunder, who were afraid to return to their homes.

[<sup>1</sup> Your Lordship will probably not place much confidence in this statement, which I have merely reported to show the language held here on this subject by the Russian Mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN].

No. 218.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 160).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 16, 1863.*

WHEN speaking to M. de Bismarck this morning on the subject of Lord Napier's representations to the Russian Government on Polish affairs, I again urged on his atten-

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parliamentary Paper. (Edit.).

tion the policy of supporting these representations; and as he had said to me in a previous conversation that the Prussian Government did not wish, by tendering advice to Russia, to give the Russian Government, on some future occasion, the right to express its opinions on the domestic affairs of Prussia, I suggested that the King might not perhaps object to offer advice to the Emperor Alexander in a private letter, which His Majesty might not wish to address to His Imperial Majesty through his Minister for Foreign Affairs; and I said that I hoped His Majesty would at least in that manner urge the Emperor to offer immediately an unconditional amnesty to such of the Polish insurgents as might lay down their arms and return at once to their allegiance.

M. de Bismarck said that he would submit this suggestion to the King, as there would be a wide difference between offering an amnesty to insurgents in arms in Poland and proclaiming a general amnesty, which would enable the whole Polish emigration, to the greater part of whom conspiracy had become a profession, to return to that country, he did not think it impossible that His Majesty might consent to write to the said Emperor in the sense I had suggested, by the Russian officers who have come here to attend the festival of to-morrow, and who will return in a few days to St. Petersburg. I replied that if his Majesty acted at all, I thought he should lose no time in doing so, but M. de Bismarck stated that there were reasons why he thought it would be better for the King not to communicate with the Emperor by telegraph. He would, however, speak with His Majesty on the subject in the course of the day.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 219.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 162. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 16, 1863.*

I INQUIRED of M. de Bismarck this morning whether the Prince of Reuss, who has lately arrived from Paris, had brought a satisfactory report of the attitude of the French Government with respect to Poland.

His Excellency said that the Prince is of opinion that the apprehensions which there was reason to entertain some days or weeks ago, as to the intentions of the Emperor, are no longer justified; but his Excellency added that Count Goltz, who does not take so favourable a view of things, is far from conceiving that all danger to the peace of Europe has passed away.

While speaking on this subject M. de Bismarck took again occasion to observe that he believed the various eventualities which the Polish insurrection had rendered possible would tend to bring about a better understanding between Austria and Prussia; and he said the King fully appreciated the friendly manner in which Austria had acted towards him in this question.

If the two Powers, therefore, his Excellency went on to say, would only consider the Diet to be an institution, as it was originally intended to be, by which the States composing its members might afford material assistance to each other — against foreign war, and revolutionary movements within the Confederation, — and not as a means of advancing the ambitious projects of any particular State, they would easily arrange all the other subjects of difference which have lately estranged them.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 220.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 341).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 18, 1863*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 298, Confidential, of the 15th instant, respecting the Report presented to the Senate on the subject of the petitions in favour of Poland.

This Report to the Senate of its Committee contains a totally unfounded imputation against Great Britain.

This country has never thought of exciting France to make war on account of Poland; it is to be hoped that the Minister sans portefeuille will defend England against this gratuitous falsehood.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

†† No. 221.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 301).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 16, 1863.*

[<sup>1</sup> REFERRING to my despatch No. 299 of yesterday's date] I proceed to give your Lordship some further details of the conversation which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on Polish affairs.

[I did not conceal from his Excellency that the tone of the last communication but one, which Baron Gross had made to your Lordship, had been considered to evince unnecessary soreness].

I repeated what I had said to him previously to my departure for London, that it had been impossible for Her Majesty's Government to entertain his Excellency's proposal in respect to an identic note to be addressed to the Prussian Government, because, while it

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

placed, however, justly, the conduct of Prussia in a reprehensible light, it left the greater culprit comparatively free of blame. Her Majesty's Government had considered themselves obliged to address themselves to both the Russian and Prussian Governments.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that had Her Majesty's Government proposed to France an identic representation to both the Russian and Prussian Governments it would have been agreed to. But this incident, he continued, had been settled, and he was happy to express his concurrence in the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government — which had been communicated to him by Mr. Grey — that the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna should advise Russia to observe the stipulations which that Treaty contained in regard to Poland. But in his opinion this advice, to be of any use, must be given collectively, and he feared that neither Austria, Prussia, nor Spain would be inclined to take a collective step.

I said that so far as I could judge from the conversation which I had had with your Lordship, although I must not be considered as giving any official assurance, your Lordship would not be disinclined to take some step in concert with the French and other Governments, provided it were clearly understood that if it failed in producing any effect upon the Russian Government, Great Britain would be at perfect liberty to desist from further interference. Austria and Prussia, I observed, might decline taking any part in a collective step, but if asked to support at St. Petersburg a friendly appeal on the part of Her Majesty's and of the Imperial Government in favour of a due regard to the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, they could hardly refuse. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that this would in itself be a great point gained.

[<sup>1</sup>I then said that I regretted to see in the Report made to the Senate by the Committee of Petitions, with reference to those regarding Poland, a paragraph which almost seem to contemplate the possibility of war. How, I asked, was war to be carried on? Not by France, unless she was prepared to violate every principle of international law by marching her troops through neutral territory. Would Austria take the field? If she would not sign a collective note, a fortiori she would abstain from hostilities. Her Majesty's Government would certainly not engage Great Britain in such a war. I trusted that the Imperial Government would be found equally averse to an appel to arms. And this lead me, I continued, to advert to another paragraph in the Report of the Senate, which insinuated that Great Britain was exciting France to a war into which Her Majesty's Government would not follow her. I must be permitted to say that so far from this being the case, the preoccupation of every person with whom I had met in England was lest France should go to war; it being their conviction, right or wrong, that such a war could only be undertaken for selfish purposes, and that the vindication of the rights of Poland by force of arms meant the acquisition by France of the frontier of the Rhine. It would be well, I said, that M. Billault should be instructed to correct the erroneous impression conveyed by the Report.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he regretted the introduction of these two paragraphs into the Report. He stated his firm belief that there was no intention in the Emperor's mind of engaging France in a war in favour of Poland, and admitted that no

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).



French troops could be introduced into Germany without the consent of the Sovereign of the territories, though he hinted that the Germans might be so favourably disposed to Poland as not to refuse such assistance as this. He expressed his belief further, that war, even if contemplated, would not be necessary, and that the Powers of Europe might, if united, obtain by energetic language all that they had a right to demand.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY 1].

No. 222.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(No. 303. Secret).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 17, 1863.*

I FOUND on my return to Paris a considerable increase of apparent sympathy in favour of the struggle for independence now going on in Poland, and I have employed the short time that has elapsed since my arrival in endeavouring to obtain such information for Her Majesty's Government as may help to guide their judgment in any decision which they may be called upon to take with reference to their relations with this Government on matters connected with the present crisis in Central Europe.

Whether the Emperor feels that the prolongation of an insurrection, which there is no doubt His Majesty at first thought would be put down without difficulty, renders an interference on his part necessary — in other words that the cause of Poland is so intimately connected with the glories of the first Empire that it cannot be safely neglected by the second; whether His Majesty considers that to confine himself to protests is to place himself in the position of the dynasty to which he succeeded, and the policy of which he has always condemned as humiliating to the French nation; or whether His Majesty hopes that benefit may accrue to him by the restoration of a Kingdom in the centre of Europe on whose sympathies he could rely, — which of those considerations is urging him on, I cannot say, but the increased interest evinced by His Majesty in the Polish cause is matter of fact. Probably all have had their weight, nor must the vision of the frontier of the Rhine, as the complement to the independence of Poland, be altogether omitted in the catalogue of considerations which are evidently swaying the Emperor's mind at the present moment.

Two modes — I am informed by a person to whom the Emperor appears to have opened himself with some degree of frankness — two modes of action in favour of Poland presented themselves: a direct and separate understanding with Russia, or the combination of the European Powers against Russia. Could His Majesty succeed in obtaining by his sole influence the re-establishment of the nationality of Poland, even if she remained united to Russia, might he not expect his reward on the banks of the Rhine? On the other hand, could he determine Austria to abandon the Polish coalition, could he induce Europe to speak strongly and collectively to Russia would Russia resist the united

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

voice of Europe? Must there not be a meeting of the Powers of Europe, and might not the claims of France be listened to with favour?

Both these plans are tinged with that optimism which is a peculiar characteristic of the Emperor, and which leads him to overlook, until he is confronted with them, all the difficulties which lie between him and the object which he wishes to attain.

The former, although still kept in reserve, was thought the least desirable arrangement; first, because it was supposed that public opinion in France will be averse to any understanding with the Power which had oppressed Poland; secondly, on account of the jealousy which such an understanding might excite in other Powers.

The second plan then was determined upon and appears to have been pushed with all the vigour of which the Emperor is capable, in so far as it comprehends the severance of Austria from the coalition which since the Peace of 1815 has held Poland in duress.

The overtures to attain this object have been addressed chiefly to Prince Metternich. The despatches which I had the honour to address to your Lordship previously to my departure for England kept your Lordship informed of the progress of those overtures up to that date. They appear to have been pertinaciously persisted in since, until the Austrian Government, alarmed at the danger, whether of listening to or of rejecting them, have called Prince Metternich to Vienna in order to hold personal communication with him.

Prince Metternich, I understand, left Paris under the conviction that the restoration of Poland to be an independent Kingdom was at the bottom of the Emperor's thoughts, though His Majesty, in the first instance, only puts forward the claims of Poland to the strict fulfilment of the stipulations made in her favour in 1815. Austria then is simply asked at present to join in a common demand for this object; but should Russia refuse, the Emperor has not concealed the hopes and anticipations which he entertains, the realization of which, however, must depend on the energetic concurrence of the Austrian Government. To obtain this concurrence His Majesty's promises are large. If the sacrifice of Cracow and Galicia are demanded as indispensable in the re-construction of a Kingdom of Poland, Austria may indemnify herself when and where she pleases. Her position in Germany is shaken, her supremacy disputed. The possession of Silesia would restore her ascendancy. Austria fears the encroachments of Russia in the East. The Emperor will change his policy completely, will go hand in hand with Austria for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. Nay, more, France and Austria will become the great Conservative Powers of Europe — the declared enemies of revolution. On one point, however, the Emperor has been especially frank — Austria must abandon Venetia; here, again, under promise of sufficient indemnity. With Venetia in his hands as a bribe, the Emperor can make terms with Italy. A Northern and Southern Kingdom, with a reasonable territory for the Pope between them, would satisfy all parties, and would relieve the Emperor from a position in Rome out of which he otherwise sees no issue.

I am almost ashamed of occupying your Lordship's time by the perusal of such absurdities, but your Lordship may be certain that such were the general views sketched out to Prince Metternich before his departure, and to which a favourable answer was anticipated.

I am unable to inform your Lordship whether M. Dronyn de Lhuys partakes these hallucinations. At all events his Excellency has said no more to me upon the subject than that if Austria understood her own interests, she would step forward to protect the rights of Poland.

It is right that I should call your Lordship's attention to the animus which the Emperor appears to entertain towards Prussia. Prussia is to lose Silesia on the one side, the Rhenish Provinces on the other; for of course the interests of France are not to be lost sight of in the alliance which is to make France and Austria mistresses of the destinies of Europe.

So bent is the Emperor on the realization of these projects that he requested M. de Bourqueney to go on a special mission to Vienna, hoping that the influence which that diplomatist once exercised in the Austrian capital might be turned to account on the present occasion. M. de Bourqueney refused on the ground of having quitted active life for ever, but much more because he would be in no way responsible for the events which the present crisis of affairs may produce.

I mentioned at the commencement of this despatch that the possibility of a direct understanding with Russia had also presented itself to the Emperor's mind. I am informed that a week ago Baron Budberg, after the arrival of a messenger from St. Petersburg, requested an audience of His Majesty, and that he gave His Majesty to understand that the Russian Government was quite ready to make concessions on the Polish question, provided they were asked for by France alone. The Emperor, who had then embarked on the wider project of the complete restoration of the Kingdom of Poland, received these overtures coldly though courteously.

Although this information is collected from various sources, I believe that your Lordship may rely on its general correctness. I shall continue to watch events with care. In the meantime I hope that your Lordship will consider this despatch as intended for Her Majesty's Government alone.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

P. S. — It may be as well that I should add that there appears to be every desire to act in these matters, if possible, with Her Majesty's Government, and I am further informed that in all the combinations with regard to territorial changes which it is evident have been discussed, the neutrality of Belgium as an independent State has formed part of them.

C.

No. 223.

*Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell. — (Received March —).*

(Telegraphic).

*Madrid, March 18, 1863.*

I HAVE read your despatch No. 26 of the 4th instant, and inclosure, to Miraflores. He will refer the matter to the Council and reply in writing. He authorized me in the meantime to report to your Lordship confidentially the following remarks: —

What you say in respect of Poland is reasonable and humane; and he thinks a combined representation to Russia on the subject by the principal European Powers, on grounds of humanity and good policy, might do good. To be effective, however, it ought to be general: but could this be the case if appeal were made, as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, to the Treaties of 1815? Would France, for instance, be disposed to invoke those Treaties? His personal impression on hearing your Lordship's despatches read, therefore, was that it would be better that the representations were made to Russia by all European Powers on general principles, irrespective of the Treaties of 1815.

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## No. 224.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, March 18, 1863, 4.30 p. m.*

HER Majesty's Government must see terms of the collective note suggested before they can give any assent to it. The Powers who shared in the partition of Poland, namely, Austria and Prussia, can hardly, after what they have said, be expected to sign it. If the language employed is very energetic, would it not be difficult for France, and almost equally so for England, to put up with a refusal? A representation in temperate language by Great Britain, France, Spain, Sweden, and Portugal, might, in case of Russian success, be a restraint on the abuse of victory. If the Poles were to succeed, they would hardly want much aid from other Powers. Ask Drouyn de Lhuys to frame such a note as he would suggest.

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## No. 225.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 18).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 18, 1863.*

DEBATE again adjourned. Prince Napoleon spoke for two hours and a-half; very violent, but wonderful talent. Billault will answer to-morrow.

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## No. 226.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, March 19, 1863.*

I HAVE received the following telegram from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid:—  
 „I have read your despatch No. 26 of the 4th instant, and inclosure, to Miraflores. He will refer the matter to the Council and reply in writing. He authorized me in the meantime to report to your Lordship confidentially the following remarks: —

What you say in respect of Poland is reasonable and humane; and he thinks a combined representation to Russia on the subject by the principal European Powers, on grounds of humanity and good policy, might do good. To be effective, however, it ought to be general: but could this be the case if appeal were made, as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, to the Treaties of 1815? Would France, for instance, be disposed to invoke those Treaties? His personal impression on hearing your Lordship's despatches read, therefore, was that it would be better that the representations were made to Russia by all European Powers on general principles, irrespective of the Treaties of 1815.

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No. 227.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 19).*

(No. 305).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 18, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the „Moniteur“ of this day, the debate in the Senate on M. Larabit's Report on the petitions in favour of Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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Inclosure in No. 227.

Extract from the „Moniteur“ of March 18, 1863.

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No. 228.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 19).*

(No. 306. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 18, 1863.*

THE question of meeting the petitions presented to the Senate on the Polish question, by agreeing to the order of the day as proposed in the Report of the Commission, or by sending them back to the Government, was again considered in the Council of Ministers this morning. The Emperor, who appears to have hesitated during the last few days, probably in the hope of obtaining a favourable answer from the Austrian Government, in which case he would without doubt have engaged himself more deeply, finding that if he advanced he would probably stand alone, inclined to the more prudent course of passing to the order of the day, and the Senate will in all probability vote it by a considerable majority.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 229.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 19).*

(No. 308).

My Lord,

Paris, March 18, 1863.

ON the receipt yesterday of your Lordship's despatch No. 341 of the preceding day, alluding to the unfounded imputation made against Great Britain in the Report to the Senate on the subject of the petitions in favour of Poland, and expressing the hope that it would be noticed by the Minister sans portefeuille in the discussion of the report, I sent the despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in order that he might communicate with M. Billault before the commencement of the discussion.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has since informed me that he has shown the despatch to M. Billault.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

† No. 230.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 19).*

(No. 309).

My Lord,

Paris, March 18, 1863.

I ASKED M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon whether, since he approved the step taken by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the affairs of Poland towards the Powers parties to the Treaty of Vienna, he had acted in a similar manner. His Excellency said that he had desired the French Representatives resident at the Courts of those Powers to express the readiness of the Imperial Government to join in a collective representation to be made to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. France has already said separately all that she could say. Any further representation to be of use must be collective.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 231.

*Earl Russell to Lord Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

Foreign Office, March 19, 1863, 4.45, p. m.

YOU might in conversation with Drouyn de Lhuys frame a proper note for Russia. You will see what Miraflores says as to the tenour of the note. Portugal and Sweden may probably agree with us.

No. 232.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 19).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 19, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG'S accounts from Cracow lead to the expectation that Langiewicz's corps must shortly be compelled to seek refuge in Galicia. He said that a squadron of Hussars watched the frontier, and that this body of insurgents would be disarmed on entering the Austrian Provinces and sent to the interior.

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No. 233.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, March 19, 1863.*

I HAVE received the following telegram from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna:—

„Rechberg's account from Cracow lead to the expectation that Langiewicz's corps must shortly be compelled to seek refuge in Galicia. He said that a squadron of Hussars watched the frontier, and that this body of insurgents would be disarmed on entering the Austrian Provinces and sent to the interior“.

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No. 234.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 19).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 19, 1863, 7, p. m.*

DEBATE finished. Order of the day adopted by a large majority. Billault's text—France must not run risks all alone.

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†† No. 235.

*Sir J. Hudson to Earl Russell. — (Received March 19).*

(No. 15).

My Lord,

*Turin, March 15, 1863.*

THE party, so called, of „Action“, has recently been busy in getting up public meetings in favour of Poland, and such meetings have been held in most of the principal cities of Italy, where they have been conducted with order and propriety, and within the limits prescribed by law.

[<sup>1</sup>I am informed, however, that these meetings have been devised as a trial of strength

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

and that the „Party of Action“ intend to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity to create disturbances in the Tyrol and at Rome.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON].

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No. 236.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 20).*

(No. 311).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 19, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the „Moniteur“ of this day, the continuation of the debate in the Senate on M. Larabit's Report on the petitions in favour of Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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Inclosure in No. 236.

Extract from the „Moniteur“ of March 19, 1863.

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No. 237.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 20).*

(No. 312. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 19, 1863.*

A PERSON who has seen the Duc de Grammont's report of his conversation with Count Rechberg after the arrival of Prince Metternich at Vienna, informs me that although the language of Count Rechberg expressed the desire of the Austrian Government to persevere in the course which it had marked out for itself in the Polish question, it yet implied the possibility of coming to an understanding with France; „but then“, said Count Rechberg, „it must be by Treaty and not by conversation“.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 238.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphie).

*Foreign Office, March 20, 1863.*

I HAVE received this day from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna the following figures: —



„Langiewiez's corps, worsted the three last days, is now close to the Austrian frontier. Official report just received from Cracow announces corps as completely disordered. The chiefs have applied for assurance from Austrian authorities that they will be allowed free passage and not kept under restraint. This has been refused.

No. 239.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 21).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 20, 1863, 11.13 p. m.*

LANGIEWICZ and his Staff have surrendered to the Austrian authorities, and are sent to Tarnow.

No. 240.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 21).*

(No. 314. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 19, 1863.*

THE Emperor having expressed a desire to see me I waited on His Majesty by his orders this afternoon. His Majesty said that he wished to speak to me because he was afraid that the tone of some of the French journals, and the gossip („caneans“) of Paris indicated a line of policy in the present crisis which might subject him to unjust suspicion. Thus ambitious designs were put forward which he did not entertain. The frontier of the Rhine was talked of as the natural consequence of the late conduct of Prussia, and other warlike projects equally absurd were the theme of conversation and furnished articles for the press. He was afraid from the tone of some of the English newspapers and from reports which had reached him from England, that he was looked upon with suspicion there, and he wished, therefore, to explain himself openly to me.

His policy, His Majesty continued, has always been to seek an alliance with some other Great Power. Knowing how many interests Great Britain and France had in common, his first object had been to maintain the most cordial relations with Her Majesty's Government, and during the progress of the Crimean war he had tried to lay the foundations of an alliance between Great Britain, France, and Austria, as the surest guarantee for the peace and tranquillity of Europe. His endeavours had failed, partly through the irresolute conduct of Austria, partly through the hesitation of British statesmen to engage themselves beyond the moment before them, and when the Italian war commenced he had been obliged to make overtures to the Russian Government, where he had found almost as much irresolution as he had previously found in Austria. Nevertheless his personal relations with the Emperor of Russia had been of that amicable nature that when the Polish insurrection broke out he had desired to abstain from all interference in it.

His Majesty appearing to pause for a reply, I said that with his gracious permis-

sion I would speak to him with the same freedom which I had always used on previous occasions when he had honoured me by listening to me.

I would not deny, I said, that the conduct of the Imperial Government since the commencement of the Polish insurrection had given rise, not perhaps to suspicions, but to apprehensions as to the consequences of the policy which that Government had recommended. When the Insurrection first broke out, it had excited little or no attention in France, and the French Government had declared its intention of abstaining from all intervention. But the Prussian and Russian Governments having entered into an arrangement universally blamed, the Imperial Government made a proposal to Her Majesty's Government to address a collective representation upon the subject to the Cabinet of Berlin alone. Considering the well known aspirations of the French nation, it would not be considered extraordinary that other nations should see in this step a desire to create a rupture with Prussia, and to calculate the consequences which might arise from it.

The Emperor declared most positively that he had no thoughts whatever of obtaining possession of the frontier of the Rhine, to which assurance I responded that I was quite certain that His Majesty would not state that which he did not believe, but that I could not forget that public opinion in France had forced him to take possession of Savoy and Nice against assurances previously given, and that public opinion might also insist on the acquisition of other advantages, were France again to be engaged in successful hostilities.

After this exordium His Majesty turned the conversation to the present state of the Polish question. Adverting to the debates in the Senate, he said that his position was becoming most difficult. He could not shut his eyes to the fact that Russia was engaged in quelling an insurrection within her own dominions, and that it was a very delicate matter to interfere with. He had, since the first establishment of amicable relations with Russia, given the Emperor Alexander to understand that this was the only question which could really imperil those relations; and he had entreated him to treat the Poles with leniency and justice. He had lately written to the Duke of Montebello, desiring him to recommend moderation and forbearance at the present moment; and he had received, in reply, every assurance of the Emperor Alexander's good intentions whenever the insurrection should be quelled, in so far as granting an all but general amnesty, for the past, and confirming, for the future, such reforms as had been already introduced. But in the meantime, continued His Majesty, the insurrection was not put down; bloodshed and pillage continued; every day added to the difficulties of his position. He felt that he must do something, and he should be glad to take any step that might be deemed necessary in concert with Her Majesty's Government. France and England thought alike upon the principles involved in this question.

I asked whether the Emperor had any plan to propose. He replied in the negative, saying that he racked his brains (*„se creusait la tête“*) to no purpose. The difficulties of the question were too many and too great. His Majesty asked what was thought by Her Majesty's Government. I replied that Her Majesty's Government had already addressed themselves to the Russian Government in the same friendly tone as the Emperor had adopted, and had met with an answer similar to that given to His Majesty. Her Maje-

sty's Government felt, therefore, that if any further step was to be taken, it must be carefully and cautiously considered. Neither Her Majesty's Government nor the British nation, much as they felt for the wrongs inflicted upon Poland, and ready as the former had always been to represent these opinions to the Russian Government, considered that it was a cause which demanded an armed intervention. This being the case, care must be taken that no demands were made on the Russian Government, the refusal of which would inflict on Her Majesty's Government a sense of humiliation, or a necessity of further action. Could the other Powers of Europe be induced to join with England and France in a temperate and friendly remonstrance to the Russian Government, pointing out the consequences which may be expected from a persistence in the policy adopted by Russia towards Poland during the last thirty years, so grave and solemn a rebuke might be attended with happy results; but would it be possible to obtain such unanimity of action from the Powers of Europe?

The Emperor expressed his entire concurrence in these views. War, His Majesty said, was out of the question, unless undertaken by Austria; not that His Majesty thought that a blow need be struck were Russia once to be convinced that Austria, backed by France and England, was in earnest. Against such a coalition Russia could offer no resistance. His Majesty expressed himself also as feeling the extreme delicacy which must attach to any further demands to be addressed to Russia. If timidly made, they would not be listened to. If firmly urged, the refusal of them would be a humiliation.

On the whole it seemed to the Emperor that the question of further proceedings must be adjourned until the decision of the Austrian Government, as to taking a more active part in these matters, should be known. A day or two would determine this.

I said that I hoped that His Majesty did not count too much on the active support of Austria. As far as Her Majesty's Government were informed the Austrian Cabinet did not seem inclined to depart from the neutral attitude which they had in the first instance assumed.

The Emperor did not himself appear very hopeful of obtaining much assistance from Austria. Nevertheless, he said that the Duc de Grammont had reported that Count Rechberg had himself spoken of the possible reconstruction of the Kingdom of Poland, in which case Austria would be obliged to make a sacrifice of Galicia.

I asked the Emperor whether His Majesty believed in the final success of the Polish insurrection, and His Majesty replied in the negative.

The impression left upon my mind by this conversation is, that the Emperor is afraid that, should nothing be effected for Poland, his own reputation will suffer. He dwelt more than once on the consequences to himself of playing the same undignified part as the successive Governments of Louis Philippe, for ever expressing sympathy for the Polish cause and never doing anything to assist it. His Majesty knows, moreover that a successful repression of the insurrection by Russia, without any advantage obtained for Poland, would alienate from him for ever the sympathies of the Poles, and would increase the hatred of the revolutionary party, already sufficiently excited by the blow given to their hopes in Italy. This state of things may lead His Majesty, should he be disappointed in the expectations which he no doubt once entertained of bringing Austria to his

views, and of establishing a common action between France, Great Britain and Austria, either to some overt act which may compromise the peace of Europe or to a secret understanding with Russia. I believe, then, that it is our interest to give His Majesty such assistance as will neither endanger the honour of Her Majesty's Government nor compromise the interests of Great Britain, but may tend to show that we are ready to represent, calmly and deliberately, in company with France, and with such other nations as will join with us, our detestation of the system which has driven Poland to desperation, and our hopes that so solemn an appeal to the equity, humanity, and good sense of the Russian Government may not be made in vain.

Should no other result be obtained, it may be hoped that we shall by this means retain such an influence over the actions of the Emperor as will enable us in some measure to exercise a control over him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 241.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 21).*

(No. 318. Secret).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 20, 1863*

THE interchange of communications which I informed your Lordship, in my secret despatch No. 303 of the 17th instant, had passed between the Emperor and Prince Metternich prior to the departure of the latter for Vienna have had a greater result than I was aware of when I wrote that despatch, inasmuch as the Prince took with him the draft of a Treaty which the Emperor had expressed his readiness to sign. Your Lordship will find in the inclosed paper a summary of the document which had been secretly communicated to me.

It appears that Prince Metternich, after hearing the development of all the Emperor's views and aspirations, said that he must be the bearer to his Government of something tangible, and he himself drew up the draft of the Treaty of which the inclosed is a summary, and by which he hoped to test the Emperor's intentions. His Majesty on reading the draft said that he was ready to agree to it, but that the signature of it must be accompanied by a memorandum setting forth more clearly the objects and intentions of the two Governments, and it was on this occasion that His Majesty told the Prince that the cession of Venetia must form part of any general arrangement between them. Prince Metternich replied that he looked upon that condition as fatal to any understanding, and that ready as he had been to support, in the measure of his attributions, the Emperor's policy in regard to Poland, he would no longer take upon himself to do so if the Italian question was to be mixed up with it.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys knows nothing of the existence of this draft, and your Lordship will, I am sure, allow me to recommend it to your secrecy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

## Inclosure in No. 241.

*Draft of Secret Treaty between France and Austria.*

## Préambule.

CONSEQUENCES extrêmes des évènements de Pologne. Désir sincère de résoudre les difficultés à venir par la paix s'il est possible, au profit de l'équilibre de l'Europe si la paix était troublée.

## Articles.

1. Alliance offensive et défensive.
2. Action diplomatique combinée sur tous les points.
3. Pas d'action militaire sans consentement mutuel. Les pièces doivent être réglées de commun accord.
4. Pas de paix de l'un sans l'autre.
5. Aucun remaniement territorial sans le consentement de tous les deux.

## No. 242.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 21).*

(No. 315).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 20, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the „Moniteur“ of this day, the conclusion of the debate in the Senate on M. Larabit's Report in favour of Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

## Inclosure in No. 242.

Extract from the „Moniteur“ of March 20, 1863.

## †† No. 243.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley* <sup>1</sup>.

(No. 364).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 21, 1863.*

IT is important that your Lordship should be enabled to judge correctly the attitude taken by Austria, during the late discussions upon the affairs of Poland.

Three despatches have been read to me at different times by Count Apponyi. The first of these despatches was a despatch addressed by Count Reehberg to Count Apponyi. It was limited to an explanation of the position taken by Austria in respect to the insurrection which had broken out in the Polish Provinces of Russia bordering on Galicia.

<sup>1</sup> A similar despatch was addressed to Lord Napier.

The action of Austria, Count Rechberg stated, was confined to an exact fulfilment of international obligations, as defined by Treaties and by the law of nations. Austria, while scrupulously performing all that duty enjoined, had declined to extend by any new Convention her engagements towards Russia. She had not listened to overtures from Prussia in this sense.

The second despatch was addressed by Count Rechberg to Prince Metternich at Paris. A copy of this despatch was forwarded to London, and was read to me by Count Apponyi.

The French Government having asked the Austrian Government to join them in a representation at Berlin against the Russo-Prussian Convention on Polish affairs, and having communicated a project of note embodying their views, Count Rechberg on the 27th of February addressed a despatch to Prince Metternich, in which, while approving the language and sentiments of the French note, he declined to join in the proposed communication, on the ground of the exceptional position of Austria in respect of the general principles of her policy, and her special interests in the Polish question.

He stated that the Austrian Government considered the Convention inopportune, and regretted its conclusion, but that they felt bound to consider whether they could openly remonstrate against it at Berlin without departing from the principles which they had always hitherto proclaimed, and giving their sanction by implication to the adoption of the principle of non-intervention in international questions, against which they had invariably protested.

With regard to the special interests of Austria, Count Rechberg said that although the Austrian Government had no intention of taking active measures so long as the insurrection was confined to Russian Poland, they could not ignore the existence of revolutionary elements, which were only awaiting a favourable opportunity to extend their action to Galicia.

Notwithstanding the calmness and wisdom shown by the Polish subjects of the Emperor, which the Austrian Government were glad to acknowledge, they would not, even indirectly, encourage national aspirations incompatible with the maintenance of their rule.

France and England, not being restrained by any such considerations, might safely declare sympathies which the care of her own interests forbade Austria to express; and, looking impartially at her position, those two Powers must acknowledge that she could not act in concert with them, without compromising the advantages which she had derived from her reserved attitude.

Hopes must not be raised which were not intended to be realized, or expectations excited which would afterwards have to be repressed, and it would be the height of imprudence to arouse aspirations in Galicia by holding out to the Poles a prospect destitute of reality.

The demonstration which the French Government proposed to make at Berlin, however mitigated in form, might have results greater than were intended, and might provoke agitations which the Austrian Government might be compelled to repress by acts which they had hitherto been able to avoid.

The Austrian Government, moreover, could hardly now pronounce a condemnation

of the Convention, seeing that they had replied by a simple refusal to the overtures that were made to them from Berlin to accede to it.

In reply to confidential observations, which the French Ambassador was instructed to make to Count Rechberg, as to the advantages likely to accrue to Austria from the contrast between her conduct to the Poles and that of Prussia and Russia, his Excellency remarked that if the Polish subjects of the Emperor of Austria were to be expected to appreciate the real advantages which they enjoyed, they must not be encouraged in illusions whose empty attraction would make them indifferent to the benefits which they derived from their position. The Austrian Government would, on that account, be most unwilling prematurely to raise questions and eventualities which did not yet seem near at hand.

With reference to the allusion made by the French Government to the possibility of recalling the Russian Government to the performance of the stipulations of 1815 in regard to the Kingdom of Poland, Count Rechberg observed that a step in that direction might produce results still more serious than the present complications.

It was doubtful if the Court of St. Petersburg would be disposed to accept friendly representations, and a more serious invitation would be a measure of such gravity that it could not be resorted to without the maturest deliberation.

Count Rechberg thought it unnecessary to examine an eventuality which was only casually alluded to by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but he added that the principle of a return to the strict performance of Treaties was one the advantages of which had always been proclaimed by Austria, but which required a general application, and must not be limited only to the stipulations of 1815 respecting Poland.

Passing over this delicate subject, and looking upon the proposal of the French Government as one which did not relate to eventualities, Count Rechberg stated that after a conscientious examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed co-operation, he had submitted the result to the Emperor, who had decided that the attitude adopted by the Imperial Government should be persisted in, as the one most in accordance with the interests of the Empire.

Count Rechberg concluded with an expression of regret that the Austrian Government had not been able to take advantage of this opportunity to prove their desire to act in concert with France and England in great questions of European policy.

The third despatch was addressed to Count Apponyi, and was an answer to the despatch addressed by me to Lord Bloomfield inviting the co-operation of Austria at St. Petersburg, in making friendly representations to Russia on the ground of the Treaty of 1815 in respect to Poland.

After recapitulating my despatches to Lord Napier and Lord Bloomfield, Count Rechberg states that without discussing the views of the English Cabinet, or the opportunity of the measure in which they had invited the Austrian Government to participate, he expressed to Lord Bloomfield the regret of the Imperial Government at not being able to offer to Great Britain a co-operation such as that proposed.

The motives which guided this decision on the part of the Imperial Government



are, says Count Rechberg, „so obvious and imperative that they cannot fail to be appreciated by Her Britannic Majesty's Government“.

His Excellency then refers to the answer which he lately gave to the French proposal for joint action at Berlin in the affairs of Poland, in which he believes that he showed with sufficient clearness the reasons which impose upon Austria a special attitude of prudence and reserve in face of the events now passing in Poland.

It would be mere repetition to reiterate all the arguments which were brought forward to prove to the French Government the absolute impossibility of any deviation on the part of Austria from the line of conduct which she has hitherto followed with the general approbation of Europe. The Austrian Government believe that they have taken into account the dictates of humanity as well as their international obligations, and they flatter themselves that by their attitude they contribute to all that the interests of Europe and of the public peace can require. Austria, moreover, has special interests to protect, which are too seriously affected by everything that concerns Poland to allow her to follow England and France in all her manifestations in favour of Polish nationality.

Adverting again to the terms of his despatch to Prince Metternich, Count Rechberg states that the objections in it which are founded on this class of ideas („fondées sur cet ordre d'idées“) apply equally to the step which I have proposed to Austria to take, and he adds that I cannot wonder if the Austrian Government persevere in the attitude which they marked out for themselves from the first.

Count Rechberg concludes by saying that he thinks it right to add one more observation. No one is more interested than Austria in seeing an end put to a deplorable state of things, which is a constant menace to the security of her own territory. But past experience, the events of 1831, and the well-known aspirations of the leaders of the Polish movement, make it doubtful whether the measures which I recommend the Government of the Emperor Alexander to adopt are sufficient entirely to pacify Poland, to satisfy its inhabitants, and fulfil the wishes of those who are now in arms.

[<sup>1</sup>Judging from these despatches, the views of Austria are rather those of a Power waiting for events, cautious in leaving the shore while the weather is uncertain, and anxious to remain where she is while there is no sure prospect of advantage in a new course, than those of a State determined to cast its lot with that of Russia and Prussia in all events.

It is not easy to dispute the prudence of this course on the part of Austria. Nor would it be just to the Austrian Government to deny that the Emperor of Austria is not so free to take a course of his own on this subject as the Queen of Great Britain and the Emperor of the French, who have no reason to blush for the partition of Poland, and are not in the enjoyment of any of the spoils of that ill-fated country.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL].

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<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).



No. 244.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 22).*

(No. 323. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 21, 1863.*

I CALLED yesterday afternoon upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys, ostensibly for the purpose of informing his Excellency of the general tenour of the conversation which I had had with the Emperor on the preceding day, but virtually to ascertain, without making any specific proposal, how far his Excellency would be disposed to compile with me a collective representation to be addressed to the Russian Government, under the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of the 19th instant, repeated in your Lordship's despatch No. 352 of the same date.

In the course of the conversation, therefore, I said to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government had had under their consideration the question of addressing a collective note to the Russian Government by such of the European Powers as would consent to take such a step, in the hope of ameliorating the condition of Poland; but that, as I had stated to the Emperor, the composition of such a note would require the greatest care and caution, neither to say too much nor too little — neither to convey a menace which could not be executed, nor to betray a weakness which would encourage resistance. Her Majesty's Government had no intention of going to war, nor would they make any demand of the Russian Government the refusal of which would be derogatory to the national dignity.

I professed myself ready to discuss with his Excellency, within these limits, the terms on which a note could be based.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he concurred generally in the views of Her Majesty's Government, that was to say, he looked upon war as undesirable, and he felt that a collective demand refused by Russia must be considered an indignity which could not be submitted to. Under present circumstances, however, he thought it better to wait until the result of Prince Metternich's mission to Vienna should be known. On the conduct of Austria must depend, in a great measure, the decision to be taken by other Powers. According to the attitude assumed by Austria towards Russia could the language of Europe to the latter be more or less strong („audacieux“); something, also, must depend on the course of the insurrection — it might spread, or it might be suddenly crushed.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he would consider the termination of the insurrection as rendering any further representation to Russia unnecessary.

His Excellency replied that that would be a matter for serious consideration.

He went on to say that supposing the insurrection to continue, and the Austrian Government to refuse to depart from its present attitude, it must be at Vienna and not at St. Petersburg that the first pressure of France and England must be applied. Without Austria nothing really effective could be done; with her cordial assistance everything was possible.

If he was to judge from the language of M. de Budberg, his Excellency proceeded, the Russian Government would be more disposed to consent to the complete emancipation

of Poland from Russian sway, than to carry out those provisions of the Treaty of Vienna which regarded Poland. In fact, it must be admitted, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that to give a national army under present circumstances to Poland, would be an act of suicide on the part of Russia, nor could the latter concede liberal institutions of any kind to Poland without creating jealousies and difficulties at home.

In the temper in which I found M. Drouyn de Lhuys yesterday, it was evidently useless to attempt to discuss with him the terms of a communication to be made to Russia; and, indeed, it must be admitted that until the intentions of the Austrian Government are clearly made known to the French Government, it is natural that the latter, in presence of the reports made to them by the Duc de Grammont from Vienna, and of the undoubted bias shown by Prince Metternich in favour of an alliance with France, joined to the extravagant assurance of the French character, should be led to hope for the consummation of their extreme expectations. I agreed, therefore, with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that, under the circumstances, it would be better to wait for Prince Metternich's return, though I intimated that I could not indulge the hope that it would materially alter the present aspect of affairs.

But, in the course of this conversation, M. Drouyn de Lhuys made an exposition of his views on the Polish question which merits the attention of Her Majesty's Government. Assuming the complete independence of Poland to be the only solution which would be really satisfactory, he expatiated on the advantages which would accrue to Austria if she would take the lead in achieving it, and he urged particularly that an Austrian Archduke might be placed on the Throne of the new kingdom. On the other hand, he did not exclude the possibility of Russia seeing her true interests in the emancipation of Poland, if she could make it over to a Russian Grand Duke.

Now, if the views of M. Drouyn de Lhuys are a counterpart to those of the Emperor in this matter, which they probably are, it is not impossible that a sort of political auction may be the consequence, in which the French Government will first bid for the concurrence of Austria in these views, and failing in obtaining it, will turn their offers to Russia. I do not wish to create unnecessary apprehensions, but in the present state of the Emperor's mind with regard to Poland, I would not guarantee that His Majesty might not give some secret pledge to Austria with regard to Venetia if he could thereby insure the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland through the aid of Austria. I happen to know that His Majesty already regrets the declaration which I informed your Lordship he had made to Prince Metternich, that any arrangement between the two Governments must comprise the cession of Venetia. On the other hand, the Danubian provinces would be a tempting bait to Russia, and although they could not be taken possession of without a violation of the Treaty of 1856, yet the Emperor is in a mood to conceive that the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland would cover a multitude of sins, and if he threatens Austria on her Venetian frontier, he would in a great measure paralyse her action in the south-eastern extremity of her Empire.

Your Lordship may think I am pushing possibilities to an extreme which they are never likely to reach. It may be, and I trust will prove so. It may be that the insurrection being quelled the Polish question will be altogether speedily forgotten. Nevertheless

should the defeat of the Polish cause be attended with demonstrations of dissatisfaction here, knowing as I do the Emperor's extreme susceptibility of failing in any question on which he has put himself forward, and of so losing caste with the French people, I should not feel satisfied if I had not called your Lordship's attention to the various consequences which may result from his desire to preserve his prestige untarnished.

I shall of course watch events here. In the meantime supposing the Russian arms to have overcome the insurrection, as seems likely, I should be glad to know whether Her Majesty's Government still propose any further appeal to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 245.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 22, 4.35 p. m.).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 22, 1863.*

NO official written reports yet received as to Langiewicz. Reehberg says that at Tarnow he presented a passport under a false Polish name delivered by Swedish Consul at Paris, but was recognized and sent to Cracow. Imperial Government intent to leave him on parole at some place of his own selection in Austria.

Two thousand men are supposed to have already crossed, arriving without arms. Austrians are sent to their homes. Subjects of Russia are quartered about and maintained at the expense of the Government.

No. 246.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 140. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 19, 1863.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 134 of the 12th instant, reporting that instructions had been received by the French Ambassador to support a further communication which he supposed, from the copy of a despatch addressed by your Lordship to Mr. Grey and forwarded to him by his Government, that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make to the Russian Government on the Polish question, I have reason to believe that the Duc de Grammont must have been under some misapprehension as to the meaning of these instructions when he first spoke to me. He has now communicated with Count Reehberg, and has said to me that as the Austrian Government decline to join in the communication already made at St. Petersburg, or to act in the sense of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Napier No. 53 of the 2nd instant, nothing further remains for him to do in this matter at the present moment.

I may observe confidentially to your Lordship that I apprehend the Duc de Gram-

mont has been a false impression, resulting partly from communications with Poles here, and partly from intelligence received from Paris, that the Austrian Government would not become unwilling supporters of the movement in Poland; and that having written in this sense to his Government, he has encouraged them also to hope for greater sympathy with their views than has been the case at Vienna.

In consequence of this disappointment I may further observe that the French Ambassador proclaims that his Government had been led to expect greater support from England in the Polish question, but that the feelings of Her Majesty's Government for Prussia, and their desire to help the Government of that country out of their present difficulty, had prevented collective action at Berlin respecting the Russo-Prussian Convention, and altogether he tries to make out that the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in the question of the day is not what had been originally expected at Paris. I deem it right to state the foregoing to your Lordship, as it explains a disappointment of the French Ambassador, which he takes no pains to conceal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† No. 247.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 141).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 19, 1863.*

[WITH reference to the telegram recorded in my despatch No. 137 of 16th instant], I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Prince Metternich is still here, and that Count Rechberg will not be sorry if he stays some days longer, as he desires before his return to Paris that he should completely understand the feelings of the Imperial Government on the subject of Poland. His Excellency has assured me again to-day that the policy of Austria has undergone no modification, and he seems satisfied that it is that best adapted to the present interests of the Empire.

He said that it appeared also to be generally appreciated by foreign Governments, and that whatever happened he should always bear in mind the general interests of peace.

His Excellency added that he should send Count Apponyi a short despatch by the present messenger respecting Prince Metternich's visit to Vienna, informing him that the policy of the Austrian Government is unchanged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† No. 248.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 142).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 19, 1863.*

MUCH has been said of the want of discipline amongst the Russian troops in Poland, and to the almost total disregard of the authority of the officers are attributed most of the frightful massacres that are each day reported in the newspapers.

Details of some of these proceedings have appeared in the „Fremden Blatt“ of to-day, and I forward the article in original, with a translation by Mr. Barrington, and beg leave more particularly to draw your Lordship's attention to it, as allusion is made to the circumstances connected with the barbarous treatment of Mr. Finkenstone].

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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† Inclosure in No. 248.

*Extract from the „Fremden Blatt“ of March 19, 1863.*

(Translation). •

EVENTS in Poland. — Letters from Podolia state that the revolution there is a *fait accompli*. Several thousand men, armed with every species of weapon, have assembled at Bar, and fresh reinforcements are continually coming in. This fact, coupled with what has occurred in Volhynia, proves that, notwithstanding the great difficulty of communication with Central Poland („Kongress Polen“), and the interrupted communication between village and village, and district and district, the insurrection is ever gaining renewed strength. The Russian authorities have ordered the peasants to arm themselves with scythes and guard the high road. In answer to this the insurgents have, in many places, proclaimed the emancipation of the peasants, but long habit and the influence of the schismatic Greek priests render this class still but slightly favourable to the insurrection. The Russian garrisons in the towns of Podolia are very weak; there are, on the whole, not more than two regiments of Infantry, here and there a few detachments of Cossacks, and not much Artillery. The Government has had all the moneys transported from the provincial towns to Kamieniec. A proclamation is circulating among the rural population, drawn up in the dialect of Little Russia, which is a sort of instruction to the peasants, especially to the chief persons among them, wherein they are reminded of the Imperial favour, and are called upon to keep an eye upon the officials, the nobility, and the priests. They are to report all they see or hear to the gendarmes.

No news of importance from the seat of war is sent to the „Czas“ (a Polish newspaper), but many reports are current of acts of violence committed by the Russian military. On the 16th, according to the „Czas“, a small division of the Smolenski Regiment, with a troop of Cossacks and Dragoons, attacked the village of Giebultow, one German mile distant from Miechow, the property of Ladislaus Bielski. The soldiers took twelve persons from the manor-house („Edelhof“) and massacred them behind the village. Three, amongst them Severin Mieszkowski, were at once killed; nine were mortally wounded. A certain Wiescolowski received several deep bayonet wounds, and was brought in this state to Cracow.

After the massacre the soldiers plundered the bodies, and left the wounded to their fate, supposing them to be dead. In the meanwhile another lot plundered the manorhouse, the owner of which had taken timely to flight. It was not till late that the colonel ap-

peared and put a stop to the pillage. On the appearance of a Polish column the Russians withdrew, and the wounded were then brought to Cracow under the protection of the insurgents. About the same time another frightful scene occurred not far from Giebultow. Louis Finkenst[one], a British subject, provided with a passport of Lord Russell's, issued on the 27th of March, 1862, was travelling across the frontier at Baran, on the 14th instant, in order to make a purchase of corn at Miechow. At the village of Gorka, not far from Giebultow, he was stopped by soldiers and taken before their Commander. No arms being found upon him, the Major gave him an escort and sent him on to Szachnowskoj. He had to pass the night on his carriage, and a subaltern („Junker“) was ordered to protect him against the men. During the night several wounded Poles were brought in. On it being known that the Poles were approaching, the soldiers demanded that the prisoners should be killed. The officer resisted this pistol in hand, but it was in vain. With the cry of hurrah! the soldiers fell upon the unarmed persons and killed several. Finkenst[one], dragged from his carriage by the hair, received twenty-six bayonet-wounds, and was robbed of 5,800 silver roubles and of all he had. When the Poles came up, Langiewicz caused Finkenst[one], at his own request, to be brought to Cracow.

## No. 249.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 143).

My Lord.

*Vienna, March 19, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation, by Mr. Mounsey, of a well-written article from the „Botschafter“ of this morning, which appears to have been inspired by the Government, on the attitude of Austria in the Polish question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

## Inclosure in No. 249.

*Extract from the „Botschafter“ of March 19, 1863.*

(Translation).

POLAND possesses many Parliamentary friends. Wherever the representation of the people are now assembled words of sympathy for her are heard, and wishes for the removal of her wrongs are expressed. In humid England, in sunny Italy, and on the banks of the Seine, Government is everywhere called on to help Poland. Even in Berlin, where people are in the habit of demanding great sacrifices in the name of freedom when other States are thereby to suffer loss, whilst they are Prussian to the backbone whenever Poland is mentioned, even in Berlin many expressions favourable to Poland have issued from the ranks of the Fortschritts Partei, though they, perhaps, only appeared in the shape of an attack on the Russo-Prussian Convention. We may add that the Pope in

his late Allocation expressed sorrow for the state of affairs in Mexico and Poland, and unveiled in ecclesiastical phraseology for the Poles when he said, „We have felt ourselves constrained to give our attention to the Poles in consequence of the vacation of some of their dioceses“. Thus this sympathy is universal, and whether we consider the declaration made the other day to Lord Palmerston by a deputation from the people, „that the English nation was ready, if necessary, even to take arms against Russia for Poland“, or cast our eyes to the above-mentioned words of the Pope, the thought which animates the whole of Europe is the same, — help Poland.

What, then, is the policy of the different Cabinets in the face of these universally expressed wishes of the people? Their policy is guided by the interests of their respective States.

The people are ever childish, ever enthusiastic. Their enthusiasm is their brightest and most touching, but at the same time their most dangerous quality. The people, especially when unaccustomed to public life and self-government, are ever ready to carry even to self-sacrifice their sympathy for the suffering and oppressed, and this is the point where people and Governments diverge. The people not only have desires, they demand the immediate fulfilment of those desires; the Government, on the other hand, knowing by experience that first impulses are more to be mistrusted in politics than in anything else, has to ask itself with that calmness and coolness which are the happiest results of a long continued guidance of State affairs, what policy is the best for the State? And as the welfare of the State does not depend alone on the state of contentment in which its own subjects live, but also on such a knowledge of its own strength that the forces which it can oppose to its rivals and enemies can be exactly calculated, the Government must ask itself, in the second place, will the country come out of the struggle strengthened or weakened? This is the consideration which influences all alliances and Conventions; this is the cause of the mutual distrust of Cabinets, for the ally of to-day has often become the enemy of to-morrow; an alliance has often been only the cloak which concealed the hostile weapon, or the decoy which led to the ambuscade. This bye-play of Governments produced the principle of non-intervention, which, now that regard must be had for the wishes of the people even in questions which were formerly raised and solved by the Government alone, is nothing more than the expression of mutual fear. To the uncertainty arising from the want of any well-defined limit between the power of the people and that of the Government, and to diplomacy, must be ascribed the fact that the principle of non-intervention is no principle at all. It is rather the exact reverse of the principle, for it is only applied when any one Power finds its interest in interfering or not interfering, as the case may be, in the affairs of foreign nations.

France, which interfered in favour of Italy, is now up in arms against the Russo-Prussia Convention. Intervention in Italy suited France because she wished to obtain possession of Nice and Savoy, and to weaken Austria. Prussian intervention in Poland does not suit France, because she gains nothing by it, or rather she protests against this intervention because she hopes to obtain some advantage from a possible conflict with Prussia.



It is the same with those sacred Treaties which were concluded *en perpétuité*. The Vicomte de la Guéronnière adjures Russia in the French Senate, „to return to the execution of Treaties“, and this at the very moment when France is doing all in her power to arrive at an understanding with Austria, and when a Paris journal is paying Austria the following doubtful compliment, „The liberal attitude of Austria has induced an extraordinary intimacy between her policy and that of France“.

We in Austria are, however, bold enough to confess that we have already too much pride to feel pleasure at our being thus complimented by France on our liberal feelings. Austria remembers well that it made peace with France on certain conditions, and that these conditions must be fulfilled, so far, at any rate, as the development of Austria's power and freedom demand their fulfilment. Austria no longer listens to compliments. It thinks first of all of its own interests, and those interests alone, the welfare and dignity of the State alone, must guide the Government at this important moment. Because Austria is well governed, it has become so powerful that its alliance is sought after by other Powers, and from her present position she must endeavour to increase her power and influence. Austria was never in a better position to demand the fulfilment of Treaties in her favour than now, when France demands their fulfilment from Russia in favour of Poland. Austria's statesmen, then, who have expressed by their humane attitude their sympathy for Poland and the Poles, do not at this moment ask themselves, „What ought we to do?“ but „What shall we do?“ Their decision has long been taken; it now only remains for them to consider the most advantageous manner for Austria of executing it.

† No. 250.

*Sir A. Malet to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 33).

My Lord,

*Frankfort, March 21, 1863.*

A STRONG persuasion is expressed in the best-informed quarters here, that the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to concur in the collective steps proposed by the French Cabinet in the Polish question has been the means of averting a perilous crisis, threatening the peace of Europe.

In reference to the same question I hear the conduct of Prussia universally condemned, and the policy of Austria as generally approved throughout Southern Germany.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 251.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 165. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 21, 1863.*

AT an interview which I had with M. de Bismarck yesterday, I acquainted his Excellency with the language which your Lordship had held to Count Apponyi with



reference to the affairs of Poland, as recorded in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Bloomfield No. 63 of the 18th instant, of which a copy was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch to myself No. 63 of the 18th instant.

His Excellency did not pretend to palliate the vices of the system by which Poland was governed under the reign of the Emperor Nicholas. It was only, however, he said, the system of administration which prevailed throughout the Russian Empire, and whatever the peasantry might become with education, the nobles of Russia, and more particularly those of Poland, are unfitted for self-government under liberal institutions, for they have always been, and are still disposed to be, the oppressors of the lower orders.

He could not, besides, wish to see the views of Her Majesty's Government realised, as the independence of Poland was incompatible with the safety and interest of Prussia, but he had spoken to the Russian Minister of the expediency of the Emperor's offering immediately an amnesty to such insurgents as might be willing to lay down their arms, and the King would also, as I suggested last week, recommend such an act to the Emperor Alexander as a measure of generosity, and at the same time of expediency, which he would do well to adopt.

He said, also, that he believed it was the intention of the Emperor to adhere to his previous plans for improving the administration and promoting the prosperity of Poland by Provincial Diets and liberal Municipal institutions, and that His Imperial Majesty might perhaps succeed in carrying them out by maintaining an army of 100,000 men in the Grand Duchy, but that whatever he did would meet with ingratitude, and the Poles who were employed by the Government would always be ready to betray it.

The Marquis de Wielopolski, who had been sent to Warsaw to inaugurate an era of conciliation, was now, he said, detested by both Russians and Poles, and looked upon by both parties as a traitor.

With reference to this subject, I may mention that a Prussian staff-officer lately arrived from the Polish frontier spoke of the proceedings of the Russian military authorities as incomprehensible; and he represents them as never having acted against the insurgents with a sufficient body of troops to ensure successes of a useful or permanent character.

A telegram, however, just arrived from Warsaw, reporting the defeat of Langiewiez seems to show that more energetic measures have been recently adopted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 252.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 166. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 21, 1863.*

PRINCE HOHENZOLLERN in speaking to me some days ago with regret of the foreign policy of the Prussian Government, said that one of its principal objects has been

the overthrow of Prince Gortchakoff, whose wish to promote an alliance between France and Russia is, they believe, the only obstacle in the way of re-establishing the relations which existed between the three Northern Courts previously to the Crimean war.

This opinion is also entirely confirmed by the manner in which M. de Bismarck has lately spoken to me of the Russian Vice-Chancellor, and of the struggle of the old Russian and German parties at St. Petersburg with respect to the policy to be pursued towards Poland, and with regard to the relations to be maintained by Russia with Germany and France.

The intrigues of these two parties may perhaps, therefore, in some degree account for the different statements which have been in circulation as to the origin of the Russo-Prussian Convention.

If it be true, as M. de Bismarck has stated, that Prince Gortchakoff was at first unwilling to take any measures at all in concert with Prussia, and that he afterwards proposed the signature of the Convention, but endeavoured to excite public opinion against it as soon as it was signed, may the Vice-Chancellor not have calculated on the King of Prussia refusing to authorize the signature of so compromising a document? — a contingency indeed, which according to M. de Bismarck's statements, had nearly occurred, and was only prevented by a desire on the part of the Prussian Government not to discourage the Emperor, or, in other words, not to give Prince Gortchakoff the opportunity, if so inclined, of representing the old system of concert with Prussia as worn out, and Prussian support as worthless.

The question may have now lost its interest, but it is only in this way that it seems to me possible to reconcile the inconsistencies in M. de Bismarck's statements, and to account for an error which the Prussian Government appear to have committed with their eyes open, but by which they may have expected to prevent the Emperor Alexander from looking to an understanding or alliance with France, or yielding to the remonstrances of the Emperor Napoleon with respect to Poland, while M. de Bismarck may have entertained a wild hope that if things went badly for Russia in that country, the Convention might pave the way to an arrangement for its eventual annexation to the Prussian Crown.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 253.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 326).

My Lord,

Paris, March 22, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Moniteur" of this day, a letter from the Emperor to M. Billault approving his late speech on Poland.

I have, &c.

For Earl Cowley

(Signed) J. W. ELLIS.

† Inclosure in No. 253.

*Extract from the „Moniteur“ of March 22, 1863.*

*Paris, le 21 Mars, 1863.*

L'EMPEREUR vient d'adresser à son Excellence M. Billault, Ministre sans portefeuille, la lettre suivante: —

„Mon cher M. Billault,

„Je viens de lire votre discours, et comme toujours j'ai été heureux de trouver en vous un interprète si fidèle et si éloquent de ma politique. Vous avez su concilier l'expression de nos sympathies pour une cause chère à la France avec les égards dûs à des Souverains et à des Gouvernements étrangers. Vos paroles ont été sur tous les points conformes à ma pensée et je repousse toute autre interprétation de mes sentiments. Croyez à ma sincère amitié.

(Signé) „NAPOLÉON“.

No. 254.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 23, 1863 6.30 p. m.*

METTERNICH is returned, and, as far as I know, brings nothing with him but civil messages, and assurances of confidence in France.

No. 255.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 38).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, March 17, 1863.*

M. BORELY DE LA TOUCHE, the French Chargé d'Affaires, informed me yesterday that he had received a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys stating that your Lordship was about to instruct me to make a proposition to this Government for a joint representation to Russia in favour of Poland, of which the French Government approved without being a party to it; and that he had mentioned the subject to Count Manderström, who denied having heard anything regarding it.

I could naturally do no more than plead equal ignorance.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

†† No. 256.

*Sir H. Howard to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23).*

(No. 65. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Hanover, March 20, 1863.*

IT would be impertinent on my part were I to pretend to transmit to your Lordship from hence any information of a novel character relative to the intentions of the Russian Government in respect to Poland. I will therefore only mention that, according to despatches which Count Platen has received from St. Petersburg, the Emperor of Russia is willing to restore the political institutions which Poland enjoyed under the Emperor Alexander I, with the exception, however, of a national army; but that he objects to doing so until the Polish insurrection is suppressed.

Count Platen does not believe that the restoration of the Polish Constitution, as it existed before the events of 1830, would satisfy the Poles, because they look, for the most part, to the reconstruction of the ancient Kingdom of Poland, with the provinces detached from it by the several partitions; but he considers that it would tranquillize public feeling in Europe, and that a great object would be attained, if the Polish question were thus to be divested of its European character; for he sees great dangers to the peace of Europe in the continuance of the present struggle in Poland, and of the excitement on the subject of it which is its consequence in other European countries.

His Excellency is, however, of opinion that the formation of a separate Polish army, as was granted by the Emperor Alexander I, would be incompatible with the existence of the Russian dominion in Poland.

[<sup>1</sup>His Excellency suspects that the endeavours of the French Government are directed towards detaching Austria on this question from England, and inducing her to enter into an alliance with themselves detrimental to the interests of Germany; but he feels persuaded that the Austrian Cabinet is too long-sighted and too German in its feelings to allow itself to be drawn into such an alliance.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) HENRY F. HOWARD].

No. 257.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 23 (?).*

(No. 340. Secret).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 24, 1863.*

I HAD the honour to transmit to your Lordship by telegraph on Sunday, the text of the letter of the Emperor to M. Billault, published in the „Moniteur“ of that day. The publication was occasioned by the following circumstance.

The Emperor, after reading on the evening of Thursday last the proof sheets of the „Moniteur“ containing M. Billault's speech, wrote him a simple letter of thanks and approbation, without any intention of giving publicity to it. Subsequently, however, notice

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).

was received by the Imperial Government from the Duc de Montebello to the effect that the Russian Government were so exasperated at the speech of Prince Napoleon, that explanations were about to be asked of the Imperial Government through Baron Budberg. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in order to avoid the necessity of replying to such a demand, suggested that the initiative of disapproving the Prince's speech should be taken in Paris, and that this might be effected by a public approval of M. Billault's speech. The Emperor consented, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys himself drew up the draft of the letter which was inserted in the „Moniteur“; but it is to be remarked that, in the original draft, the second sentence ran thus: „Vous avez su concilier l'expression de nos sympathies pour une cause chère à la France avec les égards dûs à un Souverain et à un Gouvernement ami“.

The Emperor effaced the word „ami“ and replaced it by the word „étranger“. The plural was afterwards employed to make the phrase less exclusively applicable to Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 258.

*Sir J. Hudson to Earl Russell. — (Received March 24).*

(Telegraphic).

*Turin, March 24, 1863, 3 p. m.*

THIS Government accept proposition in your Lordship's No. 3 of 4th instant. May I give a copy of that despatch and of its inclosure to Foreign Minister here?

No. 259.

*Earl Russell to Sir J. Hudson.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, March 25, 1863.*

YOU may give copies, but they must not be published.

No. 260.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 25).*

(No. 341. Secret).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 24, 1863,*

SINCE the departure of Prince Metternich, the Emperor, it would seem, has not ceased to deplore the declaration which he had made to the Prince respecting Venetia (see my secret despatch No. 303 of the 17th instant), fearing that it might be the cause of preventing Austria from adhering to the policy of France in the question of Poland.

On Thursday last, therefore, a despatch was addressed to the Duke de Grammont, with the intention of calming the apprehensions of the Austrian Government in respect to Venetia. The Austrian Government were informed that it was the Polish question alone which had any real interests for the Emperor, and that should Austria, for the benefit of the cause, consent to make any sacrifice, the Emperor would be found ready to assist her in obtaining an equitable indemnity.

It was hoped that this despatch would reach Vienna before the return of Prince Metternich, and would contribute to his bringing a favourable answer to the French proposals. I believe, however, that he had left the Austrian capital before it could be communicated to Count Rechberg.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 261.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 25).*

(No. 343. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 24, 1863.*

PRINCE METTERNICH returned to Paris yesterday. I have not seen the Prince myself, but M. Drouyn de Lhuys has had an interview with him, and informs me that the Austrian Government do not seem disposed to abandon at present the expectant attitude which they have assumed since the commencement of the Polish question. They will not make common cause with Russia, neither will they give any encouragement to the insurrection.

The Prince is charged with messages of the most friendly nature to the Emperor, in whose loyalty the Emperor of Austria professes to have complete confidence, and he is empowered to state that should events progress, the object of the Austrian Government will be to strengthen their relations with France and England.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys' tone with regard to Poland appeared to me somewhat sobered, though he still seemed to think that the Austrian Government had not spoken their last word. I asked his Excellency whether he was of opinion that they would join in a collective representation to the Russian Government? He replied that the trial might be made, and that if the Austrian Government should refuse, France and England would have to consider what course they should take, and whether it would not be advisable to make a representation with such other Powers as would join in it.

His Excellency added that he had just seen the Russian Ambassador, who had intimated that without being authorized to say so, he thought that his Government would make concessions in the sense of the Treaty of Vienna as soon as circumstances would admit of it, and had hinted that a Polish army might even be organized if it were to be employed out of Poland.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not give any other answer than to observe that whatever

the Russian Government intended to do should be done quickly, but to me his Excellency expressed the opinion that but little was to be hoped for from that quarter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 262.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 25).*

(No. 172. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 23, 1863.*

I HAD the honour of being received yesterday by the King at a private audience, to congratulate His Majesty on his birthday, and I availed myself of the opportunity to inquire as to the nature of the last reports which he had received from Poland, and to urge upon His Majesty's attention the views of the Queen's Government with respect to the measures which Russia ought to take for the future administration of that country.

The King said that though Langiewicz's corps had been dispersed, there were still considerable bands of insurgents in the field, some thousands of whom he had just learnt had passed along the Prussian frontier from Lithuania into Poland. The entire suppression of the insurrection would now, however, he believed, be merely a question of time.

I replied that I was glad, under these circumstances, to have heard from M. de Bismarck that His Majesty was disposed to recommend the Emperor of Russia to offer immediately an amnesty to all insurgents willing to surrender.

The King said he had already written in this sense and would do so again, but that he could only recommend an amnesty for the masses, as the leaders deserved punishment. He felt, however, that no measure of that kind would have any favourable influence on the Polish nation, for he had himself seen the enthusiasm produced at Warsaw in 1858 by the amnesty then proclaimed, and, two years afterwards, had found on a second visit to that capital, that those who had benefited by the Emperor's clemency had employed the interval in exciting discontent among the people.

I replied that Her Majesty's Government were nevertheless of opinion that there were only two ways by which Russia could attempt to govern Poland — either that of the Emperor Nicholas or that of the Emperor Alexander I; and that I was sure His Majesty felt that it was now impossible to revert to the first; and as he observed that the second had formerly led to rebellion, I answered that it had never been fairly tried, and that if all systems of Russian government in Poland were destined to end in that manner, it would be some consolation to the Emperor, in such an eventuality, that the public opinion of Europe could not reproach him with having acted cruelly or unjustly towards his Polish subjects; and I asked why, if the Polish provinces of Austria and Prussia could be governed with justice and humanity, it should be considered impossible to apply the same system to the kingdom.

To this His Majesty replied that Posen and Galicia had been as ripe for rebellion as the kingdom, and he could not therefore admit that the insurrection there should be

attributed to the conscription, or that there had not been an organized conspiracy throughout the whole Polish nation. He said that emissaries had appeared in Western Prussia simultaneously with the outbreak in the kingdom, to excite the Polish part of the population to insurrection, while there had not been the slightest movement in Posen; an incident that satisfied him at the time that the people of the Grand Duchy were already prepared to rise whenever called upon, and the event had justified this opinion, as reports now reached him daily of large bodies of men, supposed to be acting under orders from Paris, crossing the frontier to join the insurgents in the Kingdom.

The King then said that he had no confidence in representative institutions, which were now working badly in Prussia, and had failed everywhere except in England, where it was true that the people were warmly attached to their Sovereign, but he contended that if they were more so now than they were thirty years ago, it was more to be attributed to the high personal qualities of the Queen than to the increased privileges they enjoyed.

His Majesty concluded the conversation by stating that he was glad to find the Polish question was assuming a less serious aspect in France, and he repeated his acknowledgments for the service which Her Majesty's Government had rendered to Prussia by declining the overtures made to them from Paris. He entertained also the hope, already expressed to me by M. de Bismarck, that the events of the last three weeks would lead to a better understanding between Austria and Prussia; adding that as the peace of Europe would depend, in his opinion, upon the concert of the two Great German Powers with England, he was determined to do everything in his power to promote so desirable an object.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 263.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 25).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 25, 1863, 4.30 p. m.*

I HAVE had a long and interesting conversation with Metternich, the details of which I will send you by messenger to-night, in order to have an answer on Friday morning.

No. 264.

*Earl Russell to Sir H. Howard.*

(No. 11).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 25, 1863.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 65, Confidential, of the 20th instant, reporting to me the opinions entertained by Count Platen on the subject of the policy to be pursued by Russia towards Poland.



Her Majesty's Government agree with his Excellency that the restoration of the Polish Constitution as it existed before the year 1830 would tranquillize public feeling in Europe, and also that the formation of a separate Polish army, as it existed in the time of Alexander I, would not be compatible with the existence of the Russian dominion in Poland.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL

No. 265.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. -- (Received March 26).*

(No 39).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, March 20, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of a speech made by Count Manderström in the Chamber of Nobles on the 16th instant, upon an abortive motion in favour of Poland proposed by Baron Staël von Holstein, to the effect that Sweden should co-operate with the other Powers parties to the Treaty of Vienna, to bring about by diplomatic means the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland.

This speech may, perhaps, be considered a masterpiece of diplomatic fencing with a difficult question.

Your Lordship will observe that his Excellency adopts the distinction lately made by Viscount Palmerston in the House of Commons, between the right and the obligation regarding Poland conferred by the Treaty of Vienna.

A similar motion has been made in the Burgher Chamber, and withdrawn upon the understanding that its object would be otherwise realized.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure in No. 265.

*Extract from the „Nya Dagligt Allehanda“ of March 17, 1863.*

(Translation)

Count Manderström's reply to Baron von Holstein's motion „to present an Address to the King for the purpose of moving His Majesty's Government to co-operate with the other European Powers who guaranteed the Treaty of Vienna to bring about by Diplomatic means the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland“.

NO one can be more willing than I am to recognize the right of any Member to express his thoughts, and represent his wishes, and to have such thoughts and wishes weighed by the Diet; and it is with this persuasion, grounded as I believe it to be on the spirit of the Constitution, that I am led to offer, as far as I am personally concerned,

no opposition to the proposal of submitting Baron von Staël's motion to the Committee to which it should be referred. I further purpose, since the House of Nobles has agreed to put this motion into Committee, to accompany it with a few observations, partly of a general nature, and partly more nearly connected with the particular question which has been brought forward here.

The more extended the privilege which the Constitution has secured to each Representative to bring (in one word be it said) every imaginable subject to the attention of the Chambers, the more unlimited the field thus laid bare to his action, — the more it behoves him to reflect maturely on the affairs he subjects, in this manner, to general discussion; to weigh the influence which they may exercise on the important concerns of the country; to make himself well-acquainted with the measure he proposes; and to satisfy himself that the data he furnishes are based on perfectly reliable and probable information.

If the justness of this principle in its general applicability cannot be challenged, it may assuredly be appealed to with greater force as regards those questions which affect this Kingdom's relations with foreign Powers, — questions which everyone must acknowledge are always of an excessively delicate nature. I do not mean to say by this that the Chambers should refrain from every expression of opinion on foreign politics; on the contrary, no one can rejoice more at the interest which is taken in such questions than he who has the responsible duty entrusted to him by His Majesty's Government of interpreting the views of the country upon them.

It is perfectly clear that the person charged with the duty above-mentioned may derive advantage and support from the opinions and judgments recorded by the Chambers, and even from those expressed by individual Representatives, in shaping the particular course he pursues: but it must also be equally evident that those opinions and judgments cannot be his sole and only leading star. It is far easier, Gentlemen, to express general principles and wishes, even if they are strictly correct and adapted to the circumstances, than, while constantly holding in view the interests of the country, to take a step, founded on such general principles and wishes, which offers an advantageous and satisfactory mode of application.

Without undervaluing the worth of those statements and that intelligence which every Representative has a right to furnish, it may happen, notwithstanding, that the Government is in possession of information somewhat at variance therewith, which information, even if it be at times of such a character as not to admit of being publicly appealed to, owing to the question to which it relates being in process of negotiation, may yet have that weight that it must necessarily guide the policy which should and must be followed.

Although, therefore, as I have just had the honour to observe, the existence of a warm interest among the Representative body in all that concerns this Kingdom's relations with foreign Powers cannot be otherwise than gratifying to the Government, I am yet of opinion that that interest should not go so far as to put to hazard the initiative which the Constitution unmistakably reserves to the King in such questions. I consider it my duty, a duty I cannot abandon, to uphold that initiative, and I do so the more readily as I am

perfectly Persuaded that, not only His Majesty's interests but the interests of the State, which are inseparable from them, will thereby be best and most securely advanced.

Our history, Gentlemen, affords us a few examples, little worthy of being followed, of direct interference by the Diet in the management of questions relative to foreign policy. I believe there is no one who desires to see such proceedings repeated, and His Majesty's Government would deeply lament the re-introduction of a practice which has shown itself to be of such small advantage to the country.

It is one thing to pass sentence or to give an opinion on the variable events of the day. It is another thing to represent a desire that measures should be taken which may either be premature, or, owing to the slow progress which marks the course of business—(slow, because of our peculiar forms) — may be adopted too late, in consequence of other transactions which have subsequently occurred, and which measures, moreover, might as easily result in tying the hands of the Government as in giving it that support which it was doubtless the object to afford it.

After submitting these general considerations (to the Chamber), I pass on to the special question which has prompted Baron Staël von Holstein's motion; and if I must adopt a certain attitude of reserve in my allusions to it, I am persuaded that no one who has given any attention to the weight and significance attached to that question, will find in that attitude any just ground either for censure or surprise.

In consequence of the serious occurrences which have taken place in the Kingdom of Poland, the origin of which occurrences I sincerely deplore, Baron von Holstein submits that His Majesty's Government should express their opinion on this question as being not only fully justified to take such a course, but also bound by Treaty to do so.

He announces that several European States are about to co-operate for this purpose, and he proposes that the Chambers should move His Majesty to direct his Government to act in combination with other Powers who guaranteed the Treaty of Vienna, in order to endeavour to bring about by diplomatic means, the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland.

I presume that no one expects that I should here express my views as to the contents of the Article of the Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, as to the rights it concedes to the Contracting Powers (and) as to the duties it imposes on them.

A member who spoke before me read out in *extenso* the contents of the Article I have just alluded to; which Article, there is reason to believe, was proposed by the worthy Prince Adam Czartoriski, who died not long ago, and who at the time was in the close confidence of the Emperor Alexander.

That Article may, therefore, with perfect reason be considered to have been drawn up in the true interests of Poland. The interpretation of the Article in question has on other occasions besides the present been the object of conflicting opinions, and it cannot be decided here what construction may be the right one to put upon it, or in what manner an engagement may be held to result from its tenour. As far as I am personally concerned, I should wish to reserve the view I entertain on it in order not to be bound by any expression of opinion delivered beforehand, in case circumstances should arise

which would enable me to deliver my opinion in the only tribunal which can be looked upon as authorized to form a binding decision on the matter.

Without, therefore, expressing my opinion, I beg to call attention to the fact that the Prime Minister of England, when this subject was lately brought before Parliament, did not hesitate to state that England considered she was bound by no guarantee whatever as regards Poland, and that Minister declared that in his estimation England had indeed the right, but was under no obligation, to interfere in the question.

As regards the intelligence given by Baron Staël, to the effect that a co-operation between several European Powers was already affected, I have read, as he has himself, different versions of the report both in the foreign newspapers and in our own, but I have no more precise information respecting the co-operation in question.

I do not know whether the worthy motioner is in possession of intelligence which gives the force of fact to the report. From the information which has reached me I do not glean anything which might lead to the presumption that any understanding whatever, at any rate at present, has been come to in this respect.

The hesitation which the leading Powers of Europe have thus shown, sufficiently proves how delicate this question is, and with what prudence it is felt it should everywhere be treated; that hesitation should, moreover, explain the attitude of waiting on events which His Majesty's Government have considered they ought to assume with reference thereto.

No one can doubt that His Majesty's Government, in conjunction with other enlightened and liberal Governments, sympathize most warmly with the sufferings and adversities of an unfortunate people. No one can doubt that they desire to see a speedy termination put to a revolutionary contest; but no one, either, can be surprised if they should weigh maturely the means most likely to conduce to the attainment of the latter object, and if they should shrink from carelessly deciding on those means, — for a careless course would partly counteract instead of furthering the object in view, and partly entail consequences which would compel them to have recourse to the assistance of the Diet to a far greater degree than the latter, an all probability, either expected or intended.

The request which the Member who made this motion submits should be addressed to His Majesty by the Diet, is of such a character that His Majesty cannot accede to it of his own individual accord. In order to comply with it, the consent of the other European Powers is necessary. I submit, therefore, whether it would be right, — whether it would be prudent, — to demand that a step should be taken by His Majesty's Government respecting the carrying out of which the Diet could obtain no certainty; and whether in a point of such an extreme delicacy it should require His Majesty's Government to make overtures which might lead to their being repelled by the Power with which it is most closely allied and on the most friendly terms?

To bring forward a project which one has no prospect of being able to realize is so delicate a matter that I, for my part at least, would not wish to take the responsibility on myself of advising such a step.

I am fully persuaded that the motives which have dictated this motion — a motion which has been brought forward both in this Chamber and in the Burgher Chamber —

proceed from a noble feeling of pity for a people for whom compassion must be felt, and in no way aims at placing His Majesty's Government in an unpleasant and difficult position. But I venture to submit whether, if the motion were agreed to, this would not lead to an issue opposed to the views of the motioner and to those of the Diet?

If, as is possible, Her Majesty's Government found that the contemplated co-operation of the Diet with other European Powers could not be brought about, and that thus they had no sufficient grounds for making a proposition in such a sense — (the consequences flowing from such a step offering no advantage, but possibly even being productive of harm) — what else could result but that the Government would be unable to fulfil a desire expressed by the Diet, and not even be in a position to furnish their reasons for not doing so, as such a course might lead to the communication of transactions over which they have no control, since they do not exclusively concern them?

Would such a result be advantageous? Would such a result be desirable?

On the grounds which I have thus had the honour to bring forward, and though I will not in any way oppose the motion being further dealt with in the usual form, I request that the Committee, into whose hands what I have said to-day will be placed—since the motion is ordered to be put into Committee—will be pleased to give my observations some attention; and in consideration of the importance of the matter, weigh it with care, and deliberate how far the proposed Address to His Majesty may be considered an advantageous and suitable step. As far as I am concerned, I do not think that such a proceeding would offer any advantages, and I should presume that the Diet is not wanting in motives for leaving this matter with perfect confidence to the King for His Majesty's own examination.

† No. 266.

*Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell. (Received March 26).*

[Sir J. Crampton's No. 77 of the 18th of March will be found at (No. 287)].

(No. 78).

My Lord,

*Madrid, March 22, 1863.*

[WITH reference to my telegram of the 18th instant], I have the honour to inclose the copy of a note which has been addressed to me by the Marquis of Miraflores upon the subject of Poland, containing the copy of a despatch addressed by his Excellency to the Spanish representative at St. Petersburg, stating the views of the Spanish Government respecting the present state of affairs in that country for communication to Prince Gortchakoff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

<sup>†</sup>Inclosure 1 in No. 266.

*The Marquis of Miraflores to Sir J. Crampton.*

Muy Señor mío,

*Palacio, 21 de Marzo, 1863.*

DESPUES de tomar las ordenes de Su Magestad me complazco en poder dar á V.S. una contestacion acerca del contenido del despacho que su Excelencia el Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Reyno Unido de la Gran Bretaña e Irlanda ha dirigido á V.S. con fecha 4 del corriente, y del cual se ha servido darme comunicacion confidencial, así como de la copia del despacho que el mismo Señor Secretario de Estado dirigió al Embajador de Su Magestad Británica en San Petersburgo con fecha 2 del mismo mes.

El importante objeto contenido en ambos documentos se reduce en primer lugar al deseo manifestado por el Gobierno de Su Magestad Británica de que él de la Reyna mi Señora diriga al Gabinete de San Petersburgo algunas observaciones acerca de la cuestion de Polonia, análogas á las que el Gabinete de Londres le habia espuesto en su comunicacion al Embajador Inglés en San Petersburgo.

Sobre este punto me es en extremo grato poder manifestar á V.S. que las simpatias del Gobierno de Su Magestad no faltarán nunca al pueblo Polaco, no es posible tampoco que España deje de tomar parte en el interés que la triste suerte de aquel pays inspira á las Potencias Occidentales, interés que respecto á España aumenta en gran manera la mancomunidad de principios religiosos.

En cuanto á dirigirse al Gobierno Ruso sobre tan grave y complicada cuestion, invocando los compromisos que contrajó por los Tratados de 1815, y esponiendo los derechos al mismo tiempo que los deberes que resultan para él de aquellos Pactos internacionales, el Gobierno de Su Magestad encuentra en semejante paso inconvenientes superiores á las ventajas que podrian resultar de invocar titulos en gran manera debilitados por acontecimientos pasados ya á la categoria de los hechos consumados.

Por esta razon el Gobierno de la Reyna juzga que en el estado actual de la cuestion de Polonia, semejante lengua podría esponernos á una respuesta por parte de Rusia que en vez de contribuir á la deseada conciliacion haría mas difícil una solucion pacífica.

Si todas las Potencias signatarias de los Tratados de 1815 tratasen de celebrar Conferencias por medio de sus Representantes, ó establecen comunicaciones diplomaticas con objeto de dirigirse colectivamente al Gabinete de San Petersburgo, España tomaria desde luego parte en ellas, y no se apartaria probablemente de la accion comun; pero toda indicacion aislada será en nuestro sentir necesariamente infructuosa ó espuesta á conflictos poco á propósito para hacer eficaces los sinceros deseos de todos, encaminados á impedir cualquier motivo de desacuerdo y diferencia que pudiese contribuir, poco ó mucho, más ó ménos tarde, á alterar la paz y la armonía que afortunadamente existen hoy en Europa.

Adjunta hallará V.S. copia del despacho que acerca de esto asunto dirigió con fecha de hoy al Encargado de Negocios de Su Magestad en San Petersburgo, y cuyo contenido, inspirado por las ideas que acabo de esponer á V.S., espero llenará los deseos del Gobierno de Su Magestad Británica.

(Firmado) EL MARQUES DE MIRAFLORES.

(Translation).

Sir,

*Palace, March 21, 1863.*

AFTER taking the orders of Her Majesty, it is with pleasure that I am enable to give you a reply in regard to the contents of the despatch which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, dated the 4th instant, which, as well as the copy of the despatch which the said Secretary of State addressed to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated the 2nd instant, you were so good as to communicate to me confidentially.

The important object contemplated by both documents is re[duc]ed, in the first place, to the wish expressed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government that the Government of the Queen my Sovereign should address to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg some observations in regard to the question of Poland similar to those which the Cabinet of London had submitted to it in their communication to the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

Upon this point it is extremely gratifying to me to be enabled to state to you that the sympathies of Her Majesty's Government will never be wanting to the Polish nation, nor is it possible either that Spain should fail to take a share in the interest which the sad fate of that country inspires in the Western Powers, an interest which, in respect to Spain, is greatly increased by the community of religious principles.

In regard to addressing the Russian Government upon so serious and complicated a question, by an appeal to the engagements which that Government contracted by the Treaties of 1815, and a statement of the rights as well as the duties which arise for it out of those international compacts, Her Majesty's Government see in such a step difficulties greater than the advantages which could spring from invoking instruments that have become much weakened by events which have already become matters of history.

For this reason the Government of the Queen are of opinion that, in the present state of the question of Poland, such language might expose us to a reply on the part of Russia, which, instead of contributing to the wished for conciliation, would make a pacific solution more difficult.

If all the Powers who signed the Treaties of 1815 were to take steps for holding Conferences by means of their Representatives, or were to set on foot diplomatic communications with a view to addressing the Cabinet of St. Petersburg collectively, Spain would at once take part in them, and would probably not withdraw from the joint action; but any isolated representation would in our opinion be necessarily fruitless, or would involve the risk of conflicting views but little calculated to give efficacy to the sincere wishes of all, tending as they do to obviate any grounds of disagreement or difference which might contribute, much or little, sooner or later, to disturb the peace and harmony at present fortunately existing in Europe.

You will find inclosed a copy of the despatch in reference to this subject, which I address under this day's date to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg, and the contents of which, dictated as they are by the ideas which I have now submitted to you will, I trust, fulfil the desires of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

I avail, &amp;c.

(Signed) THE MARQUIS OF MIRAFLORES.



† Inclosure 2 in No. 266.

*The Marquis of Miraflores to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg.*

*Madrid, 21 de Marzo de 1863.*

APENAS han llegado á conocimiento de Su Magestad, oficial ó confidencialmente, las observaciones muy amistosas que de parte de algunas Potencias aliadas suyas han sido dirigidas al Gabinete de San Petersburgo, relativas á interesarse amistosamente en favor de la Polonia, — pays de antigua historia y de propia nacionalidad, pero que hoy pertenece su soberania por titulos respetables y legitimos á Russia, la que contrajo por ellos serias obligaciones y adquirió derechos consignados en los Tratados, — tomó en seria consideracion las indicaciones que se le hicieron por parte del Gobierno de Su Magestad Británica.

Mas de presente han se levantado en Polonia una resistencia mas ó menos popular, pero seriamente grave, y en tales circunstancias Su Magestad cree, y lo cree tambien su Gobierno, podria ser util hacer oir al Gabinete de San Petersburgo la voz amiga de España, no para dar consejos, que la sabiduria del Emperador no necesita, sino para dirigirlle amistosas observaciones hijas de su experiencia en materia de revueltas politicas.

El Gobierno de Su Magestad la Reyna deplora amargamente que la impaciencia de Polonia la haga no esperar á que la sabiduria del Emperador y su prudente provision y conocimiento del siglo y de la epoca actual llegase á seguir, como parecia dispuesto á ello, en favor de los Polacos el sistema de reformas comenzadas en Rusia, reformas tan profundas y esenciales que llegan hasta la alteracion de las condiciones sociales del Imperio en la gran cuestion de la emancipacion de los siervos, reconociendo en este la fuerza suprema de las ideas del siglo decimonono.

Tambien deplora Su Magestad con no menos interés que hayan llegado las cosas al duro trance y al doloroso espectaculo de ver cruzarse las armas entre Rusos y Polacos en vez de estrechar entre si vinculos de union amistosa; pero al mismo tiempo la experiencia que Su Magestad ha adquirido en épocas de triste recordacion, de que las contiendas civiles se apagan mas utilmente con moderacion, lenidad, y templanza, que con rigor y severidad empleados contra los que en último resultado tienen la condicion de subditos, y que un poco antes ó despues vienen á reconocer su extravio, impelen al Gobierno de la Reyna á emplear su amistosa palabra pidiendo á Su Magestad Imperial indulgencia, y á los que fuesen vencedores humanidad y templanza.

Tales son los deseos humanitarios de Su Magestad, y me manda prevenir á V.S. pé lectura de este despacho al Principe Gortchakoff, y le entregue copia si el Principe la descase.

De Real orden lo digo á V.S. con el objeto espresado.

Dios, &c.

(Firmado) EL MARQUES DE MIRAFLORES.

(Translation).

*Madrid, March 21, 1863.*

NO sooner was Her Majesty made aware, officially or confidentially, with the very friendly observations which have been addressed on the part of some of the Powers her



allies to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, relative to their interesting themselves in a friendly manner on behalf of Poland, — a country with an ancient history and a nationality of its own, but the sovereignty of which now belongs by honourable and legitimate titles to Russia, who, under them, has contracted serious obligations, and has acquired rights recorded in Treaties, — than Her Majesty took into serious consideration the suggestions which have been made to her by Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

[But] at the present moment a resistance of a more or less popular character, but of serious importance, has arisen in Poland; and under these circumstances Her Majesty believes, and her Government also believe, that it might be advantageous to cause the friendly voice of Spain to reach the ears of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, not for the purpose of offering advice, which the wisdom of the Emperor does not require, but in order to make the friendly observations which their own experience in the matter of political disturbances suggests.

The Government of Her Majesty the Queen deeply lament that the impatience of Poland should have caused her not to wait till the wisdom of the Emperor, and his prudent foresight and knowledge of the present age and period, should lead him to pursue, as he appeared disposed to do, in favour of the Poles, the system of reforms commenced in Russia — reforms so profound and essential that they reach even to the alteration of the social conditions of the Empire, in the great question of the emancipation of the serfs, and recognize herein the supreme force of the ideas of the nineteenth century.

Her Majesty also deplores no less sincerely that things have reached so sharp a crisis as that the painful spectacle is presented of Russians and Poles engaged in armed encounters, instead of drawing closer the bonds of friendly union; but at the same time the experience which Her Majesty has acquired during periods painful to remember, to the effect that civil contests are more efficaciously extinguished by moderation, lenity, and temperance, than by rigour and severity displayed against those who, after all, enjoy the character of subjects, and who, a little sooner or a little later, end by acknowledging their error, impels the Government of the Queen to employ their friendly influence in requesting of His Imperial Majesty indulgence, and of those who may be victors, humanity and moderation.

Such are the humane desires of Her Majesty; and she commands me to desire you to read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, and to give him a copy of it should he so desire.

I state this to you by Royal order for the purpose above named.

God preserve, &c.

(Signed) THE MARQUIS OF MIRAFLORES.

† No. 267.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 26).*

(No. 151).

My Lord,

*Vienna, March 23, 1863.*

UP to the present time no official account has been published by the Austrian Government respecting the arrival of General Langiewicz on Austrian territory, but a letter

has appeared in the „Ost Deutsche Post“ of this morning, containing some details, which, if true, are not without interest.

I inclose, for your Lordship's information, the letter in question, accompanied with a précis by Mr. Barrington.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† Inclosure in No. 267.

*Extract from the „Ost Deutsche Post“ of March 23, 1863.*

(Translation).

*Tarnow, March 21, 1863.*

THE Russian troops having advanced in force, Langiewicz had retreated along the line of the Vistula, where it forms the Austrian frontier. The Russians, about 9,000 strong, made an attack in three columns on the insurgents, who numbered about 10,000 men.

Fighting continued during the 17th, 18th, and 19th, along the bank of the Vistula between Niepolomice and Tarnow, but the corps commanded by Langiewicz was early defeated. The latter, seeing the uselessness of further bloodshed, escaped into Austrian territory, and on the evening of the 19th arrived at Uschie-Jesnickie. He there represented himself as being called Waligorski, and asked the Imperial Commander Bassler whether he would be allowed to continue his journey unmolested. On being told that this request could not be granted without express permission from the higher authorities, he finally declared himself, and placed himself under the protection of the Austrian Government.

On the morning of the 20th Langiewicz was brought to Tarnow in a carriage escorted by four hussars, and in accordance with telegraphic orders received from Lemberg he was to have left for that place at 1 p. m. By mid-day he was at the station, and the whole of Tarnow had turned out to see him.

Langiewicz had his female Adjutant, who is the daughter of a Russian General, with him, and he took two first-class tickets for Lemberg, paying for them in napoleons. Just before the departure of the train, however, a telegram arrived from Lemberg to stop Langiewicz.

He is now staying at the Hotel de Cracovie, and has a guard consisting of an officer and fourteen men, which is destined less for the security of his person than for keeping off the immense crowds of townspeople.

The Colonel of the Imperial Regiment of Dragoons visited Langiewicz, who requested him to have other visitors kept at a distance. Langiewicz considers the whole cause as lost.

Tarnow is full of fugitive insurgents, most of whom possess cards of legitimation<sup>1</sup>. According to current report here, the superior officers, as well as the leaders, appear to be provided with passports.

<sup>1</sup> A paper testifying the identity of the bearer.

Yesterday and to-day, about eighty wounded insurgents, many of them quite boys, were brought in, and placed in the military and civil hospitals. There is no appearance of any uniform, each one being dressed according to fancy. Those insurgents who have come over the frontier unprovided with papers are to be sent to Iglau by the mid-day train to-day. There are seventy or eighty of them in all. Not one brought any arms with him, unless two cuirasses can be reckoned in this category.

Langiewicz and his Adjutant are dressed in the Polish national costume. According to Langiewicz not a third part of his force had arms.

It is said here that Colonel Rochebrunne was engaged in the battle; that he also took refuge on Austrian soil, and that he arrived yesterday in Cracow. He, too, is supposed to think that it is all up with Polish affairs.

Report says that 2,000 more insurgents will cross over the Vistula. Some wounded Russians are expected here to-morrow. More than 40 insurgents went by the early train this morning to Cracow, a few taking first-class and all the rest second-class tickets, which they mostly paid for in roubles. It is not yet known for certain where Langiewicz will be taken.

Last night at 11, the Adjutant of Lieutenant-General Bamberg arrived from Cracow.

† No. 268.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 26).*

(No. 347).  
My Lord,

*Paris, March 25, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the „Moniteur“ of this day, a denial of the report that Russian troops had crossed the Prussian frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

† Inclosure in No. 268.

*Extract from „Moniteur“ of March 25, 1863.*

CERTAINS journaux persistent à affirmer le passage d'une colonne de troupes Russes sur le territoire Prussien, bien que cette nouvelle ait été déclarée inexacte par les dépêches qui sont parvenues depuis.

MM. les Ambassadeurs de Prusse et de Russie ont d'ailleurs communiqué au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des informations précises qui constatent que cette nouvelle est dénuée de fondement.

No. 269.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 26).*

(No. 353. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 25, 1863.*

PRINCE METTERNICH was good enough to call upon me this afternoon, and the conversation which we had together appears to me to be of sufficient importance to communicate it without delay to your Lordship.

Without going into unnecessary details I will state the result, which is, that although the Emperor of Austria is most anxious to preserve his present expectant attitude, and will not quit it until forced by events or by pressure from without, His Majesty hardly hopes to be enabled to maintain it.

Prince Metternich saw the Emperor yesterday, and explained the position of his Government. He is convinced that here the Polish question will not be allowed to drop, that is, that the Emperor, even should the insurrection be completely quelled, will think it necessary to take some step at St. Petersburg. Prince Metternich asked His Majesty for some tangible proposal, but could obtain no satisfactory answer.

The Prince inquired what Her Majesty's Government intended to do.

I thought it best to reply without reserve, and I said that Her Majesty's Government hoped that the Great Powers of Europe would agree in making such a representation to the Russian Government as would produce some amelioration in the administration of the Polish Provinces of Russia. Her Majesty's Government had made, and would, I did not doubt, continue to make every allowance for the difficult position in which the Austrian Government was placed, but they were not quite convinced that the last word of Austria had as yet been spoken.

Prince Metternich replied, that Her Majesty's Government were right in so far as this, — that if events progressed in Russian Poland, or if the Western Powers put such a pressure upon His Imperial Master as would oblige him to come to some decision, then and in that sense the last word had not been spoken. The Emperor of Austria was, under such circumstances, determined not to remain behindhand, and as he would have to choose between an alliance with the Western Powers, or a renewal of the Northern League, he would choose that which would be most conducive to his own interests and submit to the sacrifices which an understanding with England and France must entail.

The state of the question was simply this. The Russian Government could make no concessions of any value to the Polish provinces which would not lay the foundation of the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland. That re-establishment could not be effected without the loss of Galicia to Austria. It would be a bitter pang to the Emperor Francis Joseph to lose one of his finest provinces, for which he had a lively affection, and from which he drew some of his best troops. In other respects the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland inspired neither apprehension nor repugnance to Austria, and if the sacrifice of Galicia became a necessity the sacrifice would be made. Austria would not repeat in Poland the fault which had been committed in Italy.

I asked Prince Metternich whether, with the general satisfaction which appeared to

prevail in Galicia, it was so certain that that province would desire a separation from the Austrian Empire. The Prince seemed to entertain no doubts on this point, and I then hinted on the French project for placing an Austrian Archduke at the head of the new kingdom, should it be formed.

He replied that his Government would enter into no scheme of this kind, and he said that he had seen in the Duc de Grammont's hands, a few minutes before his own departure from Vienna, a despatch which the Duke had just received, and which intimated that such might be the solution of the Polish question. (This must be the despatch alluded to in my secret despatch No. 341 of yesterday's date). The Prince had not heard the impression produced by it on Count Rechberg, but he was sure it must have done more harm than good.

The Prince went on to say that, unfortunately, at this moment the internal state of the Government of Austria was far from satisfactory, and he doubted the possibility of any unanimity of opinion among the Ministers. M. de Schmerling was bent on becoming the President of the Government in the place of Count Rechberg. Whatever course the latter might propose to take, the former would oppose. This had been clearly proved lately. So long as Count Rechberg was supposed to be hostile to a French alliance, M. de Schmerling's press lauded that alliance to the skies. No sooner had Prince Metternich arrived at Vienna and the object of his journey came to be suspected, then the same press became as violent in an opposite sense. Nay, M. de Schmerling had, during a Council of Ministers held while Prince Metternich was at Vienna, declared it to be his duty to propose that the Emperor should issue a Proclamation expressing his firm resolve never, under any circumstances, to give up the Province of Galicia. This state of things rendered the Emperor's position still more difficult. His Majesty was obliged to tolerate M. de Schmerling because he knew not how to replace him, nor could he quite forget the services which that Minister had rendered his Crown.

After this explanation on the part of Prince Metternich, our conversation assumed a more practical turn. I did not conceal from the Prince my apprehension that if the Austrian Government should continue to turn a deaf ear to all the advances made by France, there was danger of France looking elsewhere for an alliance. Prince Metternich replied that he was well aware of this, and that hints of the kind had already been given him, and that, therefore, while declaring firmly enough the desire of his Government to maintain their present position, he had felt it prudent not to shut out all hopes of a closer alliance with France for the future. „But what I desire to do“, said Prince Metternich, „is to place some proposition or other before my Government“. I asked him whether his Government would resist all idea of a collective note worded in such a manner as rather to express an opinion than to make a demand. Her Majesty's Government, I said, were fully alive to the inconvenience, not to say the impossibility, of making demands which were not likely to be listened to, and which, therefore, must either be abandoned without dignity or enforced. Prince Metternich did not seem to think that his Government, if pressed, would altogether decline a collective step; but he said that he should prefer to see Austria take the initiative, by explaining, in a note to the Russian Government, the reasons for the attitude which she had assumed, and then, calling the attention.

of the Russian Government to the tranquillity which reigned in Galicia, argue that a certain amount of nationality, such as a national language and a national Diet, were not incompatible with the preservation of order and affection to the Government. England and France might afterwards support a note of this nature in the manner most agreeable to themselves.

I observed that, valuable as would be such a demonstration on the part of Austria, it could never be as effective as the presentation of a collective note to the Russian Government. Besides, if Austria would agree to join England and France in a collective step, it would be almost impossible for Prussia to refuse to join; whereas were Austria to act alone, excuses would be found for isolated or no action at all on the part of others. Prince Metternich seemed to feel the force of this argument, and I think that he would support at Vienna a proposal for a collective note, if drawn up in the sense he indicated. I would not press the matter further without referring to your Lordship for instructions, which I should be glad to have as soon as possible.

I asked Prince Metternich whether, in the opinion of his Government, the insurrection was likely to be prolonged. He answered that all the accounts received at Vienna, whether by the Minister of Police or by other authorities, led to the supposition that the insurgents were not at all disheartened. Of course, every day added to the strength of the Russian force, but it was impossible, he said, to exaggerate the miserable condition of the Russian troops.

I beg your Lordship's indulgence to excuse the hurried way in which this despatch is written, or I should not otherwise have sent it to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

P. S. — I beg your Lordship to consider this despatch as strictly confidential. C.

No. 270.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 26).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, March 26, 1863, 2.30 p. m.*

THE King of Sweden has offered the Emperor to assist with 100,000 men in the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland.

No. 271.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Baron Gros. — (Communicated to Earl Russell by Baron Gros, March 27).*

M. le Baron,

*Paris, le 24 Mars, 1863.*

J'AI eu hier avec Lord Cowley un nouvel entretien au sujet des événements de Pologne. Lorsque M. L'Ambassadeur m'avait parlé du désir du Cabinet de Londres de s'en-

tendre avec nous sur ce qu'il pouvait convenir de faire pour remplir utilement les devoirs qui incombent aux Puissances, je m'étais attaché à faire ressortir l'intérêt que nous avons, si nous voulons rendre notre action véritablement efficace, à obtenir le concours de l'Autriche, et je vous ai exposé, en substance, dans ma dépêche du 22 de ce mois, les considérations que j'avais fait valoir. Lord Cowley a reconnu de nouveau avec moi l'importance qu'il y a lieu d'attacher à la participation du Cabinet de Vienne; mais le Gouvernement Anglais incline à penser qu'il serait peut-être difficile d'amener dès à présent la Cour d'Autriche à faire une manifestation aussi explicite que celle que je lui avais indiquée, et le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de la Reine jugerait préférable de proposer d'abord à Vienne de simples représentations collectives qui seraient adressées par les trois puissances au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. Nous tenons, M. le Baron, à faciliter autant que possible l'accord que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique se montre disposé à établir, et je n'ai point repoussé l'idée qui m'était suggérée.

Il serait aisé, au surplus, de trouver les éléments d'une communication de cette nature. Les observations qui se présentent d'elles-mêmes, si l'on envisage la question Polonaise du point de vue Européen, en feraient le sujet. Nous pourrions constater que l'insurrection actuelle vient, une fois de plus, démontrer la gravité de la situation créée au Royaume de Pologne. Les convulsions devenues périodiques sont le symptôme d'un mal invétéré, et tiennent évidemment à des causes permanentes. Les conséquences en sont d'ailleurs fâcheuses pour l'Europe comme pour les contrées elles-mêmes qui ont à souffrir plus directement de ces conflits. Lorsqu'ils éclatent ils ont inévitablement pour effet d'agiter partout l'opinion, d'inquiéter les Cabinets, de troubler leurs rapports et de faire naître de regrettables complications. En signalant cet état de choses au Gouvernement Russe, les trois Cours appelleraient son attention sur l'opportunité d'aviser aux moyens d'y mettre un terme, et de replacer la Pologne dans les conditions d'une paix durable.

Telles sont, M. le Baron, les idées principales sur lesquelles devrait porter, à mon sens, la démarche que la France, l'Autriche, et la Grande Bretagne seraient appelées à accomplir de concert. Je les ai indiquées à Lord Cowley. Vous remarquerez que je me suis abstenu de rappeler les Traités de 1815, et que je ne propose pas d'insister, dans la note que nous ferions parvenir à la Cour de Russie, sur un retour à l'exécution des Actes du Congrès de Vienne. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, par sa dépêche du 2 Mars, a abordé ce sujet à St. Pétersbourg. L'accueil fait à sa communication ne saurait nous laisser de doutes sur les objections qui nous seraient opposées. Le Cabinet Russe ne manquerait pas de s'en référer à l'argumentation que M. le Prince Gortchakoff a développée dans sa Réponse à Lord Napier. D'autre part nous connaissons également les dispositions du Cabinet de Vienne sur ce point; nous savons qu'il a décliné les ouvertures faites par le Gouvernement Anglais aux Puissances signataires des Traités de 1815, et sa position à l'égard de Cracovie lui rend difficile en effet de s'associer à une démarche qui serait expressément motivée par ces stipulations.

Vous êtes autorisé à donner confidentiellement lecture de cette dépêche à Lord Russell.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 272.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 27).*

(Telegraphic).

Paris, March 27, 1863, 4.30 p. m.

IF you have not already advised at Vienna the signature of a collective note, Drouyn entreats you to do so.

†† No. 273.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 402).

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 27, 1863.

HER Majesty's Government are quite ready, in answer to overtures made to me yesterday by Baron Gros on the part of his Government, to make a representation to the Court of Russia on the part of Great Britain, Austria, and France, on the subject of Poland.

[<sup>1</sup> You will frame a draft with this view, and consult M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Prince Metternich before submitting it to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed)

RUSSELL].

No. 274.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 153. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, March 18, 1863.

AFTER I had presented the thanks of Her Majesty the Queen to the Emperor on the 14th instant, His Imperial Majesty graciously bidding me to be seated, entered upon a long and interesting conversation on the ruling political topics of the day.

The Emperor first touched upon the affairs of Greece. He said that the position of that country was most unfortunate, and that social anarchy was making rapid strides. The army was disorganized, little security existed for life and property. The condition of the Hellenic people, and the succession to the Throne, required the attention of the Powers.

I replied to the Emperor that for some time past I had received no intelligence or instructions from Her Majesty's Government on this subject, nor had I held any intercourse with Prince Gortchakoff with regard to it. I was confident that Her Majesty's Government shared the solicitude which His Majesty expressed for the welfare of the Greeks, and would do all in their power to abridge the period of uncertainty and trial which had lasted so long. As His Majesty had spoken to me on the subject, I could ask the Vice-Chancellor on an early occasion what were his views for the settlement of the Greek

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).



succession, and impart them to your Lordship. Since the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had declined the overtures made to him on this subject, I had not heard any candidate suggested for the vacant Throne.

The Emperor did not say anything distinctly in favour of the Bavarian Dynasty or on behalf of any other party. His Majesty seemed chiefly concerned on account of the protracted duration of a transitional period fraught with hazard, and to look to Her Majesty's Government for the contrivance of a remedy. His Imperial Majesty has, however, on more than one occasion, declared to the Bavarian Minister that he would gladly see the restoration of the banished line.

Passing from the Greek question to the contemplation of the state of the East in general, the Emperor observed, that he trusted Her Majesty's Government was well convinced by his assurances and my reports that he had no ambitious views in that quarter, but that he desired the preservation of peace in the East, and the maintenance of the Ottoman Government. Such he was convinced was the true interest of Russia. He did not confidently anticipate any great benefit to the Christian population of Turkey from the duration of their present Government; it was not in the interest of the Christians that he desired it, but in the general interest of Europe. There were evils attached to the existence of the Turkish power, but those evils must be accepted and suffered, to avoid the greater evils which would attend its disruption. He would, however, hope for the best, and do justice to any efforts which the Porte should make for the welfare of the Christian population.

I remarked to the Emperor, in reply, that I have not failed to convey his assurances in the same sense to Her Majesty's Government on previous occasions, and that I was happy to be able to do so now. We might for the present congratulate ourselves on the reconstitution of the Turkish Ministry, and the maintenance of men in power who were identified with a tolerant and liberal policy. The Turkish Government had great difficulties to contend against, if it was to be the instrument of good for the Christian population, as Her Majesty's Government hoped and believed, it could only succeed in connection with the preservation of tranquillity. The Porte must have time and peace.

The Emperor here emphatically observed that he desired it should be understood that Russia did not encourage any tendency to revolution or disorder in the dominions of the Sultan. I had heard of Russian Agents: whoever they might be, and whatever their pretensions might be now or hereafter, those Agents were not Agents of the Russian Government. He disclaimed them all. His Government had no Agents in Turkey but the avowed and official functionaries engaged in the performance of Diplomatic or Consular duties. Prince Gortchakoff had already made this declaration to me; I now had it repeated from his own lips.

His Imperial Majesty then alluded to the affairs of Poland, and expressed himself substantially as follows: — His Majesty said that he had been most painfully affected by the course which events had taken in that country, so different to that which ought to have ensued on the healing and conciliatory policy which he had desired, and still desired, to carry into effect. He trusted that Her Majesty's Government were fully aware of the origin and nature of the revolutionary movement, and of the objects to which

it was directed. The Polish insurrection was a democratic and socialist movement, prompted from without by the indefatigable contrivers of disorder in every country, the centre of whose machinations was fixed in London. The object which they had in view was not at all the realization of the scheme of government contemplated for the kingdom of Poland by the Treaty of Vienna; it was far more extensive and chimerical, — it was the restoration of Poland in the limits of the early part of the last century. He must say that the views of the Polish Revolutionists in that respect had been predicted from the first. He had recently seen a remarkable paper prepared by the officer who had been in command of the Russian force in Poland between the years 1812 and 1817, from the retreat of the French to the establishment of the institutions designed by the Emperor Alexander. In that document the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the Poles, and the nature of their aspirations, were set forth in striking colours. All that the General had foreseen and predicted had been fulfilled. His Majesty then continued to speak in a tone of discouragement of the future in Poland, expressing his apprehension that the Poles would never be contented, and that all his concessions and efforts would be made in vain. His Majesty added that the suppression of the present insurrection, and a return to the pacific and liberal government which he had at heart, was rendered more difficult by the support shown to the revolutionary cause by the press in England and France, and by the discussions in Parliament and in the Chambers. The hope of foreign assistance protracted the resistance of the insurgents, drew within the revolutionary circle men of higher condition and character, and discouraged the moderate but pusillanimous persons who had hitherto lent a feeble assistance to his Government. The Emperor seemed to appeal to me as a witness of his merciful and conciliatory designs, and his words implied that my opinion on this subject might have some weight with Her Majesty's Government, and might place his policy in a just and benevolent light.

In replying to these reflections I observed to the Emperor that, although the projects of the ultra-Revolutionary party might be extravagant and delusive, and the character of the Poles might often appear flighty and unpractical, we must not conclude that liberal institutions could not flourish in Poland, nor must we overlook the fact that the Poles had been the victims of circumstances as much as of their own faults. It was generally allowed that the condition of Poland from the year 1817 to the year 1830 was marked by great improvement, that the administration was in many respects excellent, and that that short period formed, comparatively speaking, a happy, peaceful, and prosperous era in the calamitous history of the kingdom. The Revolution of 1830, by which Poland lost the benefit of representative institutions, was not the spontaneous deliberate work of the Poles, it was the result of the French Revolution, — the fruit of an irresistible revolutionary contagion which reached them from abroad. Without that unfortunate impulse and catastrophe, the institutions established by the Emperor Alexander might have been durable and beneficial; they might be so still. As far as my personal opinion was concerned, it had been freely expressed to your Lordship. I had nothing to retract, and little to add. I had recognized in the institutions given to Poland in the year 1861 a considerable approximation to the form of government contemplated by the Treaty of Vienna, and I had submitted to your Lordship that such was my humble opinion. A Polish Mi-

nister, a Polish Council of State, Elective Councils of Municipality, District, and Province, a revived University, a general system of primary public instruction, seemed to me to constitute „national institutions“, and they certainly contained some elements of national representation susceptible of subsequent development. The Poles would have done wisely if they had accepted those institutions, used them well, and waited for the larger measure of political franchises which they would probably have acquired hereafter in connection with Russia itself. Such had been my view of the question respectfully submitted to Her Majesty's Government, and, I had every reason to believe, shared by your Lordship. This happy augury had been frustrated; this favourable impression had been destroyed by the ill-advised order for military recruitment, which had thrown everything into confusion. In other respects I trusted I had been able to do justice to the policy of the Imperial Government in Poland, but the confidence which His Majesty showed me imposed upon me the duty of speaking frankly to him in return. I must avow that I had strongly condemned the measure for recruitment in addressing your Lordship, for it seemed to me like an attempt to attack political adversaries under colour of providing for the public service.

The Emperor here contended that the military levy was a mere pretext, not the real cause of the insurrection. The explosion had only been hastened by that measure. An attempt of this kind had been long foreseen, and by no one more clearly than by Marquis Wielopolski. You saw the Marquis frequently, His Majesty said; he must have told you, as he often told me, that we had to traverse a violent crisis such as this. Yes, the Emperor repeated, the Marquis predicted that this crisis must inevitably come, and said it was better that during such a period Poland should be governed by a Pole than by a Russian, with a view to the future connection of the two countries.

I said to the Emperor that the Marquis had not made that statement to me, but it was characteristic of the foresight and firmness of the Polish Statesman, for whose character, notwithstanding his recent error, I retained a high admiration. I had indeed seen him frequently, too frequently some of my friends used to tell me; but I had been drawn towards him by a natural curiosity and instinctive sympathy. I believed him to be a sincere patriot after his own fashion, and a faithful servant of the King of Poland. He did not pretend to be a good Russian.

I don't ask him, said the Emperor, smiling, to be a good Russian; I ask him to be a good Pole, and a faithful subject of the King of Poland. The Emperor then spoke with gratitude and esteem of the Marquis, but at the same time reflected upon the asperities and imperiousness of his character which impaired the usefulness of his great abilities and rendered it difficult for others to co-operate with him. Resuming the question of the recruitment, the Emperor declared that the object of that measure, which was in itself perhaps abnormal and irregular, but which had been approved of by Marquis Wielopolski, was to remove a class of persons who formed an invincible obstacle to regular government in any shape.

The allusions of the Emperor to the expression of public opinion in England and France gave occasion to me to offer the following reflections to the Emperor: — I said to His Majesty that in England nothing less could be expected than the manifestation of

sympathy for the Polish cause which we witnessed. It was the natural sympathy of a free people for those who are striving for freedom. The same sympathy was shown, and perhaps with greater strength, to other nations engaged in the same cause. It might be sometimes an unreflecting, indiscriminating sentiment, but it was generous and sincere. The Irish — and they were not without influence in Parliament — had the additional sympathy of religion, a religion which they believed to be oppressed in Poland. In France the sympathies for Poland were warmer and more universal; it was the only ground on which the sentiments of all parties met. On this subject Legitimists and Republicans felt alike; the Faubourg S. Germain gave its hand to the Faubourg St. Antoine. The two Governments honestly reflected and expressed the tendencies and feelings of their respective nations, and such demonstrations of sympathy must be expected to continue. As His Majesty, however, seemed to attach some importance to the expression of public feeling in England, I might venture to suggest to him how that feeling might be influenced. A great deal of good might be done, in my humble opinion, by the offer of an amnesty to the Polish insurgents. Such a step would place the policy of the Imperial Government in favourable colours before the English public, and would be agreeable to the wishes and counsels of Her Majesty's Government. I could not, of course, estimate the effect which it might have in Poland.

The Emperor said that he would not be justified in conciliating public opinion abroad by using means incompatible with his duty to his own subjects. The proclamation of an amnesty would not tend to the pacification of Poland. I might well say that I could not estimate its effects there. Its effects would be mischievous. If we consulted the experience of past times we should generally find that amnesties had given immunity and encouragement to the agents of disturbance, and had been accepted and used with ingratitude by those whom they were destined to benefit. After resistance had ceased, His Majesty added, he would indeed show the largest measure of clemency consistent with his duty, and it was his intention to persevere in the course of government which he had commenced, and of which his brother was the able and zealous instrument.

I submitted to the Emperor in reply that it was not my business to advise His Majesty in respect to his conduct towards his own subjects; I had alluded to an amnesty as a measure calculated to improve public feeling abroad, and as one which Her Majesty's Government desired to see adopted. In regard to its effect in Poland I might, however, venture to say that much depended on the character of the parties now in arms. If an amnesty were publicly offered to all those who should come in before a fixed date, I presumed that such an overture would not have much effect upon the professional conspirators and revolutionists who had embarked in this adventure, nor among the most ardent class of Polish patriots; but many of those who had taken to the woods and fields might really be soon driven to it by the dread of being seized in their beds, and carried off to serve in the Caucasus or the interior of Russia — men who had preferred to kill and to be killed rather than submit to that fate: to such a class an offer of pardon might be welcome — they might avail themselves in large numbers of an opportunity to return to their homes in peace. Should such prove to be the case, not only would public fee-

ling abroad be propitiated by an act of clemency, but the numbers of the insurgents might be thinned and the force of the movement might be seriously diminished.

The Emperor did not give me any direct reply. It cannot be doubted that His Majesty is of a generous and forgiving nature, and I thought I could discern a struggle between the impulses of his heart and the sentiments of pride of power and military honour, which were wounded by the notion of treating with rebels still in arms against the Imperial authority and forces.

The Emperor having again referred to the vast designs contemplated by the leaders of the Polish movement, to the practical policy of Her Majesty's Government, which could not approve such dangerous and chimerical aspirations, and to my own opinions, which His Majesty seemed to believe were discriminating and moderate in this question, I spoke to His Majesty in the following sense: —

I said that if I correctly understood your Lordship's views, you looked to the regulation of Polish affairs contemplated by the Treaty of Vienna, to the establishment of national institutions, and of a representation conformably to the engagements to which Great Britain was a party, and which in our opinion had lost nothing of their validity. With the restoration of an independent Poland in its ancient limits, or other schemes of that nature, Her Majesty's Government had, as far as I was aware, no concern. If a knowledge of my private impressions on this question was of any value to His Majesty, I had no objection to state them. I heartily desired the establishment in the kingdom of Poland of those national and representative institutions which were prescribed by the Treaty of Vienna, but, speaking for myself and speculatively, I did not either as an Englishman or as a Protestant see what we had to gain by the constitution of a great Catholic and military monarchy, with strong French sympathies, at the back of Protestant Germany. I desired the freedom and welfare of the Poles, but I sympathized with Russia too. Great Britain and Russia might be estranged and divided by the jealousy of Russian aggrandizement in the East, but apart from that question I thought if we looked to the religion of Russia and the material interests which united the two countries, England might in a general point of view have more points of sympathy with Russia than with Poland.

Reverting to the attitude of France in this question, the Emperor remarked that it seemed strange in the French Government when it appealed to the Treaties of Vienna on behalf of Poland, for on all other occasions France renounced those Treaties.

I replied that although there might be some apparent inconsistency in the position of the Imperial Government of France when it cited the stipulations of 1815, we could not blame the French Emperor for the interest which he expressed in the destinies of Poland, for in doing so he did no more than represent the sentiments of the French nation, which he might naturally share.

The conversation, of which I have submitted to your Lordship a general but I hope a faithful sketch, was of a rather desolatory character, and lasted nearly an hour. The Emperor spoke with animation and frankness. It is impossible not to sympathize with His Majesty when brought into contact with him, for you see an honest and humane nature striving for good against adverse circumstances and manifold misrepresentations with im-

perfect knowledge and opinions, as it seems to us, somewhat cramped by the selfishness inseparable from despotic power, by military pride, and by the arbitrary traditions of the last reign. I cannot deny or conceal the esteem and respect which the personal character of the Emperor invariably elicits, or the interest inspired by a view of his great power for good or evil, and of his great mission in the transformation of his own people. I do not feel, and I cannot affect, that passion for the Polish nationality which many estimable persons warmly cherish, that I am sure that nothing I said to the Emperor could lead him to infer that I was insensible to the wrongs of Poland, or careless of the liberties of which she has been deprived in defiance of engagements to which Great Britain is a party and of which Her Majesty's Government not elaim the fulfilment.

I related the substance of my conversation with the Emperor to Prince Gortchakoff this forenoon.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 275.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 156. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 18, 1863.*

ALTHOUGH Prussia has been prevented from rendering the Russian Government any overt military assistance in the suppression of the Polish insurrection, there is no doubt that M. de Bismarek is of considerable service to this Cabinet in matters connected with the movements and designs of the Polish patriots. The two Governments, I am reliably informed, interchange their secret intelligence relative to the rebellion, and thus establish common measures of defense and security.

On the 13th instant the Russian Minister at Berlin imparted to M. de Bismarek secret intelligence communicated by the Russian Ambassador at Paris, and confidential information supplied by the Russian Representative at the Court of Saxony, reports which had referense to depôts of arms and to revolutionary intrigues more particularly affecting Prussia.

In return M. de Bismarek gave M. d'Oubril the following information: —

He assured the Russian Envoy that some American vessels had left Genoa laden with from 40,000 to 50,000 muskets destined for the insurrection, and which were to be re-shipped at Hamburg for the neighbourhood of Memel. M. de Bismarek thought the quantity of arms exaggerated, but he nevertheless advised a strict watch over the Russian coast of the Baltic in the vicinity of Polangen and Memel.

The revolutionary movement, he further told M. d'Oubril, was directed from Paris and its prime mover was Prince Napoleon, acting through the agency of Charles Edmund Choïetzki. The Prince was now endeavouring to bring about a coalition between the moderate party and the party which had taken up arms, in order to take from the latter

the revolutionary and socialist character attributed to it. This plan had the concurrence of Ladislaus Zamoiski, of Kossielski (Seffer Pasha), and of Count Brannicki.

The Russian Government having been informed of the presence of four Deputies to the Lower Chamber at the Camp of the Dictator, M. de Bismarek acknowledged the absence of one of those Deputies (Bentkowski) who had since been placed at the head of the Civil Government established by Langiewicz.

M. d'Oubril has told Prince Gortehakoff that the facts above stated show that the revolutionary movement is increasing in strength notwithstanding the energetic measures of repression already adopted; that it is being recruited by men of different parties in Poland and of greater eminence; and that it is, therefore, necessary to destroy at once the principal band of insurgents still in arms under Langiewicz.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

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No. 276.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 158).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 20, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a packet of the „Journal de St. Petersburg“ from the 23rd February to the 20th instant, containing those parts of the newspapers which have reference to the Polish insurrection.

I do not attach much value to the information thus conveyed. It is chiefly composed of records of Russian victories over scattered bands of the rebels, and of predictions of the approaching extinction of the revolt. There is rarely the least avowal of any success on the part of insurgents; there is no estimate of their forces, no description of their position or strategical movements; in short, no intelligence worthy of the attention of reasoning men.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

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† No. 277.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 24).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, March 21, 1863.*

IN my despatch [No. 19] of the 7th instant, I had the honour to forward to your Lordship some remarks on the strength of the Russian army serving in the Kingdom of Poland, but since that date, having become possessed of some further data from which to judge of the forces engaged, I have now the honour to forward to your Lordship an



amended report of the same which I have every reason to believe to be substantially correct, although I am unable to guarantee the correctness of the figures.

The army at present employed within the Kingdom of Poland, or on the march to join this army, and immediately close to the frontiers of the Kingdom may be briefly stated to consist of about 95,000 Infantry, 12,000 Regular Cavalry, 10,000 Cossacks, and 8,000 Artillery with about 200 guns, and is composed of the following divisions, viz., one division of Infantry of the Guard; one Division of Grenadiers of the Guard *en route* and expected to reach this town by the 28th instant; portions of both the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions, the remainder of these Divisions being in the Province of Lithuania or close to the Polish frontier; the whole of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions of Infantry, the latter Division having been moved into the Kingdom from Volhynia; two Regiments of Cavalry of the Guard; two Regiments of Dragoons; five Regiments of Hussars; five Regiments of Lancers; fourteen Regiments of Cossacks: each Infantry Division having a Brigade of Artillery attached, and Horse Artillery being attached to the Cavalry Brigades.

The whole of the troops composing this imposing force are well armed (the Infantry having been supplied with rifle muskets), and well equipped, and are apparently in a high state of discipline, though the reports that are received of their conduct in the field does not confirm this, but on the contrary leads to the belief that the officers have in general very little control over the soldiers under their command.

It appears, my Lord, an astonishing fact, that with such a force at the disposal of the Government there should have been only about 12,000 men hitherto allotted to the Government of Radom, the chief seat and stronghold of the insurrection, and out of this force garrisons have to be supplied for the towns of Radom, Petrikau, Chenstochow, Kielce, Opoczno, Miechow, and Olkusz, thus reducing the actual force available for the field by about one-half; and to this may in a great measure be attributed the successes that have hitherto been gained by the insurgents under Langiewicz, who without sufficient arms or ammunition for the men under his command, has succeeded in evading the columns sent against him, and has continued to maintain himself in the wooded and hilly portions of this district, keeping at the same time his communications open with the Austrian frontier of Galicia.

To the failure of the troops in obtaining any important successes in this district, and to the activity and ability shown by the insurgent Chief, may, I believe, my Lord, be traced the increased importance of the insurrectionary movement, and the whole hope of the outbreak appears to depend on the fate of the force under this Chief, as although the insurrection exists in all parts of the kingdom and the troops are constantly harassed by the appearance of small bands where least expected, the force under Langiewicz may be considered as the nucleus of the National Army, and any serious disaster to this force would be proportionately felt throughout the kingdom.

At present, my Lord, the largest available force in the field on the side of the Government is in the Province of Lublin, where large reinforcements have been received from Volhynia, probably with a view to watch the Austrian frontier, but it may also be supposed that as these reinforcements reach their destination, the force in the Govern-



ment of Radom will be increased in sufficient numbers to allow of their taking the field in such force as to render the position of Langiewicz most difficult, unless he can succeed in obtaining a supply of arms and ammunition to enable him to increase the force under his command in proportion. He will have no difficulty in procuring men, but arms and ammunition are not so easily procured.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

†† No. 278.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 25).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, March 21, 1863.*

I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship [by telegraph] on the 13th instant the resignation of the Central National Committee, and the nomination of Langiewicz as Dictator of Poland; [<sup>1</sup>and I have now the honour of forwarding to your Lordship a translation in French of the Proclamation issued by the Dictator, announcing the fact of his having assumed the direction of the National Government, and calling the nation to arms to resist the Muscovite forces; also the Proclamation of the Central Committee announcing their resignation].

This step on the part of the leaders of the insurrection may, I believe, my Lord, be looked upon as having been taken for the purpose of proving to the rest of Europe that the insurrection is now a national movement, and to show that the assertions of the Russian Government, that it is merely the act of the Revolutionary party in Europe, are not correct; as well as from the desire to rally openly to the national standard the nobles and others of the Moderate party in the kingdom, who have hitherto kept aloof, from the disinclination of declaring themselves for an unknown programme, but who are at the same time known to be ready to declare themselves as soon as a favourable opportunity for so doing may present itself. And the withdrawal of Mieroslawski from the movement must also be considered as having been decided upon in deference to the views of the Moderate party in the kingdom.

The most important event since the date of my last despatches to your Lordship is, my Lord, in my opinion, the position that has been taken by the Archbishop of Warsaw. This Prelate, since his nomination to the high post of Head of the Polish Church, has exerted himself most energetically in favour of the Government, and by so doing has become most unpopular with his clergy; and the resignation of his post as Councillor of State in the present crisis was all the more unpalatable to the Government as it was unexpected. It is now stated on good authority that as his resignation has not been accepted by the Grand Duke, his Grace has addressed a letter to His Majesty the Emperor,

<sup>1</sup> Not in the Parliamentary Paper (Edit.).

which he has forwarded through His Imperial Highness, and in which the grievances of the Poles are set forth in strong language, as well as the insufficiency of the reforms heretofore granted to pacify the country; and appealing to the well-known high sentiments of His Majesty to grant such concessions to this distracted country as shall stop the present effusion of blood.

The resignation of the independent members of the Council of State has been followed by a similar step on the part of the Municipal Council of this town, though such a measure cannot be considered as of any great importance from the nature of the duties of the Council in question, but it adds further evidence to the general want of confidence in the Government of the country.

The resignation of office of the Marshals of Nobility in Lithuania is also announced, and the spread of the agitation in the old Polish Provinces appears on the increase.

In the meantime, my Lord, whilst all Poles are eagerly watching for symptoms of the manner in which the Western Powers are likely to act in the present emergency, the insurrection in the kingdom itself appears to be making further progress; and although nothing certain is known of the position of Langiewiez, it appears undoubted that he has now a better armed and organized force under his immediate command than at any previous period, and although this force is justly considered the mainstay of the National movement, the action of the National party in other portions of the kingdom is as active as ever, and small bands exist in all parts of the country, disputing their ground when necessary with the detachments of the Imperial troops sent against them, even within a few miles of the town of Warsaw.

It is impossible for me to give your Lordship any decided or positive information of the movements of these various bands, but it appears to me, my Lord, that the position of the Russians is far from improving, and that unless more ability and energy is shown by the officers in command of the Imperial troops than has hitherto been the case, the insurrection may continue unsubdued for months, even though unsupported by other Powers; and that if the Poles had the means of procuring arms and ammunition in sufficient quantities to arm their volunteers, the army now engaged in the suppression of this insurrection, large as it is, would be barely sufficient for the purpose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 278.

*Proclamation of the Central Secret Committee, transferring its authority to Langiewiez as Dictator.*

Le Comité Central comme Gouvernement Provisoire.

EN livrant à la publicité la proclamation du Général Langiewiez, par laquelle il annonce au pays qu'il a pris le pouvoir suprême Dictatorial, le Comité annonce qu'il vient de déposer son autorité entre les mains du Dictateur, auquel la nation doit obéir désormais.

Une Commission Exécutive sera nommée par le Dictateur pour exercer l'autorité dans cette partie du pays qui est encore au pouvoir de l'ennemi.

(Le sceau du Comité).

Inelasure 2 in No. 278.

*Proclamation of Langiewicz to the Poles as Dictator.*

Compatriotes,

LES plus généreux enfants de la Pologne ont commencé, au nom du Tout-Puissant, une lutte contre les éternels ennemis de la liberté et de la civilisation, lutte provoquée par d'horribles abus du Gouvernement Moscovite.

Malgré les circonstances les plus défavorables, et bien que le conflit armé ait été précipité par les excès d'oppression de l'ennemi lui-même, la lutte commencée sans armes dure depuis deux mois. Elle se fortifie et se développe énergiquement devant une guerre à mort, devant les massacres, le pillage, et l'incendie qui marquent les pas de l'ennemi.

La Pologne ressent douloureusement l'absence d'un pouvoir central non occulte, capable de donner une direction aux forces engagées et d'en appeler de nouvelles à la lutte.

Quoique la nation possède des citoyens plus dignes et plus capables, et bien que je sente l'immensité de mes devoirs et la grandeur de la responsabilité qui pèsera sur moi, la gravité et la nécessité des circonstances m'engagent, après m'être concerté avec le Gouvernement Provisoire, à prendre en main le suprême pouvoir Dictatorial, que je remettrai entre les mains des représentants de la nation aussitôt que nous aurons secoué le joug Moscovite.

En entendant conserver la direction des opérations militaires, je reconnais cependant la nécessité d'un Gouvernement Civil, dont les attributions seront réglées par une ordonnance spéciale.

Continuant l'oeuvre du Gouvernement Provisoire, je confirme les principes de liberté et d'égalité de tous les citoyens qu'il avait proclamés, ainsi que la propriété pour les paysans des terrains qu'ils ont possédé jusqu'ici pour des redevances en argent ou en corvées, et pour lesquelles les propriétaires seront indemnisés par le Trésor.

Maintenant, peuples du Royaume, de la Lithuanie, et de la Ruthénie, gémissant sous le joug barbare des Moscovites, je vous appelle à l'insurrection. L'accord de tous les citoyens sans distinction de classe et de religion, l'universalité du sacrifice, l'unité du pouvoir, rendront terribles pour l'ennemi nos forces, maintenant disséminées; et assureront l'indépendance et le bonheur des générations futures de notre patrie.

Aux armes donc, pour l'indépendance, la liberté, la patrie.

(Signé)

M. LANGIEWICZ, Général et Dictateur.

Au Quartier-Général de Goszoza, ce 10 Mars, 1863.

† No. 279.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. -- (Received March 28).*

(No. 26).

My Lord,

Warsaw, March 22, 1863.

INFORMATION has been received here from Galicia, from an Austrian source, that Langiewiez having suffered a severe defeat has passed into Austrian territory, where he has been arrested, that he is now confined in the citadel of Cracow, and that large numbers of insurgents have passed into the Austrian territory, crossing the Vistula, closely pursued to the frontier by the Russian troops.

The report in question states that Langiewiez passed the frontier with a passport under the name of Waligorski, but no details of the matter are known to me, nor have any accounts of the operations that led to his defeat hitherto been made known, and as yet, although the intelligence comes from an official source, it does not appear certain that the individual arrested as Langiewiez is the Dictator himself, and the identity is still strongly denied by the Poles. It certainly, my Lord, is strange that if so important a success has been obtained over the insurgents by the Imperial troops, as to force large numbers of them over the frontier, including the Chief himself, no official report or notification of such a success should have been made by the officer in command of the Russian troops, especially when it is considered that even the most trifling skirmishes have been deemed worthy of such notice; and it may also be remarked that the last authentic intelligence received from that part of the country gave the position of Langiewiez at many miles from the Austrian frontier.

Should, my Lord, this report prove to be correct, it must be considered as a severe blow to the Polish cause, independently of the defeat itself, as although Langiewiez has probably only been put forward as Dictator for the purpose of concealing the true names of the guiding heads of the insurrection, his defeat may give occasion to intrigues to place Mieroslawski at the head of the movement, which, if successful, must take from the insurrection its present national features, and prevent all combined action with the moderate party in the kingdom, as well as alienate the sympathies of the general opponents of revolution in the rest of Europe, who now may be inclined to look with favour on the Polish movement.

It is impossible as yet, my Lord, to state what effect the news of this defeat may produce on the Poles in general, as, until the details of the affair are known, no conjecture can even be made as to the real position of the opposing parties, and it would, therefore, be premature to attempt to draw any conclusion until the report receives further confirmation; but I may state to your Lordship that the exasperation of both parties at present is so great that, although in the event of the report being fully confirmed, it may appear a favourable moment for the declaration of an amnesty and for promises of further concessions, it is to be feared the Poles themselves would refuse to lay down their arms, unless induced to do so by some stronger guarantee for their liberties than the promises of the Imperial Government.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

EDWD. STANTON.

† No. 280.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 27).

My Lord,

Warsaw, March 24, 1863.

ALTHOUGH no Russian bulletin giving any details of the late operations in the Government of Radom, that appear to have resulted in the dispersal of the insurgent forces under Langiewicz, have been as yet published, the reports that have come from other quarters confirm the main incidents already reported to your Lordship, though at the same time they tend to diminish their importance in a political sense.

From these, my Lord, it would appear that Langiewicz, considering his presence necessary in other parts of the kingdom, probably in the Government of Lublin, had requested permission from the Austrian frontier authorities to be allowed to pass unmolested; that this permission having been refused, he attempted to accomplish his object, provided with a passport under a false name, but was arrested, and has been conveyed to Cracow.

From the same reports, my Lord, it appears that on the 17th instant Langiewicz left the town of Chrobierz, crossed the River Uida, burning the bridge behind him, and marched in the direction of the town of Busk; that a slight engagement took place in the afternoon, but the insurgents were able to continue their march. On the 18th instant they took up a position in a wooded country at Grochowiska, on the road to Pinezow, where a serious engagement took place, the insurgents having been attacked on the flank by a column of troops moving from Stopnica, as well as by the troops in their front. The Poles claim to have remained masters of the field; but, fearing the arrival of further reinforcements to the Russians, retired in the night to the village of Welki, a distance of about three English miles.

Here a Council of war was called, which resulted in Langiewicz dividing his forces into two corps, and appointing Smiechowski and Ozachowski to their command; he then issued a Proclamation to his army, a translation of which I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith, and on the 19th instant left for the Austrian frontier, where he was arrested as above reported.

The band under Smiechowski left Welki on the 19th, marching by Wislica to Koszyce, where he appears to have been routed, and his band forced across the frontier of Galicia; and an Austrian report that reached Warsaw on the 23rd instant states that a force of 1,300 men, with two guns had passed into Galicia, and been disarmed, which may probably be the remains of this force.

The band under Ozachowski, about 2,000 strong, is supposed to have gone in a northerly direction, but nothing is known of their movements.

The Austrian Government appear to have ascertained that Langiewicz is a Prussian subject, but I am unable to state whether the inquiries that have been made on his account have anything to do with his future treatment.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

† Inclosure in No. 280.

*Proclamation issued by Langiewicz previous to his Departure from the Camp at Welki.*

Brave and faithful companions.

MY office as Dictator requires my attention to various civil and military matters, and to the strengthening of our numerous bands fighting the Muscovite in other portions of the country, all of which require a better organization.

This necessity forces me to leave your ranks for a short time, those ranks in which I have been since the first night of the insurrection. I had hoped not to have been forced to leave you without sharing in a fresh victory; for this reason I sought a battle near Miechów; I stopped at Chrobierz, and fought the bloody encounter of Grochowska.

I do not take leave of you. The objects of my journey requiring secrecy, I cannot tell you whither I am directing my course. I take with me several officers to supply other detachments with commanders. Thirty lancers will accompany me as an escort, and will afterwards return to the camp. I have divided my corps in two parts with distinct commanders, and I have given instructions to these.

We have all sworn to fight. I shall keep my promise, companions, and expect obedience on your part, and a faithful service to the cause of our country.

We will continue to fight Russia in the name of the Almighty until we obtain the liberty and independence of our country.

(Signed) M. LANGIEWICZ.

†† No. 281.

(No. 176). *Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. -- (Received March 28).*

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 26, 1863.*

THE reports received by the Prussian Government represent the state of affairs at Warsaw to be extremely complicated, in consequence of the state of isolation in which the Marquis Wielopolski is now placed. The Grand Duke, it is said, continues to have confidence in his Excellency, but the Poles and Russians are equally dissatisfied with him. I am also told that the Prussian Government believe the party to be increasing at St. Petersburg, who are disposed to grant extreme concessions to Poland, and, if necessary, complete independence.

[<sup>1</sup>I have inquired of M. de Bismarck how far this is true, and his Excellency answered that nothing could exceed the irresolution prevailing at St. Petersburg; that General Somorokoff had been appointed six weeks ago to proceed to Poland to suppress the insurrection, but had not yet received orders to set out, and the Emperor apparently could not decide whether it would be more expedient to recall M. de Wielopolski or to support him].

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

The Russian Minister has received intelligence to-day of three corps of insurgents having been defeated, of which one had come from Galicia, and another consisted principally of Poles from the Grand Duchy of Posen who had served in the Prussian army.

M. de Bismarck complains of two English steamers, the „Gipsy Queen“ and the „Ward Jackson“, having sailed from London for the coast of Prussia with arms and ammunition for the Polish insurgents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 282.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 355. Secret).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 26, 1863.*

I LEARN on good authority that about a week ago the Emperor received a letter from the King of Sweden, in which His Swedish Majesty, adverting to the Polish question, said that he had 100,000 as good troops as could be brought into the field, and that he was ready to employ them in helping to restore the independence of Poland. That whether Austria would move, or whether England would move, did not signify, though their neutrality would be necessary. France and Sweden were strong enough to effect the object they had in view. Let the Emperor send to Sweden all the transports of which he could dispose, and His Swedish Majesty engaged that a campaign of two months would see him at St. Petersburg.

I do not know what answer has been returned to this communication, but will endeavour to ascertain.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 283.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 356. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 26, 1863.*

I HAVE had a curious conversation with the Prussian Ambassador, and not altogether without importance, as showing that the Prussian Government has, if possible, greater repugnance to the restoration of Polish independence than the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself.

Adverting to the well-known desire of the Emperor to accomplish this event, Count Goltz said that it was a question of life and death to Prussia. Anyone who knew the restless nature of the Poles must be satisfied that should the Russian provinces of Poland



establish their independence, they would not be content until they should have incorporated with them all the neighbouring provinces, and opened themselves a way to the sea by getting possession of Dantzic. But this was not all. There had always existed a great sympathy between France and Poland; and in what position would Prussia find herself between two Powers always ready to understand each other in a policy of aggression? Prussia must for her safety add at least another 100,000 men to her army.

I merely observed that I could have hoped that the milder rule of Prussia, as compared with that of Russia, would have obviated all apprehension of disaffection on the part of her Polish subjects; and I said that in the event of the realization of such an eventuality as the re-establishment of Polish independence, it was probable that much of the sympathy which now existed between France and the Poles would disappear. I was careful at the same time to let Count Goltz understand that Her Majesty's Government had no other object in view than the amelioration of the condition of the Polish subjects of Russia, and had no desire to see any territorial changes.

In the course of this conversation Count Goltz said that M. de Bismarek, while Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, had strenuously and successfully opposed the few concessions made to Poland by the present Emperor. These were effected after he (Count Goltz) had succeeded him; and on that occasion he had received a strong despatch from Count Bernstorff, the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, desiring him not to depart from the policy followed by his predecessors, and to protest against the reforms introduced into the administration of Poland. He had remonstrated against this course, as injurious to the credit and honour of Prussia, and the protest had been withdrawn.

It is right that I should add that, although Count Goltz's language to me was confined to simply depicting the danger which would ensue to Prussia from the establishment of an independent Poland, he has expressed himself in very warm language to others, declaring that both Prussia and Russia would lose their last man before consenting to such a change.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

†† No. 284.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 28).*

(No. 365).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 27, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, whom I saw this afternoon, informs me that your Lordship concurs in the opinion expressed in a despatch which his Excellency addressed to Baron Gros the day before yesterday, and which was communicated to your Lordship yesterday, that an effort should be made to induce the Austrian Government to join in a collective step with a view of calling the attention of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to the state of Poland, and the consequences which result from it.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in expressing his satisfaction at the identity of opinion exis-



ting between the two Governments on this question, said that he had already spoken to Prince Metternich, and instructed the Duc de Grammont in this sense, but that he was afraid that some hesitation still held the Austrian Government in check. [<sup>1</sup>Prince Metternich had suggested that it would be sufficient that Count Rechberg should address a circular to the Representatives of Austria abroad, explaining the present attitude of the Austrian Government, and giving a certain measure of advice to Russia, and that the Governments to whom this circular might be addressed should each of them take such steps as they might deem advisable. If Austria joined in a collective note, she would render herself liable to the imputation of being dragged into („à la remorque“) the policy of France and England.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed great dislike to this mode of proceeding, which he said he had combatted in his conversation with Prince Metternich. If Austria was afraid of being supposed to be the tool of France and England she might herself take the initiative in proposing a collective note. His Excellency entered into a series of arguments to prove that the true policy of Austria would be to associate herself with the Western Powers in a calm and moderate appeal to the Russian Government, and he asked whether Her Majesty's Government had taken any steps at Vienna in the sense of the opinion which your Lordship had expressed to Baron Gros.

I replied that your Lordship had some short time back recommended a community of action on the part of all the Powers who had signed the Treaties of 1815, and that the Austrian Government had then declined to abandon their present position. I did not know whether any further steps had since been taken.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that unless Her Majesty's Government were disposed to join their advice to that of the French Government, he feared that the irresolution of the Austrian Government would be prolonged. He earnestly hoped, therefore, that your Lordship would lose no time in writing to Vienna to urge upon the Austrian Government the propriety of acting simultaneously with France and England. He had no desire to dictate the terms of the note: let the Austrian Government draw it up. The value to him was in the collectiveness of the note rather than in the expressions, more or less strong, in which it might be couched.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY].

No. 285.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell.* (Received March 29).

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 29, 1863.*

FRENCH Ambassador and myself have seen Count Rechberg, and proposed collective note to Russia. His Excellency has taken the Emperor's orders. Austrian Government desire to act with Western Powers, but maintain that their interests in Galicia place

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

them in a totally different position. Whilst declining collective note they are willing to address a despatch to be delivered at St. Petersburg simultaneously with the communication from England and France.

A draft of this proposed despatch to be sent immediately to Paris and London.

No. 286.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 30, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG has decided to wait for arrival to-morrow of a messenger from Prince Metternich before sending to Paris and London the draft of the proposed despatch to St. Petersburg, mentioned in my telegram of yesterday.

No. 287.

*Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 77. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Madrid, March 18, 1863.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions I have communicated to the Marquis of Miraflores your Lordship's despatch No. 26 of the 4th instant, and its inclosure, respecting the affairs of Poland.

In order that the Marquis might make himself thoroughly master of the views of Her Majesty's Government therein set forth, I caused a translation into Spanish of these documents to be made, and read it to his Excellency.

After listening attentively to this communication, the Marquis of Miraflores observed that the main object of your Lordship's despatch to me being to ask the Spanish Government to associate itself to a representation made to the Russian Government through the medium of Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, this was a question to which he could not give me an answer without referring the matter to the Council. This he would immediately do, and he thought the affair was of sufficient importance to render it desirable that the reply of the Spanish Government should be conveyed to me in writing.

In the mean time, however, he would state to me frankly what his immediate impressions were on hearing your Lordship's despatches read. I might mention them to your Lordship as his personal ideas, on a *prima facie* view of the matter merely — in no way prejudicing the decision of the Spanish Government.

In the first place he would say, that the general scope of the advice of Her Majesty's Government to the Emperor of Russia was based on feelings of humanity and principles of sound policy; and there was nothing in what your Lordship said on these heads of which he did not heartily approve. He would add that in his belief an appeal by all

the principal Powers of Europe to the Emperor of Russia in favour of Poland would not be without a beneficial effect.

But such an appeal to be effective ought, he thought, to be general, that is to say, it ought to be made by all the Powers without exception, and based as much as possible upon grounds in regard to which those Powers who made it could fully agree.

Now he had remarked that in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Napier great stress was laid upon stipulations of the Treaties of 1815, as binding upon the Emperor of Russia, to re-establish a certain definite political system in the Kingdom of Poland, and to restore to the Poles certain rights acquired for them by those Treaties, but now withheld, contrary to their provisions.

That the stipulations in question bear the sense attached to them by Her Majesty's Government admitted of no doubt; but had all the Powers who were parties to the Treaties now the same views as to their binding force? Would they all be willing to join in an appeal to Russia based on the immutability of the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna? He thought not. The fact was that the course of events had reduced the Treaties of Vienna, in the opinion of many, to the condition of historical recollections; and certain Governments, by their acts, if not by their declarations, showed that they thought that, if not formally abrogated, their vitality was practically extinct.

Would France, for instance, join Great Britain in a remonstrance to Russia in favour of Poland, on the ground of the obligations of the Treaties of 1815?

The predominant principle of those Treaties was to curb the power of France. Such, at all events, was the prevailing feeling in that country. It had been the avowed policy of succeeding Governments in France to get rid of stipulations made with such a design. In that policy they have succeeded to a great extent; for the Treaties had been departed from not only in minor details, but specially in what he, the Marquis of Miraflores, had always looked upon as the main feature of the whole arrangement, viz., the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Need he allude to the territorial changes in Italy, the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, or to what he considered as a positive violation of the Treaties in the case of Cracow?

I observed in reply (with a similar reservation to that made by his Excellency, that I was only expressing my personal impressions), that although I was aware of the prevalent feeling in France to which he had alluded, and fully alive to the importance of the alterations which had taken place in the arrangements of 1815, it did not seem to me that the French Government was thereby precluded from appealing to those provisions of the Treaties which had not been modified or abrogated by more recent Treaty engagements. The changes which had taken place in the arrangements of 1815 had all, as far as France was concerned, been recognized, and fixed by fresh Treaties to which the Powers represented at the Congress of Vienna were either contracting or acquiescing parties. This did not appear to me to invalidate the remaining stipulations of the Act of the Congress of Vienna, upon which most of the subsisting territorial arrangements of Europe still repose.

With respect to the present question in Poland, I was not aware what communications, if any, had taken place between Her Majesty's Government and that of France, but

it did not appear clear to me that the French Emperor would object to appeal to the Treaties of Vienna as supporting the just rights of Poland. It seemed to me, on the contrary, that if any of the Powers were to feel a difficulty in doing so, it would rather be Austria and Prussia than France, because on their part there had been an absolute disregard of the Treaties of Vienna precisely in regard to Poland itself. For with whatever ingenuity the occupation of Cracow had been defended by Prince Metternich as not inconsistent with their provisions, that act was protested against by other parties to the Treaties as a direct infraction of them.

England, the Marquis of Miraflores remarked, might no doubt appeal with a clear conscience to the Act of the Congress of 1815, and indeed so might Spain, for the same reason, viz., that both had faithfully observed its stipulations, and that neither had profited by the alterations which the course of human events had brought about in the political arrangement which it was meant to perpetuate.

This consideration, however, did not, he remarked, touch his argument, because what he thought desirable was unanimity as to the grounds upon which a common appeal was to be made to Russia in favour of Poland, and such unanimity, he thought, could only result from the Powers basing their remonstrance on general principles of humanity and good policy.

I had the honour of transmitting the substance of this despatch to your Lordship in my telegram of the same date.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

JOHN F. CRAMPTON.

No. 288.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 165).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 24, 1863.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF informed me yesterday that a ship had been discovered loading arms and ammunition in the Thames, which were destined for the Polish insurgents. His Excellency showed me a telegram from Baron Brunnow, by which I learn that the fact has been denounced to the competent authorities in England. The Vice-Chancellor added that the Baltic coast of Russia being now open, it would be watched by the Imperial cruizers, but that every attention would be paid that English vessels should not be exposed to any unwarrantable interruption.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 289.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 158).

My Lord,

Vienna, March 26, 1863.

A FEW hours after the arrival of the last messenger I had an interview with Count Rechberg, and read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 63 of the 18th instant, giving an account of a conversation which your Lordship had held with Count Apponyi on the occasion of that Ambassador communicating the answer of the Austrian Government on the proposal that Austria should unite with Great Britain in making representations at St. Petersburg in favour of a complete fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty of Vienna relating to Poland.

His Excellency thanked me for this communication, and told me that he also had received a despatch from Count Apponyi in the same sense; and that every account that reached Vienna tended to confirm his opinion in the wisdom of the policy on this question, which had received the Emperor's sanction.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 290.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 159. Confidential).

My Lord,

Vienna, March 26, 1863.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of this day, Count Rechberg said with regret that, notwithstanding all the assurances of the French Government, he could not bring himself to place any faith in their intentions, and that he had but little inclination to act on any of their recommendations.

The greatest distrust, I may say, continues to prevail here as to the plans of France; and notwithstanding the accounts that coldness in their relations with Russia had taken the place of the cordiality which existed till very lately, Count Rechberg fully expects the present state of things will be of very short duration, and that we shall soon see the affairs of the two countries placed on their former confidential footing.

Count Rechberg has heard by telegram of Prince Metternich's arrival at Paris and of his reception by the Emperor, who had received him most graciously, and said that he quite understood and appreciated the policy of Austria in the Polish question.

His Excellency added that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had expressed himself more ardently to Prince Metternich, and in language much more favourable to Poland, than had been employed by the Emperor.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† No. 291.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 163).

My Lord,

Vienna, March 26, 1863.

I INQUIRED yesterday of Count Rechberg if General Langiewicz, who I heard had been removed to the citadel of Cracow, was kept under restraint. His Excellency replied that he was not sorry to be in a place of safety, for such was the fury of the Polish democratic party against him, that he had requested a guard for his personal security, and that sixteen men had been supplied for this service. Count Rechberg said that Langiewicz would probably not remain long at Cracow, but that it was yet undecided where he should take up his residence: Brünn in Moravia had been thought of. He would enjoy perfect liberty and be left on his parole until the insurrection was over, and an amnesty published; which he heard from M. Balabine, and also from Prince Gortchakoff, would probably be done at the earliest possible moment.

I asked if any communication had arrived from St. Petersburg as to Langiewicz. Count Rechberg answered that Prince Gortchakoff had inquired if the Austrian Government were satisfied as to his identity, and on learning that they were so, he expressed the hope that Langiewicz would be watched, and kept in a place of safety until the insurrectionary movement was over.

From Prussia there have been no inquiries addressed to the Imperial Government, and he hopes no questions will be addressed to him as to Langiewicz; he does not expect either Government will raise the question of delivering him up. Austria would not consent to do so. and both at Berlin and St. Petersburg they appear satisfied at the conduct of the Imperial Government.

I asked Count Rechberg if he thought the insurrection would soon be quelled. He replied that he did not think it would last much longer; the Austrian frontiers were covered with refugees, and the differences and jealousies between the Polish Chiefs would facilitate the military operations of Russia.

His Excellency added that it had been reported to him that Langiewicz's own opinion was that the insurrection was fast expiring; that in fact there were no materials for success, no arms, no sufficient military organization; and that it was hardly to be expected that men not half drilled, and scarcely armed, could withstand an attack of regular troops; that to have continued such an unequal contest would have been unjustifiable, and could only end in a useless sacrifice of human life.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 292.

*Mr. Paget to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 52).

My Lord,

Copenhagen, March 26, 1863.

I TOOK an early occasion of reading to M. Hall your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Lytton, No. 1 of the 4th instant, in which Her Majesty's Government invite the co-opera-

ration of the Danish Government in appealing to Russia to fulfil, on behalf of her Polish subjects, the conditions of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815.

His Excellency, whilst entirely assenting to the views and arguments therein set forth by your Lordship, observed, that as Denmark had not been a signing Power to the Treaty of which Russia is asked to realize the conditions as regards the Kingdom of Poland, his present impression was that it would not become the Danish Government to address to that of Russia any formal remonstrance upon this subject.

M. Hall, however, added, that he would more maturely consider your Lordship's suggestion, and give me a decided answer in a few days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 293.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 179. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 26, 1863.*

I AM assured that the Duke of Oldenburg, who passed through Berlin last week from St. Petersburg, told his friends here that the Emperor of Russia had informed him that the Convention signed on the 8th of February between Russia and Prussia had originated entirely with the Prussian Government, and that His Imperial Majesty had been surprised that they should have thought of a measure so likely to increase their difficulties with the Chambers, and to excite the disapproval of the Western Powers.

The Duke of Oldenburg is also said to have mentioned that the Emperor afterwards complained that the Prussian Government had asked him to take the initiative in getting rid of an agreement which they themselves had proposed to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 294.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 184. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, March 28, 1863.*

BARON DE TALLEYRAND read to me two days ago a despatch which he received from the Messenger Ridgway from the French Consul at Warsaw, the principal object of which appeared to be to paint, in the darkest possible colours, the atrocities which the exasperated feelings of the population and the soldiery have occasioned in Poland, but it seems to me that the worst cases which he cited must have occurred as long ago

as the first days of March, and might therefore have been reported sooner, unless he had since learnt that such information would be acceptable at Paris.

I am told by M. de Bismarck that a Count Dzialesky, who lives in Posen, has raised 1,000,000 francs on his property for the use of the insurgents, and that the telegrams which appeared in the French papers are generally fabricated by him. His Excellency also says that the peasants from Posen who had joined the insurgents and been driven back into the Grand Duky, described themselves to have been the victims of the false representations of their priests and landlords.

The Prussian Government express much satisfaction at M. Langiewicz having sought refuge in Austria, instead of crossing into Prussia, as there is no law in Prussia by which they could have interfered with the liberty of a Prussian subject in his circumstances.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 295.

*Sir H. Howard to Earl Russell. — (Received March 30).*

(No. 76).

My Lord,

*Hanover, March 28, 1863.*

THE Prusso-Russian Convention concerning Poland may, it is to be hoped, now be said to belong to history, of which it will not form a bright page.

Nevertheless, I ought not, perhaps, to omit to mention that about a week ago, Prince Ysenburg, the Prussian Envoy at this Court, received a circular despatch from M. de Bismarck, which is destined to serve as a guide for his language on that subject.

I have not seen the despatch, because Prince Ysenburg said he was not at liberty to communicate it to anybody, but I have learnt from him that in it M. de Bismarck calls attention to the exaggerated impressions which prevailed abroad concerning the alleged Convention; states that the instrument is not a Convention, but only an agreement; that it will not now be carried out and may be considered as a dead letter; and that explanations, which have proved satisfactory, have been given to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY F. HOWARD.

No. 296.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, March 30, 1863, 7 p. m.*

YOU will see by Lord Bloomfield's telegram that Austria will not agree to collective despatch, but suggests a simultaneous despatch at St. Petersburg. If this plan were



adopted Her Majesty's Government think England and France should make their notes separate, but identic. Your draft in your private letter might form a basis, and the notes should be communicated at Vienna before they are presented at St. Petersburg. Let me know what M. Drouyn de Lhuys says. If he prefers to abandon the plan entirely, Her Majesty's Government will not object.

## No. 297.

*Count Pasolini to the Marquis d'Azeglio. — (Communicated to Earl Russell by the Marquis d'Azeglio, March 31).*

M. le Marquis,

*Turin, le 21 Mars, 1863.*

PAR une note verbale en date du 19 courant Sir James Hudson, ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique, a porté à ma connaissance la dépêche adressée le 2 Mars par Lord Russell à Lord Napier sur les événements de Pologne. Il m'a de plus engagé au nom de son Gouvernement à adresser au Gouvernement Russe, par l'entremise du Marquis Pepoli, des observations analogues à celles du Gouvernement Anglais. La dépêche de Lord Russell est inspirée par un véritable intérêt pour la Pologne. Le Gouvernement Anglais déclare que la cause de l'insurrection doit être cherchée dans ce fait, — que la Pologne ne jouit pas des garanties qui lui ont été accordées par les Traités de 1815, et il réclame le rétablissement de ces garanties comme le seul remède qui puisse raffermir la tranquillité générale, et prévenir le retour des scènes de désolation qui ont ému l'Europe.

Les sentiments exprimés dans cette occasion par le Comte Russell sont de tout point conformes aux nôtres. Avant d'avoir officiellement connaissance de l'attitude de l'Angleterre dans cette question, le Gouvernement du Roi s'est trouvé à même d'exprimer sur cet objet une opinion tout à fait semblable. En donnant mes instructions au Marquis Pepoli, qui partait pour St. Pétersbourg, je n'ai pas omis de lui recommander d'appeler l'attention de son Excellence le Prince Gortchakoff sur la nécessité de reprendre en Pologne la sage politique que l'Empereur Alexandre I avait inaugurée, et que l'Empereur Alexandre II avait exprimé l'intention de suivre de nouveau. Peu de jours après, en présence des protestations de l'opinion publique, qui en Italie, comme ailleurs, s'est déclarée de plus en plus favorable à la Pologne, j'ai cru qu'il était de mon devoir de revenir sur ce sujet, et j'ai envoyé au Marquis Pepoli, qui s'était arrêté à Berlin, la dépêche dont vous trouverez ci-joint la copie.

Comme vous le remarquerez, M. le Marquis, bien que le Gouvernement du Roi, par l'accession de la Sardaigne aux Traités de 1815, fut à même de prendre, comme l'Angleterre, le texte de ces Traités pour point de départ de ses observations, c'est un autre ordre de considérations que nous avons jugé convenable de faire valoir. Ce sont les principes de justice et d'humanité, ce sont les véritables intérêts de la Russie que nous avons préféré invoquer. En exprimant notre opinion à un Gouvernement qui nous a donné, en reconnaissant le Royaume d'Italie, des preuves d'une sympathie réelle et sincère, nous avons cru devoir choisir la forme la plus amicale, et tenir un langage qui ne pût éveiller en aucune façon de justes susceptibilités.

Des incidents étrangers à la politique ayant retardé l'arrivée du Marquis de Pepoli, je ne suis pas encore à même de vous faire connaître la réponse que son Excellence le Prince Gortchakoff a pu donner aux observations que notre Ministre a été chargé de lui présenter. Marquis Pepoli a été du reste autorisé d'avance à concerter ses démarches avec les Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, et je n'ai aucun doute qu'il ne se soit empressé de remplir cette partie importante de la mission qui lui a été confiée.

En faisant connaître ce qui précède au Comte Russell, et en lui laissant copie de cette dépêche et de son annexe, vous aurez soin, M. le Marquis, de le remercier de l'invitation qu'il vient de nous adresser, et dont nous prenons acte.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est heureux de se trouver en cette circonstance complètement d'accord avec la France et l'Angleterre, en prenant la défense des grands principes auxquels l'Italie est redevable de son existence politique. Vous ajouterez, par conséquent, que si le Cabinet Anglais croyait nécessaire de faire sous forme collective des démarches ultérieures auprès du Gouvernement Russe, le Gouvernement du Roi est prêt à s'y associer, et à exercer toute son influence pour atteindre le but que le Comte Russell s'est proposé. Je m'empresserai de mon côté d'informer le Marquis Pepoli de l'invitation que le Gouvernement Anglais vient de nous adresser, en l'engageant de nouveau à procéder d'accord avec Lord Napier.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé)

G. PASOLINI.

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Inelasure in No. 297.

*Count Pasolini to the Marquis Pepoli.*

M. le Marquis,

*Turin, le 8 Mars, 1863.*

LES événements de Pologne ont continué depuis votre départ à attirer fortement l'attention générale. En Italie comme dans plusieurs autres pays de l'Europe, des meetings se sont formés et le Gouvernement du Roi a eu à se décider sur la ligne à suivre en présence de ces manifestations. Convaincu qu'il n'existe qu'un moyen de prévenir des inconvénients sérieux, celui de se renfermer dans la légalité, le Ministère s'est borné à empêcher que ces démonstrations n'eussent un caractère blessant pour les Gouvernements étrangers. Il a eu la satisfaction de maintenir ainsi un ordre parfait, et le Ministre de Russie a pu en rendre témoignage à son Gouvernement.

Après avoir exécuté scrupuleusement ses devoirs internationaux, il reste au Gouvernement du Roi une autre tâche à remplir. C'est d'exprimer au nom de l'Italie le vif désir que le coeur généreux de l'Empereur Alexandre fasse oublier par un acte éclatant de magnanimité les scènes terribles qui viennent de se passer en Pologne. Le souvenir de ce qu'ils ont souffert avant d'avoir pu se réunir autour du trône du Roi Victor Emmanuel est trop présent à l'esprit des Italiens pour qu'ils ne soient pas douloureusement émus en voyant se répéter sans cesse en Pologne les insurrections sanglantes et les sanglantes répressions. Son Excellence le Prince Gortchakoff trouvera par conséquence naturel que nous exprimions la confiance que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, écoutant

les inspirations généreuses de son cœur, persistera dans la voie des concessions et des réformes, si malheureusement interrompues par le recrutement et par le soulèvement qui en a été la suite. Nous avons la conviction absolue que cette politique est la seule qui réponde en même temps aux exigences de l'humanité et aux véritables intérêts de la Russie.

Ainsi que je vous l'ai marqué dans mes instructions je crois que la Pologne, en gardant sa religion, sa langue, et des institutions analogues à celles que l'Empereur Alexandre I lui avait accordées, et qui sont consacrées par les Traités, sera pour la Russie un élément de puissance et de prospérité. C'est en cherchant à amener entre ces deux nations séparées par la religion et l'histoire, mais réunies par l'affinité de race, une réconciliation sérieuse et durable, que l'Empereur Alexandre réussira à résoudre ce redoutable problème.

Je me flatte qu'avant même votre arrivée à St. Pétersbourg, le télégraphe nous aura apporté les nouvelles des déterminations magnanimes attendues par l'Europe avec tant d'anxiété. Dans ce cas vous n'aurez, M. le Marquis, qu'à féliciter sincèrement le Gouvernement Russe de cette sage résolution. Si des circonstances qu'il m'est impossible de prévoir empêchaient Sa Majesté le Czar de donner cours immédiatement aux intentions qu'il nourrit sans doute, vous pourrez, M. le Marquis, vous conformer dans vos entretiens avec son Excellence le Prince Gortchakoff aux sentiments exprimés dans cette dépêche, et vous joindre à cet effet aux efforts que les Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre pourront faire pour parvenir au même but.

Agréé, &c.

(Signé)

G. PASOLINI.

† No. 298.

*Sir J. Hudson to Earl Russell. — (Received March —).*

(No. 21).

My Lord,

*Turin, March 25, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that, in obedience to your instructions, I read to Count Pasolini your despatch [marked No. 3] of the 4th instant upon the deplorable acts of violence of which Poland is now the scene; and I stated to him that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a communication of similar views by the Representatives at St. Petersburg of the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of June 1815, would tend to the cessation of bloodshed, and to the enjoyment by the people of Poland of those rights which were promised them at Vienna, and which have been so long withheld from them.

Count Pasolini said that the King's Government had been greatly moved by the lamentable scenes of violence recently acted in Poland; and that it had considered it incumbent upon it, as one of the parties to the Treaty of June 1815, to make known at St. Petersburg its opinion upon these melancholy events; and that on the 8th instant he had addressed a representation upon this subject to the King's Minister at St. Petersburg

very much in the sense of your Lordship's despatch [No. 3]; and further, that he had instructed the Marquis d'Azeglio to explain in detail to your Lordship the language held and the steps taken by the King's Government on this occasion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

†† No. 299.

*Sir J. Hudson to Earl Russell. (Received March 31).*

(No. 24).

My Lord,

*Turin, March 28, 1863.*

[I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the „*Italie*“ newspaper containing a Report of] a speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies, on the evening of the 26th instant, by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chevalier Visconti Venosta, upon the subject of the petitions which had been addressed to the House by various cities in Italy in favour of Poland.

This speech was listened to with attention, and the House cheered the Minister when he sat down.

The debate was adjourned at midnight, till the usual afternoon session next day, when the House almost unanimously voted the order of the day (proposed by the Committee named by the House to examine and report upon those petitions), which was to the following effect: —

„The House, convinced that the King's Government will not fail to take the most opportune and efficacious measures in favour of Poland, transmits the petitions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and passes to the order of the day“.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

Inclosure in No. 299.

*Extract from „L'Italie“ of March 28, 1863.*

SPEECH of the Viscount Venosta in the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

M. Visconti Venosta, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. — La Chambre comprendra l'émotion que j'éprouve en prenant la parole pour la première fois, de ce banc, ou je me trouve par suite des graves fonctions que j'ai assumé(e)s. Je me recommande donc à l'indulgence de la Chambre, car je ne puis pas même en ce moment me faire fort de mes sentiments de dévouement entier aux intérêts nationaux. Une question douloureuse, compliquée, touchant aux plus grands problèmes de la politique Européenne, a amené des pourparlers entre les Puissances Européennes, des négociations diplomatiques, et la publication de documents que vous connaissez. La question Polonaise est très vaste, elle est une des questions les plus larges et les plus compliquées de l'histoire de notre époque. Par rapport à nous spécialement, il semble que cette question peut se résumer dans ces

deux propositions: quelle doit être, relativement à la question Polonaise, la politique nationale, et quelle la conduite du Gouvernement du Roi? Dès à présent je déclare accepter les conclusions de la Commission qui expriment ce qui correspond à l'inspiration de la politique nationale, ce que le Gouvernement entend faire et a fait, comme je vais le démontrer.

Le mouvement Polonais avait à peine éclaté que mon prédécesseur se préoccupait déjà de la situation de la Pologne et chargeait notre Représentant à St. Pétersbourg de manifester amicalement au Gouvernement Russe les désirs et les vœux du Gouvernement Italien en faveur de la Pologne. Il le chargea de lui rappeler l'attitude que la Russie avait prise durant la guerre de l'indépendance, et de lui mettre sous les yeux les avantages et les préjudices qui peuvent être pour nous le résultat de l'adoption vis-à-vis d'elle d'une ligne de conduite plutôt que d'une autre.

Notre Représentant était en voyage lorsque les affaires de la Pologne prirent des proportions plus larges et plus graves. Alors, mon prédécesseur formula en une note les désirs du Gouvernement du Roi relativement à la conduite qu'il aurait voulu voir adopter vis-à-vis de la Pologne. Notre conduite a trouvé son pendant dans celle des Grandes Puissances Occidentales. Plus tard, le Gouvernement du Roi a reçu une note de l'Angleterre, par laquelle on l'invitait à une action commune avec les autres Puissances en faveur de la Pologne. Par ce fait, l'Angleterre nous donnait une nouvelle preuve de son amitié constaté(e) pour nous.

Le Gouvernement du Roi répondit qu'il était prêt à s'unir avec les autres Puissances jusqu'au point indiqué par ses intérêts et par les sympathies qu'il éprouvait pour la cause Polonaise. Le Gouvernement du Roi a donc, ce me semble, prévenu les vœux de la Chambre en faisant ce qu'il pouvait en faveur de la Pologne et en s'ouvrant l'accès à un Congrès des Puissances Européennes, s'il doit avoir lieu. L'Italie est donc à sa place. Maintenant, comme l'a dit le Rapporteur de la Commission, il faut envisager la conduite du Gouvernement du Roi au double point de vue des sympathies pour la Pologne et de la raison d'Etat; c'est à ces deux sources que, selon moi, doit s'inspirer notre politique, appelée à être indépendante toujours, isolée jamais. (Bravo! Applaudissements).

No. 300.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received March 3 (?).*

(No. 376).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 30, 1863.*

I HAD the honour to receive on Saturday morning your Lordship's despatch No. 402 of the 27th instant, informing me with reference to a communication made to your Lordship by Baron Gros, that Her Majesty's Government were quite ready to make a representation to the Court of Russia on the part of Great Britain, Austria, and France, on the subject of Poland, and desiring me to frame a draft of note with this view, and to consult M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Prince Metternich before submitting it to Her Majesty's Government.

When this despatch reached me, the same uncertainty respecting the intentions of the Austrian Government prevailed as when I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship on this subject, and it seemed to me unadvisable to consult M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and useless to consult Prince Metternich respecting the terms of a note, to the principle of which the Austrian Government had not yet agreed.

Indeed, to judge from the conversations which I had with Prince Metternich and M. Drouyn de Lhuys yesterday, it would seem that the Austrian Government refuses to do more than to address a circular despatch to the Austrian Representatives abroad explanatory of the position assumed by Austria since the commencement of the Polish question, though at the earnest request of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Prince Metternich had telegraphed to Vienna to endeavour to induce his Government to reconsider this decision.

Prince Metternich thought that he might receive a final answer as to-morrow.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 301.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received March 31).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, March 31, 1863.*

SINCE arrival of Austrian messenger from Paris, Count Rechberg is confirmed in propriety of intended despatch to St. Petersburg. The draft left to-day for Paris and London.

He desires collective action, but not in identic form.

No. 302.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 1).*

(No. 380).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 31, 1863.*

PRINCE METTERNICH, whom I met this afternoon in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' ante-room, has not yet received any reply to his last despatches, nor did he seem to be aware that Count Rechberg had suggested the simultaneous transmission of despatches to St. Petersburg by the Governments of Great Britain, Austria, and France. His Government, he said, had abandoned the idea of a circular despatch, but, as he thought was about to send instructions with reference to the Polish question to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in Russia, merely communicating the substance of these instructions to the Governments of the Western Powers afterwards.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 303.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 1).*

(No. 381).

My Lord,

*Paris, March 31, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS could only receive me so late this afternoon that I have but just time to inform your Lordship, with reference to your telegram of 7 p. m. yesterday, that, in his Excellency's opinion, no further decision can be taken in the Polish question until the draft of the proposed Austrian despatch to St. Petersburg shall have been submitted to Her Majesty's and the Imperial Governments. Should the terms of that despatch be weak and irresolute, should it in fact say less than the Western Powers have already said at St. Petersburg, there would, in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' judgement, be little use in supporting it, for the Russian Government would at once detect that the three Powers were not agreed. If, on the other hand, the language of the despatch should prove to be such as the two other Governments could generally approve, they might endeavour to give it greater strength if necessary, and a simultaneous and identic, though not collective step, might be taken at St. Petersburg. In the event, as was most probable, that the Austrian note would not prove satisfactory to the Western Powers, it might be as well that the latter should pause before taking any further step in the hopes that time and the march of events might bring Austria nearer to them.

Such, in a few words, is the substance of M. Drouyn de Lhuys opinion, but his Excellency begged me to remember that it was only a personal one, and subject to be modified by the Emperor.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 304.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 3, 1863.*

I HAVE seen Count Apponyi, and have read the Austrian project of note for St. Petersburg. It seems to me to furnish occasion for separate notes on the part of England and France, which would be useful. They might be very nearly to the same effect as the Austrian, leaving out Galicia. What does the Emperor of the French say, however?

No. 305.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. (Received April 3).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 3, 1863, 5 p. m.*

DROUYN is not satisfied with the Austrian draft. Still he thinks that it might be accepted if the last paragraph were altered, and the Austrian Minister be charged to

leave a copy with Gortchakoff. As it is, he thinks it worth little or nothing. More by messenger.

No. 306.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 4).*

(No. 390).

My Lord,

*Paris, April 3, 1863.*

PRINCE METTERNICH placed yesterday in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' hands the draft of the despatch which Count Rechberg proposes to address to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburg, together with the explanatory despatch addressed to himself with reference to the affairs of Poland. The Prince was good enough to send me these papers to read, and I went this afternoon by appointment to M. Drouyn de Lhuys to learn his opinion of them.

His Excellency said that the draft in its present state was less than nothing (*„moins que rien“*), and that he would not be disposed to adopt it. He had understood that the observations of the Austrian Government were to be made in the form of a note, whereas the milder form of a despatch had been adopted; that nevertheless if the Austrian Government would consent to alter the last paragraph, which simply charged the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to be the exponent of the opinions of his Government, and to report the impression made by them on the Russian Government, into an order to leave a copy of the despatch with Prince Gortchakoff, he should be inclined to take the despatch such as it is, introducing only such changes at the commencement as the different situations of the two Governments rendered necessary. It was true that such a despatch would say less than the French Government had already said, but what was lost in the contents of the despatch would be compensated for by the strength imparted to it through the simultaneous action of the three Powers.

I said to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I thought some attempt might be made to introduce some stronger expressions into, and to give a more positive colour to, the Austrian despatch. We might send a counter project to Vienna. It was probable that the Austrian Cabinet might consent to some, if not all the alterations we might propose. At all events the trial was worth making, and if it had no other result, would probably induce Count Rechberg to consent to a copy of the despatch, as he proposed it, being left with Prince Gortchakoff.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys coincided in this opinion, which, however, I was careful to tell him I only offered as a personal one pending instructions from your Lordship.

I inclose copies of the despatch addressed by Count Rechberg to Prince Metternich, and of the draft of that which it is proposed to send to St. Petersburg, in case none should have been left with your Lordship by Count Apponyi.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.



Inelasure 1 in No. 306.

*Count Rechberg to Prince Metternich.*

Mon Prince,

*Vienne, le 31 Mars, 1863.*

LE DUC DE GRAMONT et Lord Bloomfield ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements de m'entretenir d'un projet de démarche identique et collective que les deux Cabinets de Paris et de Londres auraient en vue de faire à St. Pétersbourg, pour demander au Gouvernement Russe de replacer le Royaume de Pologne dans des conditions propres à y assurer le retour et le maintien de la tranquillité.

Mes dépêches antérieures sur la question Polonaise ont toujours établi que, malgré certain rapprochement entre nos appréciations et celles des Gouvernements Anglais et Français, nous ne pouvions cependant nous placer entièrement sur la même ligne.

Je me suis assez étendu sur ce point vis-à-vis de votre Altesse pour qu'il soit superflu d'y revenir ici. Je me bornerai donc à vous dire que dans mes conversations avec les deux Ambassadeurs, j'ai de nouveau insisté sur les graves motifs qui forçaient l'Autriche à observer dans la question Polonaise une réserve conforme à sa situation particulière, essentiellement différente de celle des deux autres Puissances. Passant ensuite à l'examen de l'affaire spéciale qui se trouvait en cause, j'ai dû faire observer que dans une démarche pareille à celle dont il s'agissait le point de départ pour l'Autriche se trouvait être naturellement tout autre que pour l'Angleterre et la France.

La possession de la Galicie rend en effet le Gouvernement Impérial fort intéressé à ce que la Pologne Russe ne redevienne point le théâtre de troubles et de conflits sanglants. Nous devons en conséquence nous fonder avant tout sur les embarras suscités au Gouvernement Impérial par l'agitation qui règne dans le voisinage immédiat de ses frontières, pour demander à l'Empereur Alexandre qu'il porte remède à cet état de choses.

Nous souffrons d'ailleurs trop directement de ce qui vient de se passer en Pologne, pour ne pas être dans le cas d'exprimer au Gouvernement Russe notre désir de voir prévenir le retour de semblables événements. Aussi sommes-nous disposés à adresser à notre Chargé d'Affaires à St. Pétersbourg la dépêche dont votre Altesse trouvera ci-près le projet. Elle nous semblerait correspondre autant que notre situation particulière le permet aux vues des Cabinets de Paris et de Londres.

Je vous autorise à en donner confidentiellement connaissance à M. Drouyn de Lhuys, qui verra, j'espère, dans cette communication une preuve de notre désir de nous rapprocher des vues Françaises.

Ainsi que je l'ai fait remarquer à Lord Bloomfield et au Duc de Gramont la nuance qui sépare en cette occasion l'attitude de l'Autriche et celle des deux autres Cours trouve son explication dans la nature même des choses. En élevant sa voix en faveur des Polonais, l'Autriche, qui possède elle-même une province Polonaise, doit tenir un langage à part. Mais si ce langage tend vers le même but que celui qui est poursuivi par la France et l'Angleterre, il peut servir ainsi à constater l'harmonie qui règne entre les trois Puissances.

Nous croyons tenir compte par là, autant que nous le pouvons, des vœux qui nous

ont été exprimés et nous aimons à penser que notre projet, présenté avec ces explications, trouvera un accueil favorable auprès du Gouvernement Français.

Une dépêche identique, contenant la même annexe, est adressé(e) à l'Ambassadeur de l'Empereur à Londres.

Recevez, &c.

Signé) RECHBERG.

Inclosure 2 in No. 306.

*Draft of Despatch from Count Rechberg to Count Thun.*

*Vienne, le*

DEPUIS la défaite et la dispersion des bandes armées les plus importantes par leur nombre et leur organisation, l'insurrection en Pologne peut être considéré(e) comme définitivement vaincue.

Ce fait, qui dégage le Gouvernement Russe de ce qu'il devait jusqu'ici à des considérations de dignité et d'honneur militaire, nous permet d'appeler aujourd'hui son attention sur l'influence fâcheuse que les troubles de la Pologne exercent sur nos propres provinces.

En effet il est impossible que la Galicie ne se ressente pas d'événements aussi déplorables que ceux qui viennent de se passer dans le voisinage immédiat de ses frontières. De graves embarras sont ainsi suscités au Gouvernement Impérial, qui doit donc attacher un prix tout particulier à en voir prévenir le retour. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg comprendra sans doute lui-même les dangers des convulsions périodiques qui agitent la Pologne, et il reconnaîtra l'opportunité d'aviser au moyen d'y mettre un terme en replaçant les Provinces Polonaises soumises à la Russie dans des conditions d'un(e) paix durable.

On éviterait de la sorte des conséquences fâcheuses pour l'Europe entière et pour les contrées qui souffrent plus directement des conflits qui, comme les derniers que nous venons de voir éclater, ont inévitablement l'effet d'agiter l'opinion d'une manière inquiétante pour les Cabinets et capable de faire naître de regrettables complications.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, présenter sous la forme la plus amicale ces observations à M. le Vice-Chancelier, et nous informer de l'accueil qu'elles auront rencontré.

Recevez, &c.

†† No. 307.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 443).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 4, 1863.*

[I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 390 of the 3rd instant].

I have to state that Count Appouyi came to me yesterday by appointment, and read

to me two despatches, the one addressed to himself, the other intended for the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg.

To the beginning of the projected despatch to St. Petersburg, [stating that the insurrection is subdued] and to the part which relates to the position of Austria in reference to Galicia, the Governments of England and France have nothing to say.

But the latter part appears to Her Majesty's Government very important. It shadows forth ulterior consequences which, according to the present views of the Russian Government, are too likely to be realized. These consequences, it is declared, may be calamitous to all Europe, and the conflicts which may then be revived may give rise, it is said, to complications to be regretted.

Her Majesty's Government could hardly ask the Austrian Government, with their interests so much engaged in a Polish province, to go farther. [<sup>1</sup> But I told Count Apponyi that it would be necessary, for the vindication of Her Majesty's Government, that the two despatches, of which I send you copies, should be presented to Parliament. This step will have all the effect of a copy given by the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburg to Prince Gortchakoff; but if the French Government wish to have this alteration made in the Austrian despatch, Her Majesty's Government will be happy to see it adopted.

Her Majesty's Government are preparing a despatch for St. Petersburg, upon the tenour of which they are desirous of consulting the French Government. The close will resemble that of the Austrian despatch, but the beginning will refer to the former communications of the British Government. If the Emperor of the French should concur, a despatch in different language and arrangement, but of a like tenour, might be sent to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL].

No. 308.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 5, 1863.*

THE following figures have been received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg: —

„Russian army to be placed on war footing. Reserved battalions called out, and officers' leave stopped. Forts (fortifications?) at Cronstadt being armed. Insurrection in Lithuania apprehended“.

No. 309.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 5, 1863.*

CAN you account for the alarm at St. Petersburg, as reported in Lord Napier's telegram which I sent you this day?

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

No. 310.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 5).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 5, 1863, 5 p. m.*

IT is hoped that the Austrian Government will consent to leave a copy of the despatch destined for St. Petersburg with Prince Gortchakoff, if they are pressed. Drouyn begs you to urge it through Bloomfield.

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No. 311.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 5, 1863.*

I HAVE received the following telegram from Earl Cowley: --

„It is hoped that the Austrian Government will consent to leave a copy of the despatch destined for St. Petersburg with Gortchakoff if they are pressed. Drouyn de Lhuys begs you to urge it through Bloomfield“.

I have to instruct your Excellency to urge Count Reehberg to make this change.

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No. 312.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 5, 1863.*

WITH reference to your telegram of this day I have sent the following figures to Bloomfield: —

„I have received the following telegram from Earl Cowley: —

„It is hoped that the Austrian Government will consent to leave a copy of the despatch destined for St. Petersburg with Prince Gortchakoff, if they are pressed. Drouyn begs you to urge it through Bloomfield“.

„I have to instruct your Excellency to urge Count Reehberg to make this change“.

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No. 313.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 5).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 5, 1863, 7.15 p. m.*

YOUR suggestions as to the course to be pursued at St. Petersburg are agreed to here. Drouyn will send Gros to-morrow a draft of his despatch for communication to you. Grammont writes word that Reehberg agrees to communicate to Gortchakoff a copy of his despatch; nevertheless Drouyn wishes you to telegraph to Bloomfield to make sure.

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No. 314.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April —).*

(Telegraphic).

*St. Petersburg, April 5, 1863. 1 p. m.*

RUSSIAN army to be placed on war footing. Reserved battalions called out, and officers' leave stopped. Fortifications at Cronstadt being armed. Insurrection in Lithuania apprehended.

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† No. 315.

*Sir A. Magenis to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No 30).

My Lord,

*Lisbon, March 21, 1863.*

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch [No. 12] of the 4th instant, I availed myself yesterday of the first opportunity which offered after its receipt on the 14th, to communicate to the Duke de Loulé that despatch, as well as the copy of the despatch [No. 53] which you had addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the 2nd instant which was inclosed in it, stating the course which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Russian Government ought to adopt to put an end to the lamentable state of things at present existing in the Kingdom of Poland, and to satisfy European opinion.

I stated to his Excellency that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a communication of similar views by the Representative of Portugal, as one of the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, at St. Petersburg, would tend to the cessation of bloodshed, and to the re-establishment in Poland of those rights which were promised to its inhabitants at Vienna, and which had been so long withheld from them.

I found that the Duke de Loulé was quite prepared by the despatches of Count Lavradio for the communication which I made to him; and he added that the French Minister, who had seen him a few minutes before myself, had stated that his Government was aware that I was to make a communication on the subject, and had instructed him to give it his best support.

The Duke de Loulé at once concurred in your Lordship's suggestion, without loss of time, to address a communication to the Portuguese Minister at St. Petersburg in the same sense as your Lordship's despatch [No. 53] of the 2nd instant to Lord Napier.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

† No. 316.

*Sir A. Magenis to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 34).

My Lord,

*Lisbon, March 25, 1863.*

WITH reference to my communication of your Lordship's despatch [No. 53] of the 2nd instant to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg respecting the present state of affairs in the Kingdom of Poland, to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my despatch [No. 30] of the 21st instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Cazal Ribeiro, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1860, addressed a question on the 23rd instant, in the Chamber of Deputies, to the Duke de Loulé as to the course the Government meant to pursue with respect to Poland.

The Duke replied to this question by alluding to my verbal communication to him, the day before, of your Lordship's despatch, and expressed the strongest sympathy for the cause of Poland, which he declared be „sacred“. The whole debate expresses so strongly the sympathy of the Chamber for Poland, that I inclose a short translation of what passed on that occasion.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

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 † Inclosure in No. 316.

*Summary of Proceedings in Portuguese Chamber of Deputies with respect to Poland,  
March 23, 1863.*

UPON M. Cazal Ribeiro saying that as the Duke of Loulé was present, he would like to hear what he had to say respecting Poland, the President of the Council (Duke of Loulé) replied that he had come on purpose to the Chamber in order to satisfy the wishes of the illustrious Deputy.

When this question was announced on the 21st instant, the Government had not as yet received any communication on the subject in question; but subsequently Her Britannic Majesty's Minister had verbally informed him that the British Government had addressed a communication to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia for re-establishing the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815; and that it would be very desirable that all the Powers who signed that Treaty should also address the same request.

That the Government had replied in the affirmative, because it thought that the cause of Poland was so sacred, and has attracted so much sympathy that none of the said Powers will fail to assume that position in the matter which it is their duty to assume.

That it was also the intention of the Government to inform the Chamber of this affair, in the hope that it would give the Government a vote of approval in order that its proceedings might have greater force and weight.

M. Cazal Ribeiro thanked the Duke for his prompt reply, and expressed his entire

assent to the views of the Government, which would, he trusted, inform the Chamber of any further proceedings in this question, and he declared with pleasure that the Government will only meet with one opinion on this subject, so great is the sympathy which the state of Poland inspires.

M. Pereira Dias moved the following Resolution, which was approved and voted unanimously: —

„I propose that it should be inserted in the journals that the Chamber received the statements made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subjects of the affairs of Poland with pleasure and satisfaction“.

†† No. 317.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 42).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, March 30, 1863.*

DURING the last week or ten days, considerable sensation has been caused here by the arrival from Vienna of Prince Constantine Czartoriski, nephew of the late Prince Adam, who has been cordially received both by the Sovereign and the people, having had the honour of dining with His Majesty, and having been invited to a public dinner at the Exchange, composed of some 200 persons of all classes, when the utmost enthusiasm prevailed, and when the Prince delivered an eloquent and fervid address, as your Lordship will see by the inclosed account taken from the „Afton-bladet“ journal.

Your Lordship will also perceive that Prince Czartoriski disclaimed all pretension to any armed intervention for the Polish cause, aspiring merely to moral support and encouragement, a tone which Count Manderström tells me that the Prince has likewise adopted in conversing with him.

How long he is to remain I have not been able to learn, but it is said that he will visit Copenhagen.

On arriving here Prince Czartoriski paid a formal visit to Count Paar, the Austrian Minister, but it was not by him that he was presented to the King.

[<sup>1</sup> In surmising that the Russian Government might possibly take umbrage at the Prince's reception, Count Manderström expressed himself in the sense that the Swedish Government must meet such displeasure with the resignation of indifference; adding, that the Czartoriski family had not been placed under the ban of Europe, in which sentiments I strongly signified my concurrence].

I have also the honour to inclose a translation of an appeal to the public, signed by Members of the Diet, in favour of subscriptions on behalf of the Poles.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).

† Inclosure 1 in No. 317.

*Précis of an Article in the „Afton Bladet“ of March 28, 1863.*

(Translation)

THE banquet which the „Committee for the Poles“ instituted in this capital had arranged in honour of Prince Constantine Czartoriski took place yesterday at the Exchange, under the presidency of the Chairman of the Committee, Baron A. C. Raab.

The number of guests was as large as the locale would hold, namely, above 200 persons. Among them there were remarked several of the leading members of the House of Nobles, about one-half of the Burgher Chamber, and a considerable number of the members of the Peasant Chamber, as well as the President of the latter Assembly.

There was but one member of the Clerical Chamber, and even that member was not in holy orders.

Moreover, there were the Secretaries of the „Committee of the Constitution“ and of the „Committee of the Laws“, several of the most influential members of the Stockholm Exchange, a number of persons holding superior and subordinate offices under Government, members of the Academy of Science, and of the Academy of the Liberal Arts and Sciences, as well as other scientific men, artists, and authors. It was, on the whole, a very large meeting of citizens belonging to all grades and classes.

In the course of the dinner Baron Raab, the Chairman, rose to propose the King's health, in a speech remarkable for the loyalty of its expressions and for its spirited description of the advantages which Sweden had, from the earliest times, derived from those feelings of attachment to liberty, and to their King and country, which its inhabitants had shown. The toast was drunk with enthusiasm, and popular songs were sung, in which the whole company joined.

M. P. R. Tersmeden then gave the health of the Prince in a speech delivered in French, and in which he gave a sketch of the services of the family of Czartoriski in the cause of Polish independence.

To this speech the Prince replied in the following terms: —

„Gentlemen, — The first step I took on Swedish ground (when the steamer, on board of which I was, stopped at Ystad) was greeted with the shout of „Long life to Poland“! This was a happy omen, and when the volunteer corps assembled there, pressed my hand, I felt I was among a people who were really capable of constancy in friendship. Ever since that moment the friendly reception accorded to me has not abated an instant. In the palace of the King as in the cottage of the peasant the welcome I have received has everywhere been equally warm, kind, and open-hearted.

„The friendly words which have just been expressed on behalf of myself and my family furnish me with an opportunity of publicly recording here the gratitude I feel for the friendly reception I have met with in Sweden. Be assured, Gentlemen, that all these assurances of sympathy will find the warmest response in Poland, and it is in the name of my countrymen that I offer you my thanks from the depth of my heart“.

General Hazelius then gave a toast for Poland in an eloquent speech, which was followed by deafening cheers of „Long live the Poles“! the orchestra striking up the



Polish National Hymn, „Czas con Polski“. Swedish words had been set to this hymn and distributed among the company, who all sung it in chorus.

Prince Czartoriski then responded to the toast as follows: —

„Gentlemen, — I deeply regret that I do not understand your fine-sounding language, otherwise I should have been able to appreciate better, and answer more appropriately, the words in which a highly respected Swede has given the toast for my beloved country.

„But from the very tone of the speaker's voice, and from the enthusiastic applause with which you have greeted the name of Poland, uttered with so much noble warmth, I gather both what are the speaker's and your feelings for the Polish nation, and I thank you from my inmost heart for those feelings and for the manner in which they have been expressed here.

„A century nearly has passed away since the division of Poland was commenced; but in spite of the lapse of time, in spite of Siberia, of the Caucasus, of the knout, of imprisonment and exile, the feeling of independence has never for one moment abated in Poland.

„The generation now living was born in thralldom or in a foreign land. Notwithstanding this, it has preserved a pure and unmixed feeling of patriotism which nothing has been able to shake, and which can never be extinguished until the last Pole has shed his last drop of blood. (Loud applause).

„The whole world knows what Poland has suffered. It has been a long martyrdom, and through that martyrdom Poland has assuredly expiated her past errors. (Yes! yes!)

„Three times did Poland believe that her hour of freedom was at hand; three times did she attempt to shake off the oppressive yoke of barbarians: but never did she lose courage, never did she doubt the justice of her cause, never did she mistrust the future, although each fresh defeat entailed fresh persecutions, and the yoke became more galling, the tyranny more unbearable. The nation bowed its head, called on God to hasten the hour of deliverance, and bore all with patience and resignation.

„But everything in this world has its limit; and the Polish nation, driven to the uttermost bounds of persecution, has risen as one man once more, with no other arms but its despair, — with no other support but its rights. It would be very cruel if the nation were to be again cheated of its hopes. No! Gentlemen, no! this is impossible. The times are different now from what they were; and Europe is not, happily, in the same position it was thirty years ago.

„In 1831 it was not so much the Russian armies which suppressed the insurrection, it was rather the indifference of the other Governments which quelled it. At that time there was neither a word of consolation or of hope for the future offered to Poland.

„The Polish army might win battles, but it could not lay the foundations of a durable state of things without having the moral assistance of Europe. And what advantage was it to Poland to win battles without that assistance? But in 1831 the European Cabinets settled, according to their own views, the fate of nations, and they were all of them more or less under the influence of an egotistical or timorous policy, which was directed to no object beyond that of avoiding every complication for the time being,

without taking into consideration the dangers which menaced the future. Circumstances have undergone important changes during the thirty years which have since elapsed. Public opinion has become a Power which must now be taken into account, and which has consequently changed the foundations on which politics reposed.

„Even now, as in 1831, the Polish army will conquer, although it stands alone, although it has hardly any arms and hardly any ammunition; but Europe will, we hope, not act as it acted in 1831. What Poland now requires of the other European nations is, as in 1831, not to declare war, not to send its armies there, but merely to give Poland its strong moral support, and to give it openly, completely, and without reserve.

„It is on this account, Gentlemen, that every proof of sympathy is so precious to Poland, doubly precious coming as that sympathy does from hence. Sweden and Poland are united to one another not only by the mutual sympathies which Swedes and Poles feel for each other, but even by a community of interests. (Yes! yes!) The significant testimony of sympathy for Poland which is now being offered in a land which is so free, which is so happy, and whose King ever goes hand in hand with his people, this testimony of sympathy cannot do otherwise than produce a marked impression on the banks of the Weichsel as on those of the Neva.

„These are the motives, Gentlemen, which prompt me to empty my glass with my whole heart, and I venture to say in the name of all my countrymen, in behalf of Sweden's prosperity, its honour, and greatness“.

It is superfluous to say that this speech called forth a storm of enthusiastic applause.

Many other toasts were proposed; one, amongst others, by Magister Sohlman, in honour of the Scandinavian sister kingdoms, in which he expressed the hope that the principle „Divide et impera“ which had so long prevailed in the Scandinavian north, and of which the enemies of our freedom and nationality had so well known how to make use (although not with the same success as had been the case in Poland), might entirely give way to another principle, namely, „Join in order to be able to become independent“.

A telegram was then read which had just arrived from Sundsvall, to the effect that a large number of the inhabitants of that place begged to express to Prince Czartoriski their warmest hopes that the Polish nation might regain their freedom and independence.

Prince Czartoriski expressed his gratification at this message, and requested that his thanks, and those of his countrymen, might be conveyed to the inhabitants of Sundsvall.

Per. Nilsson (member of the Peasant Chamber) then proposed a toast in honour of the „Women of Poland“, who had given such great proofs of love for their country and heroic courage in times of need and misfortune, and even in the field of battle.

Prince Czartoriski replied to this toast in a very warm and eloquent manner.

He described in lively colours the part which Polish women had taken in the honourable martyrdom of Poland; „but“, he observed, „the fact that they have worn mourning on their persons and in their hearts for their native country is not the most important circumstance; the fact that they have defied the Russian orders not to wear the national colours — that they have tended the wounded with tender care — that at times they have themselves rushed on the bayonets of the enemy — is not all: the main, the

most important point, and that for which they will be blessed for ever, is, that like true mothers they have taught us never to give up all hope for our country!"

† Inclosure 2 in No. 317.

*Extract from the „Nya Dagligt Allehanda“ of March 24, 1862. (?)*

(Translation).

An Appeal. — THE sympathies which our country feels for Poland's noble and unhappy people are so strong, and have shown themselves in so clear a manner, that it is no longer necessary to find words to give them life and expression.

These sympathies are devoted to the cause of right, to strong patriotic feelings, to unmerited sufferings.

They cannot, therefore, become less intense owing to the alternating chances of the struggle; they cannot be lessened, and must rather be increased by that unfortunate fate which an unequal contest may entail on freedom's defenders.

Let the Swedish people, who at the present conjuncture do not do honour so much to success as to the cause of justice and heroism, give the Poles, above all things, as a proof of their sympathy, the moral support which they can afford them for the moment, while watching for that hour when the Cabinets of Europe will be obliged to exert themselves in earnest to arrive at a satisfactory solution of this question, from a point of view founded on the rights of nations and on the claims of civilization.

Let the Swedish people express their sympathies by acting in the way which is practicable under actual circumstances, and let Committees be formed in different parts of the country to collect subscriptions for the Poles, which subscriptions can hereafter be sent to the Undersigned, who, at the large meeting held at Stockholm, formed themselves into a „self-constituted“ Committee for the Poles.

These subscriptions can, if the contest continues, be forwarded to the Emigration Society in Paris, and be a direct gain to the cause of liberty; and should (which God avert!) the champions of freedom be obliged to yield on this occasion, such subscriptions may be of welcome assistance in supporting those who have been fortunate enough to escape the Czar's bloody revenge, in order, with empty hands, to experience the necessities and the sufferings of exile.

*Stockholm, March 24, 1863.*

Treasurers of the Committee,

(Signed) A. C. RAAB.

AUG. BLANCHE.

Secretaries to the Committee,

F. W. STAEL von HOLSTEIN.

P. R. TERSMEDEN.

EMIL von QUINTEN.

J. MANKELL.

PER. NILSSON (of. Espö).

A. SOHLMAN.

A. W. UHR.

J. ANDERSSON (of Oestergötland).

HORALD WIESELGREN.

No. 318.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 43).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, March 31, 1863.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to state that Count Manderström informed me yesterday that he understood Her Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen had made a proposition to the Danish Government for a joint representation to Russia in favour of Poland, when M. Hall had replied that, while perfectly willing to assist in so praiseworthy an undertaking, it was to be observed that Denmark had not been a party to the Treaty of Vienna.

Count Manderström proceeded to insinuate that perhaps there had been some mistake on this subject, and that the proposal made at Copenhagen might have been intended for Stockholm.

His Excellency added that, in order to clear up all doubt about this matter, he had addressed Count Wachtmeister confidentially respecting it.

I could only repeat to Count Manderström what I had said to the French Chargé d'Affaires, as stated in my despatch above mentioned, namely, by denying all official knowledge on the point in question, although I had of course been repeatedly informed by the public journals that your Lordship had made the said proposition to the Government of Sweden as one of the parties to the Treaty of Vienna.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 319.

*Admiral Harris to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 36).

My Lord,

*Berne, March 30, 1863.*

MEETINGS in favour of the Poles have been held in this city, at Olten and in a few other places.

Much sympathy has been expressed, but, as far as I can ascertain, the subscriptions hitherto raised are of small amount; nor do I hear of any Swiss volunteers disposed to risk their lives in the cause.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 320.

*Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 29).

My Lord,

*Munich, March 31, 1863.*

I INQUIRED lately of Baron Shrenk whether there was any foundation for the statement put forth by the German Press, that the Bavarian and other German Representatives at Frankfort had brought before the Diet, or intended to bring before that Body, the question of the Convention entered into between Russia and Prussia, on the grounds that such a Convention might expose the German territory to violation, and consequently might involve the Germanic Confederation in war.

Baron Schrenk replied that, as far as he was informed, this question had never been mooted at Frankfort, and he had received no intimation from M. Von der Pfordten that the point in question was likely to be raised. His Excellency added that there was no doubt that according to the stipulations of the Final Act of the Treaty of Vienna, the Diet might have applied to Prussia to make known to it the terms of this Convention.

It had, however, not done so, and under the present circumstances it was perhaps better that no fresh discordant question had been brought forward at the Diet to envelop the relations between Prussia and Southern Germany.

I observed to his Excellency that the Province of Eastern Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Posen were not included in the territory of the Germanic Confederation, and that consequently Silesia was the only portion of the Prussian territory coming within the terms prescribed by the Article of the Final Act of Vienna. His Excellency informed me that a declaration had been made in 1849 by Prussia at Frankfort, announcing that Eastern Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Posen were annexed to the German Confederation, but that this declaration had been subsequently recalled by Prussia in 1852, and that its annulment had been officially recorded in the Protocols of the Diet.

But his Excellency said, that according to the stipulations of the Final Act of the Treaty of Vienna, it might be a question how far Prussia, as a member of the Confederation, was authorized to enter into a Convention with a foreign State without the assent of that Body, which in its consequences might bring about a violation of the German territory.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

† No. 321.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 193).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 3, 1863.*

SEVERAL important subjects occupied the attention of the Chamber of Deputies in the sitting of the 31st ultimo.

First of all the Minister of Finance introduced a Bill intended to supply the place of the unsuccessful Budget of last session. It contains an account of the income and expenditure of the year 1862, which, from the financial point of view, is of a satisfactory character, showing, instead of the estimated deficit of 3,385,000 thalers, a *bonâ fide* surplus of 5,269,854 thalers. M. de Bodelschwing expressed the hope, in the name of the Government, that the House would pass this measure, thereby giving a retrospective sanction to the expenditure incurred last year, and extricating the country from the abnormal position into which the interruption of the ordinary financial legislature had placed it.

The Bill having been referred to the Budget Committee, M. de Bismarck laid before the House the Treaties with Belgium and the Protocol signed on the 28th ultimo, copies of which were transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch [No. 190] of the 28th of March.

The House next occupied itself with three several motions arising out of the Polish question.

The first had reference to the petition of certain persons who prayed that the Government should be urged to annul the Convention with Russia. The Committee of Petitions moved that the House should proceed to the order of the day, the subject of the Convention having been exhausted on the occasion of the last Polish debate. A lengthy discussion arose, in the course of which, the Minister President and the Polish policy of the Government were severely attacked by several speakers; MM. Syhel, Verihow, and Waldeck amongst the number.

M. de Bismarck, who suffered from indisposition, met these attacks by charging the House with occupying itself with matters of which it knew nothing. It brought accusations against the Government founded upon information derived from debates in foreign Parliaments, from communications made by foreign Governments, from newspaper articles. He, M. de Bismarck, would answer these accusations by again positively declaring that whatever stood in contradiction to his own assertions, no matter from what source that contradiction came, was untrue. The House might prefer believing foreign Governments to believing their own, but should remember that the assertions of the former rested on conjecture only, and did not pretend to the accuracy of positive knowledge. The House knew nothing of the nature of the Convention, and did not even know whether it existed or had ceased to exist. Its only chance of approximating to a knowledge of the truth was to note what on various occasions he had stated that the Convention was not.

In the course of the debate M. de Rönne adverted to the Cartel Convention of 1857, and wished the House to express an opinion to the effect that it was invalid in consequence of never having received the legislative sanction required by section 48 of the Constitution. The speaker was, however, called to order by the President, on the ground that this Convention formed no part of the question before the House.

The discussion having been brought to a close by the adoption of the Committee's recommendation to pass over to the order of the day, there followed the interpellation of the Polish section (fraction). It called upon the Government to state whether it was their intention to deliver up to the Russian authorities the Russo-Polish prisoners now in their hands.

Count Eulenburg answered that the persons to whom the interpellation referred be-

longed to different categories, and that their treatment, therefore, would differ accordingly. He could state, however, that the intentions of the Government generally were in the direction of clemency („milde“), and that there was all the more room for this, that it was to be foreseen that a majority of cases would turn out to be those of persons who had been forced against their inclination to participate in the movement. On the other hand, he must declare that the Government could not withdraw itself from the obligation imposed upon it by Laws and Treaties.

It should be remarked, with reference to the above declaration, that although the interpellation itself, to which it is an answer, only refers to Russo-Polish subjects, the so-called printed „motives“ or preamble by which every motion is accompanied, speak of Prussian subjects in custody for participation in the late troubles. It is evident that the first part of Count Eulenburg's declaration refers to the latter class.

Lastly, there was read the interpellation of M. de Syhél. It called upon the Government to state: —

1. What costs had been incurred in the concentration of troops along the Polish frontier.

2. Whence the funds to defray these costs had been derived.

General Rönne replied, that it was quite impossible at present to estimate this cost, and that the expenses hitherto had been defrayed from the military chest.

The House thereupon adjourned for the Easter recess.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

†† No. 322.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 195).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 4, 1863.*

[<sup>1</sup>I OBSERVE in the „Times“ of the 2nd instant, which arrived here this morning, a very violent article commenting on the declaration made in the Second Chamber by Count Eulenburg to which I referred in my despatch No. 193 of yesterday's date. I therefore] think it right to state that I have reason to believe that as a great proportion of the fugitives from Poland into Prussia are Prussian subjects and many of them belong to the Landwehr, his Excellency meant to say that Prussian fugitives would be treated with clemency, but that the Prussian Government could not refuse to fulfil their international engagements with Russia in cases in which the extradition of Russian subjects coming under the stipulations of these Treaties might be demanded by Russia.

I am assured by M. de Bismarck that he is only aware of six persons having been given up to the Russian authorities since the beginning of the insurrection; namely, four

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).



arrested at Thorn, and two, of whom one was a Russian officer who had assassinated the Major of his regiment, and the other an Ensign who had deserted.

[<sup>1</sup> His Excellency does not expect that a general claim will be made by Russia for the extradition of all Russian subjects compromised in the insurrection, who may have escaped into Prussia, and he tells me that all not so claimed will be sent at the expense of the Government into France.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.]

No. 323.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 196. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 4, 1863.*

In a conversation which I had this morning with M. de Bismarck, his Excellency said that Germany was now becoming aware that the Convention with Russia of the 8th February had not been entirely useless in checking Prince Gortchakoff's plans for a Russian alliance with France; and he repeated all he had already told me as to the origin of the agreement and the views of the Prussian Government in signing it.

He made a very long statement on the subject, which did not vary in any important particular from those which I have already had the honour of reporting to your Lordship; and when he had finished, I replied he, perhaps, was not aware that the Emperor of Russia has declared that Prussia proposed the Convention to him, and afterwards asked him to take the initiative in abrogating it. M. de Bismarck said he could not believe that the Emperor of Russia had ever made the first part of this statement, as it was entirely untrue, but that he may possibly have made the second, as his Ministers had led him to believe, till he was undeceived by the King of Prussia, that the Prussian Government wished the Convention to be abrogated; but so far was this from having been the case, that though they had no wish to give effect to its stipulations, the King had positively refused to consent to its formal abrogation, in the face of the foreign opposition likely to be made to it.

After leaving M. de Bismarck I had some conversation on this subject with my Austrian colleague, who stated to me that he had positive information that the Convention was a trap of Prince Gortchakoff's, in which he was himself caught, and that his Excellency had drawn up the Convention in terms to which he believed the Prussian Government would not assent, in order to put a stop to their interference with his policy with respect to Poland.

If Count Carolyi's information is correct, the conjecture which I made in my despatch No. 166 of the 21st ultimo as to Prince Gortchakoff's motives in the transaction proves to have been well founded.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).



†† No. 324.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 200).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 4, 1863.*

IN a conversation which I had this morning with M. de Bismarek, I expressed surprise that while Austria appeared to consider she might, without any danger to her Polish province, co-operate with Her Majesty's Government and that of France in endeavouring to obtain from the Government of Russia those rights which the people of Poland are entitled to claim, Prussia should hold aloof, and exhibit herself to Europe as the ally of Russia in the oppression of Polish nationality; and I said it seemed to me that it would be worth her while to attract to herself some of the European sympathy and approval which Austria was likely to gain in this question.

He replied it was impossible for Prussia to change a policy which she had pursued for the last two years; and, after warning the Emperor of Russia, during that time, of the inevitable consequences of encouraging Polish aspirations after nationality, to call upon him now to grant the Poles the autonomy claimed for them.

[<sup>1</sup> He said he believed Prince Gortchakoff and the Marquis Wielopolski to have been endeavouring to form an anti-German Panslavonic League in alliance with France, in which the autonomy of Poland would have been a principal feature; and the policy of the Prussian Government at St. Petersburg having been hitherto to oppose these schemes, they could not now change it, nor could they alter their opinion that an independent Poland would be a great danger for Prussia.

I replied, that if Poland ever should become independent, it seemed to me she would be a weaker neighbour on their frontier than Russia, and that he would do well to remember how the action of Austria in the Crimean war had been crippled by the exposure of her northern frontier to the armies of Russia.

I said I made these observations to him entirely from my own friendly feelings towards Prussia, and from my regret at perceiving that Her Majesty's Government evidently considered that there was little or no probability of their own just and humane views with respect to Poland meeting with any sympathy at Berlin.

M. de Bismarek, in speaking of the schemes entertained at Paris for the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland, said that he understood that Austria was also to have been invited to cede Venice to Italy, and to accept as an equivalent for that province and Galicia either Silesia or the Danubian Principalities. He said Count Karolyi had acknowledged to him that the cession of Galicia to Poland had been suggested by the French Ambassador at Vienna, but he had no fear of „such infantine“ projects being seriously listened to by the Austrian Government.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.]

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

† No. 325.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 202).

My Lord,

Berlin, April 4, 1863.

WITH reference to my despatch [No. 176] of the 26th ultimo, I am informed by M. de Bismarck that an insurrectionary movement had taken place at Polangen, near the Russian frontier, evidently with a view to receive the arms expected by the „Ward Jackson“. That vessel had, however, he said put into Malmoe about five days ago, in consequence of the English crew having refused to proceed further in her. She had embarked a new crew, but is still believed to be at Malmoe. The „Gipsy Queen“, he said, did not appear to have passed the Sound.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 326.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 170).

My Lord,

Vienna, April 2, 1863.

ON the 28th ultimo a deputation of fifty members of the last Hungarian Diet met at Pesth for the purpose of presenting to M. Déak an album containing photographs of all the members of the Upper and Lower Houses of 1861.

The meeting, as might have been expected, became a political demonstration; and Baron Eötvös, who had been chosen to deliver the album to M. Déak, is said to have made a speech containing so striking an appeal to the national and independent feelings of the Assembly, that every newspaper in which it was published the next morning at Pesth was seized.

The following is the only portion of it that has been allowed to appear in print:— „Considering this album as a symbol of the concord which reigned amongst the members of the last Diet, may it serve as a pledge of that fidelity with which the nation clings to its laws. It is our conviction that the object of the nation can only be attained in the way pointed out by the last Diet, and hereon we take our stand“.

The answer of M. Déak, however, is given at some length and I have the honour to inclose the translation of it, by Mr. Barrington, which clearly shows that the Hungarian nation are as determined as ever to maintain their autonomy, and to refuse any co-operation in the Constitution for the whole Austrian Empire, which was promulgated in February 1861.

I understand that this meeting at Pesth has had the effect rather of confirming than of shaking the Austrian Government in the decision, reported in my No. 152 of the [26th] ultimo, that the present moment is inopportune for meddling in the affairs of Hungary.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 326.

*Speech of M. Déak on receiving present of a Photographic Album.*

(Translation).

NO greater distinction can be shown to a simple citizen who, when striving with you for the good of all, only did what was his duty, than that which you, my friends, in your own name and in that of our absent colleagues, have just shown to me. In public life the most valued gift is the love and confidence of one's fellow-citizens, and in token of this love and confidence you have just presented me with this testimonial as a symbol of that unity of purpose of which our country stands so much in need. I can only express the gratitude which I shall always feel by such simple words as spring from the depths of my heart, but you will yet learn by them to understand and esteem the sentiments by which they are inspired. The cause in which we are all bound up together is the sacred cause of our own country; and we have taken our stand upon legal ground. Opinions may vary as to the benefit to be derived from individual laws; forms of government, constitutions, the leading principles of legislation, are subject to transformation in every nation; but there is one principle which remains eternal and unassailable, and which must be maintained wherever justice is supreme, that one, namely, which provides for the laws continuing in full force until their suspension by the proper legal authority. This principle affords the sole sure basis on which to build the rights of both governing and governed, and history proves that in countries which have perished from internal disunion and demoralisation, the first step to ruin was the non-observance of the laws. It was this principle which guided us in our addresses, wherein we urged the strict maintenance of our laws.

Our position was the very opposite of a revolutionary one, the grounds on which we assumed it being purely legal, as all we demanded was that the laws which were framed in order to give an equal guarantee for the privileges of both ruler and nation should neither be strained nor superseded. These addresses produced no result, but this fact does not cancel those duties which are imposed on me by law, nor does it entitle me to deviate from that path which is clearly assigned to me by law; and, indeed, any other would be dubious, and even dangerous. I cannot bring the respect I owe to the laws into collision with the loyalty I owe to the Ruler, for, according to my notions, the Ruler is the personification of the laws; and whilst labouring in the interest of the latter, I at the same time guard the privileges of the former. The fate of nations is in God's hand; events which no one is capable either of foreseeing or controlling may frustrate the purest intentions, but still we shall bear the strokes of fate with far more equanimity if we loyally fulfil our duties as citizens in defence of the laws, than if we, possibly with well-meant yet mistaken motives, resign, to no purpose, a position which is a sacred bequest of past ages. For 900 years our nation has existed here; we have already survived hard times; internal dissensions and external foes have often brought us to the verge of destruction; yet through all these struggles we have ever maintained our independence, our laws, and our Constitution. And yet in these 900 years we had suffered

ourselves to commit a great injustice; that injustice, namely, which was exercised by the class which had no share in the general burden, against the others which had to bear burdens enough, but which had no share in the privileges of citizens. This moral crime was atoned for in 1848, in which year the nation, from a feeling of duty, performed an act of justice towards the people.

Divine Providence cannot permit that the moment in which a duty was fulfilled, the moment in which the Hungarian so honourably paid what was due to the people, should also signalize the last flicker of national life, and that the country should be stripped of its independence, its Constitution, and its freedom, just as it was at the point of discharging a sacred debt. The time will come when those who now wish to annihilate our constitutional independence in order to promote their own liberty will see that the freedom of one nation cannot be in hostile opposition to the freedom of another, and that it is false policy violently to upset the Constitution of the one in order to strengthen that of the other. Such policy is shallow, for it does not lead to that brotherly union which is essential to all freedom. We, therefore, will continue for the future to act up to our duty as citizens upon the principles already enunciated, and when we again have the opportunity of speaking on the affairs of our country, we will be as just to every nationality and to every class as we were to the people in 1848. In conclusion, my esteemed friends, receive my warmest thanks, and retain for me that hearty goodwill and friendship which to me is the greatest treasure of my life.

† No. 327.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 172).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 2, 1863.*

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 28th ultimo, stating that a collective note on the affairs of Poland to be addressed to Russia by Austria, England, and France, was under consideration, and that Her Majesty's Government hoped it would be drawn up in such terms that the Austrian Government, with whom they are most anxious to act, will consent to sign it, I lost no time in informing Count Rechberg of the communication which had reached me.

Having met with a trifling accident which prevented my leaving the house, his Excellency and the French Ambassador were kind enough to call on me together on Sunday. Count Rechberg said that he was most desirous to act on this question with England and France, but that the exceptional position of Austria in regard to her Polish Province of Galicia rendered it impossible for her to adopt exactly the same course as that which might be decided on by England and France; that he had taken the Emperor's orders, and submitted to His Imperial Majesty the draft of a despatch to be addressed to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, which he thought would answer the purpose we had in view; and at all events preserve a community of sentiment on the part of the three Powers.

His Excellency read this despatch, and as neither the Duc de Gramont nor myself saw the least chance of obtaining the assent of the Imperial Government to the principle of a collective note, it only remained for us to express our regret that Austria could not take the step in the form we had proposed.

Count Rechberg said that he was ready to forward the draft of his despatch to London and Paris, and that if approved of it might be communicated to Prince Gortchakoff at the same time as the notes of England and France.

Seeing that no better arrangement was likely to be obtained, we requested Count Rechberg to send off the necessary instructions to London and Paris without delay, which he promised to do, and Count Apponyi will probably have communicated the proposed Austrian despatch to your Lordship some days before this can reach your hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 328.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 173. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 2, 1863.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 172 of this day, on the subject of a proposed collective note to be addressed to the Russian Government by England, France, and Austria, on the affairs of Poland, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, though unwilling to adopt the form of a note, Count Rechberg is very desirous that the three Governments should act together with the object of obtaining serious concessions from the Emperor of Russia in favour of his Polish subjects. His Excellency feels strongly on the subject, and considers moreover that it is highly important and in the interests of peace that the policy of England and Austria should, as it were, be bound up with France, by which a cheque will be established on the more adventurous projects of the Emperor Napoleon.

Count Rechberg has informed me, with reference to the projected collective action of the three Powers at St. Petersburg, that the Duc de Gramont first called his attention to the subject about ten days ago, and appeared greatly surprised that I had not made any communication to his Excellency respecting the plan, which he gave him moreover to understand had originated with Her Majesty's Government.

Finding that I was without orders, the Duc de Gramont, it appears, telegraphed to Paris, and he received a messenger on Saturday morning with instructions to submit the project to Count Rechberg, and was again surprised to hear from his Excellency that I had made no communication to him, and it was only later in the day that I received your Lordship's telegram alluded to in my other despatch.

No sooner was Count Rechberg aware of the communications your Lordship had sent me than he at once decided on the course that would be most advantageous to

the interests of the Austrian Government, the adoption of which, he thought, would also partially satisfy Her Majesty's Government and that of France, and prove the willingness of Austria to act with us simultaneously at St. Petersburg, though declining to do so in the form of a collective note.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 329.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 174. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 2, 1863.*

I READ with surprise news published some days ago in the „Cologne Gazette“, of a project of the Emperor Napoleon to re-establish an independent Kingdom of Poland under the Duke of Leuchtenberg; and on alluding to it in the course of a conversation with Count Rechberg, his Excellency said there might be some truth in the intelligence.

He then proceeded to explain that immediately after the departure of Prince Metternich for Paris, the Duc de Gramont (who, he observed, had received a messenger two days previously, and had probably deferred his visit till after the Prince had left Vienna), came to him and entered into a desolatory conversation on the affairs of Poland. He talked of the independence of Poland, of the establishment of a separate kingdom, to which Galicia and Posen should be joined, observing facetiously that Austria would care little about Galicia, as Prussia would lose Posen.

Count Rechberg said that at first he could not believe the French Ambassador was speaking seriously, but he was persuaded that he acted in pursuance of instructions, and he was, therefore, obliged to answer that Austria could entertain no such project as the cession of a valuable province, and that he did not see how a proposition of the kind could be made unless accompanied with the offer of an equivalent.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was evidently as little prepared for such a proposal coming from the French Ambassador as the public was to read of the project, attributed in the papers to the French Emperor, of placing the Duc of Leuchtenberg on the throne of Poland.

His Excellency hopes that if the plan was at one time seriously entertained in high quarters at Paris, it is for the moment abandoned; his accounts, he added, are more tranquillizing than they were a fortnight ago, and the Emperor is reported to be much less excited about Poland than he was.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 330.

*Sir A. Malet to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 37).

My Lord,

*Frankfort, April 4, 1863.*

REFERRING to Lord A. Loftus' despatch No. 29 of the 31st March, which I have had the honour of receiving under flying seal, I beg to state that I would not have failed to acquaint your Lordship if any idea had existed of bringing the Prusso-Russian Convention before the Diet.

If the existence of this reported Convention had been proved, and if its terms implied an infraction of existing European Treaties, it would have come within the scope of the second paragraph of Article XXXVI and of Article XXXVII of the Final Act of the Vienna Conferences, and any foreign State which conceived itself to be aggrieved might have complained, or protest against such Convention to the Diet.

In the present instance, there seems little doubt, if the Convention in its original form was such as I had the honour of reporting to your Lordship in my despatch No. 20, marked Confidential, of the 20th February last, that it would have been competent to any one or more of the States Parties to the Treaties of Vienna, to complain singly or collectively to the Diet of such a measure having being taken by one of its members. It also seems clear by the terms of Article XLVII of the same Final Act, that the Diet would have been in no wise bound to assist in defending Prussia from any of the consequences which might have ensued to that Power, if she had engaged herself to Russia in the manner that has been surmised.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 331.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, April 6, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG is willing not only to authorize Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to leave with Prince Gortchakoff a copy of the proposed despatch, but to direct him to transmit one in a note.

His Excellency received a telegram this morning from Prince Metternich, saying French Government would be better pleased if the despatch to Russia were more decided. He does not refuse to modify it.

No. 332.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 6, 1863.*

I HAVE received the following figures from Lord Bloomfield: —

„Count Rechberg is willing not only to authorize Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to leave with Prince Gortchakoff a copy of proposed despatch, but to direct him to transmit one in a note.

„His Excellency received a telegram this morning from prince Metternich, saying that the French Government would be better pleased if the despatch to Russia were more decided.

„He does not refuse to modify it“.

No. 333.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 6, 1863, 4 p. m.*

NOTHING is known here of the news which you transmitted to me from St. Petersburg. Is it possible that the Russian Government have heard of the King of Sweden's offer?

No. 334.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 6, 1863.*

You will not communicate to Drouyn de Lhuys the draft to Napier which I sent to you in my private letter of the 4th instant till you get a copy of the despatch as signed.

No. 335.

*Proposed Despatch to the Duc de Montebello. — (Communicated to Earl Russell by Baron Gros, April 6).*

M. le Duc,

*Paris, le Avril, 1863.*

L'INSURRECTION dont le Royaume de Pologne est en ce moment le théâtre a excitée en Europe, au milieu d'un repos qu'aucun incident prochain ne semblait devoir altérer, une émotion aussi générale que profonde.



Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté obéit donc à un devoir en exprimant à la Cour de Russie les réflexions que cet état des choses est de nature à suggérer, et en signalant à sa sollicitude les inconvénients et les dangers qu'il entraîne.

Ce qui caractérise les agitations de la Pologne, M. le Duc, ce qui en fait la gravité exceptionnelle, c'est qu'elles ne sont pas le résultat d'une crise passagère. Les effets qui se reproduisent, presque invariablement à chaque génération, ne sauraient être attribués à des causes purement accidentelles. Ces convulsions devenues périodiques sont le symptôme d'un mal invétéré; elles attestent l'impuissance des combinaisons imaginées jusqu'ici pour réconcilier le Royaume de Pologne avec la situation qui lui a été faite.

D'autre part, ces perturbations trop fréquentes sont, toutes les fois qu'elles éclatent, un sujet d'inquiétude et d'alarmes. La Pologne, qui occupe en Europe une position centrale, ne saurait être troublée sans que les États placés dans le voisinage immédiat de ses frontières se ressentent de cet ébranlement. C'est ce qui est arrivé à toutes les époques où la Pologne a pris les armes. Ces conflits, comme on peut en juger par celui dont nous sommes en ce moment témoins, n'ont pas seulement pour conséquence d'agiter les esprits d'une manière inquiétante, mais en se prolongeant, ils pourraient troubler les rapports des Cabinets et faire naître les plus regrettables complications.

Nous aimons à espérer, M. le Duc, que la Cour de Russie accueillera, dans le sentiment qui nous les a dictées, des considérations aussi dignes de son attention. Elle se montrera animée, nous en avons la confiance, des dispositions libérales dont le règne de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Alexandre a déjà donné de si éclatants témoignages, et elles reconnaîtront, dans sa sagesse, l'opportunité d'aviser aux moyens de replacer le Royaume de Pologne dans les conditions d'une paix durable.

Vous voudrez bien donner lecture de cette dépêche à M. le Prince Gortchakoff et lui en remettre une copie.

† No. 336.

*Count Rechberg to Count Apponyi. — (Communicated to Earl Russell by Count Apponyi, April 7).*

M. le Comte,

Vienne, le 31 Mars, 1863.

LE Duc de Gramont et Lord Bloomfield ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements de m'entretenir d'un projet de démarche identique et collective que les deux Cabinets de Paris et de Londres auraient en vue de faire à St. Pétersbourg pour demander au Gouvernement Russe de replacer le Royaume de Pologne dans des conditions propres à y assurer le retour et le maintien de la tranquillité.

Mes dépêches antérieures sur la question Polonaise ont toujours établi que malgré certain rapprochement entre nos appréciations et celles des Gouvernements Anglais et Français, nous ne pouvions cependant nous placer entièrement sur la même ligne.

Je me suis assez étendu sur ce point vis-à-vis de votre Excellence pour qu'il soit superflu d'y revenir ici. Je me bornerai donc à vous dire que dans mes conversations avec les deux Ambassadeurs j'ai de nouveau insisté sur les graves motifs qui forçaient

l'Autriche à observer dans la question Polonaise une réserve conforme à sa situation particulière essentiellement différente de celles des deux autres Puissances. Passant ensuite à l'examen de l'affaire spéciale qui se trouvait en cause j'ai dû faire observer que dans une démarche pareille à celle dont il s'agissait le point de départ pour l'Autriche se trouvait être naturellement tout autre que pour l'Angleterre et la France.

La possession de la Galicie rend en effet le Gouvernement Impérial fort intéressé à ce que la Pologne Russe ne redevienne point le théâtre de troubles et de conflits sanglants. Nous devons en conséquence nous fonder avant tout sur les embarras suscités au Gouvernement Impérial par l'agitation qui règne dans le voisinage immédiat de ses frontières, pour demander à l'Empereur Alexandre qu'il porte remède à cet état de choses.

Nous souffrons d'ailleurs trop directement de ce qui vient de se passer en Pologne, pour ne pas être dans le cas d'exprimer au Gouvernement Russe notre désir de voir prévenir le retour de semblables événements. Aussi sommes-nous disposés à adresser à notre Chargé d'Affaires à St. Pétersbourg la dépêche dont votre Excellence trouvera ci-près le projet. Elle nous semblerait correspondre autant que notre situation particulière le permet aux vues des Cabinets de Paris et de Londres.

Je vous autorise à en donner confidentiellement connaissance à Lord Russell, qui verra, j'espère, dans cette communication une preuve de notre désir de nous rapprocher des vues Anglaises.

Ainsi que je l'ai fait remarquer à Lord Bloomfield et au Duc de Gramont, la nuance qui sépare en cette occasion l'attitude de l'Autriche de celle des deux autres Cours trouve son explication dans la nature même des choses. En élevant sa voix en faveur des Polonais, l'Autriche, qui possède elle-même une province Polonaise, doit tenir un langage à part. Mais si ce langage tend vers le même but que celui qui est poursuivi par la France et l'Angleterre, il peut servir ainsi à constater l'harmonie qui règne entre les trois Puissances.

Nous croyons tenir compte par là, autant que nous le pouvons, des vœux qui nous ont été exprimés; et nous aimons à penser que notre projet, présenté avec ces explications, trouvera un accueil favorable auprès du Gouvernement Anglais.

Une dépêche identique, contenant la même annexe, est adressée à l'Ambassadeur de l'Empereur à Paris.

Recevez, &c.

(Signed)

RECHBERG.

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Inclosure in No. 336.

*Draft of Despatch from Count Rechberg to Count Thun.*

*Vienne, le*

DEPUIS la défaite et la dispersion des bandes armées les plus importantes par leur nombre et leur organisation, l'insurrection en Pologne peut être considérée comme réduite à des proportions moins grandes [sérieuses].

Ce fait, qui dégage le Gouvernement Russe de ce qu'il devait jusqu'ici à des considérations de dignité et d'honneur militaire, nous permet d'appeler aujourd'hui son attention sur l'influence fâcheuse que les troubles de Pologne exercent sur nos propres frontières.

En effet il est impossible que la Galicie ne se ressente pas d'événements aussi déplorables que ceux qui viennent de se passer dans le voisinage immédiat de ses frontières. De graves embarras sont ainsi suscités au Gouvernement Impérial, qui doit donc attacher un prix tout particulier à en voir prévenir le retour. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg comprendra sans doute lui-même les dangers des convulsions périodiques qui agitent la Pologne, et il reconnaîtra l'opportunité d'aviser au moyen d'y mettre un terme en remplaçant les provinces Polonaises soumises à la Russie dans les conditions d'une paix durable.

On éviterait de la sorte des conséquences fâcheuses pour l'Europe entière et pour les contrées qui souffrent plus directement des conflits qui, comme les derniers que nous venons de voir éclater, ont inévitablement l'effet d'agiter l'opinion d'une manière inquiétante pour les Cabinets et capables de faire naître de regrettables complications.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, présenter sous la forme la plus amicale ces observations à M. le Vice-Chancelier, et nous informer de l'accueil qu'elles auront rencontré.

Recevez, &c.

†† No. 337.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 7).*

(No. 398).

My Lord,

*Paris, April 5, 1863.*

[<sup>1</sup>I HAVE communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the substance of your Lordship's despatch No. 443 of yesterday's date, in which you inclose copies of the papers which had been placed in your hands by Count Apponyi, indicating the course which the Austrian Government proposed to pursue with respect to the Polish question, and you state the impression made upon you by the perusal of them and the steps which you desire that Her Majesty's and the French Governments should take].

M. Drouyn de Lhuys [<sup>1</sup>expressed his general concurrence in your Lordship's views and he] said that he was preparing the draft of the despatch which he proposed addressing to the Duc de Montebello, and that he would send it to-morrow night to Baron Gros for communication to your Lordship. He hoped that your Lordship would equally communicate to him the despatch which you might decide on sending to Lord Napier.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to read to me some extracts from a despatch dated the 3rd instant, which he had received this morning from the Duc de Grammont, and from which it would appear that on the Duke representing to Count Rechberg the desire of his Government that a copy of the Austrian despatch should be left with Prince Gortchakoff, Count Rechberg had replied that he had so intended it, and that a formal order

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

should be given to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in that sense. The Duc de Grammont then proposed that the three despatches should be communicated to the Russian Vice-Chancellor by the three Representatives at St. Petersburg in identic though separate, notes, and he says that Count Rechberg did not altogether object to this course. M. Drouyn de Lhuys would prefer it, and will write in that sense to the Duc de Grammont, but without making a point of it, and he hopes that your Lordship will do the same.

When the three Governments shall have agreed as to the manner in which their several despatches shall be worded, and communicated to Prince Gortchakoff (the communications should be effected, in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion, with as much simultaneity as possible), his Excellency proposes that each of the three Governments should send copies of the three despatches to their Representatives at other Courts, and invite those Courts to join in the demonstration in favour of Poland in such measure as they may deem advisable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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Inclosure in No. 337.

*Identic Note proposed to be addressed to the Russian Government.*

LE Soussigné ayant reçu de son Gouvernement la dépêche ci-jointe relative à des observations qu'il est chargé de présenter à son Excellence M. le Vice-Chancelier, ne croit pas pouvoir mieux faire que de transmettre à son Excellence la copie du document où elles sont consignées.

Le Soussigné &c.

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No. 338.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. -- (Received April 7).*

(No. 401).

My Lord,

*Paris, April 6, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just written to inform me that the Austrian Government are willing to adopt the project of note inclosed in my despatch No. 398 of yesterday's date, as the means of transmitting to Prince Gortchakoff the copy of the despatch which Count Rechberg is about to address to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg with reference to the Polish question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 339.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 7).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 6, 1863, 11.45 p. m.*

I HAVE made no communication of your despatch to Drouyn, but may I beg of you not to send any to St. Petersburg, without a previous understanding with this Government not as to its contents, but as to the instructions to be given with it.

I have informed Drouyn, according to your instructions, that you Wish to act in concert with this Government; and if your despatch is signed and sent to St. Petersburg without previously communicating it here, he may think that he has been set aside. His despatch to Montebello will not be sent to its destination before you have seen it, and it is advisable, he thinks, that arrangements should be made that all three despatches should reach St. Petersburg about the same time.

No. 340.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1863, 1.45 p. m.*

THE despatch for St. Petersburg shall be sent to Paris before going to its destination. It will not be ready for two or three days probably.

No. 341.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1863, 2.30 p. m.*

I HAVE received the following figures from Lord Napier: —

„Russian Minister trusts that Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that Russia has decidedly no aggressive intentions whatever. Great reductions having been made of late years in the army, the Government thought it right, with a view to general aspect of affairs, to complete their forces. Apprehensions of France, and the state of Lithuania, are probably chief motives; but, doubtless, army has been much reduced“.

No. 342.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1863, 6.40 p. m.*

HER Majesty's Government hope French despatch will not be read to Prince Gortchakoff till that of British Government arrives at Petersburg.

No. 343.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 475).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1863.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatches Nos. 398 and 401 of the 5th and 6th instant, that Her Majesty's Government think that as the despatches which the British, French, and Austrian Governments propose to address to the Court of Russia on the subject of Poland will not be identie, it would be better that they should not be communicated to the Russian Government in identie notes, but that copies of them should merely be given to Prince Gortchakoff by the respective Ambassadors.

Her Majesty's Government, however, will be prepared to adopt either course.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 344.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield<sup>1</sup>.*

(No. —).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office; April 8, 1863.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. — of the 4th ultimo, in which I forwarded to your Lordship a copy of an instruction which I had addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, relative to the state of affairs in Poland, I inclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have received in reply from His Excellency<sup>2</sup>.

Your Lordship will read Lord Napier's despatch to Count Rechberg.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 345.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 8).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, April 8, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG hears from Prince Metternich that copies of the despatches for Russia to be addressed by England and France, will be here on Friday morning. He desires to see me on that day, and will be prepared to despatch a messenger to St. Petersburg the same evening.

<sup>1</sup> Similar despatches were addressed to Sir A. Buchanan, Sir A. Paget, Sir J. Crampton, Sir A. Magenis, Sir J. Hudson, and Mr. Jerningham.

<sup>2</sup> No. 207.

†† No. 346.

*Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(No. 72).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1863.*

IN reference to your Excellency's despatch [No. 195] of the 4th instant, I shall be glad to learn what was the fate of the four persons arrested at Thorn, — whether they or any other persons delivered up by Prussia have been put to death by the Russian authorities; and also whether, under the Convention of 1857, political refugees from Russian Poland must, according to the terms of that Convention, be delivered up by Prussia on the demand of Russia?

[<sup>1</sup> Be so good as to answer these questions by telegraph].

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 347.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 76).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1863.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch marked No. 173, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, reporting a conversation which you had held with Count Rechberg on the subject of the proposed collective note to the Russian Government respecting the affairs of Poland.

The form of a collective note, but not by Austria, England, and France alone, was suggested by the French Government and adopted by Her Majesty's Government.

At a later time the French Government desired that the question should be postponed till Prince Metternich's return from Vienna.

Since that time the French Government has revived the proposal as one fit to be adopted by Austria, England, and France only. Her Majesty's Government willingly adopted the suggestion.

I should be glad to learn what are the serious reforms in the Kingdom of Poland which, in the opinion of Count Rechberg, Russia could introduce with good effect. The views of Her Majesty's Government have been fully explained in the despatch of March 2 to Lord Napier, a copy of which was forwarded to your Excellency in my despatch No. 55 of the 4th of that month.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

RUSSELL.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

No. 348.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 9).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 9, 1863, 10.45 a. m.*

THE French despatch will certainly not be communicated to Gortchakoff until yours can be communicated at the same time. The intention of sending the former to St. Petersburg to-morrow was taken in consequence of Gros having informed Drouyn that your despatch would be here yesterday, and at Vienna on Friday. Drouyn, therefore, supposing yours to be gone, determined on sending off his to Vienna, so as to reach there simultaneously with yours; and he calculated that if Reechberg had observations or objections to make, they might be known here by the telegraph before Friday evening.

† No. 349.

*Amended Draft of Despatch to the Duc de Montebello. — (Communicated to Earl Russell by Baron Gros, April 9).*

M. le Duc,

*Paris, le Avril, 1863.*

L'INSURRECTION dont le Royaume de Pologne est en ce moment le théâtre a éveillé en Europe de vives préoccupations, au milieu d'un repos qu'aucun événement prochain ne semblait devoir altérer. La déplorable effusion de sang dont cette lutte est l'occasion, et les douloureux incidents qui la signalent, excitent en même temps une émotion aussi générale que profonde.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté obéit donc à un devoir en exprimant à la Cour de Russie les réflexions que cet état de choses est de nature à suggérer, et en signalant à sa sollicitude les inconvénients et les dangers qu'il entraîne.

Ce qui caractérise les agitations de la Pologne, M. le Duc, ce qui en fait la gravité exceptionnelle, c'est qu'elles ne sont pas le résultat d'une crise passagère. Des effets qui se reproduisent presque invariablement à chaque génération, ne sauraient être attribués à des causes purement accidentelles. Ces convulsions devenues périodiques sont le symptôme d'un mal invétéré; elles attestent l'impuissance des combinaisons imaginées jusqu'ici pour réconcilier le Royaume de Pologne avec la situation qui lui a été faite.

D'autre part, ces perturbations trop fréquentes, sont, toutes les fois qu'elles éclatent, un sujet d'inquiétude et d'alarmes. La Pologne, qui occupe en Europe une position centrale, ne saurait être troublée sans que les Etats placés dans le voisinage immédiat de ses frontières se ressentent de cet ébranlement. C'est ce qui est arrivé à toutes les époques où la Pologne a pris les armes. Ces conflits, comme on peut en juger par celui dont nous sommes en ce moment témoins, n'ont pas seulement pour conséquence d'agiter les esprits d'une manière inquiétante; mais, en se prolongeant, ils pourraient troubler les rapports des Cabinets, et faire naître les plus regrettables complications. Nous aimons à espérer, M. le Duc, que la Cour de Russie accueillera, dans le sentiment qui nous les a dictées, des considérations aussi dignes de son attention. Elle se montrera animée, nous en avons



la confiance, des dispositions libérales dont le règne de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Alexandre a déjà donné de si éclatants témoignages, et elle reconnaîtra, dans sa sagesse, l'opportunité d'aviser aux moyens de replacer le Royaume de Pologne dans les conditions d'une paix durable.

Vous voudrez bien donner lecture de cette dépêche à M. le Prince Gortchakoff et lui en remettre une copie.

No. 350.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 484).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 9, 1863.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, a copy of a draft of a despatch on the affairs of Poland which has been communicated to me by Baron Gros<sup>1</sup>, and which the French Government propose to address to their Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 351.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley<sup>2</sup>.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 9, 1863.*

THE despatch for St. Petersburg is now ready, and will be sent by messenger to Paris to-night. The messenger will go on to Vienna. If nothing further occurs, a messenger will go to St. Petersburg to-morrow night, namely, Friday.

† No. 352.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley<sup>3</sup>.*

(No. 485).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 9, 1863.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, a draft of a despatch on the affairs of Poland which I propose to send to-morrow night to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg<sup>4</sup>, with instructions to communicate it to the Russian Government.

[Your Excellency will communicate a copy of this draft to M. Drouyn de Lhuys].

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

<sup>1</sup> No. 349.

<sup>2</sup> A similar telegram was addressed to Lord Bloomfield.

<sup>3</sup> A similar despatch was addressed to Lord Bloomfield.

<sup>4</sup> No. 354.

No. 353.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(No. 80).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 9, 1863.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, copies of the drafts of despatches on the affairs of Poland which have been communicated to me by Count Apponyi and Baron Gros<sup>1</sup>, and which the Austrian and French Governments propose to address to their respective Ambassadors at St. Petersburg.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed)      RUSSELL.

† No. 354.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(No. 88).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 10, 1863.*

HER Majesty's Government think it incumbent upon them to state once more to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia the deep interest which, in common with the rest of Europe, they take in the welfare of the Kingdom of Poland.

The general sympathy which is felt for the Polish nation might of itself justify Her Majesty's Government in making, in favour of the Polish race, an appeal to the generous and benevolent feelings of His Imperial Majesty, who has of late by various and important measures of improvement and reform, manifested an enlightened desire to promote the welfare of all classes of his subjects. But with regard to the Kingdom of Poland, Her Majesty's Government feel that the Government of Great Britain has a peculiar right to make its opinions known to that of His Imperial Majesty, because Great Britain having, in common with Austria, France, Prussia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, been a party to the Treaty of Vienna of June 1815, Her Majesty's Government are entitled to interpose with regard to any matter which may appear to them to constitute a departure from the provisions and stipulations of that Treaty.

By the first Article of that Treaty the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was erected into a Kingdom of Poland, to be inseparably attached to the Empire of Russia under certain conditions specified in that Article; and Her Majesty's Government are concerned to have to say that although the union of the Kingdom to the Empire has been maintained, the conditions on which that union was distinctly made to depend have not been fulfilled by the Russian Government.

The Emperor Alexander, in execution of the engagements contracted by the Treaty of Vienna, established in the Kingdom of Poland a national representation and national institutions corresponding with the stipulations of the Treaty. It is not necessary for Her Majesty's Government now to observe upon the manner in which those arrangements were practically administered from that time down to the revolt in 1831. But upon the

<sup>1</sup> Inclosure in No. 336; and No. 349.

suppression of that revolt by the success of the Imperial arms, those arrangements were swept away, and a totally different order of things was by the Imperial authority established.

Prince Gortchakoff argues, as his predecessors in office have on former occasions argued, that the suppression of that revolt cancelled all the engagements of Russia in the Treaty of Vienna with regard to the Kingdom of Poland, and left the Emperor of Russia at full liberty to deal with the Kingdom of Poland as with a conquered country, and to dispose of its people and institutions at his will. But Her Majesty's Government cannot acquiesce in a doctrine which they deem so contrary to good faith, so destructive of the obligation of Treaties, and so fatal to all the international ties which bind together the community of European States and Powers.

If, indeed, the Emperor of Russia had held Poland as part of the original dominions of his Crown, or if he had acquired it by the unassisted success of his arms, and unsanctioned by the consent of any other Power, he could have contended that might was equivalent to right, and, without listening to the dictates of generosity and justice, he might have punished a temporary revolt of a portion of his Polish subjects by depriving the whole of them and their descendants for ever of those privileges and institutions which his predecessor had deemed essential to the welfare and prosperity of the Polish Kingdom.

But the position of the Russian Sovereign with regard to the Kingdom of Poland was entirely different. He held that kingdom by the solemn stipulation of a Treaty made by him with Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden; and the revolt of the Poles could not release him from the engagements so contracted, nor obliterate the signatures by which his Plenipotentiaries had concluded, and he himself had ratified, those engagements.

The question, then, having arisen whether the engagements taken by Russia by the Treaty of Vienna have been and are now faithfully carried into execution, Her Majesty's Government, with deep regret, feel bound to say that this question must be answered in the negative.

With regard to the present revolt, Her Majesty's Government forbear to dwell upon that long course of action, civil, political, and military, carried on by the Russian Government within the Kingdom of Poland, of which the Poles so loudly complain, and to which they refer as the causes which occasioned, and in their opinion justified, their insurrection. Her Majesty's Government would rather advert to the much-wished-for termination of these lamentable troubles.

What may be the final issue of this contest it is not, indeed, for Her Majesty's Government to foretell; but whether the result shall be the more extended spread of the insurrection, and its assumption of dimensions not at present contemplated, or whether, as is more likely, that result shall be the ultimate success of the Imperial arms, it is clear and certain that neither result can be arrived at without a calamitous effusion of blood, a great sacrifice of human life, and an extensive devastation of property; and it is evident that even if Poland shall be reduced to subjection, the remembrance of the events of the struggle will long continue to make it the bitter enemy of Russia, and a source of weakness and of danger, instead of being an element of security and of strength.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, most earnestly entreat the Government of

Russia to give their most serious attention to all the foregoing considerations; and Her Majesty's Government would beg, moreover, to submit to the Imperial Government that, besides the obligations of Treaties, Russia, as a member of the community of European States, has duties of comity towards other nations to fulfil. The condition of things which has now for a long course of time existed in Poland is a source of danger, not to Russia alone, but also to the general peace of Europe.

The disturbances which are perpetually breaking out among the Polish subjects of His Imperial Majesty necessarily produce a serious agitation of opinion in other countries of Europe, tending to excite much anxiety in the minds of their Governments, and which might, under possible circumstances, produce complications of the most serious nature.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, fervently hope that the Russian Government will so arrange these matters that peace may be restored to the Polish people, and may be established upon lasting foundations.

Your Lordship will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, and you will give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

† No. 355.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(No. 89).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 10, 1863.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that you should concert with your Austrian and French colleagues as to the day on which you shall present to Prince Gortchakoff copies of the despatches respecting Poland which you are severally instructed to deliver to his Excellency.

The copies should be presented on the same day by each of you, though at separate interviews with the Russian Minister.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

†† No. 356.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier<sup>1</sup>*

(No. 90. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 10, 1863.*

I HAD a long conversation yesterday with Baron Brunnow, some parts of which were of much interest.

In a former conversation I had said to him that I could not be surprised that men

<sup>1</sup> Similar despatches were addressed to Lord Bloomfield and Earl Cowley.

driven to despair should commit wild deeds of revenge, or that the ferocious disciples of Mazzini should be guilty of assassinations; but that the acts of atrocity committed by the disciplined army of Russia excited, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, surprise as well as horror. Baron Brunnow had replied that dreadful crimes of savage cruelty had been perpetrated by the insurgents, and had given rise to acts of retaliation. He informed me yesterday that General Berg would take the command of the Russian army in Poland, [<sup>1</sup>and that the Grand Duke Constantine would probably leave the country]. He said that General Berg was an able commander, and was likely by his military arrangements to put an end to the insurrection. I replied that if General Berg was, as I believed, an officer of high repute, I hoped he would restore discipline in the Russian army in Poland, and punish these acts of insubordination and barbarous violence, which had hitherto been unrestrained. Baron Brunnow denied the truth of the stories in circulation upon this subject.

Baron Brunnow asked me some questions as to the nature of the representations about to be made at St. Petersburg, and when I told him that the despatch of Her Majesty's Government was chiefly founded on the non-observance of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, he expressed some satisfaction that we still founded our demands on the basis of that Treaty. But there was one question he felt he was entitled to ask, and that was whether the communication Her Majesty's Government were about to make at St. Petersburg was of a pacific nature.

I replied that it was, but that as I did not wish to mislead him I must say something more. Her Majesty's Government had no intentions that were otherwise than pacific, still less any concert with other Powers for any but pacific purposes.

But the state of things might change. The present overture of Her Majesty's Government might be rejected as the representation of the 2nd of March had been rejected by the Imperial Government. The insurrections in Poland might continue and might assume larger proportions; the atrocities on both sides might be aggravated and extended to a wider range of country. If in such a state of affairs the Emperor of Russia were to take no steps of a conciliatory nature, dangers and complications might arise not at present in contemplation.

Baron Brunnow said he could not call our former despatch an overture. The intentions of the Emperor towards Poland were most kind and benevolent. But there were projects afloat for altering the map of Europe. In these projects compensations to Russia were included. Russia entered into none of these projects; she wanted no compensation; she held by the present territorial arrangements of Europe, and he (Baron Brunnow) trusted Great Britain would do so likewise.

I said it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government to do so. But Russia herself had in some cases been active in proposing and carrying into effect territorial changes. I trusted, however, that in the present case the Emperor of Russia, by granting an amnesty to those who would lay down their arms, and the benefits of free institutions to Poland, would put an end to the insurrection.

It had formerly been said that the Emperor of Russia could not give liberal insti-

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

tutions to Poland while he denied similar benefits to his Russian subjects. But at the present time Russia as well as Poland might well look to the enjoyment of representative institutions. Why should they not be granted at one and the same time to the Kingdom of Poland and to the Empire of Russia?

Baron Brunnow had no information as to the intentions of the Emperor on this subject, and I did not press him further.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 357.

*Earl Russell to Baron Gros*

*Foreign Office, April 10, 1863.*

EARL RUSSELL presents his compliments to the Baron Gros, and has the honour to transmit to His Excellency, confidentially, a copy of the despatch which he has addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the subject of Poland<sup>1</sup>.

No. 358.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 10).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 10, 1863, 2 p. m.*

I HAVE communicated to Drouyn the draft of your despatch to Napier, as also the observations contained in your No. 475 respecting the manner in which the three despatches should be communicated to Gortchakoff. Drouyn is of opinion that the language of the despatches not being identic, renders their transmission in identic notes more desirable, as showing that the three Governments are acting in concert.

No. 359.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 10).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, April 10, 1863.*

M. DE BISMARCK does not believe that any of the six persons referred to in my despatch No. 195 will be executed except the officer accused of murder, but he has apparently no positive information on the subject.

I believe that political refugees, even if not reclaimable as such, could be claimed under one or other of the classes specified in the Convention.

<sup>1</sup> No. 354.

No. 360.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 10).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, April 10, 1863.*

FRENCH Ambassador has communicated copy of despatch for Russia to Count Rechberg, who delays departure of his messenger to St. Petersburg until he receives communication of your Lordship's despatch on the affairs of Poland.

Am I authorized to give his Excellency copy of your Lordship's despatch?

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No. 361.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 11, 1863.*

YES. Our despatches gone last night to St. Petersburg.

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No. 362.

*Earl Russell to Lord Bloomfield.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 11, 1863.*

AS the French Government prefer the presentation of identic notes covering our three despatches, and the Austrian Government have no objection to that mode, arrange with Count Rechberg to adopt it at St. Petersburg. I send a draft of such note: —

„The Undersigned having received from his Government the annexed despatch relative to the observation which he is instructed to make to his Excellency the Vice-Chancellor, considers that he cannot do better than transmit to his Excellency a copy of the document in which they are recorded“.

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†† No. 363.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 11).*

(No. 426).

My Lord,

*Paris, April 10, 1863.*

I HAD the honour to receive this morning your Lordship's despatch No. 485 of yesterday's date, inclosing the draft of the despatch to Lord Napier on the state of Poland which your Lordship proposes to send this day to St. Petersburg, and desiring me to communicate it to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I lost no time in executing your Lordship's instructions.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after reading the draft, said that as he conceived the ques-

tion arising out of the Treaty of Vienna to have been amply discussed on previous occasions, he had not made any special allusion to it in his despatch, and as it had been agreed that the representations to be made at St. Petersburg by the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Austria, should not be identic in terms, the variation did not, in his opinion, signify. He would, therefore, send the French despatch, as he had previously intended, to-night.

[<sup>1</sup>I then mentioned that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that as the terms of the British, French, and Austrian despatches were not identic, it would be better that they should not be communicated to the Russian Government in identic notes, but that copies of them should merely be given to Prince Gortchakoff by the respective Ambassadors.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he must confess that the more divergent were the terms of the despatches, the more necessary it appeared to him to transmit copies of them to the Russian Government in identic notes. The concert of the three Courts would then be more clearly established. His Excellency said further that since he had last conversed with me on this subject, he had represented to Count Rechberg that the first paragraph of the Austrian draft was hardly in keeping with the actual state of affairs, and had suggested that it should be modified. Count Rechberg had felt the necessity of doing this, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys had then asked whether the whole despatch might not be strengthened with advantage, and Count Rechberg had promised to consult Lord Bloomfield and the Duc de Gramont to see what further alterations could be introduced.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY].

No. 364.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 11, 1863.*

YOU will arrange with the French and Austrian Representatives to present identic notes, with the copies of our several despatches. Present them to Prince Gortchakoff on the same day.

I send a draft of such note: —

„The Undersigned, having received from his Government the annexed despatch relative to the observations which he is instructed to make to his Excellency the Vice-Chancellor, considers that he cannot do better than transmit to his Excellency a copy of the document in which they are recorded“.

The despatch was sent to your Excellency yesterday.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).



No. 365.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 11, 1863, 1.45 p. m.*

HER Majesty's Government quite ready to agree to the identic note as a mode of transmission. Lord Napier has been instructed accordingly.

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No. 366.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 12).*

(Telegraphic).

*S. Petersburg, April 12, 1863.*

EASTER SUNDAY, amnesty granted to all insurgents in Poland and Russia who lay down their arms before 1st of May, old style.

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No. 367.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 12).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, April 12, 1863.*

I HAVE communicated and left with Count Rechberg copy of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Napier on affairs of Poland. His Excellency sends messenger to St. Petersburg this evening, who will arrive there twenty-four hours after those from London and Paris.

With regard to transmitting copy of despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, Count Rechberg considers unusual, in cases like the present, adoption of form commencing „The Undersigned“, and prefers that of the first person. He wishes it to be a letter, and not a note of transmission.

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No. 368.

*Earl Russel to Earl Cowley.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 12, 1863.*

LORD NAPIER telegraphs to-day that an amnesty is granted to all insurgents in Poland who lay down their arms before the 1st of May, old style.

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No. 369.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 186. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 31, 1863.*

COUNT THUN, after presenting his letters of recall to the Emperor, had some conversation with His Majesty on the aspect of political relations in Europe. In the course of these reflections the Emperor said to the Count that he hoped his Excellency was convinced that Russia had no views of disturbance or aggrandizement in the East. The Austrian Minister replied that he was indeed convinced of the sincerity and good intentions of His Majesty, but that he feared many things were done without His Majesty's knowledge which gave countenance to the belief that the Imperial Government contemplated changes in the East of a dangerous character. His Excellency added that he had now no official character whatever, but as a private person and a true friend of His Majesty he felt it his duty to say this; and as an example of the intemperate zeal shown by Russian Agents, Count Thun adduced the relations maintained by M. de Balabine at Vienna with all the Panslavist writers and adventurers in Austria and its vicinity, and the encouragement thus given to designs of that character.

The Emperor replied that there had been much exaggeration and misunderstanding as to Russian agencies; but His Majesty allowed that M. de Balabine might have been sometimes rather imprudent in his conversations.

Count Thun in relating this incident to me remarked that his position on the eve of his departure from Russia had given him a good opportunity to address the Emperor in this sense, and that he felt I could not do so with equal facility or advantage. He hoped, however, that I might be able to find an opportunity for strengthening the impression which he had perhaps imparted to the Emperor and of keeping His Majesty's eyes open to the intrigues going on without his approval. I said that I would do so if a safe and proper occasion offered. Your Lordship can, however, well understand how delicate my position is between the Emperor and Prince Gortchakoff. I seldom see the Emperor. I do not know how far I possess his confidence. My direct official relations are with the Prince. I believe that I have his confidence and goodwill in some degree, which I can turn to some account. By speaking to the Emperor without your Lordship's direct orders in a sense at all prejudicial to the interest of the Vice-Chancellor I might incur the enmity of his Excellency, who would not fail to do me some mischief with the Sovereign. I might thus lose my standing both with the Emperor and the Minister.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 370.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 208. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 6, 1863.*

ON two points concerning Poland the sentiments of Englishmen are earnest and united. There are no Englishmen who have not an indignant sense of the wrongs and sufferings of which Poland has long been the victim; there are none who do not desire to see Poland replaced in the enjoyment of those liberties which were secured to her by the Treaty of Vienna, by stipulations to which Great Britain was a party.

Some Englishmen go further. Leaving the ground of the present territorial settlement in Europe, and the bases of recent international engagements, they invoke the higher laws, as they deem them, of nationality and retributive justice. They desire an independent Poland, and such politicians may be divided into two classes: — 1st. Those who contend for the independence of the Kingdom of Poland, as at present circumscribed by Treaty; and, 2nd. Those who would reconstitute a great Polish State on the basis of nationality.

1. The creation of an independent Polish Monarchy in the limits of the present kingdom subject to the Russian Crown is certainly not a project chimerical or extravagant, or repugnant in all respects to the sentiments of the Russian nation. It would procure great relief to the Russian finances; it would remove from the Russian Government a weight of moral obloquy; it would disengage the Russian Government from obligations towards foreign Powers galling to the pride of an independent State; it would lighten the conscience of many just and liberal Russians who demand freedom for themselves, and would not willingly deny that benefit to others. It must be allowed, however, that there are formidable impediments to this apparently temperate and useful proposal.

The Russian Government, having in view the balance of power and its relations to foreign Governments, might decline to be the only party sacrificing to Polish nationality. The Republic of Cracow is still arbitrarily deprived, not only of national institutions, and of separate representation, but of independence itself, secured to it by solemn stipulations. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg might expect some proportionate concessions on the part of Austria and Prussia, to which these Powers, or at least the latter, would hardly accede. Nor is it clear that either Austria or Prussia would be contented to see the establishment of an independent, but still mutilated, Polish kingdom on their borders when the force of Polish nationality and ambition would be for ever kindled, and for ever threaten to spread beyond its legitimate hearth. Above all, it would be asked by the Russian Government, how is Russia itself to be protected against Polish and Roman Catholic aggression, which would continue to assail the semi-Polish provinces attached to the Empire — provinces which, in their days of darkest depression, the Polish patriots have never ceased to claim? An independent Poland raised on the area of the present kingdom would never, so the Russians say, be a normal State practicing the duties of peaceful commerce with its neighbours; it would be a citadel of revolutionary forces, a camp and place of exercise in which the Poles of every origin would organize their military

strength for vaster enterprizes, a patriotic propaganda from which the emissaries of Polish nationality aspirations, and faith would be launched into every region in which the Polish race is intermixed with men of other extractions. Before sanctioning the scheme of a limited independent Polish State, would not Russia demand some security or guarantee on the part of other Governments parties to the transaction, and would Her Majesty's Government and the other Powers concerned find it convenient to bind themselves towards Russia in any degree in that respect?

2. If we turn to the schemes cherished by the more ardent partizans of the Polish cause, we find that these generous but impractical innovators meditate the delivery of the ancient Polish soil (as they imagine it) from foreign dominion, the extrication of the Polish race from the foreign influences and institutions in which it is involved, the constitution of a State stretching from the Dnieper to the Vistula, from the Baltic to the Euxine. With the dreams and designs of such a representation, Her Majesty's Government cannot even speculatively have much sympathy. It is the duty of diplomatists, I conceive, while the general peace endures, to subordinate their suggestions and reasoning, if not absolutely to what exists, at least to what is possible, and to advise for the best under the discouragements which the blindness or injustice of the past have laid upon the present, soliciting at most from the wisdom of Sovereigns and Governments that rectification of inherited evils which we cannot demand as a right by arms. It is open to me to abstain from all reflections on the chimera of a resuscitated Poland framed in the illusions of a Mieroslawski, or even of a Zamoyski; but I think it more honest to state that I find my personal convictions in this matter altogether conformable to my official duty. I cannot, even from a remote extra-professional position, contemplate the proposed reformation of the political geography of Eastern Europe, with any belief that it would serve the interests of England or those of other Powers with which we are deeply engaged by indelible sympathies, and with which in certain contingencies our national fortunes would probably be embarked.

The inclosed map is traced from the revolutionarily scheme published at Paris. The red space is regenerated Poland, the blue is dismembered and attenuated Prussia, in the yellow your Lordship will recognize Austria very slightly diminished, the green expanse is Russia repelled within its eastern boundaries of the sixteenth century. As St. Petersburg is left in possession of the Czar, it is probable that no Swedish co-operator was consulted. Moscow is not to be claimed, as I understand, unless satisfaction be much longer deferred, but Kiew, the earlier cradle of the Orthodox religion and throne, is placed within the circle of Polish Romanism. This is indisputably the project for which patriots altogether careless of the modest diplomatic fictions of the year 1815, are now fighting with a desperation and conscious self-sacrifice of which history offers no example, since the resistance of the Dutch people against their Spanish oppressors.

But if this project were carried into execution, would it be congenial to the interests of England and conducive to the balance of power in Europe? I for one respectfully but firmly say, no. It would be the foundation of a great Catholic military aggressive State, animated by all the incitements of vengeance and of hope inspired by the strongest animosities against Russia and Germany, by the warmest sympathies for France,

It would give an ascendancy to the Roman religion and the French power unexampled in former times, and I see no sufficient compensation for such a result in the abridgment of Russian territory or the diminution of Russian influence. Nor would the realization of this scheme be consistent even with common justice or with the popular will impartially interpreted, for the Polish patriots would carry the ensigns of their visionary nationality wherever heretofore the Polish arms have had a transient triumph, wherever the Jesuits have forced the Latin supremacy upon an Orthodox population, wherever a Polish aristocracy has raised its brilliant but unprofitable sway over a neglected peasantry. The Lithuanians are not Poles, but a separate branch of the Slavonic race. The Esthonians and Lettes of the Baltic provinces are as remote from the Poles as they are from the respectable German landlords; the lower orders in Podolia and Ukraine are little Russians; the landed proprietors and burghers alone are Poles and Roman Catholics. All these regions have been more or less associated with Poland by violence in past centuries, while the Russians were absorbed in their long struggle for national life and faith with their Mahometan invaders; but there is no demonstration or probability that the mass of the people in these provinces desire to revert to the Polish connection, while the liberal Russian patriot would certainly regard the union of those provinces with Poland as the spoliation and partition of his country, and would suffer every extremity rather than submit to it. The Poles, however, heated with enthusiasm, think nothing of these things, and are ready without scruple to impose on others the wrongs which have been exercised on themselves. Not on the ground of general policy, not on that of English interest, not on that of national or local justice, can I go with those who would built up a State co-extensive with the delusive measure of Polish nationality; but I acknowledge the devotion of those who strive for it in the field, and I understand the motives of those who advocate it in the Chambers, the press, and the pulpits of Imperial France. The independence and unity of Italy are imperfectly attained, but the French Empire has advanced its power to the southern slope of the Alps. The restoration of the Polish State on the basis of nationality will assuredly not be effected while the strength of Germany and Russia remain unbroken. During the struggle, whatever may be the fate of Poland, the frontier of France would be pushed to the Rhine.

Whether the reflections which I have submitted to your Lordship be founded in reason or not, Her Majesty's Government can best determine. The question which I have touched still belongs to the domaine of private judgment, and I cannot flatter myself that my opinion will have much weight. I am not aware that your Lordship has taken any authoritative decision, either respecting the independence of the present Kingdom of Poland or the reconstitution of a great Polish State on the basis of nationality. The official advice as yet enunciated by Her Majesty's Government has for its aim the reconciliation of Poland to the Russian Crown, and the concession to the Polish people of the „national institutions“ and of the „representation“ awarded to them by the Treaty (of) Vienna. On this point, at least, I imagine all Her Majesty's servants and subjects are of one mind.

With a view to the realization of their good purposes, Her Majesty's Government have advised the Emperor of Russia, first, to grant an amnesty; and secondly, to re-estab-

lish in Poland without delay the Representative Constitution bestowed by the Emperor Alexander I.

I will now proceed to submit to your Lordship some reflections upon the measures thus suggested. The tenour of my remarks may not sound altogether in harmony with the prevailing tone of sentiments in England, but my position is an exceptional one, and it is my duty to present to Her Majesty's Government a question by which the Government to which I am accredited is chiefly affected, not only in connection with abstract right and justice, and with the claims of Great Britain, but also in relation to the other interests in which the welfare and destinies of Russia itself are deeply involved.

1. In regard to the amnesty designed by Her Majesty's Government, I think that every impartial judgment must conclude that the Emperor ought to promulgate a measure of that kind for several cogent motives. Such a measure is due to the Poles as a manifestation of repentance on the part of the Imperial Government, who were guilty of a grievous injustice to the Polish nation by the military recruitment; it is due to the foreign Governments concerned in the Treaty of Vienna, guardians of the rights and liberties of Poland; it is due to the outraged public feelings in every country; it is due to the good fame of the Emperor, whose well-deserved reputation of moderation and clemency should not be hazarded and lost on a single unhappy cast; it is due to the interests of Russia itself for the promulgation of an amnesty might deprive the movement of many of its adherents, and enable those who have taken up arms more from dread and detestation of military bondage than from purely revolutionary motives to return to their homes and families in peace. It is also obvious that the amnesty should be associated with the withdrawal of the order for an arbitrary military levy, and that some public and tranquillizing assurance should be offered that the conscription will be suspended, and be eventually put in effect on an equitable basis.

With reference to the extent of the amnesty Her Majesty's Government have not propounded any definition, nor fixed any limitation. I presume, however, that Her Majesty's Government have in view chiefly an overture of clemency to parties still in arms, or who went into the rebellion in consequence of the recent arbitrary course of the Vice-regal Government. Your Lordship probably does not contemplate the sudden re-admission of all the exiled or imprisoned Poles, of every shade of political opinion, to their country in absolute freedom, for that would accumulate the materials and precipitate the explosion of a new revolt. Her Majesty's Government would perhaps deem it sufficient that the most dangerous class of political enthusiasts should be exonerated from the actual rigour of personal confinement, penal labour, or military service, remaining subject to some local restraint, and that confiscated properties should be restored to the use if not to the personal management of the owners; in short, that the amnesty granted by the Russian Government should be surrounded by some of the safeguards which authority is justified in prescribing with a view to self-preservation.

2. When Her Majesty's Government recommend the restoration in Poland of the Representative Constitution of the Emperor Alexander I, without the national army, I do not distinctly apprehend whether they absolutely affirm that form of Representative Government to be the only form which can be established in Poland with justice and ad-

vantage, or whether they select that scheme of representation as one which has been approved by experience and which sufficiently responds to the terms of the Treaty of Vienna without positively insisting on its restoration to the exclusion of any other.

If the Constitution of 1818 be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as the only lawful government of Poland, unjustly suspended since the year 1830, and as the only legitimate expression of the stipulations of Vienna, then, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it follows that it is the duty of Russia to revive that Constitution as it formerly existed, and to leave it to the Representatives of Poland, in conjunction with their Sovereign, subsequently to make any change in that form of government which the lapse of time and change of circumstances may render desirable. If that be emphatically the view of Her Majesty's Government it would ill become me to dissent from their decision. I must then admit that the revival of the Constitution of the Emperor Alexander I would alone redeem the pledges of Russia towards Poland and Europe, and that the Imperial Cabinet would do well in having recourse to that measure, and in boldly confronting the hazards and inconveniences by which it might be attended.

The Constitution of 1818 may, however, be rather regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a convenient and acceptable form of Representative Government which on general grounds of policy it would be desirable to restore, but they may not consider that it is the only form of representation which could be lawfully introduced in Poland. Their wishes may point in fact to the establishment in that country, generally, of national institutions and a national representation appropriated to its wants and commensurate with the wishes and sentiments of the reasonable part of its inhabitants. Her Majesty's Government may consider themselves, not as the guarantors of a specific statute which perished in the midst of a popular revolution aiming at national independence and which has fallen into abeyance since, but as the guarantors of some valid and useful form or other of a free National Constitution for Poland under the Russian Crown. If this be the sense of Her Majesty's Government a wide field is opened for discussion.

If the Constitution of 1818 had been continued in Poland, a similar Constitution could not have been long denied to the Empire. We know that the love of representative liberty had struck a deep root among the nobility of Russia before the year 1825. The manifestation of that generous passion was suppressed by the Emperor Nicholas, who, governing on the same principles both in Russia and in Poland, reduced both alike to silence and submission. Russia and Poland were companions (though enemies) in servitude. In emancipation they must also be companions, even though enemies still. In both nations a new generation has sprung up, largely imbued with the opinions of Western Europe, and inspirited by the example and contact of representative freedom partly won in Austria and Prussia. To make concessions to Poland and refuse them to Russia would arouse the strongest resentment among the educated Russians. Under such an unequal regimen the Emperor and his Government would forfeit all sympathy except among the most ignorant and superstitious class. I do not know whether among persons of civil education the instruments could be found for administering the Government on that humiliating basis. It is not too much to say that the superior order of the Russians, whether living independently or serving the State, would in that case be formed in one vast



and permanent conspiracy against the Sovereign. The general sentiment here is that the conquered cannot obtain more than the conquerors; that what is granted in Poland must be granted in Russia too.

If this be truly the case, a dispassionate reasoner must allow that the task of the Russian Government is singularly complicated, and the Imperial Cabinet having once avowed their firm intention to redeem their engagements and to establish a national and representative system in Poland, might reasonably demand some respite in regard to time and some freedom in regard to the form and contrivance of these institutions. The Emperor, when asked to give a Parliament to Poland, is asked to revive and reform the Diet of Finland, to create Elective Assemblies in the three Baltic Provinces, to convoke a Representative Assembly of the great Russian Nation, to contrive some special institution for the mixed Border Provinces between Russia and Poland, and to harmonize the jarring interests and passions of his heterogeneous dominions in some Federal Council at the centre of the Empire. The problem is one before which a Bentham or a Siéyes might be in fault.

It is certainly possible that the convocation of a Representative Assembly at the present conjuncture in Poland might be attended by beneficial results for that country. If a Conservative majority were returned, prepared to accept the connection with the Russian Crown as the basis of their political existence, and to suppress the memory of ancient and recent wrongs, such an Assembly might offer the opportunity and the scene of a reconciliation between the two countries, and afford to the greater nobility an honourable occasion for abandoning their irresolute and hostile attitude, and supporting a Government which gave them functions in the State worthy of their intelligence and position.

The Polish Diet might become a discreet and practical body, and legitimate representation of property and moderate opinions; a place of useful business, and the instrument of useful reforms. It might offer a profitable example to the other portions of the Empire aspiring to the same franchises. If it fell out otherwise, the Russian Government would at least have made an honest effort to perform their engagements to Poland and to Europe, and might speciously claim exoneration from a duty which the passions of its subjects rendered impracticable.

It is contended, on the other hand, by the Russian Government, and even by those here who do not always share its views, that there is nothing in past experience in the character of the Poles or in the complection of the present times which can justify us in expecting any happy effects from the immediate convocation of the Polish National Parliament, and that such a measure would rather operate to the common prejudice of Poland and of Russia than for their good. The Poles, it is alleged, have never been patient or wise in public discussions; there is no reason to believe that the national temperament is altered; the elections would take place under circumstances of great local excitement, the members would come up heated with the spectacles of recent violence, the Parliament would meet in the midst of a stormy city, before all the monuments of ancient glory and independence, beside the tombs of the martyrs, under the eyes of inspiring women, in the presence of a foreign and triumphant army, whose weapons would be hardly washed of the stains of Polish blood. The Assembly would probably instantly



become the arena of every resentment and every aspiration. Its first act might be a declaration of the inalienable rights of the whole Polish race, the dethronement of the Russian dynasty, the prosecution of the Ministers in the Russian interest, an appeal to France, the election of a new Sovereign, any aberration of romantic patriotism. If the discussions of the Assembly proved to be intolerably disordered, and if its dissolution were peremptory and final, what benefit would remain from this ill-timed attempt at the revival of free institutions? The meeting of the mourning Diet would remain a picturesque and fugitive incident in the melancholy drama of Polish destinies. If the attempt were prolonged and repeated, and if the relations of the Russian Viceroy to the the Polish representation took the features of that chronic strife which reigned between Lord High Commissioner and the Ionian Chamber, the consequence would be a great exasperation on the part of the Russian people, who would see their hereditary enemies in the possession of liberties and privileges perhaps greater than their own, yet converting these benefits to the annoyance and prejudice of Russia. If, on the other hand, the institutions accorded to Poland were contemporaneously extended in the same measure and the same form to Russia, the Russian Government might be forced, without due deliberation, into an erroneous course, and might abandon to popular debate questions, already in course of treatment, affecting the very foundations of property and society, which it is most important to settle peaceably before the old form of autocratic Government be dissolved. A premature convocation of a Representative Assembly on the Belgian or Italian model, under circumstances of irritation, might prove to be an evil, rather than a benefit to Russia. The constitution of Representative Government in this Empire is a deep question which demands an earnest study of national character and national wants. In the opinion of mosts, the interests of useful and fruitful freedom would be best consulted by the creation of elective Provincial Councils, with some point of union in a National Senate or Council of State. I do not pretend to determine how this may be, but the Russians may reasonably refuse to be hurried into precipitate resolutions by foreign irritation or contagion; and we must allow that it is of the last importance that the new experiment of Representative Government at Warsaw should be made under favourable circumstances, in a manner advantageous to Poland and acceptable to Russia.

Her Majesty's advisers have counselled the Emperor of Russia to grant an amnesty and to restore Representative Government without delay in Poland. They did so in conformity with Treaty rights, with national feeling, with their own convictions. They could not do less, and their opinion was tendered in a plain, frank and friendly form, which I think has commanded respect, if it has not obtained success. Her Majesty's Government have probably not been surprised by the reply of the Imperial Cabinet.

With the negotiations which have continued since the presentation here of your Lordship's despatch No. 53 of the 2nd March I am not exactly acquainted. I believe that Her Majesty's Government have endeavoured to unite all the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna in a combined representation to the Russian Government on behalf of Poland, based on the terms of that Treaty. The efforts of Her Majesty's Government have issued in the separate delivery by several Powers of advice or remonstrances founded on various considerations. I have heard since, vaguely, of overtures for a Congress. I pre-

sume that the object of Her Majesty's Government in these proceedings has been to frame a conservative control over revolutionary sympathies, to mitigate the impulses of French policy or ambition, to guard the general peace without neglecting the claims of Polish nationality and freedom. If Her Majesty's Government be enabled either to organize a general remonstrance here, or to bring the Polish question under the discussion of a European Congress, they may, in my humble judgment, be enabled to extort from Russia a new declaration based on the terms of the Treaty of Vienna. If Her Majesty's Government, as seems more probable, be unable to associate the Powers for a common harmonious effort in any form, it would perhaps be prudent not to expect from the Russian Government, in reply to our isolated demands and those of France, more than the following concessions or assurances: —

1. That a limited amnesty will be granted after the suppression of the revolt;
2. That the order for an arbitrary military levy will be withdrawn, or at least that the levy will not be continued;
3. That the national institutions granted in the year 1861, which comprise in some degree the elements of a „representation“, will be continued and developed in Poland;
4. That Poland shall be admitted to an equal share of any representative rights which may hereafter be granted to the other portions of the Imperial dominions.

If the reflections which I have respectfully offered to your Lordship were published in England, I presume that I should incur the double reproach of being cold in the cause of Poland and in that of representative institutions. To the first imputation I could plead guilty in so far as I prefer what I believe to be the interests of England and Germany to the aspirations of the Polish race; to the second I would entirely demur. The cause of human freedom and representative institutions is embarked in Russia as well as Poland, embarked on a vaster scale among a race not at all inferior to the Poles in natural qualities, with perhaps a better chance of success. The Russian Empire is passing through a great transformation in honourable tranquillity, under a respectable Sovereign and an improving administration. A great error, nay a great crime, has been committed in Poland, but we are justified in hoping that it was an exceptional wrong in a general course of justice and conciliation. To that course I, for one, believe that the Russian Government would be happy to return. I see in the cessation of the Polish revolt, in the subordination of European interference to moderate aims, and in the maintenance of peace, the best guarantees for the solid progress of representative principles of government in Poland and in Russia also.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

†† No. 371.

(No. 29). *Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

My Lord,

*Warsaw, April 7, 1863.*

SINCE the dispersal of the insurgent forces under the immediate command of Langiewicz, but few striking events have occurred within the Kingdom of Poland, and many

of the members of the Government here appear to consider the insurrection as nearly trampled out. I cannot, my Lord, myself in any manner participate in this opinion; but, on the contrary, I believe that within a very short time, notwithstanding the apparently overwhelming force of the Russians, fresh bands will appear in all parts of the Kingdom, and that the leaders of the movement having learnt by the failure of the ex-Dictator that it is nearly impossible for them to maintain in the field any forces large enough to operate in a regular manner against the columns of their enemy, have now determined to try the effect of partisan warfare carried on simultaneously by small bodies in all such parts of the Kingdom as by the nature of the country may be suited to such a warfare.

It cannot be denied, my Lord, that the hopes of the insurgents have been raised by the prospect of diplomatic intervention in their favour, and it is probable that their determination to continue the unequal struggle may be based on hopes of more active assistance from the Great Powers than mere diplomatic intervention, provided they can succeed in maintaining themselves for some time longer.

[<sup>1</sup>The late apparent calm may, my Lord, in a great measure be attributed to the national custom of making Easter the great festival of the year, and numbers of young men known to all, but the Government, to have belonged to the insurgent bands have during the last week been in Warsaw for the purpose of passing the holidays with their families, and these are now returning to their various posts to renew the conflict as soon as the signal is given].

The most important intelligence lately received here, my Lord, is from Samogitia, where it appears the insurrection has broken out in a very decided manner, all classes of inhabitants joining in the movement, and the Russian troops are stated to have been worsted at Usciany and Poniewiesz, in the neighbourhood of Dünaburg, and it appears still very doubtful whether the insurrection may not become general throughout the Province of Lithuania and the other old Polish provinces.

[<sup>1</sup>The Russian Government here continues to view the insurrection as a local matter to be arranged by themselves alone; at least, my Lord, I gather so much from a conversation that took place a short time since between His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke and M. Wenglewski, when the latter, having resigned his post in the Council of State, obtained an audience of His Imperial Highness for the purpose of taking leave. At this interview I am informed this gentleman stated his conviction that there were only two ways of pacifying the country: the first was for Russia to take the initiative, and to give Poland her independence, and conferring the crown of the Kingdom on a member of the Imperial family; the second means being an intervention of the other Powers of Europe by a Congress or otherwise, to procure for the country her autonomy.

The Grand Duke replied that the Poles always trusted to the Western Powers helping them; that they would be again deceived, as there would be no intervention in their favour; and that as for a Congress, Russia would not accept such a means of arranging a difference that should be settled among the Slavonic races alone, without the interference of either the Teutonic or Latin races].

The feeling against Russia amongst all classes of the inhabitants of this country,

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).

with perhaps the exception of the peasants, is now so strong that I fear, my Lord, any offer of political liberty short of actual independence, if made by Russia herself, would not satisfy the Poles, or be sufficient to pacify the country; but I believe at the same time that much less would be willingly accepted if pressed by an European Congress, as in the latter case they would see how far they might look for support from the other Powers, and they would be obliged to bow to the decision of Europe, even if not completely satisfied by the arrangement arrived at.

From the reports received here it appears, my Lord, that even the liberal party in Russia are far from being well-disposed towards the Poles, and it is to be feared that if left to make the best of their own case alone with Russia, and unless the Great Powers take the settlement of the question into their hands, the prospects of Poland offer little beyond desolation and ruin for the present generation, and material injury for the future welfare, prosperity, and civilization of the country.

In conclusion, I beg to forward to your Lordship herewith, a translation of a Proclamation of the Central Revolutionary Committee, announcing their having resumed the supreme authority since the arrest of Langiewicz in Austria, and declaring any attempt by individuals to assume the Dictatorial authority to be treasonable.

This Proclamation, my Lord, appears to have been issued to satisfy the nobles and Moderate party that any attempt by Mieroslawski to seize the supreme power would not be allowed by the leaders of the movement.

[I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON].

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† Inclosure in No. 371.

(Translation).

*Proclamation.*

THE Central Committee, as National Government, informs the nation that in consequence of the arrest of the Dictator Langiewicz by the Austrian Government, the supreme national authority has been resumed by them.

With a view to guarantee the country from the confusion that might arise from attempts to seize the supreme power by any single individual, the assumption of Dictatorial authority, or of any other form of government, whether at home or abroad, is declared treasonable.

*Warsaw, March 27, 1863.*

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No. 372.

*Colonel Stanton to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 30).

My Lord,

*Warsaw, April 7, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that General Count Berg, who was recently nominated Adlatus to His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine for

military affairs in this Kingdom, arrived at Warsaw on the 5th instant, and has taken over the command of the army engaged in Poland.

Although his Excellency's nomination is ostensibly confined to the direction of the military affairs of the Kingdom, it is very generally believed, my Lord, that other and equally important duties have also been confided to him, and that his Excellency, in the absence of the Grand Duke, will preside at the Council of Administration of the Kingdom, in which case the position of the Marquis Wielopolski will become most difficult, and the continuance of that nobleman in the Government almost impossible, as Count Berg is generally supposed to be an unflinching supporter of the old Russian party, who consider Russianizing Poland to be the only way out of the present difficulties, and who would shrink from no measures of repression, however severe, to carry their views into effect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. STANTON.

†† No. 373.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 180).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 9, 1863.*

AS it is extremely difficult to obtain any reliable intelligence respecting the movement in Poland, I have requested Mr. Mounsey to report to me his impressions of what he saw and heard on the occasion of his late visit to Cracow.

He has addressed to me an interesting letter on the subject, and I have the honour to forward the same herewith for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

†† Inclosure in No. 373.

*Mr. Mounsey to Lord Bloomfield.*

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 7, 1863.*

IN accordance with the desire expressed to me by your Lordship, I have the honour to lay before you all the information which I was able to collect during my very short stay at Cracow respecting the state of public feeling there on the subject of the Polish insurrection.

In pursuing my inquiries as to the circumstances under which Mr. Finkinst(o)n received his injuries, I had several opportunities of ascertaining the general feelings of the inhabitants, whilst the hospitality shown me by one of the best families in Cracow placed me frequently in contact with men of fortune and standing both in Galicia and Rus-

sian Poland. But without possessing the above sources of information, any one passing twenty-four hours in the town must inevitably arrive at the conclusion that its inhabitants entertain the most profound sympathy for the movement now going on in Poland, and the most determined hatred of Russia and all that is Russian, and I believe that these feelings exist not only in Cracow, but in every Galician town. It is, of course, impossible for me to state with certainty the sentiments of the rural population; but it would seem that though passive, they are not hostile to the cause of Poland. This I infer from the facility with which the Galician bands are said to traverse the country on their way to join the insurgents.

Nor do the people of Cracow attempt to conceal their feelings. They show themselves in various ways — by the hospitality, care and attention bestowed upon the wounded, by the large crowds which follow to the grave the corpses of those who die of the injuries they have received at the hands of the Russian soldiers, and by the mourning costume worn by the whole population.

The active spirits of the place go much beyond such demonstrations. From very good authority I learnt that an Insurrectionary Committee is permanently established, and holds nightly sittings in the town. It is entrusted, I was told, with the organization of bands, the appointment of their Commanders, &c., and is in constant communication with the Warsaw Committee, and those said to be in existence at Lemberg and other Galician towns. Its general proceedings were openly talked of to me, and many people seemed to be aware of its existence. There is, further, no doubt that many Cracovians are to be found in the insurgent ranks. The students at the University supplied a considerable quota, and amongst the wounded lying in the hospitals several natives may be found.

An anecdote was related to me which plainly illustrates the state of feeling amongst the people, [and the affected blindness of the Austrian Government to their sympathy for Poland]. Soon after Langiewicz's surrender, the remains of his army were brought into Cracow to the number of several hundreds, and confined in the riding school and other public buildings; anywhere, in fact, where space could be found for them. Before the expiration of a week they were almost all free again and across the border. An eyewitness of the fact informed me that under pretence of visiting their relatives, the female population of the town, each furnished with some extra article of female costume, easily obtained access to the prisoners, and that the latter shortly afterwards passed the sentries in the slightest of all disguises, some wearing a bonnet, others a shawl, &c., &c.

Some few, the most dangerous, I presume, were better guarded, and afterwards sent to Bohemia; but it seems that at the time the Austrian authorities hardly knew what to do with the large number of fugitives then swarming across the frontier.

More stringent measures have since been adopted by the authorities. On arriving by rail the traveller is not allowed to leave his carriage until his passport has been examined. Frequent domiciliary visits are made, and a considerable military force guards the frontier. These measures are, however, futile, and it is quite impossible to prevent any one passing into Poland. The bands formed in Galicia choose some dark night, or locate themselves in a wood till dusk, and as soon as the patrol has passed, over they go; or

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

else they pass singly and re-unite on the Polish side of the frontier, which is generally unguarded by Russian troops.

The latter are now concentrated, and are seldom seen on the frontier, except when from the reports of their spies — and I am told they have many [<sup>1</sup>amongst the Government officials] in Galicia — they learn that a band is to pass at a given point and hour.

[<sup>1</sup>The humanity of the Austrian Government in this Polish question is known, but not appreciated at Cracow, and I was frequently asked, „Is Austria sincere?“ and as frequently told that „she only acts in this manner because it suits her purpose, not from sympathy with her Polish subjects, but from unwillingness to aid in subduing a movement which occupies the whole power of Russia, and prevents her for the moment from intriguing elsewhere“].

Langiewicz's defeat was not considered at Cracow as at all likely to induce a termination of the insurrection, and though the first news of it may have damped the hopes of many, it has eventually increased the energy of all. Many persons there strongly condemned his plan of carrying on the war. They were fully aware that, without considerable supplies, it was a mistake to concentrate such a large force, and a system of guerilla warfare has since been adopted in consequence.

The defeat of the Dictator [<sup>1</sup>is much to be regretted but it certainly] has not caused the Poles to despair. They still fight and arm and hope [<sup>1</sup>England, they know, sympathises with them, but material aid they do not expect from her. Austria will not help them. In France they centre their hopes. A year before the Italian war, they say, no one dreamt of the liberation of Italy, and France owes more to Poland than she did to Italy].

I do not think that the granting of a given amount of political freedom and administrative reform will satisfy the Poles. The object of their desires is the re-establishment of an independent Poland. For this they have always fought, and for this they will always struggle. It is the constant subject of their thoughts, and at present the only possible source of conversation.

Mieroslawski was at Cracow during my stay. He seems to enjoy little or no popularity, and I heard it imputed as a crime to the Austrian Government that he was not deprived of his liberty. This imputation, it is true, proceeded from a member of the aristocratic party, with whom the friend of Mazzini does not stand in good odour. But I believe that generally Mieroslawski is looked upon with a certain amount of distrust, and, as he is charged with being the cause of the dissensions and divisions which broke out in Langiewicz's camp previous to the latter's ultimate defeat, and which partially contributed to that defeat, it is easy to understand his present unpopularity.

Such being the state of public feeling in Galicia, it may be asked why no disturbances have taken place there, and why the insurrection has not extended to that province? The answer is, I think, first, because the Galicians are happier and better governed than the Russian Poles; secondly, because they enjoy perfect religious liberty; and thirdly, and especially, because the policy of Austria in this question has been so humane and conciliatory, when contrasted with that of Prussia and Russia, that the Gali-

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).



cians are, as it were, reconciled to remain under her rule until they see a more certain prospect of obtaining their independence.

One word on the atrocities committed by the Russian soldiers. They are generally attributed at Cracow to the want of discipline existing at this moment in the Russian army. This want of discipline, I was told, does not result from the abolition of the knout alone. Another cause exists. It seems that the Russian Government suspect many of their officers of being imbued with liberal principles, and it is said that the soldiers have been ordered to obey their non-commissioned officers, and to exercise a sort of surveillance over those of a superior rank.

These, my Lord, are my impressions of the state of things in Cracow and Galicia. They are the result of what I there saw and heard. I had no time to examine minutely into all that I have related. I have given it as it was told me, and I believe it to be correct.

[I have, &c.

(Signed)

AUG. HENRY MOUNSEY].

No. 374.

(No. 186).

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 9, 1863.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's cyphered telegram of the 5th instant, and to the telegrams recorded in my despatches Nos. 177 and 179 of the 6th and 8th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Rechberg expressed the greatest readiness to meet the wish which I conveyed to him on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg should be instructed to leave with Prince Gortchakoff a copy of the intended despatch on the affairs of Poland; and, as I have already reported, he is willing to authorize him to transmit the communication to the Russian Vice-Chancellor in a note.

I inquired of his Excellency if he meant by the word „note“ a signed official communication, or a simple covering note of transmission. He seemed almost indifferent as to the form that may be selected, and ready to adopt whichever is deemed most advisable and likely to produce the effect at St. Petersburg so much desired by the three Powers; and I may add that, in consequence of the publicity which has been given to the negotiation, he is anxious that as little delay as possible should occur in forwarding the intended communication to St. Petersburg.

Count Rechberg remarked, on an address to the Emperor provoked by the Polish insurrection, which the telegraph reports to have been unanimously voted by the nobility of the Government of St. Petersburg, expressing their loyalty, and their confidence in His Majesty's resolution to maintain the integrity of the Empire, — that he feared this address may have been got up with a view to strengthen the hands of the Government in replying to communications that were expected to arrive from abroad in favour of Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.



†† No. 375.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 187. Confidential).

My Lord,

Vienna, April 9, 1863.

IN reply to inquiries which I have lately addressed to Count Rechberg for news from Poland, his Excellency has expressed an expectation, [that] notwithstanding the powerful resistance of the insurgents, [and the conviction that every Polish heart is with the movement he looks to the early] success of the Russian arms, and to the country being sooner or later [reduced to its former condition and] forced to accept whatever terms the Emperor Alexander may be disposed to grant. Count Rechberg has never dropped a word in approbation of the original partition of Poland, but he considers it a duty to treat the Polish question from his present view of Austrian interests that the territorial arrangements should remain as now established, but that every persuasion should be used to induce Russia to bestow a system of administration on her Polish Provinces likely to ensure their tranquillity and that of the neighbouring States.

[<sup>1</sup>In speaking with his Excellency on the question of an independent Poland, he has declared that the interests of Austria must always be opposed to any such project. An independent Poland was formerly, and would in his opinion be again, the unvarying ally of France, ever threatening the independence of Germany. Poland, his Excellency says, is at this moment united for the purpose of getting rid of the yoke of Russia; but if this were obtained, how long would she remain so? Would she not soon become, as in former times, a prey to intestine feuds, and a source of even greater trouble to her neighbours than she now is? ✓

The foregoing is the language which Count Rechberg has lately held to me when conversing on rumours that have been current of efforts attributed to the French Government to endeavour to re-establish the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and he has spoken so plainly on the subject that I have thought it my duty to report the above as the substance of his observations.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD].

† No. 376.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 188).

My Lord,

Vienna, April 9, 1863.

THE Russian troops have, in several instances, recently violated the Austrian territory when pursuing insurgents, and have not infrequently committed gross outrages on the frontier troops.

On one occasion a detachment of Cossacks, following fugitive Poles, refused to regard the summons of the Austrian guard, upon whom they fired, killing one man. The

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).

Cossacks, being in overwhelming force, took prisoners the officer commanding the Austrian guard and his men, and after plundering them conveyed them over the frontier to a Colonel of Russian dragoons. This officer immediately ordered their release and made an apology for the conduct of the Cossacks, but refused to give his name or that of his regiment.

Similar cases of the violation of Austrian territory by Russian troops are said to be of frequent occurrence.

The Russian Government show every disposition to apologize and give satisfaction for these illegal acts, and it may therefore be inferred that they are referable solely to the demoralization and want of discipline which now characterize the Russian army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 377.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 210).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 11, 1863.*

IN conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 71 of the 8th instant, I read yesterday to M. de Bismarck the copy which it inclosed of Lord Napier's despatch to your Lordship No. 131 of the 9th ultimo, reporting what passed at an interview with Prince Gortchakoff when he addressed to his Excellency the representations on the state of affairs in Poland which are contained in your Lordship's despatch to his Lordship No. 53 of the 2nd ultimo.

M. de Bismarck offered no observations of importance on the communication which I made to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 378.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 211. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 11, 1863.*

IN consequence of some conversation which I had last Tuesday with M. de Thile, the Under-Secretary of State, in the sense of my observations to M. de Bismarck with respect to the policy of Prussia in the Polish question which I reported in my despatch No. 200 of the 4th instant, M. de Thile undertook to suggest to M. de Bismarck the expediency of my being encouraged to modify my reports of the unwillingness of Prussia

to support at St. Petersburg the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the concessions which ought to be granted by the Emperor to his Polish subjects; and M. de Thile subsequently wrote to me that M. de Bismarck would speak to the King on the subject in the course of the evening. I told M. de Thile that it was entirely a private suggestion which I made to him under the impression that Prussia might have some misgivings as to the wisdom of acting differently from Austria in this question, and he not only assured me that he appreciated my motives in making it, but also expressed an opinion that there were many reasons why the Prussian Government should adopt it.

It appears, however, that the King considered any change in the language of Prussia would be attributed to fear of France, and that it would, therefore, be inconsistent with his dignity to evince any wish to modify the position which he at present occupies in the question. I have reason to believe, however, that M. de Werther has been endeavouring to obtain explanations from Count Rechberg as to the nature of representations which the Austrian Government are about to make to Russia, in order that they may judge whether they could concur in them, but Count Rechberg has hitherto excused himself from giving Baron Werther any information, on the ground that he could not do so until negotiations pending between Austria and the Western Powers had been concluded. I am told also that Count Rechberg has stated that Russia will have every reason to be grateful to Austria for the part she has taken in these negotiations.

With reference to this subject M. de Bismarck said to me yesterday that when the history of the negotiation now in progress becomes known, it will not improbably appear that Prussia has not been behind any other Power in recommending the Emperor of Russia to adopt a liberal policy with respect to Poland, and that the advice tendered privately by the King has not been less influential than if it had been given officially by his Government.

His Excellency, however, declined to give me any information as to what the King may have written to the Emperor.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† No. 379.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(No. 214).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 11, 1863.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 72 of the 8th instant, I have acquainted M. de Bismarck with your Lordship's wish to learn the fate of the four persons referred to in my despatch [No. 145 ?] of the 4th instant, who were arrested some weeks ago at Thorn, and sent across the Polish frontier; and whether any other persons delivered up by Prussia have been put to death by the Russian authorities; and also whether, under the Convention of 1857, political refugees from Russian Poland must, according to the terms of the Convention, be delivered up by Prussia on the demand of Russia.

With regard to the first of these inquiries M. de Bismarck said that he felt convinced the persons first referred to, those arrested at Thorn, had not been put to death, but he could not give me any precise information as to their fate; and other persons to whom I have applied for information, while sharing M. de Bismarck's conviction, appeared to be equally ignorant. I am assured, however, that inquiries will be made upon the subject, and that if any Prussian authority can give the information which I have asked for, it will be communicated to me.

M. de Bismarck knew nothing positively of the fate of the two officers referred to in my despatch [No. 195] of the 4th instant who had been delivered up to Russia, but he presumed that the one who had been guilty of murder would be executed, and that the other having been accused merely of desertion, would be sent to serve as a private in the Caucasus — the usual punishment awarded to officers of the Russian army for the offences of which they may have been guilty.

With respect to the Convention of 1857, M. de Bismarck said that its provisions were, in his opinion, so elastic that they might include persons accused of any crime or misdemeanour, and that political offences, which were crimes against the State, could not afford any ground of exemption; and that as one object of the Convention had been to prevent Russian subjects from crossing into Poland on the eve of a recruitment, the greatest possible latitude had been given to the right of Russia to claim the extradition of all persons who were liable to military service. He said that almost all persons, therefore, leaving Russia might be claimed under that category.

M. de Bismarck added that there was another Convention which had been entered into between Austria, Russia, and Prussia in 1834, and which, having never been abrogated, was still in force, if Russia thought fit to appeal to it, by which the three Powers are mutually bound to deliver up to each other refugees who may have been guilty of high treason or crimes against the State, including individuals belonging to Associations of a revolutionary character. His Excellency believed, however, that Russia would not avail herself of this right, and she had not addressed any demands either to Austria or Prussia for the extradition of the refugees who had escaped from Poland.

I inclose a copy of this Convention, with a translation by Mr. Morier, for your Lordship's information, and I also inclose a statement, with a translation by Mr. Jocelyn, copied into the Berlin newspapers from the „Cologne Gazette“, which professes to contain the instructions sent to General Werder, the Commander-in-chief at Posen, as to the treatment and disposal of all persons crossing from Poland into Prussia.

I have inquired of M. de Bismarck whether the contents of this document are authentic; but he professed to be unacquainted with them, and not to be, therefore, able to answer my inquiry, though he said some arrangements must have been made by the Departments interested as to the manner in which the numerous Russian refugees and Prussian subjects escaping from the ranks of the insurgents into Posen should be disposed of, and as to the localities where their respective cases should be duly investigated.

Should these instructions be genuine, and not ingeniously invented to excite ill-feeling against the Prussian Government, they would seem to imply, on the part of the latter, the intention not only of delivering up to Russia all such individuals as Russia has a right

to claim, but likewise that of forcing back upon Russia those that she does not claim, and against whom no criminal charge lies. It is, at least, difficult to see what other interpretation can be given to the wording of the paragraph respecting Category C of the persons arrested, which states that such persons as are not liable to military service in Russia, and against whom no charge can be brought, are to be treated according to Article XXIII of the Cartel Convention of 1857. By referring to this paragraph of the Convention in question, of which I only obtained a copy this morning after I had last seen M. de Bismarek, I find that it invests each of the Contracting Parties with the right of compelling the other Contracting Party to take back all individuals being subjects of the latter who may have crossed into the territory of the former: „Chacun des deux Etats s'oblige à reprendre ceux de ses propres sujets dont l'autre Etat voudrait se débarrasser“, &c., &c.

Should these instructions, therefore, be literally carried out, all Russian subjects whatever crossing into Prussia during the period of the insurrection in Poland, might come ultimately to find their way back into Russia — the suspected at the demand of Russia, the unsuspected at the demand of Prussia.

I shall not fail at the earliest opportunity again to call M. de Bismarek's attention to these instructions, and to ask his Excellency, in the event of their being genuine, whether it is the intention of the Prussian Government to carry them out in their full vigour.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 379.

*Extract from the „National Zeitung“ of April —, 1863.*

(Translation).

THE Minister of War has communicated, according to the „Cologne Gazette“, the following order to General von Werder respecting the treatment of the Polish fugitives:—

„The following measures have been determined upon by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of War, for the treatment of the Russian subjects who cross the frontier from Russian Poland to Prussian territory, in so far as they do not belong to the Russian army.

„1. On the whole, the provinces of the Prusso-Russian Cartel Convention of <sup>8 August</sup> 1857, are to be followed in the treatment of such persons as have crossed the frontier.

„2. When it is not possible to send back those persons immediately upon their crossing the frontier, they are to be considered as arrested, and are to be conducted under a military escort to the fortress which may lie nearest to the point where they crossed the frontier.

„In the first instance, the fortresses of Graudenz, Posen, Neisse, and Kosel are to be used for this purpose; and should these not prove sufficient, in the next place, those of Pillau, Weichselmünde, Danzig, Kustrin, and Schweidnitz.

„The above-named places are capable of affording the following accommodation:—  
 „(Here follow the numbers, amounting to 68 „chamber prisoners“, and 2,680 ordinary ones).

„4. The examination of the persons who have crossed the frontier is to be made as soon as possible after their arrest, in order to determine their individual circumstances, and the particular object they had in crossing.

„The information thus obtained will be followed by a classification of the prisoners, according to which the manner of their delivery (to Russia), and the reclamation of the various expenses incurred, are to be determined.

„5. The classes into which they will be divided comprise — (a), the insurgents who are to be treated according to the provisions of Articles XV and XVII of the Cartel Convention (because they have committed a crime or offence in Russia); (b), non-insurgents, but persons of an age to serve in the army, to whom Articles I to IX of the Cartel Convention are to be applied; (c), those who are not liable to military service, — unsuspicious persons, who are to be treated in accordance with Article XXIII.

„6. Those persons who have been escorted to the fortresses are to be treated and guarded in the same military way, until they are delivered up, as is prescribed for the individuals belonging to the penal companies („Straf-Abtheilungen“) (of the Prussian army).

„7. Those of the persons who have crossed that belong to the higher classes are to be all conducted to the fortress of Posen, and there to be treated as „chamber prisoners“ („Stubengefangene“), because the authorities of that place alone possess the necessary material for their proper examination.

„The more detailed orders as to the subsistence of such as have crossed the frontier will be issued by the Department of the Commissariat, and the orders to the Military Commandants by the General Department of War“.

A copy of this regulation has been transmitted to the head-quarters of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 6th Corps d'Armée, and your Excellency is charged with the carrying out of any further measures required for putting the above instructions into execution. The chief Presidencies have received analogous instructions from the Minister of the Interior.

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† Inclosure 2 in No. 379.

*Convention between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, signed March 15, 1834.*

(Translation).

WE, Frederic William, by the grace of God, &c., &c., King of Prussia.

The better to confirm the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between us and their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of Russia, King of Poland, and between our respective States, and in view of the common interest of the three Powers to maintain quiet and legal order in the Polish provinces subject to their several authority, we have come to the following agreement with their Majesties.

Whoever shall have been guilty in the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian States of the crime of high treason („lèse-majesté“), or armed rebellion („Empörung“), or shall have

allowed himself to join any association directed against the Throne or the Government, shall find neither protection nor asylum in any of the three States.

The three Courts, on the contrary, bind themselves to order the immediate surrender of any individual charged with any of the above crimes, whenever he shall be claimed by the Government to which he belongs.

It is understood, however, that these resolutions have no retrospective force.

Having agreed with His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, King of Poland, that the above arrangements shall be brought to the knowledge of the public in the three States, this, so far as we are concerned, takes place by these presents, whilst we further charge all our civil and military authorities to see to their full execution from the 1st of April of the present year.

Given under our hand and seal.

(Signed) FREDERICK WILLIAM.

(Signed)

VON BREMER.  
MUHLER.

VON KAMPZ.  
ANEILLON.

No. 380.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(Telegraphic).

*St. Petersburg, April 12, 1863.*

YOUR despatch No. 53 respecting Poland has been published in the French papers with circular despatch. Answer of Russia to your despatch No. 53 is contained in my despatch No. 131 of the 9th of March.

Prince Gortchakoff asks leave to print the original text of your despatch here, together with my despatch No. 131 containing his answer.

Your Lordship might publish them both in England at the same time.

No. 381.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 13, 1863.*

YOUR despatch as well as mine will be given to Parliament. Your despatch must not be published first in St. Petersburg, as you are the Ambassador of the Queen and not of the Emperor.

No. 282.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13, 3 a. m.).*

(Telegraphic).

*St. Petersburg, April 13, 1863, 11.30 p. m.*

THE Imperial manifesto declares a desire to bury in oblivion all the past acts of the rebels, and proclaims a free pardon to all Polish subjects implicated in the late trouble.



les who lay down arms and return to obedience by the 13th May, except those responsible for other crimes and those guilty of offences in the Imperial army. It promises to maintain institutions already granted, and alludes to subsequent extension according to requirements of the time and of the country. An amnesty is also offered to the parties in arms in the Western Provinces.

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No. 383.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 13, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG prefers a note beginning, „Being charged on the part of my Government“, and written in the first person. You are at liberty to adopt either this form or that already sent to you in my telegraph of the 11th instant. You should all three adopt the same form.

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No. 384.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(Telegraphic).

*Vienna, April 13, 1863.*

COUNT RECHBERG has instructed Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to transmit the despatch to Prince Gortchakoff in a communication written in the first person instead of the third. His Excellency had not the draft of this paper at hand when I was with him to-day, but he told me it began thus, „Being charged on the part of my Government“, &c.

I have just seen French Ambassador. He telegraphs the foregoing to Paris. He and I think it might be well if our Ambassadors at St. Petersburg were desired to adopt the form of the Austrian note. An identic form of communication will be thus obtained at cost of a trifling alteration.

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No. 385.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13, 7 p. m.).*

(Telegraphic).

*Berlin, April 13, 1863, 5 p. m.*

WITH respect to my despatches Nos. 195 and 214 I have talked to Bismarck, who says I must have misunderstood him as to Prussian Government sending Polish refugees to France. I believe instructions of Minister of War are authentic, and expect certain information with respect to them.

Bismarck says I should not complain of Prussia until refugees have been actually given up, as Russia will probably never demand them. He asks why Prussia should feed



unsuspected persons who have nothing to fear from Russia, instead of sending them to their homes in conformity with Article XXIII of the Convention. I go to Mecklenburg to-morrow, but Mr. Morier will forward further information if obtained.

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No. 386.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 13, 1863.*

I HAVE sent the following figures to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg:—  
 „Count Reebberg prefers a note beginning „Being charged on the part of my Government“, and written in the first person. You are at liberty to adopt either this form or that already sent to you in my telegram of the 11th. You should all three adopt the same form“.

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No. 387.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 13).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 13, 1863 10.30 p. m.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS knew nothing this morning of the desire of Count Reebberg to substitute a letter for the note, that is, the first person for the third, to cover the transmission of the three despatches to Prince Gortchakoff, but he has this moment written to say that he has been informed by the Duc de Gramont of the modifications, and that he telegraphs to French Ambassador at St. Petersburg to adopt it.

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No. 388.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 170. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 27, 1863.*

THE Russian Ambassador at Paris considered himself bound in duty to protest formally against the speech made by Prince Napoleon in the Senate on the Polish question.

Baron Budberg could not admit that the Prince had spoken merely as a Senator; he could not divest himself of his responsibility as a member of the Imperial family, and his speech had therefore compromised the Government of the Emperor of the French.

Under these considerations the Baron sought an interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the day that the speech made by Prince Napoleon appeared in the „Moniteur“.

Baron Budberg declared to the Minister that, as the Ambassador of Russia, he would request him to convey to the Emperor Napoleon the painful impression which the lan-

guage of the Prince would be sure to produce, and his right to expect that His Majesty would cause to be sent to him a disavowal and categorical censure of the false and offensive allegations which his cousin had taken the liberty to pronounce („et que j'étais en droit de m'attendre à ce que Sa Majesté me fasse parvenir un désaveu et un blâme catégorique des allégations fausses et blessantes que son cousin s'était permis“).

The Ambassador added, that personally he could tell Prince Napoleon, if he were to meet him, „You say that Russia kisses the hand which struck her; I say, in reply, that you have bitten the hand which fed you and your mother“ („je vous réponds que vous mordez la main qui vous a nourri, vous et votre mère“).

M. Drouyn de Lhuys is reported to have listened to Baron Budberg with apparent embarrassment. When the Russian Ambassador had concluded, he expressed his deepest regret that the Prince had been so violent („ses plus vifs regrets de l'entraînement auquel le Prince s'était laissé aller“), and his firm conviction that the Emperor would, on his part, be deeply affected by it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 389.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 175. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 27, 1863.*

IN my despatch, marked Most Confidential, No. 170 of this date, I submitted to your Lordship the details of a communication which had passed between Baron Budberg and M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the speech of Prince Napoleon on the Polish question. The exact truth of this account, which reached me from a confidential source, was instantly confirmed to me by Prince Gortchakoff, who read to me part of Baron Budberg's original letter, containing the passage in which Baron Budberg states that he might say to Prince Napoleon that he had „bitten the hand which has nourished his mother and himself“.

Prince Gortchakoff spoke of the remonstrance of the Russian Ambassador with great approval, and confirmed the truth of the retort which Baron had meditated (but not delivered); for a pension had been paid for many years by Russia to the ex-Queen of Westphalia, without which Prince Jerome and his family would have starved.

I asked Prince Gortchakoff whether the Emperor of the French had made any disavowal or apology to Baron Budberg on account of the language of his cousin. The Vice-Chancellor had replied that the disavowal was contained in the letter of the Emperor to M. Billault.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 390.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 184).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 31, 1863.*

IN my despatch No. 113 of the 27th ultimo, I submitted to your Lordship that General Berg had been designated as Commander-in-chief in Poland, but that owing to some opposition on the part of the Grand Duke he had been withdrawn and that General Sumarokoff had received the nomination.

The selection of General Sumarokoff was not at all approved by the judgment of the public, and after some hesitation the Government returned to General Berg, who has been rendered more acceptable to the Viceroy, and whose appointment as Commander-in-Chief is now definitely announced.

General Berg was a man of great enterprise and activity in his youth, and was esteemed to be at a more advanced age, and in a sedentary employment, one of the most accomplished officers in the Imperial service. In the Government of Finland he failed, partly in consequence of a meddling and irritating course of conduct, partly by his reactionary sentiments, which were not in harmony with the spirit of the time and the policy of the Emperor. He made himself particularly obnoxious by a circular on the liberty of the press conceived in a puerile and repressive sense. He is now about 70 years of age. His health has on several occasions appeared to be seriously impaired, and there is nothing in his person or conversation in society which exhibits much intelligence or energy. I am told, however, by those who are more in his intimacy that he is still capable both of mental and physical exertion. General Berg is of a good family of the Baltic provinces, his moral character is unimpeachable, and, as far as I now, he has never shown any deficiency of humanity. He is a fair specimen of the military gentleman of the German type, a representative of the Livonian aristocracy, who have furnished many respectable and devoted servants to the Russian Sovereigns in all the Departments of the State. The only objection which I see to the nomination of General Berg lies in his political sentiments, which I conceive to be decidedly opposed to a popular Government, at least such has been the prevailing sentiment among his contemporaries and fellow-countrymen. The Mayendorffs, Lievens, and Bergs are a class among whom may be found hearty Tories holding strong and sincere conservative feelings, not on account of mere profit of Court favour, but from conviction and passion. That is not the case among the Russians, who are either courtiers, employés, or liberals.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 391.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 6).*

(No. 187).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 31, 1863.*

WHEN I had the honour of seeing Prince Gortchakoff the day before yesterday, his Excellency showed me an extract of an English newspaper, containing an account of

the barbarous treatment reported to have been inflicted on Mr. Finkenst[one], a British subject, by a detachment of Russian soldiers, under whose charge that gentleman was being conveyed in Poland, when they were suddenly attacked by a detachment of insurgents.

The Vice-Chancellor stated his hope and belief that the statement was erroneous or exaggerated, but he informed me that he would instantly refer the subject to Poland for inquiry.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 392.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 189).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 1, 1863.*

THE Chargé d'Affaires of Spain informs me that he has addressed Prince Gortchakoff, on the part of his Government, in regard to the affairs of Poland. The sentiments of the Cabinet of Madrid on this subject are embodied in the form of a despatch to to M. Diaz, and merely contain a recommendation to pursue a conciliatory and merciful course. The Spanish Government cites its own experience of civil wars, and remarks that popular discontents cannot be suppressed by severity alone. The intervention of the Spanish Government is not justified on the grounds of the Treaty of Vienna.

M. Diaz read the despatch of his Government to the Vice-Chancellor, and left a copy of it in his Excellency's hands.

Prince Gortchakoff merely remarked that insurrections could not be quenched by clemency alone.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 393.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 190).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 2, 1863.*

MARQUIS PEPOLI called on me this afternoon, and communicated to me the instructions under which he has been acting in reference to the affairs of Poland.

His Excellency imparted to me a despatch addressed to him by M. Pasolini, under date of March 7, in the following sense.

The Italian Minister begins by stating that manifestations of sympathy had been made in Italy for the Polish cause, which the Government had confined within the limits of legality and respect to foreign Governments. He then proceeds to say that the Italian Government having thus scrupulously executed its international obligations has another

task to fulfil, namely, to express the lively hope of the Italian people that the Emperor Alexander will efface the recollection of the recent dreadful scenes of which Poland has been the theatre, by a conspicuous act of magnanimous clemency.

The Italians have such a lively memory of all they suffered before attaining their national unity that they cannot contemplate the sanguinary insurrections and the sanguinary acts of authority in Poland without deep emotion; Prince Gortchakoff will, therefore, think it natural on the part of the Italian Government to express their confidence that the Emperor will persevere in the course of concessions and reforms so unhappily interrupted by the revolt. Poland will be an element of prosperity and power to Russia if left in possession of its religion, its language, and institutions similar to those granted by Alexander I, and consecrated by Treaty. By following this course the reigning Emperor may solve the formidable problem of reconciling two nations separated by faith and history, but united by an affinity of race. If declarations in this sense have been made by the Russian Government before the arrival of Marquis Pepoli at St. Petersburg, his Excellency will express the grateful satisfaction of the Italian Government; if not, he will find in this instruction the basis of his language to the Vice-Chancellor, and he will unite his councils with the efforts of the Representatives of England and France in the same sense.

A second instruction is addressed to Marquis Pepoli on the 21st of March by which his Excellency is again directed to associate himself with his French and English colleagues in their representations on behalf of Poland.

Marquis Pepoli has spoken to Prince Gortchakoff in the sense desired by his Government, but has not placed in his Excellency's hands copies of the instructions addressed to him. He was not instructed by his Government to do so.

The Vice-Chancellor has informed the Italian Minister that when resistance in Poland has ceased, an amnesty will be granted, excluding only the chief leaders of the movement; but he has not held out to Marquis Pepoli any hope that the Emperor will grant a general Representative Constitution, though His Majesty will persevere in the course of administrative reforms already commenced.

Marquis Pepoli has stated to me that he will be happy to co-operate with me in any representation which I may be instructed to make on behalf of Poland, with this reservation however, that he cannot cite the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, to which his country in its present form was not a party, and which were framed to the prejudice of France and Italy. His Excellency also points out a certain discrepancy between the instructions addressed to him and to myself; he is charged to recommend the concession of institutions analogous to those granted by Alexander I, and a perseverance in the course inaugurated by Alexander II, while I am charged to recommend distinctly the restoration of the Constitution of the Emperor Alexander I.

I said to Marquis Pepoli that I was not enabled to state that Her Majesty's Government regarded the Statute of 1815 as the only possible and useful realization of the engagements of the Treaty of Vienna. Her Majesty's Government had, perhaps, mentioned that Constitution, and expressed a preference for it as one which had been approved by experience, and which sufficiently fulfilled the stipulations of Treaties; but I presumed Her Majesty's Government would be satisfied with a Representative Constitution for the

Kingdom of Poland, securing to the people substantial liberties, and the expression of their national sentiments. On this point, however, I was not exactly informed.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 394.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 191. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 2, 1863.*

THE Russian Ambassador at Paris has recently addressed a despatch to his Government on the attitude of Austria with reference to the Polish question. He has informed the Russian Cabinet that the Government of the Emperor of the French appear to wish the public to think that although there may be considerable difficulty in obtaining the co-operation of Austria, owing to the peculiar position held by that Power, yet, everything considered, the Cabinet of Vienna would derive such great advantages from her friendly relations with France that she must eventually adopt the political course that may be proposed to her from Paris.

Baron Budberg had an audience from M. Drouyn de Lhuys immediately after Prince Metternich, when the French Minister told him, „The Prince has brought us what we expected from Vienna. Austria wishes to preserve her neutrality, to conciliate parties, and to prevent war as much as possible“ („et à empêcher la guerre autant que possible“).

Baron Budberg tells Prince Gortchakoff that the words thus unguardedly spoken by M. Drouyn de Lhuys are of a nature to give rise to reflections.

The Russian Minister at Vienna had reported that the Austrian Cabinet does not share the views of Prince Metternich, who is favourable to co-operation with France; nevertheless, whether it is that the answers of Count Rechberg have not been sufficiently explicit, or whether it is that the Austrian Ambassador at Paris has made use of his influential position at Court, and modified the terms of the reply, Baron Budberg states that Austria is nevertheless considered at Paris to be identified, in the principal points at least, with the policy which the French Cabinet proposes to follow. This supposition appears to be adopted by Prince Metternich, whose views to that effect are communicated in the journal „La France“, said to be under the inspiration of his Excellency.

It is nevertheless not impossible, Baron Budberg reports, that Austria, while continuing to feel the greatest distrust in the intentions of the Emperor Napoleon, only appears to lend an ear to the idea of a Congress on the affairs of Poland, knowing well that such a combination must fall to the ground on the categorical refusal of Russia to take a part in it („sachant que cette combinaison échouerait devant notre refus catégorique d'y prendre part“).

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

†† No. 395.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 194).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 4, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, [<sup>1</sup>with reference to my despatch No. 184], an extract of the official journal of this date, stating that an Imperial Decree has been issued conferring on General Berg all the powers belonging to the office of Viceroy of Poland during the temporary absence of the Grand Duke.

[<sup>1</sup>It has been reported for some time past that the Grand Duke meditates a visit to St. Petersburg. In that contingency Count Berg would hold an authority superior to M. Wielopolski, who would not easily tolerate such a subordination. It may be suspected that the nomination of the new Commander-in-chief will produce dissensions and resentments among the heads of the Civil administration.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.]

† Inclosure in No. 395.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of April 4, 1863.*

PAR un Oukase du 19/31 Mars courant, adressé au Sénat dirigeant, Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné ordonner qu'en cas d'absence momentanée de Son Altesse Impériale le Grand Duc Constantin Nicolaïévitch, le Général d'Infanterie, Aide-de-camp Général Comte Berg, nommé adjoint de Son Altesse Impériale comme Commandant-en-chef des troupes dans le Royaume de Pologne, assumera tous les devoirs incombant à Son Altesse Impériale comme Namiestnik du Royaume.

No. 396.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. (Received April 14).*

(No. 197. Most Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 5, 1863.*

MY despatch No. 191 of the 2nd instant conveyed to your Lordship the impressions of Baron Budberg with reference to the attitude of Austria on the question of Poland, and I now have the honour to submit some further evidence which has reached me from a confidential source of the suspicion with which the policy of Austria is regarded both by Russia and Prussia.

The Russian Minister at Berlin has compared his communications from Vienna with those of M. de Bismarck, and has assured Prince Gortchakoff that the language held by Count Rechberg has been identical to both Representatives.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit).



M. de Werther has reported to M. de Bismarck that Austria is determined to retain possession of Galicia, a rich and fruitful province; that she has never maintained, and never will maintain the principle of nationalities, nor will she purpose the adventurous policy of territorial re-distribution.

Austria does not wish to see a Congress, and desires no Conferences; and as yet there is no question of representations at St. Petersburg. The Austrian Cabinet, says M. de Werther, desires to moderate and to render vague anything that may be too precise in the overtures of the two Western Courts. She does not refuse to discuss those overtures, in order not to isolate the Emperor Napoleon, and not to leave him to his own inspirations. Nevertheless M. de Bismarck is assured Austria will not lend herself to any collective or identical representation at St. Petersburg.

The Prussian Minister at Vienna has further imparted to his Cabinet that your Lordship has informed Lord Bloomfield that it is likewise in order not to leave Napoleon to the sole influence of hazardous resolutions („également pour ne pas laisser Napoléon seul en présence de résolutions hasardées“) that the English Cabinet had thought it best to take the French overtures into consideration. A telegram, M. de Werther states, addressed to Lord Bloomfield, has instructed his Excellency to press upon Austria the necessity of a similar policy — a pressure which appears to have effected its object.

The Prussian Cabinet is warned through M. de Werther that the negotiations are fitted to recall to our memory communications which preceded the Crimean war.

In communicating the information received by M. de Bismarck, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin makes the following comments. —

England accepts the negotiations proposed by France in order to moderate the Emperor Napoleon, Austria follows the example; but under the deceptive appearances of conciliation, the bases of an understanding are being elaborated, which may at any moment result in the gravest and most painful („pénibles“) consequences with reference to the condition of Europe.

Austria perseveres in her correct attitude with regard to the insurrection. She announces her intention to act according to the declarations made in the despatch of the 11th February. But will that attitude extend equally to the Polish question in general? That, M. d'Oubril says, is a question on which doubt may exist. As yet Count Rechberg has not communicated either to the Russian or the Prussian Representative the tenor of the proposals made by France and England. He told M. de Werther that he had only been imperfectly acquainted with those proposals by telegraph, observing, however, that they had no reference either to the independence of Poland, or to the establishment of a Polish Kingdom under a Prince of Leuchtenberg, as had been pretended.

This want of frankness has produced a bad impression on the Russian Minister at Berlin, who thinks the Austrian Government, if friendly, might have been more communicative to the Representative of Russia.

M. de Werther has informed his Government that he supposes the new propositions on the subject of Poland were settled between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley. M. de Bismarck, however, told M. d'Oubril that the initiative had evidently proceeded from the French Cabinet, which was striving hard to come to an understanding with En-



gland and Austria, and that this position of affairs was considerably aggravated by the suspicions still entertained, both in England and in Austria, of the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance.

The manner in which the report of the establishment of an independent Poland under a Prince of the family of Leuchtenberg had been discussed by the press of those two countries, M. de Bismarck added, was a further proof of the existence of such suspicions.

From the same source I learn that M. de Bismarck has given an additional proof of his devotion to the Russian interest, by informing M. d'Oubril that the Russian authorities have been instructed to keep a strict watch over the coast in the vicinity of Polognen. The Prussian Minister at the same time suggested the dispatch of Russian gunboats to the coast in question, which M. d'Oubril said could not be done at the present season, but that a clipper had been despatched on that duty.

The clipper here mentioned may be one of the Russian vessels recently lying under repair in the Thames.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 397.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 198).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 5, 1863.*

THE first signal of patriotic agitation against Poland has been given. The Assembly of Nobility of the Government of St. Petersburg have adopted by acclamation the accompanying Address to the Emperor, expressive of their determination to support the integrity of the Empire. In case of intervention or menace from abroad, this spirit will run very high. In the Polish question all the national and religious passions of the Russian people are touched. The recruits in the Russian provinces are coming in with unusual alacrity, and go off under the impression of an impending „holy war“.

I was not present when the Address of the Assembly was adopted, but I am informed that there was a scene of enthusiasm, in which the feeling of devotion to Russia was, no doubt, at least as strong as that of devotion to the Sovereign. It is not so much the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland which arouses the indignation of the Russians as the alleged views of the Poles on the frontier provinces, extending even to the sacred mother city of Kiev.

The frontier provinces are the traditional battle-ground and debateable land between the Polish and Russian nations. They will never be relinquished by Russia without a mortal struggle.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† Inclosure in No. 397.

*Address.*

(Translation).

THE nobility of the Government of St. Petersburg, being animated by an ancient devotion to the Throne and to their native country, consider it to be their sacred duty solemnly to express to you, Sire, the sentiments by which they are inspired. The pretensions of the Polish insurgents to the possessions of Russia fill us with grief and indignation. Our enemies conceive the era of the great reforms undertaken by you for the happiness and welfare of the State is a favourable one for their attacks against the integrity of the Russian Empire, but they are deceived: the nobility, tried in devotion and abnegation, and sparing neither exertion nor sacrifice, will, in connection with all the orders of the nation, know how to take its stand firmly and immoveably in defence of the territory of the Empire. Let the enemies of Russia know that the spirit of our ancestors lives in us, — the spirit which succeeded in establishing the unity of our beloved country.

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No. 398.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 202. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 6, 1863.*

THE state of Lithuania inspires the most serious apprehensions in the minds of the Russian Government. The effervescence in that province has greatly increased of late, and exaggerated reports of the despatch of arms and reinforcements from England to be landed on the Baltic coast may have contributed to this result. I am assured from confidential sources that many officers of the Russian army connected with those parts, whether on furlough or on active service, are finding their way on various pretexts to their native districts, resolved to take part in a revolt which is expected to break out about the middle of the present month. The Government of Kovno, in which the population is almost exclusively Roman Catholic, is the principal seat of agitation.

The border provinces of Russia, in past times connected with Poland for various periods, contain about 11,000,000 of inhabitants. Of these, according to Russian accounts, about 1,200,000 men are at present professed Romanists, while 1,800,000 belonged formerly to the United Greek Church in communion with Rome, but were driven into the Orthodox fold, as is alleged, by the severities of the Emperor Nicholas. If the latter class preserve any attachment for their former mixed religious allegiance, there may be about 3,000,000 souls more or less favourable to the Polish and Roman Catholic cause within the Russian border, and 8,000,000 of the Orthodox arrayed against them. It must be remembered, however, that the minority comprehends a great portion of the proprietors, burghers, and professional men, while the Orthodox are mainly confined to the peasantry.

From a revolt in the border provinces of Russia I apprehend a very great deal of confusion and suffering, the burning of chateaux, the destruction of crops and cattle, the

confiscation of property, the ruin of the Catholic aristocracy, the gratification of every form of international and religious passion; but no serious embarrassment to the Russian Government. Indeed, there are some Russians who would not be sorry to see such a movement, just as the English and Scotch Puritans might have viewed with complacency a revolt of the Papists in Ireland, with a view to the destruction and exile of their enemies and the seizure of their lands.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 399.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 203).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 6, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an Imperial Decree having reference to the sequestration of the property of persons in the Russian provinces bordering on Poland concerned in the prevailing insurrection.

The sequestration or confiscation of property in consequence of political offences has in it much that is afflicting and repugnant to our feelings, for such a measure never fails to affect the happiness of many innocent persons; and moreover, in this case, the act may be construed to affect a very numerous class who have many claims on our sympathy. Nevertheless I do not see on the face of the Decree any feature of severity which has not often found a place in the legislation of other States under similar circumstances.

The sequestration is to be imposed on the possessions of persons actually guilty of sedition or rebellion; some provision is made for the support of the families of the parties concerned, and the measure stops short of confiscation. The Government reserves to itself to make a definite settlement at the close of the disturbances.

What may be feared is, that under the exercise of martial law in a period of great excitement, and in the hands of Russian functionaries, the guilt of parties accused may be very lightly assumed, and that many abuses may be practised.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

† Inclosure in No. 399.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of April 5, 1863.*

*Règlement concernant la Mise sous Séquestre des Biens des Individus impliqués dans les Désordres dont les Gouvernements limitrophes du Royaume de Pologne ont été le théâtre, et pour la gestion de ces biens.*

Sect. 1. LA complicité aux désordres qui ont éclaté dans quelques parties des Gouvernements de l'Ouest entraîne une responsabilité dont les effets s'étendent sur les personnes comme sur les biens des coupables.

Sect. 2. Les biens des personnes qui ont pris part aux désordres sont mis sous séquestre, à la diligence de l'autorité locale supérieure, afin de garantir la responsabilité matérielle encourue par elles.

Sect. 3. Peuvent être placés sous séquestre les biens appartenant à l'individu complice des désordres et qui se trouvent dans l'empire, tels que: immeubles de toute nature, biens meubles et capitaux en billets de la banque, actions et obligations non exemptées du séquestre par des dispositions positives des lois générales, ainsi qu'en argent comptant et en titres de créances.

Sect. 4. Peuvent également être placés sous séquestre les biens de toute nature dont l'individu complice des désordres jouit à titre d'usufruitier temporaire ou viager, en vertu d'actes ou de documents quelconques.

Sect. 5. Les biens séquestrés sont mis à la disposition de la Chambre Locale des Domaines de l'Empire.

Sect. 6. Les maisons situées dans les villes et placées sous séquestre peuvent être confiées à l'administration de la municipalité locale.

Sect. 7. La remise du bien séquestré et de tous les titres qui s'y rapportent à la personne chargée de l'administration du séquestre est faite par un fonctionnaire de la police locale ou tout autre à la nomination de l'autorité supérieure de la province, d'après un inventaire dressé sur papier libre, en présence de deux témoins dignes de foi. Il est loisible au propriétaire, aux membres de sa famille qui se trouvent sur les lieux, ou au gérant du bien, d'assister à cette remise.

Sect. 8. On n'inscrit point dans l'inventaire les objets que les lois générales permettent de laisser à la disposition des débiteurs en faillite lorsque l'on dresse inventaire de leurs effets mobiliers.

Sect. 9. Les biens d'un individu complice des désordres, qu'il possède par indivis avec d'autres, sont laissés à l'administration des autres co-propriétaires non impliqués dans les désordres; toutefois, dans cette occurrence, le fonctionnaire chargé de faire la remise du bien, de concert avec celui qui a mission de le recevoir, vérifient exactement le revenu que produit le bien, et exigent des co-propriétaires entre les mains de qui la gestion en est laissée, l'engagement écrit de verser à la Chambre des Domaines de l'Empire, à l'expiration de chaque semestre, la part des revenus à laquelle aurait droit le complice des désordres.

Sect. 10. Les biens ci-dessus, tenus à bail par des fermiers non impliqués dans les désordres, en vertu de contrats non sujets à litige et conclus avant la sanction du présent règlement, seront laissés entre les mains de ces fermiers; mais ces derniers prendront l'engagement par écrit de verser à la Chambre des Domaines de l'Empire le prix de leurs fermages aux échéances fixées par les baux.

Sect. 11. Le Ministre des Domaines de l'Empire munira les Chambres placées sous son autorité d'une instruction détaillée sur tout ce qui concerne l'administration économique des biens séquestrés et la comptabilité de cette administration.

Sect. 12. Toutes les dépenses d'administration des biens séquestrés seront imputées sur leurs revenus.

Sect. 13. Les revenus produits par un bien séquestré servent à effectuer à leurs échéances tous les paiements dus pour emprunts aux établissements de crédit et au capital provenant des Jésuites, de même que pour les redevances à l'Etat et les redevances provinciales, et à satisfaire à toutes les créances particulières basées sur des titres légaux certains, délivrés avant la sanction du présent règlement.

Sect. 14. Défalcation faite de tous les paiements et des dépenses d'administration du bien, nécessaires et autorisés par le présent règlement, le reliquat des revenus est transmis à la Banque de l'Etat ou à ses succursales, pour y être placé à intérêt.

Sect. 15. Le propriétaire et sa famille quittent le bien séquestré; toutefois, si les membres de sa famille n'ont pas participé aux désordres et que, ne possédant pas de propriétés distinctes, ils manquent de moyens d'existence, l'autorité locale supérieure pourra leur faire donner, pour leur entretien, une partie du revenu net restant après défalcation de tous les paiements et dépenses incombant au bien et autorisés par le présent règlement.

Sect. 16. Le séquestré sera maintenu jusqu'aux dispositions à intervenir après la répression définitive des désordres; toutefois si, avant cette époque, il était reconnu que l'imputation de complicité aux désordres élevée à l'égard du propriétaire du bien séquestré n'était pas fondée, le séquestre sera immédiatement levé à la diligence de l'autorité locale supérieure, et le bien sera rendu au propriétaire avec tous ses revenus, défalcation faite des paiements et dépenses effectués en vertu du présent règlement.

† No. 400.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. -- (Received April 14).*

(No. 206).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 6, 1863.*

THE Vice-Chancellor requested me to call on him this afternoon. His Excellency showed me a despatch which he had addressed to the Russian Minister at Madrid, in reply to the instructions placed in his Excellency's hands by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires here, as reported to your Lordship in my despatch [No. 189] of the 1st April.

In his reply to the Spanish letter, the Vice-Chancellor remarks that the experience of the Government of Her Catholic Majesty must have shown them that the first duty of every Government, in the event of insurrection, is to restore authority, and to protect peaceful citizens in their lives and property and their industry; but that after the cessation of resistance, it was the purpose of the Emperor to use that clemency which was so congenial to Her Majesty's character. The tone of the letter is, on the whole, friendly.

I asked Prince Gortchakoff whether he had made any reply to the representations of the Italian Government. The Vice-Chancellor replied that the verbal remarks of Marquis Pepoli had been so slight and occasional that he had hardly thought himself called upon to take much notice of them.

He had observed to the Italian Representative that the Government of Russia did

not interfere in the affairs of Italy. I asked Prince Gortchakoff whether Marquis Pepoli had not recommended the restoration of representative institutions in Poland. The Vice-Chancellor answered that the Italian Minister might have spoken in that sense, but his reflections were of a very informal character.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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† No. 401.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 207).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 6, 1863.*

THE Vice-Chancellor obligingly showed me this afternoon a letter from Baron Brunnnow, in which his Excellency comments upon the operations of the Poles in England and of their partizans. Baron Brunnnow reports that recruiting is openly carried on at various localities in London for the Polish cause, and that vessels are reported to be fitting out in the Mersey, one I presume at Liverpool, the other at Birkenhead, with cargoes of arms ostensibly for America, but really for the Baltic. The Polish recruits are concentrated at Gravesend.

Baron Brunnnow also furnishes the Vice-Chancellor with the names of several English gentlemen who had formed themselves into a Committee on behalf of the Polish movement. These gentlemen, however, did not appear to me to be a very influential body.

Prince Gortchakoff was not able to inform me of the actual departure of more than one vessel from England on a hostile adventure, that, viz., of the „Ward Jackson“, which, as your Lordship is aware, has been detained in Sweden. His Excellency remarked that he conceived Her Majesty's Government might surely interfere with greater energy to prevent recruiting, but he did not express himself with any resentment or impatience on the subject, having no doubt in view the inexorable deliberation and impartiality of our laws.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER.

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† No. 402.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 209).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 6, 1863.*

I REMARKED to Prince Gortchakoff this afternoon that it would be very agreeable to me if I could convey to Her Majesty's Government some conciliatory communication respecting the designs of the Imperial Government in Poland. I had understood from the French Ambassador that the military recruitment had been abandoned, but I had no dis-

inct authority for such a statement, and the Duke de Montebello did not seem to know exactly in what his belief was founded.

The Vice-Chancellor replied that he could not give categorical replies on such a subject at the demand of Foreign Ministers. A reply had been already returned on the communications of Her Majesty's Government. I knew from him generally, and from other sources, what were the benevolent intentions of the Emperor. In regard to the recruitment, his Excellency added that the recruitment was over. The order of recruitment bore that it was to be carried into effect from such a date to such a date; the period was passed; there was no further ground for raising more men; none, in fact, were raised.

I asked Prince Gortchakoff whether I should be justified in stating to your Lordship that the period of recruitment would not be extended or renewed, and that no more people would be levied under that enactment.

The answer of the Vice-Chancellor was not very distinct. He did not avow that the Government had taken any resolution on the subject, but he left me under the impression that it was not intended to carry the system further, and that the Law of 1859, or some similar law, would be hereafter the rule of military conscription in Poland.

The Vice-Chancellor informed me that he had telegraphic intelligence of the arrival of Count Berg at Warsaw.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER

†† No. 403.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 50).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, April 6, 1863.*

I HAD the honour to receive, on the 4th instant, your Lordship's despatch No. 6 of the 4th ultimo, regarding a joint representation to the Government of Russia in favour of Poland.

Having, in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, communicated that despatch and its inclosure to Count Manderström, his Excellency said that he would consult the King, and make known the Government's decision upon the subject as soon as possible.

[<sup>1</sup>After commenting, and with no expression of satisfaction, upon the long delay in the arrival of your Lordship's despatch, Count Manderström observed both that the aspect of the Polish question had considerably varied since the date of that despatch, and that Prince Gortchakoff having, as he understood, very coldly received the representation made by England, to the extent of declining to receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador a copy of your Lordship's despatch, it was hardly to be expected that a similar representation on the part of Sweden would meet with a better reception.

As to the delay adverted to, I remarked that the despatch had been nine days coming from Copenhagen by the Swedish packet-post, when his Excellency rejoined that

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper (Edit.).



in the first place the common post might have been used, which would have brought it in three days, and, in the second place, that there still remained more than twenty days for its transit from London to Copenhagen.

Count Manderström added that there had probably been some mistake in the matter, and he may possibly have recollected the precedent of your Lordship's despatch No. 33 of last year, which was dated the 5th of November and arrived on the 23rd of December, containing a communication for his Excellency on Danish affairs.

Count Manderström further stated that he had some time since written both to London and to Paris in the sense that the Government of Sweden was willing to join in any common proceeding friendly to the interests of Poland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM <sup>1</sup>.

No. 404.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(No. 215. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 12, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a confidential letter from the Prussian Under-Secretary of State, communicating to me the copy of an official telegram received this morning from Warsaw, which reports the proclamation of a general amnesty to all insurgents who may lay down their arms before the <sup>1st</sup>/<sub>13th</sub> May, with the exception of those who have been guilty of a dereliction of military duty.

Your Lordship will observe that M. de Thile attributes this measure to the counsels which the Emperor of Russia has received directly, or through Diplomatic Agents, from the King of Prussia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 404.

*M. Thile to Sir A. Buchanan.*

(Confidentielle).

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Berlin, ce 12 Avril, 1863.*

JE m'empresse de vous transmettre ci-près traduction d'un telegramme officiel que nous venons de recevoir de Varsovie. Votre Excellence y trouvera avec plaisir les vues qui ont présidé aux conseils que le Roi mon auguste Maître a donné à ce sujet à l'Empereur Alexandre, soit directement, soit par les organes diplomatiques.

Agréé, &c.

(Signé) THILE.

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).



## Inclosure 2 in No. 404.

*Telegram dated Warsaw, April 12, 1862 (?)*.

(Traduction).

PAR Ukase de l'Empereur, en date du 11 Avril, tous les insurgés qui jusqu'au 1/13 Mai auront déposé les armes sont pleinement amnistiés, à l'exception seulement des crimes commis dans les rangs de l'armée.

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No. 405.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 14).*

(Telegraphic).

*Paris, April 13, 1863, 11.45 p. m.*

I HAD sent off my telegram of 10.30 this evening before receiving yours of 7.9.

Metternich has no instructions, but you will have seen that Drouyn agrees to the first in place of third person in note to Russian Government.

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†† No. 406.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 15).*

(No. 442).

My Lord,

*Paris, April 14, 1863.*

I CALLED yesterday upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the purpose of ascertaining two points: —

First, whether the knowledge that the Russian Government had promised an amnesty to the Poles who should return to their allegiance before the 1st of May, old style, with an assurance that the Emperor would maintain the new institutions which he had lately granted to Poland, had made any difference in the opinion of the French Government with respect to the transmission to St. Petersburg of the three despatches from the British, French, and Austrian Cabinets.

Secondly, whether any communication has been made to his Excellency from Vienna, requesting that the three notes to be addressed to Prince Gortchakoff by the Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia, covering copies of the said despatches, should be in the first person, instead of the third, as originally agreed to.

With respect to the first point M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that the promise of an amnesty was nothing new; that the Emperor of Russia had from the first declared that he would grant one whenever circumstances would permit of it; but he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) must remark, that on the day on which the Ukase of amnesty had been signed, there had appeared another at St. Petersburg, putting a sequester on the property of

those who had joined the insurrection. Then as to the new institutions which were to be maintained, his Excellency must observe that it was under these very institutions that the obnoxious act of conscription which had led to the present insurrection had been perpetrated. There was nothing, therefore, in these promises which in his opinion rendered the transmission of the three despatches less desirable than before.

As to the alteration suggested by Count Rechberg in the note of transmission, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he had heard nothing of it, but that [it appeared to him too microscopic to merit any attention]. Whether the note was to be written in the first or third person was the same to him.

Later in the day his Excellency wrote to me to say that the Duc de Grammont had apprized him of Count Rechberg's wish, and he had therefore authorized the Duc de Montebello to adopt the formula of the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 407.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 508).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 15, 1863.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 442 of yesterday's date, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree in the view taken (by) M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as therein reported, in regard to the amnesty promised by the Emperor of Russia to the Poles who should return to their allegiance before the 13th proximo.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

RUSSELL.

No. 408.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 15).*

(Telegraphic).

*St. Petersburg, April 15, 1863.*

AUSTRIAN messenger has not arrived. Joint representation cannot be made till the 17th instant. In despatch No. 88 respecting Poland may I insert after the word „doctrine“, and before the word „so“, the words „which they deem“, or words to that effect?

No. 409.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(Telegraphic).

*Foreign Office, April 15, 1863.*

YOU may insert „which they deem“. Point out alteration to Austrian and French colleagues.

No. 410.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received April 16).*

(No. 53).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, April 10, 1863.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 50 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inclose a translation of a communicated article which has appeared in the official journal „Post och Inrikes Tidningar“, in reply to, and in rectification of, an article of the „Aftonbladet“, of which I transmit a translated extract, blaming the Swedish Government for not assuming a proper attitude regarding the Polish insurrection, and severely criticizing Her Majesty's Government for an alleged neglect to treat Sweden like the other Parties to the Treaty of Vienna respecting the same subject; the latter attack having, of course, being occasioned by the long delay in the arrival of your Lordship's despatch No. 6 of the 4th ultimo.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 410.

*Extract from the „Post och Inrikes Tidningar“ of April 8, 1863.*

(Translation).

AN article of the „Afton-bladt“ of yesterday's date contains certain allegations which, notwithstanding the decided tone which characterizes them, are not in harmony with the exact state of the case.

Without going into any criticism of the nature and aim of the article in question, it may perhaps be advisable to point out and contradict the inaccuracies which it contains.

The „Afton-bladt“ states that „to the list of persons who originally signed the Treaty of Vienna were added, besides the Great Powers, merely Sweden, Spain, and Holland“. The last named Power is evidently an involuntary *lapsus calami* for Portugal.

The article further asserts that Lord Russell „not only made a representation on the Polish question to Spain and Portugal, but that he did not address a single word to the Swedish Cabinet on the matter“, and draws from this fact certain conclusions conveying an affront to our Government.

The true state of the case is, that Lord Russell addressed a despatch to Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Stockholm on this question at the same time that he addressed similar communications to the British Ministers at Madrid and Lisbon, although for reasons into the explanation of which it is not in the province of this article to enter, the despatch in question reached Stockholm very late.

Another statement made in the article above mentioned, of which the writer is bound to prove the accuracy, is, that the Swedish Cabinet has done nothing whatever in this matter. Although the author of the article seems to wish it to appear that he is *au courant*

of the secrets of our Cabinet, it may be permitted to doubt whether he is acquainted with all of them.

We too have „reliable“ informants in this respect, and their statements do not coincide with those of the author of the article in question.

Time will probably show which of these statements is most to be relied on.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 410.

*Extract from the „Afton-bladt“ of April 7, 1863.*

(Translation).

NOTWITHSTANDING the keen sympathies felt for Poland in Sweden, and which have even shown themselves among our Representative body, people have been within the last few weeks contented to abide by the reports that our Government displayed a very energetic activity in this question, and that it would be utterly superfluous any longer to express a desire that a diplomatic co-operation should be effected between our Government and the other Powers in behalf of Poland.

But people have deceived themselves very considerably in this particular. Our Cabinet has, in truth, done nothing whatever in the matter; but Lord Russell, that Minister so shortsighted and superficial as regards his foreign policy, has, according to what we learn on reliable authority, wounded Sweden once more in much the same manner as he did not long ago with reference to the Danish question.

To the List of Powers who originally signed the Treaty of Vienna, besides the Great Powers, were merely added Sweden, Spain, and Holland. Lord Russell is now said, according to information we have received from a trustworthy source, to have made a representation on the Polish question not only to Spain and Portugal, but even, as we have learnt by a letter from Copenhagen, to Denmark, but he has not addressed a single word on the subject to the Swedish Cabinet.

✓ This is the best proof that the noble Lord's attitude in this important matter is an attitude of running away with the question, since he will not co-operate with those who it might be supposed had a more decided interest in it. But that attitude entails also a gross affront to our country, which manifestly must be ascribed to the little friendly feeling that Lord Russell entertains, according to all appearances, for Sweden, but which, for the sake of the principle it involves, our Government can scarcely allow to pass without comment.

Meanwhile it would seem to us that the Swedish Government would have full reason to take an initiative in this question, just as the Italian Government has done; and, on the ground of the warm interest expressed upon it by the Swedish people, to address representations there on to all the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna.

Such a course would display no greater temerity than if Sweden were to protest alone against the incorporation of Cracow with the Austrian Empire, or that of Savoy with France.

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No. 411.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 16).*

(No. 194. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 14, 1863.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram dated the 11th instant, 3.10 p. m., and to the telegrams recorded in my despatches No. 191 of the 12th, and No. 192 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on Sunday, after communicating to Count Rechberg the copy of your Lordship's despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, inclosed in your No. 79 of the 9th instant, I inquired of his Excellency if he had decided on the form of note in which Count Thun should transmit a copy of the Austrian despatch, on the affairs of Poland, to Prince Gortchakoff, and I took with me a copy of the proposed note communicated in your Lordship's telegram to me of the 11th instant, and asked if it was in conformity with the project of the Imperial Government.

Count Rechberg replied that at one time he had approved of the form I brought with me, but that on further consideration, and after hearing the opinions of his Department, he had arrived at the conclusion that an official note written in the third person, and commencing „The Undersigned“, was quite unusual in making communications of this kind, and that he certainly should prefer employing a more simple form, one written in the first person; and he said, moreover, that he did not consider it essential that these notes of transmission should be identical.

It was evident from this observation that Count Rechberg had made up his mind to instruct the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to write in the first person; and on seeing his Excellency again yesterday I thought it essential to clear up the point, and on hearing that his messenger was actually off, I inquired whether he had sent also a draft of the note in which a copy of his despatch was to be transmitted to the Russian Government, and he replied that he had done so. I then asked to see it; he answered that he could not show it to me, because the original draft was with the Emperor, and observed that the drafts of such papers, and not copies, were always sent to His Imperial Majesty. On my pressing him to tell me from memory how the note was drawn up, his Excellency said it commenced „Etant chargé de la part de mon Gouvernement“, and was written in the first person.

On leaving the Imperial Chancery of State, I called on the French Ambassador, and recounted to him what I had learned respecting the alteration in the intended Austrian note of transmission.

The Duc de Gramont was totally unprepared for this change, and as we considered it would be useless attempting to bring the Austrian Minister back to the original draft — which had, I believe, been suggested by the French Ambassador himself — we resolved to telegraph to our Governments, and recommend the adoption of the form of the intended Austrian note, as the only certain way of insuring an identity of communication at St. Petersburg.

I have been happy to receive your Lordship's telegram of 6.40 p. m. yesterday, and trust that no further difficulty on the subject will arise.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† No. 412.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 16).*

(No. 195).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 14, 1863.*

THE active participation of foreigners in the Polish movement has seriously attracted the attention of the Austrian authorities, and the Governor of Galicia has issued a notice warning Austrian subjects against taking part in the insurrection, and assisting the emissaries of revolution.

I have the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a translation, by Mr. Barrington, of this notice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

† Inclosure in No. 412.

*Notice published at Lemberg by Count Mensdorff Pouilly, Governor of Galicia,*  
(Translation). *dated April 10, 1863.*

FOREIGNERS mostly are occupied here with increased zeal on behalf of the insurrection in Russian Poland, in recruiting men, raising money, and affording other means of resistance.

But Austrian subjects too take part in these proceedings, either by actively assisting these emissaries of the revolution or else, if not themselves engaged, by forwarding material support to the insurgents.

The Provincial Government, finding that the warning published on the 15th of March last has not been generally observed, now imposes the duty upon its agents to put a stop to these illegal proceedings by all the means at their disposal, and by the exercise of the utmost rigour of the law, in order to preserve both the population and the country from useless sacrifices.

† No. 413.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 16).*

(No. 196).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 14, 1863.*

ON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 79 of the 9th instant, I lost no time in waiting on Count Rechberg.

I read to him the draft of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Napier on the affairs of Poland, and left a copy of the same with his Excellency.

He thanked me for the communication, and said that he was only waiting for it to send off his messenger to St. Petersburg, who would be the bearer of the Austrian despatch already known to your Lordship.

I have since learnt that the messenger started on Sunday night.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 414.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 16).*

(No. 197. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 14, 1863.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 80 of the 9th instant, inclosing copies of drafts of despatches on the affairs of Poland, which the Austrian and French Governments propose to address to their Representatives at St. Petersburg, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, when I communicated to Count Rechberg the draft of your Lordship's despatch on the same subject, he said that he had changed the last part of the first paragraph of his own despatch, and had substituted for „définitivement vaincue“ the following words, „réduite à des proportions moins grandes“, which he considered an improvement.

Your Lordship will recollect that the Austrian draft of despatch was written some weeks ago, just after the surrender of Langiewicz, and at a moment when it was here believed the insurrection was nearly over.

Count Rechberg also told me that an alteration had been made in the original draft of the despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and that towards the end of the last paragraph but one the word „remplacer“ („le Royaume de Pologne dans les conditions d'une paix durable“) had been changed to „placer“. His Excellency seemed to consider this alteration was not without signification.

Having subsequently called on the Duke de Gramont, he showed me the original copy of the draft sent to him from Paris, which bore evident marks of the „re“ having been erased.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 415.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 16).*

(No. 199).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 14, 1863.*

AS it is not unfrequently reported that unfair uses are made of British passports and of British protection, I have thought it might be advantageous to read to Count

Rechberg your Lordship despatch No. 1 of April 9th to Mr. Consul Dalyell at Jassy, containing directions for that officer's guidance in case of Poles or others seeking his protection, which was sent under flying seal to me by the last messenger.

His Excellency thanked me for this communication, and I hope that it will serve to remove false impressions that exist here as to the occasional conduct of our agents in such cases.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 416.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received April 17).*

(No. 55).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, April 11, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract from the „Weekly Review“, which the „Afton-bladt“ newspaper has begun publishing in French, giving details of meetings in favour of Poland at Upsala and other places, the „Rector Magnificus“ of the first named university appearing to have raised by his eloquence „tempests of applause“.

The „Review“ also contains some additional particulars regarding the „Ward Jackson“ steamer embargoed at Malmo, which may possibly be of interest to your Lordship.

The Reviewer would seem bent on representing the English captain and crew who forsook the vessel at Copenhagen, in the light of „perfides insulaires“; but it appears to me that they may possibly have so acted from finding themselves the victims of perfidy.

I have not received any Consular information regarding the „Ward Jackson“.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure in No. 416.

*Extract from the „Afton-bladet“.*

LES sympathies pour la Pologne continuent à laisser dans l'ombre presque tous les autres objets de l'attention publique. Loin de s'affaiblir par suite des nouvelles fausses ou exagérées qu'on répand sur les défaites subies par les vaillants soldats de la liberté Polonaise, ces sympathies deviennent plus vives de jour en jour, et plus nombreuses les manifestations qui les expriment. Récemment, dans la ville Universitaire d'Upsal, a eu lieu un grand meeting en faveur de la Pologne. Là, les Professeurs de l'Université, avec le „Rector Magnificus“ à leur tête, les étudiants, un grand nombre de fonctionnaires et d'employés, de bourgeois et d'ouvriers, se sont prononcés avec le plus grand enthousiasme pour la liberté et pour l'autonomie de la Pologne, et ont exprimé le voeu que la fraternité régnât entre les Polonais et les Scandinaves. Le discours chaleureux du Profes-



seur Mesterton a soulevé des tempêtes d'applaudissement. Nous venons de recevoir la nouvelle que de semblables démonstrations se sont faites à Sundsvall, à Fahlun, à Nora. Partout dans le pays s'ouvrent les souscriptions. On annonce qu'un grand meeting aura lieu à Christiania, capitale de la Norvège.

Un fait, qui s'est passé ces jours-ci, est venu singulièrement exciter encore l'intérêt. Nous voulons parler de l'arrivée sur nos côtes d'une petite troupe d'émigrés Polonais, qui par une expédition d'une rare hardiesse, voulaient aborder sur un des points de la Baltique, et aller porter à leur frères qui se battent, des armes et des munitions. Malheureusement cette expédition a échoué, en partie par la lâcheté ou la trahison du Capitaine Anglais commandant du bâtiment qui portait ces nobles champions de la liberté, en partie par suite de l'indiscrétion dont se sont rendus coupables envers la Pologne plusieurs journaux du Continent, qui pourtant lui sont dévoués. En effet, ils ont eu l'imprudence d'annoncer qu'une expédition partirait de Londres, sous le commandement du Colonel Lapinski, et averti ainsi le Gouvernement Russe, qui, dit-on, a envoyé une croisière de Réval, dont le port est ouvert depuis quelque temps par suite de la douceur de cet hiver.

Le bâtiment Anglais affecté à l'expédition s'appelle „Ward Jackson“ et appartient à la „Steam Navigation Company“ de Hartlepool, qui l'a frété à l'expédition. Il avait à bord environ 200 hommes, dont les trois quarts sont Polonais (les autres sont des volontaires Français, Italiens et Hongrois), et une quantité considérable de munitions. Le commandant du navire, nommé Robert Weatherley, s'est rendu coupable d'une conduite suspecte, d'abord en s'arrêtant trois jours inutilement à Helsingborg, puis en se dirigeant sur Copenhague, sous prétexte d'y prendre un pilote, au lieu de se rendre directement dans la Baltique. La nouvelle qu'on s'exposait à rencontrer une croisière Russe n'avait pas le moins du monde effrayé les chefs et les membres de l'expédition, qui tous avaient juré de ne se laisser prendre à aucun prix, même s'ils avaient affaire à l'un des plus grands vaisseaux de guerre Russes. Le bâtiment arrivé dans la rade de Copenhague, le commandant s'enfuit avec tout l'équipage Anglais, et en emportant les papiers de bord. On ne put trouver d'assistance à Copenhague que pour conduire le navire jusqu'à Malmö, en Suède, pays où les Polonais savaient devoir trouver les plus vives sympathies pour leur cause, et un asile tout aussi sûr qu'en Angleterre et en France. Après que les autorités de Malmö, où le bâtiment arriva le Lundi 30 Mars, eurent avisé le Gouvernement Suédois de ce fait, celui-ci laissa au „Ward Jackson“ deux jours pleins pour mettre à la voile et quitter ce port. Mais ce départ n'ayant pu avoir lieu, faute d'équipage, ou peut-être aussi, dit-on, parce que la croisière Russe avait paru devant Copenhague et Malmö, ordre fut expédié par le télégraphe de mettre sous séquestre jusqu'à nouvel ordre, conformément aux réglemens de douane, le navire arrivé sans papiers de bord, mais de laisser aux passagers la libre disposition de leurs personnes.

Le Polonais ont été reçus avec la plus grande cordialité par les habitants de Malmö. Ils ont été logés dans la ville, et le soir même de leur arrivée une fête a été organisée en leur honneur, où ils ont été salués par les chants de la Société Musicale de la ville. Ils ne devaient pas tarder à donner aux habitants de Malmö une preuve de leur courage et de leur résolution. Jeudi dernier, dans l'après-midi, un incendie, dû probablement à une cause spontanée éclata à bord du „Ward Jackson“, stationné dans le port. Le feu, qui

s'était déclaré dans la soute au charbon, pouvait, par suite de la présence à bord d'un grand approvisionnement de poudre, devenir fatal pour une partie considérable de la ville, et tout le monde frémissait à la seule pensée de cet immense danger. Les Polonais eux-mêmes se mirent à l'oeuvre pour éteindre l'incendie et montrèrent dans cette occasion une présence d'esprit extraordinaire, et un incroyable mépris de la mort. Trois heures après tout danger avait disparu.

Le Colonel Lapinski est demeuré à Malmö auprès de sa troupe. Mais le Commissaire Civil de l'expédition, Demontowicz, qui d'après le dernier numéro de la „Cloche“ est nommé Commissaire du Gouvernement national Polonais pour la Lithuanie, s'est rendu à Stockholm.

No. 417.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 18).*

(No. 217).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 11, 1863.*

I HAD occasion to see Prince Gortchakoff this afternoon, when his Excellency remarked that your Lordship's despatch No. 53 of the 2nd ultimo, embodying the representations of Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Poland, had been published in all the foreign newspapers in connection with a circular despatch having reference to the same subject. His Excellency stated that such having been the case, he thought that it would be just that his reply to the overtures of Her Majesty's Government contained in my despatch No. 131 of the 9th ultimo should also be made public. With this view he requested me to ask your Lordship for permission, by telegraph, to publish my report above-mentioned, in connection with your Lordship's despatch, in the official newspaper. He was placed in a false position by the separate publication of your Lordship's despatch, and was frequently called on by his friends here for his reply. He had not yet sanctioned the appearance of Your Lordship's despatch apart in the Russian journals; he wished both documents to appear in original together.

I told Prince Gortchakoff that I should lose no time in imparting his wishes to your Lordship, and I accordingly forwarded a telegram to your Lordship in cypher under this date.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 418.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 18).*

(No. 218).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 12, 1863.*

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 11th instant last night, prescribing to me the course which Her Majesty's Government desired

I should observe in presenting to the Russian Minister the remonstrance concerning Poland with which I am to be charged in connection with the Representatives of France and Austria.

I waited on the French Ambassador this afternoon, and asked his Excellency whether he had received any instructions from his Government on this subject. I found the Duc de Montebello vaguely informed that the Governments of Great Britain, France and Austria had come to an understanding in this matter, but his Excellency did not know in what form or on what points this concurrence had been effected. He was advised that a messenger had left Paris and might be expected here on the 15th instant.

I stated to the French Ambassador the substance of your Lordship's telegram, and we agreed to act in concert as soon as we should be fully informed of our duty under the instructions of our respective Governments.

I will see the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires to-morrow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 419.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 18).*

(No. 220).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 12, 1863.*

THE official newspaper of this morning contains the inclosed Manifesto offering a free pardon to all parties who have been concerned in the recent insurrection in Poland, saving those who shall continue in arms after the  $\frac{1st}{18th}$  of May next. The only exceptions specified are persons guilty of other crimes, or such as have violated their military duty.

The maintenance of the institutions recently granted to Poland in all their integrity is promised, and the Emperor reserves to himself the duty of developing those institutions hereafter in conformity with the wants of the times and the country.

A separate Ukaze offers a similar amnesty to parties engaged in the disorders within the boundaries of the Western Governments of Russia. From the phraseology of the Decree some doubt might arise as to whether the proffered amnesty be intended to apply to those who have already been delivered over to justice, or only to those who are still in arms, and who may come in before the expiration of the term of grace. One of my colleagues informs me, however, that he knows from competent authority that the amnesty is intended to apply to both classes alike.

The Imperial Manifesto is conceived in a tone of humanity and clemency which is congenial to the character of the Emperor; a religious physiognomy is given to it, which we are familiar with in Russian documents of State; the sense of it is undoubtedly consistent with the interests of the Imperial Cabinet and with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. We may regret that the discontents in Poland are simply referred to the instigations of foreign or exiled revolutionary agents — a statement which cannot be sincere, even on the part of the most zealous Russian; and that no mention is made of the

military recruitment, which was the proximate provocation of the late revolt. The Russian Government might have used a bolder sincerity with advantage: they might have avowed an error which they feel, and have promised a remedy which they have in view.

This act of mercy has been appropriately promulgated on Easter Sunday. How far it has been prompted by the expectation of foreign intervention, I am not able to affirm with confidence. I am inclined to think that it may have been accelerated by such apprehensions, but it is also plainly consistent with policy, as well as with the benevolent disposition of the Sovereign.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

+ Inclosure in No. 419.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of <sup>March 30 and 31</sup><sub>April 11 and 13</sub> 1863.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le 31 Mars, 1863.*

### *Manifeste Impérial.*

DES la première nouvelle des désordres survenus dans le Royaume de Pologne, nous avons suivis l'impulsion de notre coeur en déclarant que nous ne rendions pas la nation Polonaise responsable d'une agitation funeste surtout à elle-même. Nous ne l'avons attribuée qu'aux excitations préparées depuis longtemps hors du pays par quelques individus auxquels de longues années d'une vie errante ont fait contracter des habitudes de désordre, de violence, et de complots ténébreux qui ont perverti chez eux les sentiments élevés d'amour pour l'humanité, et même inspiré la pensée de souiller par le crime l'honneur national.

Ces manifestations d'un autre âge, depuis longtemps condamnées par les arrêts de l'histoire, ne s'accordent plus avec l'esprit de notre époque. La génération actuelle doit avoir pour but de fonder le bien-être du pays, non par des torrents de sang, mais dans la voie du progrès pacifique.

C'est le but que nous nous sommes tracé lorsque, confiant dans la protection divine, nous avons fait devant Dieu et notre conscience le serment de consacrer notre vie au bonheur de nos peuples.

Mais pour accomplir dans toute son étendue ce serment, qui nous demeurera toujours sacré, nous avons besoin de l'assistance de tous les hommes de bien sincèrement dévoués à leur patrie et qui placent leur dévouement non dans des calculs intéressés ou des tentatives criminelles, mais dans le maintien du repos public, sous la sauvegarde des lois.

Dans notre sollicitude pour l'avenir du pays, nous sommes prêts à vouer à l'oubli tous les actes passés de rébellion. En conséquence, désirant ardemment mettre un terme à une effusion de sang aussi stérile pour les uns qu'elle est pénible pour les autres, nous accordons un pardon entier à tous ceux de nos sujets du Royaume impliqués dans les derniers troubles, qui n'auraient point encouru de responsabilité pour d'autres crimes ou

des délits commis au service dans les rangs de notre armée, et qui jusqu'à la date du <sup>1</sup>/<sub>13</sub> Mai déposeront les armes et rentreront dans l'obéissance.

C'est sur nous que repose l'obligation de préserver le pays du retour de ces agitations désordonnées et d'ouvrir une ère nouvelle à sa vie politique. Elle ne peut s'inaugurer que par une organisation rationnelle de l'autonomie administrative locale, comme fondement de tout l'édifice.

Nous en avons posé les bases dans les institutions octroyées par nous au Royaume; mais, à notre sincère regret, le résultat n'a pas encore pu en être soumis à l'épreuve de l'expérience, par suite des instigations qui ont substitué des entraînements chimériques aux conditions d'ordre public sans lesquelles nulle réforme n'est possible.

En maintenant encore aujourd'hui ces institutions dans leur intégrité, nous nous réservons, lorsqu'elles auront été éprouvées dans la pratique, de procéder à leur développement ultérieur selon les besoins du temps et ceux du pays. Ce n'est que par la confiance qu'il témoignera dans nos intentions que le Royaume de Pologne pourra effacer les traces des malheurs actuels et marcher sûrement vers le but que notre sollicitude lui assigne. Nous invoquons l'assistance divine afin qu'il nous soit donné d'accomplir ce que nous avons toujours considéré comme notre mission.

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

*St. Pétersbourg, le 31 Mars, 1863.*

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*Oukase de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, adressé au Sénat Dirigeant, en date du 31 Mars, 1863.*

LA rébellion depuis longtemps préparée sous main, et qui a enfin éclaté dans le Royaume de Pologne, a entraîné également des désordres dans quelques parties des Provinces occidentales de l'Empire. Les meneurs secrets du mouvement excité contre notre Gouvernement, s'opposant obstinément à la réalisation de nos intentions bienveillantes pour l'organisation des affaires du Royaume, se sont efforcés d'accroître les difficultés que nous rencontrions dans cette tâche, en élargissant le cercle de leurs entreprises criminelles et de leur pernicieuse influence. Dans ces vues, ils avaient depuis longtemps cherché à ébranler les sentiments de dévouement envers nous de nos fidèles sujets des Gouvernements de l'Ouest. Ils ont employé à cet effet les mêmes moyens qui, dans les limites du royaume, ont eu des suites déplorables quoique incomplètes. Enfin des bandes armées ont pénétré dans les frontières de l'Empire afin de propager dans les contrées de l'Ouest les troubles que n'avaient pu exciter ni les tentatives des émissaires de la révolution ni leurs appels clandestins à la révolte. Nos troupes ont dispersé les bandes qui se sont montrées dans les Gouvernements limitrophes du Royaume de Pologne. Leurs débris sont poursuivis dans les bois où ils ont cherché refuge. Cependant, malgré la folie d'une lutte sans espoir, les chefs continuent à consacrer tous leurs efforts afin d'entraîner les populations paisibles, et emploient dans ce but tantôt les promesses, tantôt les menaces et même la violence.

Ceux des habitants des Gouvernements de l'Ouest qui se sont réunis aux bandes re-

belles et qui ont été pris par nos troupes, ou ceux dont la participation à la révolte a été constatée par tout autre moyen, sont livrés à la justice.

Mais nous savons que tous ne sont pas également coupables, et nous désirons leur donner les moyens de profiter de nos sentiments de clémence souveraine.

A cet effet, nous ordonnons que les autorités supérieures soient chargées de déclarer, dans les limites des localités qui leur sont confiées, que nous accordons un pardon entier et complet à tous les habitants des Gouvernements de l'Ouest impliqués dans ces désordres qui, n'ayant pas encouru de responsabilité pour d'autres crimes, rentreront dans l'obéissance avant le 1 Mai prochain.

Nous conservons l'espoir que cette faveur souveraine sera justement appréciée par les habitants bien pensants, et que, de leur côté, ils continueront de concourir au maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquillité publique, fermement convaincus que de cette condition dépend la réalisation des plans que depuis le commencement de notre règne nous avons conçus dans la pensée d'étendre les droits octroyés à tous nos fidèles sujets et d'élargir progressivement la sphère d'activité tracée aux diverses institutions locales dans notre Empire.

Le Sénat dirigeant est chargé de prendre les dispositions nécessaires en exécution du présent Oukase.

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

*St. Pétersbourg, le 31 Mars, 1863.*

No. 420.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. -- (Received April 18).*

(No. 219. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 16, 1863.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 13th instant, on the subject of my despatches No. 195 of the 4th instant and No. 214 of the 11th instant, I have not received any more certain information as to the authenticity of the instructions alleged to have been addressed by the Minister of War to General Werder respecting refugees crossing from Poland into Prussia. The explanations which I have obtained tend, however, to confirm me in the belief that the instructions, a translation of which was inclosed in my despatch No. 214, are genuine.

If they had not been so, M. de Bismarck could not have objected to give me positive information to that effect.

I took an opportunity, on the 13th instant, of laying before his Excellency my above-mentioned despatches, and begging him to enable me to inform your Lordship which of them contained a correct statement of the intentions of the Prussian Government. After reading my despatch No. 195 his Excellency said I must have entirely misunderstood him if I were under an impression that the Prussian Government would send Polish refugees to France, and begged me to correct that statement.

I replied that I was quite ready to do so, but that I could have been under no mistake as to the meaning of his previous language to me on the subject, as, he had

added, „they are so much liked there“, and, if he had spoken in jest, the character of our conversation had given me no reason to believe he had been doing so.

With respect to the alleged instructions to General Werder, his Excellency said he was entirely unacquainted with them, but he admitted the probability of their not being entirely apocryphal.

I therefore expressed regret that the Prussian Government should apparently have determined to treat persons crossing from Poland into Prussia under the present circumstances of the former country, exactly as if no insurrection had taken place, and not only to deliver up the refugees demanded by Russia, but to force back into Poland all persons who had escaped from it.

M. de Bismarck repeated that no refugees had yet been demanded by the Russian authorities, and that he did not believe any would be claimed unless they had been guilty of other crimes than the mere participation in the insurrection; and with regard to those persons against whom there is no suspicion and who are to be sent back to Poland under Article XXIII of the Cartel Convention, if the instructions to General Werder are genuine, his Excellency said there could be no reason why the Prussian Government should incur expense in the maintenance of persons against whom the Russian Government could have no cause of complaint, and who would, at all events since the proclamation of the amnesty, have nothing to fear if they returned to their homes. I said I was sorry to hear him use this language, for though Article XXIII of the Cartel Convention might be necessary for the protection of Prussia in a time of peace, its being enforced at present against innocent persons who may have been driven from their homes by the excesses of the Russian soldiery, or of the insurgents, could not fail to create in other countries a very unfavourable opinion of Prussian humanity; and as his Excellency seemed disposed to complain of my interfering in a question of Prussian internal administration, I said that the alleged instructions were now before the world and would not impossibly attract the attention of the English Houses of Parliament, and my interference had therefore had merely originated in a wish to enable Her Majesty's Government to deny their authenticity, or at all events to explain that they were not likely to be acted upon.

M. de Bismarck did not give me any very explicit explanations on this subject, and he felt, I believe, that it would be difficult for him to do so. He said, however, if any Polish refugees were given up to the Russian authorities, and forced across the frontier, such incidents could not occur without their being known to the public, and it would then be time enough to complain of the conduct of the Prussian Government, if it appeared to be deserving of blame.

From these and some other observations which he made, but which I ought, perhaps, not to report in a despatch even of a confidential nature, I trust that I am not too sanguine in entertaining a hope that there is no great probability of the Prussian Cartel Convention with Russia being used as a means of placing Polish political refugees in the power of the Russian authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.



No. 421.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 18).*

(No. 223).

My Lord,

Berlin, April 16, 1863.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the inclosed translation of an article from the „Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung“, in reference to the amnesty lately proclaimed by the Russian Government to the insurgents in the Kingdom of Poland.

The paper from which it is extracted is generally, and I believe not without truth, supposed to be used by M. de Bismarck as the means of conveying to the public information and views which the Government are desirous should find their way into a circulation in a less direct manner than through the official organs; and it was in its columns that appeared the first hint of Prussia's having suggested at St. Petersburg the expediency of an amnesty.

The present article is universally believed to owe its inspiration to official sources, and under these circumstances it is not without interest.

The writer claims for Prussia the entire merit of the amnesty, and contrasts the power for good — of which her action in this instance has afforded the proof — with the impotence which must have necessarily paralyzed any efforts made in this direction by Great Britain, France, or Austria. These happy results are due to the strength of character exhibited by the Prussian Ministers in not snatching at the laurels of a cheap popularity which the Governments of the other Great Powers have been struggling for. He concludes by an encomium on the character of the Emperor Alexander, and hails a moral alliance with Russia as a glorious result of the amnesty, and the share which Prussia had in bringing it about.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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 Inclosure in No. 421.
*Extract from the „Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung“ of April 15, 1863.*

(Translation).

THE policy of the Cabinet of Berlin celebrated yesterday one of those triumphs which seldom fall to the share of diplomacy.

We allude to the amnesty, the news of which arrived to us from St. Petersburg by telegraph.

We were on a former occasion in a position to declare that the Prussian Government was the first among those of the Great Powers to recommend at St. Petersburg the publication of an amnesty, and consequently it will be practically impossible to take from her the merit of the initiative in this matter.



In order to estimate the value of the Prussian recommendation we need only to compare the policy of Prussia with that of the three other great Powers.

Lord Napier would have had a somewhat envious part to play if, on taking the recommendation of his Government for an amnesty to Prince Gortchakoff, the latter, in lieu of all other answer, had produced the despatches from the Russian Minister in London acquainting him that the British Government was permitting the armament of the „Ward Jackson“, and of other expeditions, with the object of sending succour to the Polish insurgents.

We are further of opinion that the Duke of Montebello would not have been more happy in his representations, as the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs is probably not ignorant of the manner in which one is wont at Paris to trot out before the public the *democratic cheval de manège* yelegt the Polish Revolution.

Nor would the counsels of Austria have found an altogether willing ear at St. Petersburg, even if they had flowed from so loyal a mouth as that of Count Thun, who, however, no longer resided there when the time for these representations had come.

Consequently it was the Cabinet of Berlin alone which could with a prospect of success take the first step towards inducing the Russian Government to adopt this humane measure. That this step has met with the most brilliant success is proved by the fact of the amnesty.

Of course the attempt will be made on the part of those opposed to us to diminish to the utmost the importance of this success. It will be asserted that the entire merit of this high-hearted resolve falls to the share of the Emperor Alexander, but the fact that Prussia was the first to pronounce the word „amnesty“ at St. Petersburg, and that this word has been realized, is one which cannot be obliterated.

One may reckon the merit of our Cabinet in this matter as low as one likes; the praise at least of evincing strength of character cannot be denied it, when we consider how the English Cabinet used the Polish question to strengthen by popular demonstrations its failing popularity; how in France colouring matter was extracted from Polish blood to give a fresh coating of paint to the principles of 1789, as against the impending elections; and how at Vienna Polish sympathies were used to built up a bridge for an *entente cordiale* with the „National Verein“.

And whilst for these endeavours cheap laurel crowns were raining down from all parts of Europe upon the „Party of Progress“, abuse of every sort was being heaped upon the Cabinet of Berlin. In the home and foreign press, in the Chamber of Deputies of their own country, Prussian Ministers had to submit to be the butts of the coarsest insults; the Polish insurrectionary Committee threatened the Minister President with death: and yet, spite all this, the Cabinet never turned aside one inch from the path which it had presented to itself.

„The path to an alliance with Russia“, will be the sneering remark.

„Yes, to an alliance with Russia“, we answer, and that without hesitation.

There is no need for us to use this word in its political acceptation; we use it in its moral acceptation, we speak of a moral alliance. For when we see a Prince like Alexander II disturbed in the midst of his gigantic plans of reform by a senseless and

execrable revolution, beating this revolution down, and immediately after his victory putting back his sword into the scabbard, and when we hear him addressing the men who threatened with impious hand to interrupt and destroy his great, beautiful, and humane plans, in the following words taken from the amnesty, „The present generation must make it their task to establish the well-being of the country, not by streams of blood, but along the path of quiet progress“; — when, we say, we see and hear a Prince act and speak in such wise, we declare without shyness that an alliance with such a Prince does honour to every Sovereign, to every State, and to every party.

The Russian amnesty is not reduced to an imaginary minimum by a „Law of Public Safety“. It expresses nothing beyond the hope that the Emperor may be able to continue undisturbed his great works of reform, and all those who in Europe have a feeling left for what is great and exalted will feel gratitude to the Emperor for this act, and will appreciate the policy of the friendly Cabinet which gave its support to the amnesty, and, by the attitude it assumed, rendered it possible that it should be promulgated at so short a notice.

†† No. 422.

*Mr. Jerningham to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 57).

My Lord,

*Stockholm, April 13, 1863.*

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch No. 50 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to state that Count Manderström read to me to-day the despatch dated the 7th instant, which he had addressed to the Swedish Minister at St. Petersburg on behalf of Poland, in consequence of the invitation contained in your Lordship's despatch [No. 6] of the 4th ultimo; and, as his Excellency mentioned that a copy of his despatch had been sent to London for communication to your Lordship, I need only add that Count Manderström observed that he had thought it better to abstain from entering into any particulars regarding Polish reform as your Lordship had done, since what might be advisable coming from England might be the contrary coming from Sweden; that, in fact, though he did not think Her Majesty's Government wrong to enter upon such details, he thought the Swedish Government right to abstain from them.

His Excellency said that a copy of his despatch had also been sent to Paris.

[<sup>1</sup>Intelligence of the conditional amnesty and reforms for Poland having been received last night by Count Manderström, he appeared to think that nothing more in the shape of concession was to be reasonably expected from the Russian Government under existing circumstances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM].

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parl. Paper. (Edit.).

† No. 423.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 216).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 12, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in reference to my despatch [No. 198] of the 5th instant, an extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of the 7th instant, containing the official translation of the address presented to the Emperor, by the Assembly of the Nobility of St. Petersburg, in reference to the insurrection in Poland.

The same journal contains the speech delivered by Prince Suwaroff in closing the sittings of the Assembly.

The address of the Assembly having been presented to the Emperor by a deputation of that body, His Majesty returned a gracious reply, transmitted herewith, thanking the nobility for their patriotic declarations.

It may be regretted, I think, that the Emperor did not avail himself of this occasion to make use of some conciliatory expressions towards his Polish subjects, and to define his intentions in regard to the institutions and liberties of Poland hereafter, in connection with Russia.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 423.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of April 7, 1863.*

*Adresse à Sa Majesté l'Empereur, votée à l'Unanimité par l'Assemblée de la Noblesse du Gouvernement de St. Pétersbourg, dans sa Séance du 22 Mars, 1863.*

Très-gracieux Souverain,

LA noblesse du Gouvernement de St. Pétersbourg, inspirée par son dévouement séculaire au trône et à la patrie, considère comme un devoir sacré d'exprimer solennellement à votre Majesté les sentiments qui l'animent.

Les prétentions au patrimoine de la Russie, provoquées par les troubles de Pologne, excitent notre douleur et notre indignation.

Nos envieux se flattent de l'espoir que l'ère des réformes, inaugurée par votre Majesté pour le bonheur et la prospérité de l'Etat, sera favorable aux projets qu'ils forment contre l'intégrité de l'Empire.

Leur attente sera déçue.

La noblesse, qui s'est toujours signalée par son dévouement et son abnégation, indissolublement unie à toutes les classes de la nation, ne reculera devant aucun effort ni devant aucun sacrifice pour défendre, avec une inébranlable fermeté, les territoires de l'Empire.

Les ennemis de la Russie apprendront qu'il vit encore en nous ce puissant esprit de nos ancêtres qui a créé l'unité politique de notre patrie bien-aimée.

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La Session de l'Assemblée de la Noblesse de Gouvernement de St. Pétersbourg a été close par le discours suivant de son Altesse le Prince Italiisky, Comte Souvorow-Rymniksky: —

„Messieurs,

„J'apprends que la Noblesse du Gouvernement de St. Pétersbourg a terminé la série de ses travaux par un acte solennel dans lequel elle a exprimé à Sa Majesté l'Empereur ces sentiments de fidélité et l'empressement qu'elle mettrait à répondre, si les circonstances l'exigeaient, au premier appel de notre auguste Maître pour la défense des droits sacrés qui garantissent l'intégrité de l'Empire.

„Cette voix, qui devait avant tout retentir dans la capitale, parviendra jusqu'aux confins les plus reculés de notre pays, et y réveillera l'écho d'une sympathie et d'un enthousiasme unanimes.

„Je ne toucherai pas, Messieurs, aux questions importantes qui ont formé l'objet de vos délibérations pendant la période de votre session; je ne m'arrête qu'à l'événement le plus éclatant, accompli dans l'enceinte de votre assemblée, que je déclare close et dont j'emporte le souvenir le plus satisfaisant“.

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† Inclosure 2 in No. 423.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of April 10, 1863.*

LE 26 Mars, à midi et demi, Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné recevoir au Palais d'Hiver la députation chargée de lui soumettre l'expression des sentiments de fidélité de la noblesse de St. Pétersbourg.

Sa Majesté, visiblement émue, après avoir honoré de quelques paroles chacun des membres de la députation, a daigné leur dire ce qui suit: —

„Je vous remercie de cette adresse. Elle m'a procuré, dans les circonstances actuelles, un moment des plus agréables et des plus consolants. Comme gentilhomme, je partage entièrement ces sentiments, et je suis persuadé qu'ils vous sont communs avec toute la noblesse Russe.

„J'espère que vous transmettez à vos enfants les mêmes sentiments dont vous m'avez réjoui.

„Je comprends l'amour de la patrie tel que vous l'avez exprimé. Depuis des siècles il a constitué la force de la Russie: de génération en génération il restera le gage certain de sa puissance.

„Je vous remercie encore une fois, et je vous prie de faire part à la noblesse de ma sincère reconnaissance“.

† No. 424.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 227).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 15, 1863.*

AFTER the Address from the Assembly of the nobility of the Government of St. Petersburg had given the signal, the anti-Polish movement was taken up by the Municipality of St. Petersburg. A meeting of the burgesses was convoked, at which there was a great fermentation, and at which [these honest but impolitic] people manifested a hearty disposition to offer up their lives and fortunes for their Czar, their Church, and their country, on condition that no concessions should be made to the Poles. The duty of framing an Address to the Sovereign was, however, left to the prudence of a Committee, and their deliberations resulted in the accompanying document, which is not intemperate, but which preserves something of the fanatical fervour which is natural to the lower order of Russians.

It is expected that the contagion of patriotism will spread all over the Empire, and that the various official and popular bodies will vie with each other in laying their services at the feet of the Emperor.

The leading journals at Moscow are animated with strong national sentiments, and plead the cause of Russia against Polish aggression (as they deem it) and foreign intervention with vehemence.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† Inclosure in No. 424.

*Extract from the „Journal de St. Pétersbourg“ of April 15, 1863.*

LA Municipalité de St. Pétersbourg a été admise à l'honneur de présenter à Sa Majesté l'Empereur l'expression suivante de ses sentiments de fidélité: —

„Très-gracieux Souverain,

„En célébrant le grand jour de la Résurrection du Christ, la Russie tout entière, et avec elle ta fidèle capitale, se souviennent avec joie que cette fête solennelle a été aussi l'anniversaire du jour où la Providence a donné la vie au Monarque qui préside glorieusement aux destinées de la patrie et nous guide dans la voie du bien public.

„Nous, citoyens de St. Pétersbourg, adressant nos prières au Très-Haut pour la prolongation de ton règne bienfaisant, nous éprouvons plus que jamais le besoin d'épancher devant toi les sentiments qui nous animent.

„Des ennemis, envieux des progrès de la Russie, et ne voyant dans le réveil des forces sociales que la fermentation d'éléments subversifs, ont conçu le projet de porter atteinte à l'intégrité et à l'indivisibilité de l'Empire Russe. Ils songent à la possibilité d'en arracher des provinces antique berceau de l'orthodoxie Russe, et qui ont été réintégrées dans l'ensemble de notre patrie, au prix de torrents de sang Russe.

„Nous, citoyens de St. Pétersbourg, sommes convaincus que toute tentative contre

l'intégrité de l'Empire est une atteinte à l'existence de la Russie, au sein de laquelle le sentiment de l'honneur national et de l'amour envers le Souverain est plus vivace que jamais.

„Nous ne répondons pas à nos ennemis par la haine et une soif de vengeance; mais s'il plait à la Providence de mettre la Russie à l'épreuve, nous ne reculerons devant aucun sacrifice; nous lèverons l'étendard pour le Tzar et la patrie, et nous marcherons partout où nous conduira ta volonté souveraine“.

L'original est signé, au nom de la Municipalité de St. Pétersbourg, par le Golova (le Maire), les anciens et leurs adjoints.

No. 425.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 229).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 15, 1863.*

MESSENGER RIDGWAY came in last night with your Lordship's despatches concerning Poland. I lost no time in calling on the French Ambassador, who had received his courier. We read over our respective instructions, and agreed to meet the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires this morning early, in order to receive from him the terms of the identic note which we are directed to present along with copies of our instructions. The Duke de Montebello, on his part, undertook to arrange with Prince Gortchakoff that we should be received on the same day, for we apprehended that if we sent in separate applications for interviews on the same day, the Minister might evade our desire and appoint us on separate days, and thus elude the wishes of our Governments.

I found this morning that the Austrian messenger had not arrived, and could not come in before this evening late.

I have, therefore, requested the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires to meet me at the residence of the Duke de Montebello to-morrow forenoon. The combined representations will probably be presented to the Russian Government on the 17th instant.

Although Count Thun had not received his instructions, the French Ambassador was already in possession of a copy of Count Rechberg's despatch, as well as of that under which I am instructed to act.

I am, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 426.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 231. Confidential).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 15, 1863.*

WHEN the French Ambassador read over to me last night the instructions of his Cabinet and that of Vienna respecting Poland, I was surprised by the weakness of lan-

guage and argument discovered by the Governments of France and Austria on this subject. That weakness is no doubt due to infirmities inherent in the origin and conduct of those two Governments. While Her Majesty's Government found their counsels in behalf of Poland on the solid basis of Treaty stipulations, M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Count Reehberg take refuge respectively in vague generalities respecting the general peace and the preservation of good order in Galicia. Although Her Majesty's Government do not here suggest categorically any remedies for the existing evils in Poland, by standing for the terms of the Treaty of Vienna, they invoke the institutions stipulated for in that Treaty; but the Governments of Austria and France point to nothing distinct either by enunciation or implication, leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the Russian Government. It is certainly a great misfortune that the arguments addressed by the three Cabinets have not been identical, for in that form they would have been far more cogent; but an Englishman may at least derive some satisfaction from the validity in which the claims of Her Majesty's Government are founded and the firmness with which they are expressed. It is not our fault if the Imperial dynasty of France is a permanent protest against the Treaties of 1815, and if Austria has violated them by the seizure of Cracow.

In reading over your Lordship's despatch aloud, the Duke of Montebello stopped at the paragraph in which, after stating the argument used by Prince Gortchakoff to the effect that the rights of Poland and those of the foreign Powers which signed the Treaty of Vienna were annulled by the revolt of 1830, your Lordship adds, that „Her Majesty's Government cannot acquiesce in a doctrine so contrary to good faith“.

The French Ambassador spontaneously remarked that the expression was abrupt and might appear offensive to Prince Gortchakoff and the Russian Government. The same impression had been conveyed to my own mind. I therefore determined, without informing the Duke of my intention, to use the liberty of submitting by telegraph to your Lordship' better judgment the insertion of the words „which they deem“, which I thought would soften, without really weakening, your Lordship's expressions.

The language of your Lordship's despatch is throughout so perspicuous that I thought this concession to the sensitiveness of a foreign official ear would not impair the vigour of our representations. The English official style is much simpler than that commonly used abroad, and what sounds merely plain in our language is apt to appear peremptory in French when it is not intended to do so. I would not have delayed the delivery of the despatch on this account, but as a day or two were to be unavoidably lost, I thought a reference to your Lordship would do no harm.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 427.

*Sir J. Hudson to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 28).

My Lord,

*Turin, April 16, 1863.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 12 of the 8th instant, and, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions I this



morning read to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs the copy of a despatch on the state of affairs in Poland from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg which was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch above mentioned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HUDSON.

No. 428.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 200. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Vienna, April 16, 1863.*

I HAVE not failed, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 76 of the 8th instant, to inquire of Count Rechberg what serious reforms he thought Russia might advantageously introduce into the Kingdom of Poland at the present moment.

His Excellency replied that the question was a difficult one to answer at any time, and more especially when the insurrection seemed by no means subdued, for he apprehended that nothing would really satisfy the insurgent Poles of the present day short of their independence, and the restoration of Poland to its former geographical limits. As this his Excellency believed to be the feeling of the great mass of the Polish population, he could propose no remedy, — no reform to meet the expectations of those now bearing arms against the dominion of Russia; and he grieved to say the question was becoming each day a more important one for Austria. Much of the evil, no doubt, his Excellency said, was attributable to former persecutions of the members of the United Greek Church. They had been compelled at the point of the bayonet to adopt the orthodox Greek faith, to abandon the religion of their fathers and their connection with the Roman Catholic Church. This was one of the serious complaints of the Poles, and to it might be added the difficulties under which the Catholic Bishops and clergy laboured generally in their communications with Rome. These religious grievances, he added, have been carefully fostered until a favourable opportunity arose of turning them into fruitful causes of dissatisfaction and rebellion.

At this moment, Count Rechberg said he could not think of any proposal of reform that would be acceptable, or even useful, in arresting the movement. The Poles in arms sought more than Russia would give, and therefore, so long as the insurrection lasted, he thought it would be vain to look for concessions from Russia that would pacify the insurrection.

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is plain. The Austrian Government view with alarm the state of things in Poland; they are convinced that Russia will not rest until the insurrection is quelled, and that until that moment has arrived, no serious reform of the system of government which she has adopted towards Poland is to be expected at her hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.



No. 429.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 201).

My Lord,

Vienna, April 16, 1863.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 75 of the 8th instant, I have read to Count Rechberg the copy of Lord Napier's No. 131 of the 9th ultimo, reporting his conversation with Prince Gortchakoff, after communicating to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs your Lordship's despatch No. 53 of the 2nd of March on the affairs of Poland.

Count Rechberg requested me to express his thanks to your Lordship for this communication, but he made no remarks on it and appeared to have been already accurately informed, by the Austrian Mission at St. Petersburg of what had passed at this interview between Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Vice-Chancellor.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

No. 430.

*Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell. — (Received April 20).*

(No. 204. Confidential).

My Lord,

Vienna, April 16, 1863.

COUNT RECHBERG showed me to-day a communication received from the Russian Minister, forwarding a telegram which announces the amnesty published in favour of the Poles.

His Excellency said he felt somewhat embarrassed as to the answer he should send to it, because he was sure the amnesty would have no effect in arresting the insurrection, and yet it was a communication to which, as a matter of courtesy, he must send a reply.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

BLOOMFIELD.

†† No. 431.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. (Received April 22).*

(No. 236).

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, April 17, 1863.

I WAS directed by your Lordship to read your despatch No. 88 of the 10th instant, concerning Poland, to Prince Gortchakoff, and to place a copy of it in his Excellency's hands.

[<sup>1</sup> By your Lordship's despatch No. 89 of the same date I was instructed to present the communication of Her Majesty's Government on the same day on which the Ambassador of France and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires should deliver the remonstrances of their respective Cabinets.

By your Lordship's telegraphic despatches of the 11th and 13th instant the terms of an identic letter were imparted to me, by which it was desired that the representations of the three Cabinets should be accompanied].

In order to avoid the inconvenience which might have been attached to separate applications to the Vice-Chancellor for audiences, the Duke de Montebello obligingly offered to convey to Prince Gortchakoff the wish of our respective Governments that we should be received on the same day, and the Vice-Chancellor appointed this forenoon for our successive interviews.

This method appeared also to be recommended by the reflection that it gave a joint and common character to our proceeding.

The French Ambassador was received first, and delivered a copy of the despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the Russian Minister, by whom the Duke was informed that the orders of the Emperor would be taken on the subject.

I had the honour of seeing the Vice-Chancellor at half-past 11. I stated to his Excellency that I was directed by Her Majesty's Government to read to him a despatch from your Lordship containing the views of Her Majesty's Government on the affairs of Poland, and to leave a copy of it in his hands, in connection with a letter which was conceived in terms similar to those employed by the Representatives of France and Austria for the same purpose.

I then gave the two documents to the Prince. His Excellency, after reading your Lordship's despatch aloud, informed me that he would take the orders of His Imperial Majesty, and that the reply of the Russian Government would be communicated hereafter to your Lordship.

Count Thun was admitted subsequently, and received a similar answer from the Vice-Chancellor.

[<sup>1</sup> I have, &c.  
(Signed) NAPIER].

No. 432.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 22).*

(No. 237).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 17, 1863.*

GREAT excitement and a general expectation of war continue to prevail in all classes of society here. National patriotic feeling is wound to a high pitch, and the Government would be supported by public opinion in any measure of severity and repression applied to Poland. Even the conditional and restricted amnesty accorded by the Emperor

<sup>1</sup> Omitted in the Parliamentary Paper. (Edit.).

does not meet with approval either in the army or among persons in civil employments, or in independent positions. In this general effevescence it seems to me that the Emperor and his advisers preserve the greatest share of coolness and reflection.

While the public and official action of Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Poland is more strenuous and conspicuous than that of France, the apprehensions and animosities of the Russians are chiefly directed towards the French nation. It is believed that France is secretly bent on war, that overtures have been already made to Italy for co-operation, and that Sweden is entirely at the command of the Cabinet of Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

† No. 433.

*Lord Napier to Earl Russell. — (Received April 22).*

(No. 239).

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 17, 1863.*

I HAVE never pretended to offer to Her Majesty's Government any information of the actual state of the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland or the border provinces of Russia. I have no sources of trustworthy intelligence at my command. I think it right to state, however, that the account published in the Continental, and reproduced in the English newspapers, concerning an alleged existing insurrection in Lithuania, Samogitia, and even Courland, are absurdly exaggerated. The railroad from Warsaw and from the Prussian frontier which traverses the heart of the supposed revolution, has not been stopped for one hour during the last fortnight.

The Government entertain serious apprehensions of an extensive outbreak in the semi-Polish Governments, and are prepared for it; but nothing of the kind has occurred hitherto.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NAPIER.

No. 434.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 22).*

(No. 228. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 20, 1863.*

THE French Ambassador called upon me this morning and allowed me to read a despatch from his Government, inclosing a copy of the despatch communicated by the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Prince Gortchakoff on the 17th instant, and authorizing him to read it to M. de Bismarck.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys after referring to the previous steps taken in the negotiations

respecting the insurrection in Poland, observes that the French Government had not omitted to ask the concert of Prussia in the representations which they had addressed in common with Great Britain and Austria to the Russian Cabinet from any want of deference to Prussia as a great Power, but in consequence of the solidarity of her policy in the question with that of Russia having afforded no hope of her joining in them. M. Drouyn de Lhuys concludes, however, with an assurance that it would afford him much satisfaction if M. de Bismarck, after becoming acquainted with the despatch to the Duke of Montebello, should be disposed to support the language of France at St. Petersburg.

M. de Talleyrand said that M. de Bismarck observed, in reply to this overture, that the Prussian Government was as anxious as that of France could be to see tranquillity established in Poland on a just and permanent basis, and that they had already induced the Emperor to offer an amnesty to the insurgents, and to proclaim most liberal intentions as to the future administration of the country, but as they did not know what precise means would attain the object in view they had not ventured to suggest any. They would, however, willingly recommend any system to the Emperor Alexander which the French Government could satisfy them would induce the Poles to become contented and loyal subjects of His Imperial Majesty. Whatever may be the object of the French Government in making this communication to M. de Bismarck, M. de Talleyrand felt that there was no probability of his Excellency's acceding to the overture with which it was accompanied.

M. de Talleyrand also allowed me to read the copy of a despatch to the Duke of Montebello, in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys reports a conversation with Baron Budberg on the subject of the amnesty lately proclaimed by the Emperor of Russia, and of the representations forwarded to St. Petersburg, during which his Excellency made some remarks of the Russian Ambassador's as to the vague nature of these representations by observing that they had been left vague from consideration for the Emperor, and the French Government had also been discouraged from referring to the Treaties of 1815 by the reception which the reference to these Treaties in your Lordship's despatch No. 53 to Lord Napier had met with from Prince Gortchakoff.

I have also seen to day a despatch from the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, reporting the presentation to Prince Gortchakoff of the despatches of the three Governments, and mentioning the circumstances under which Lord Napier was authorized to introduce a slight alteration into your Lordship's despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 435.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 22).*

(No. 229. Confidential).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 20, 1863.*

M. DE BISMARCK, when speaking to me two days ago of the progress of the in-

surrection in Poland, said there was no probability of its being put down while the Marquis of Wielopolski remained in power at Warsaw.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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No. 436.

*Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Russell. — (Received April 22).*

(No. 230).

My Lord,

*Berlin, April 20, 1863.*

I HAVE reason to believe that great alarm prevails here among commercial classes lest the affairs of Poland should lead to war. And ther is a very general opinion that the feudal party consider that the interests of Prussia would be advanced by such a contingency. ✓

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ANDREW BUCHANAN.

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† No. 437.

*Earl Cowley to Earl Russell. — (Received April 22).*

(No. 462).

My Lord,

*Paris, April 21, 1863.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has sent a copy of the French despatch on Polish affairs to all the Representatives of France in Europe, desiring each to invite the Government to which he is accredited to signify at St. Petersburg its approbation of the step taken by Great Britain, France, and Austria.

His Excellency observed to me this afternoon that he trusted that Her Majesty's Government would take a similar course, since the greater the foreign pressure brought to bear upon the Russian Government, the greater was the probability of that Government being induced to give some real satisfaction to Poland.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me further that he had addressed a despatch to the Duc de Montebello, commenting on the Emperor of Russia's offer of an amnesty in the terms in which he had spoken to me, and which I repeated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 442 of the 14th instant. I told M. Drouyn de Lhuys that your Lordship concurred in his opinion on this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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† No. 438.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 528).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 22, 1863.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 462 of yesterday, that Her Majesty's Representatives at the several Courts in Europe will be instructed to communicate to the Governments to which they are accredited a copy of my despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the affairs of Poland, [No. 88] dated the 10th of April, and to request them to give instructions in a similar sense to their respective Representatives at the Court of Russia.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

† No. 439.

*Circular addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassadors and Ministers at all the Courts in Europe (except Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna).*

My Lord,

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 22, 1863.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I addressed, on the 10th instant, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of Russia<sup>1</sup>, instructing him to make a communication to the Cabinet at St. Petersburg on the subject of the affairs of Poland.

You will communicate a copy of this despatch to the Government to which you are accredited, and invite them to make a communication of a similar tendency to the Russian Government.

I understand from Lord Cowley that your French colleague is instructed to communicate, with the like request, a copy of the despatch on the same subject which has been addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

† No. 440.

*Earl Russell to Earl Cowley.*

(No. 532).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 22, 1863.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, a copy of the circular despatch which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at

<sup>1</sup> No. 354.

the several Courts in Europe on the affairs of Poland<sup>1</sup>, to which reference is made in my despatch to your Excellency No. 528 of to-day's date.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 441.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(No. 100).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 22, 1862(?).*

I HAVE laid before the Queen your Excellency's able despatch No. 208.

I do not wish to make any comment on your instructive and thoughtful remarks on the aspirations of the Poles, the views of Russia, and the general interests of Europe.

But there are two points in regard to your own Government upon which I wish to set you right.

Her Majesty's Government do not wish to prescribe the particular form which representative institutions in Poland should assume.

The Government of Russia went through a course of bloodshed, perfidy, and rapine to accomplish the partition of Poland. She made certain engagements at Vienna as to the manner in which her portion of that unhappy country should be governed. Her Majesty's Government ask her to fulfil these engagements. It is not for Great Britain to point out how the anomalies of Government in Russia and in Poland may be reconciled. It is not for Great Britain to say how Russia is to govern Poland constitutionally, secure the confidence both of Russians and Poles. It is a task to which she has pledged herself; Great Britain calls upon her to perform it.

Certain it is that the arrest of 2,000 Poles as conscripts, of whom not fifty belonged to the secret societies, is not the way to inspire the mass of the people of Warsaw with reliance on the security of their persons. Certain it is that Proclamations, indirectly exciting the peasantry against their landlords, and the preliminary steps to confiscation in Lithuania, are not the measures which will induce the owners of property in Poland to co-operate with the Russian Government in the administration. Other modes must be taken; but it is for the Emperor of Russia, and not for Her Majesty's Government, to devise these modes.

With respect to another part of this subject your Lordship is mistaken in supposing that Her Majesty's Government wished the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna to join in a collective representation to Russia.

What Her Majesty's Government wished was, to induce the principal Powers to impress upon the Russian Government that Europe felt sympathy for the sufferings of Poland, and desired to make the voice of justice and clemency heard at St. Petersburg.

Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Italy have complied, each in its own language, with the request of Her Majesty's Government.

Whatever may be the issue of the present struggle, these representations afford a se-

<sup>1</sup> No 429.

curity that the attempts made by Russia after 1832 to deprive Poland of its national language and national religion cannot be repeated in reliance upon the indifference of Europe.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

No. 442.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(No. 101).

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 22, 1862(?).*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 234 of the 16th instant, that you quite misunderstood the purport of the telegram I sent to you on the 13th instant, which only meant that a despatch from the Queen's Ambassador should not be first published in a foreign newspaper.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) RUSSELL.

† No. 443.

*Earl Russell to Lord Napier.*

(No. 106).

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 24, 1862(?).*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch [No. 220] of the 12th instant, inclosing a copy of a Manifesto on Polish affairs issued by the Emperor of Russia on the 31st March  
12th April.

Her Majesty's Government have carefully and anxiously considered the contents of this document in the hope to find in it the germ of a restoration of peace, and a hope of good government to Poland.

I have to make to you the following remarks as the result of their deliberations.

An amnesty may lay the foundation of peace in two cases: —

1. If the insurgents have been thoroughly defeated, and are only waiting for a promise of pardon to enable them to return to their homes.

2. If the amnesty is accompanied with such ample promises of the redress of the grievances which gave occasion to the insurrection, as to induce the insurgents to think that their object is attained.

It is clear that the first of these cases is not that of the present insurrection.

It is not put down; it is, on the contrary, rather more extensive than it was a few weeks ago.

Let us, then, examine the amnesty with reference to the second of the supposed cases.



The Emperor, referring to the institutions which he has conferred („octroyées“) on the Kingdom of Poland, says: —

„En maintenant encore aujourd'hui ces institutions dans leur intégrité, nous nous réservons, lorsqu'elles auront été éprouvées dans la pratique, de procéder à leur développement ultérieur selon les besoins du temps et ceux du pays“.

This promise can hardly be satisfactory to the Poles. For it must be observed with regard to the institutions already given, that it was during their existence that 2,000 young men were seized arbitrarily in the night, and condemned to serve as soldiers in the Russian army in defiance of justice, and even in violation of the Law of 1859, so recently enacted. So that it is evident no security would be obtained by submitting again to the same laws. With those institutions in full force and vigour, innocent men might be imprisoned as criminals, or condemned to serve as soldiers, or banished to distant countries, without a trial, without publicity, without any guarantee whatever.

As to the promise held out for the future, it must be observed that it is made to depend on the practical working of these institutions, and on the wants of the time and of the country.

The first of these conditions alone destroys all reasonable hope of the fulfilment of this promise. For the practical working of the institutions hitherto given, depends on the co-operation of native Poles of property and character as Members of the Council of State, and of Provincial and Municipal Assemblies. But the recent conduct of the Russian Government in Poland has deprived them of the confidence of all Poles of this description, and forced all such Poles to withdraw from the bodies in which their functions were to be exercised.

There are wanting, therefore, in this Imperial Manifesto, the first elements of success, namely, a guarantee of security on the one side, and the feeling of trust and confidence on the other.

In a despatch of Lord Durham, then Ambassador at St. Petersburg, dated in August 1832, Lord Durham says, — „There has long been a jealousy, nay, hatred, existing between the Russians and Poles“. Her Majesty's Government had hoped that the present Emperor, by raising the social position of his Russian, and securing the political freedom of his Polish, subjects, might have united both by the link of loyal attachment to the throne.

This hope has been unfortunately disappointed, and it is with great pain that Her Majesty's Government observe that the feelings of hatred between Russians and Poles have not in the lapse of thirty years been softened or modified.

The present amnesty does not appear likely to diminish the intensity of the insurrection, or give any solid security to the most moderate of Polish patriots.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RUSSELL.

## APPENDIX.

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*Convention de Cartel, signée par les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, et de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, Roi de Pologne, le  $\frac{8 \text{ Aout}}{27 \text{ Juillet}}$  1857.*

Au nom de la Très-Sainte et Indivisible Trinité!

LA Convention de Cartel conclue le 20/8 Mai, 1844, entre Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, Roi de Pologne, étant expirée, et quelques unes de ses dispositions ayant été reconnues susceptibles de recevoir plus de développement et de précision, leurs Majestés ont jugé utile et convenable de conclure une nouvelle Convention de Cartel, et ont à cet effet nommé des Plénipotentiaires, savoir:—

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le Sieur Othon Théodore Baron de Manteuffel, Président de Son Conseil et Son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Chevalier des Ordres de Prusse de l'Aigle Noir et de l'Aigle Rouge avec feuilles de chêne, couronne et sceptre, Grand Commandeur de l'Ordre de Hohenzollern, Commandeur de l'Ordre de St. Jean

*Uebersetzung der Kartelkonvention, unterzeichnet von den Bevollmächtigten Seiner Majestät des Königs von Preussen und Seiner Majestät des Kaisers von Russland, Königs von Polen, am  $\frac{8 \text{ August}}{27 \text{ Juli}}$  1857.*

Im Namen der Hochheiligen und untheilbaren Dreieinigkeit!

Nachdem die zwischen Seiner Majestät dem Könige von Preussen und Seiner Majestät dem Kaiser von Russland, König von Polen, unterm 20/8 Mai, 1844, abgeschlossene Kartelkonvention abgelaufen ist, und einige ihrer Bestimmungen einer näheren Erläuterung und grösseren Bestimmtheit fähig erachtet worden sind, so haben Ihre Majestäten es nützlich und angemessen gefunden, eine neue Kartelkonvention abzuschliessen und zu diesem Behufe zu Ihren Bevollmächtigten ernannt, nämlich: —

Seine Majestät der König von Preussen, den Freiherrn Otto Theodor von Manteuffel, Ihren Minister-Präsidenten und Minister der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, Ritter des Preussischen Schwarzen Adler-Ordens, des Rothen Adler-Ordens mit Eichenlaub, Krone und Scepter, Gross-Komthur des Königlichen Hausordens von Hohenzollern, Ehren-Kom-

de Prusse, et Chevalier Grand-Croix des Ordres de Russie de St. André, de St. Alexandre Newsky, &c.:

Et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, Roi de Pologne, le Sieur Philippe Baron de Brunnow, Son Conseiller Privé actuel, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse et leurs Altesses Royales les Grands-Ducs de Mecklembourg-Schwerin et de Mecklembourg-Strelitz, Chevalier Grand-Croix des Ordres de Russie de St. Wladimir de première classe, de St. Alexandre Newsky en diamants, de l'Aigle Blanc, de Ste. Anne de première classe et de St. Stanislas de première classe, et des Ordres de Prusse de l'Aigle Rouge de première classe, et de St. Jean de Jérusalem, &c.;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins-pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont conclu et signé la Convention de Cartel, dont la teneur suit ici mot à mot: —

#### ARTICLE I.

La présente Convention, qui sera mise à exécution quatre semaines après l'échange des ratifications, s'appliquera: —

(a.) A tous les individus qui désertèrent le service actif des armées respectives, ainsi qu'aux effets militaires qu'ils auront emportés, tels que chevaux, harnais, armes, habillements; en outre, aux individus qui n'ont obtenu de congé qu'à condition de se présenter au premier appel pour rentrer au service actif et qui en conséquence appartiennent à la réserve.

(b.) A tous les individus qui, selon les lois de l'État qu'ils ont quitté avec ou sans

mandator des Preussischen Johanniter-Ordens, und Grosskreuz des Russischen St. Andreas und St. Alexander-Newsky-Ordens, u. s. w.;

Und Seine Majestät der Kaiser von Russland, König von Polen, den Baron Philipp von Brunnow, Ihren Wirklichen Geheimen Rath, ausserordentlichen Gesandten und bevollmächtigten Minister bei Seiner Majestät dem Könige von Preussen und Ihren Königlichen Hoheiten den Grossherzögen von Mecklenburg-Schwerin und Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Grosskreuz des Russischen St. Wladimir-Ordens erster Klasse, des St. Alexander-Newsky-Ordens in Brillanten, des Weissen Adler-, des St. Annen- und des St. Stanislaus-Ordens erster Klasse, sowie des Preussischen Rothen Adler-Ordens erster Klasse, des Johanniter-Ordens, u. s. w.;

Welche, nach Auswechselung ihrer in guter und gehöriger Form befundenen Vollmachten, diejenige Kartelkonvention abgeschlossen und unterzeichnet haben, deren wörtlicher Inhalt folgendermassen lautet: —

#### ARTIKEL I.

Die gegenwärtige Convention, welche vier Wochen nach Auswechselung der Ratifikationen zur Ausführung gebracht werden soll, erstreckt sich: —

(a.) Auf alle aus dem aktiven Dienste der beiderseitigen Armeen desertirten Individuen und die von ihnen mitgenommenen Militaireffecten, als: Pferde, Reitzzeug, Armatur- und Montirungsstücke; desgleichen auf die aus dem aktiven Dienste, unter Vorbehalt ihrer Verpflichtung zu demselben, beurlaubten, mithin zur Kriegsreserve gehörigen Individuen;

(b.) Auf alle, nach den Gesetzen des Staats, welchen sie mit oder ohne Absicht der

l'intention d'y rentrer, sont sujets, ne fût-ce que dans la suite, au service militaire.

(c.) Aux individus qui, ayant commis des crimes ou délits dans l'un des deux Etats, se sont enfuis sur le territoire de l'autre, pour se soustraire aux poursuites de la justice et à la peine qu'ils ont encourue.

## ARTICLE II.

Si les individus mentionnés dans l'Article précédent sous la lettre (a), sont saisis en uniforme, si l'on trouve sur eux d'autres objets appartenant à l'équipement militaire, ou, en général, s'il est hors de doute qu'ils ont déserté le service militaire de l'autre Etat, ils seront sur-le-champ, et sans réquisition préalable de cet Etat, arrêtés et conduits avec les effets militaires trouvés sur eux, à la frontière qui sépare les deux Etats, pour y être remis aux autorités respectives chargées de les recevoir. Quant aux individus dont la désertion n'est pas manifeste, mais devient probable par suite de leur propre déclaration ou de circonstances particulières, les autorités militaires ou civiles qui auront eu connaissance de séjour d'un pareil individu, prendront aussitôt les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher son évasion. Elles feront ensuite dresser un procès-verbal à ce sujet, et le communiqueront aux autorités militaires provinciales de l'autre Etat, qui alors déclareront si le prévenu a effectivement déserté ou non, sur quoi, dans le cas de l'affirmative, le déserteur leur sera livré de la manière susindiquée.

Les individus mentionnés dans l'Article précédent, lettre (b), ne seront arrêtés et res-

Rückkehr verlassen haben, wenn auch erst für die Folge, zum Militärdienste verpflichteten Individuen;

(c) Auf diejenigen Individuen welche, nachdem sie in einem der beiden Staaten ein Verbrechen oder Vergehen begangen, sich der Untersuchung und Bestrafung desselben durch die Flucht auf das Gebiet des anderen Staates zu entziehen gewusst haben.

## ARTIKEL II.

Die im vorstehenden Artikel unter (a.) bezeichneten Individuen sind, wenn sie in militärischer Bekleidung oder mit andern Gegenständen der militärischen Ausrüstung betroffen werden, oder wenn überhaupt darüber, dass sie aus dem Militärdienste des andern Staates entwichen sind, kein Zweifel obwaltet, sofort, ohne dass es dazu einer vorgängigen Requisition Seitens dieses Staats bedarf, zu verhaften und mit den bei ihnen gefundenen Militäreffekten zur Grenze, welche beide Staaten trennt, zu transportiren, um daselbst an die zu ihrer Empfangnahme beauftragten jenseitigen Behörden abgeliefert zu werden. Bei denjenigen Individuen, deren Desertion nicht offenbar, sondern in Folge besonderer Umstände oder ihrer eigenen Aussagen nur wahrscheinlich ist, muss von den Militär- oder Civilbehörden, welche von ihrem Aufenthalte Kenntniss erhalten haben, sofort für ihre Sicherstellung gesorgt werden. Demnächst haben sie darüber ein Protokoll aufnehmen zu lassen, und solches der jenseitigen Provinzial-Militärbehörde mitzutheilen, welche hierauf zu erklären hat, ob das bezeichnete Individuum wirklich desertirt ist oder nicht, welchem nachst im Bejahungsfalle der Deserteur ihr auf die obenerwähnte Weise auszuliefern ist.

Was die im vorigen Artikel unter (b.) bezeichneten Individuen betrifft, so findet de-

titués qu'à la suite d'une réquisition expresse, qui, dans chaque cas spécial, sera faite par les autorités compétentes de l'Etat auquel ces individus appartiennent.

### ARTICLE III.

(1.) L'extradition des individus appartenant aux classes *a* et *b* de l'Article I n'aura cependant pas lieu, si avant de s'être rendus dans l'Etat qu'ils ont quitté en dernier lieu, ou avant d'y avoir pris service, ces individus ont été sujets de l'Etat où ils se sont retirés lors de leur désertion, et que les rapports résultant pour eux de cette qualité n'aient pas été annulés suivant les formes prescrites par les lois de cet Etat. Mais même dans ce cas on rendra les chevaux et les effets militaires que ces individus auraient emmenés avec eux en désertant.

(2.) De même si un individu appartenant à l'une ou l'autre de ces deux classes s'est rendu coupable de quelque crime ou délit dans l'Etat où il s'est retiré, son extradition pourra être refusée jusqu'à ce qu'il ait subi la peine que lui infligent les lois de cet Etat.

(3.) Dans le cas où l'arrestation et l'extradition d'un individu ne devront s'effectuer qu'à la suite d'une réquisition (ainsi que cela est stipulé dans l'Article II, notamment à l'égard des déserteurs qui ne sont pas reconnaissables comme tels), il s'est écoulé l'espace de deux ans depuis l'époque de la désertion ou de l'évasion d'un individu de cette catégorie, celui des deux Etats auquel serait adressée une réquisition pour le réclamer ne sera point tenu d'y satisfaire. Si

ren Verhaftung und Auslieferung nicht anders statt, als in Folge einer jedesmaligen ausdrücklichen Requisition von Seiten der kompetenten Behörde desjenigen Staats, welchem die Individuen angehören.

### ARTIKEL III.

(1.) Die Auslieferung der zu den Klassen (*a.*) und (*b.*) des Artikels I. gehörigen Individuen wird jedoch nicht stattfinden, wenn dieselben, ehe sie sich in den zuletzt von ihnen verlassenen Staat begeben oder dasselbst Dienste genommen hatten, Unterthanen desjenigen Staates waren, wohin sie sich bei ihrer Entweichung geflüchtet haben, und diejenigen Verhältnisse, welche für sie aus dieser Eigenschaft entspringen, nicht nach den in diesem Staate geltenden gesetzlichen Vorschriften aufgelöst worden sind. Doch werden, selbst in diesem Falle, die von solchen Individuen bei ihrer Entweichung mitgenommenen Pferde und Militäreffekten zurückgegeben.

(2.) Ebenso kann die Auslieferung eines der einen oder der anderen dieser beiden Klassen angehörigen Individuums, wenn dasselbe sich in dem Staate, wohin es entwichen ist, ein Verbrechen oder Vergehen hat zu Schulden kommen lassen, bis zur Abbüßung der nach den Gesetzen dieses Staates dafür verwirkten Strafe verweigert werden.

(3.) In den Fällen, wo die Verhaftung und Auslieferung eines Individuums nur in Folge vorheriger Requisition stattfinden soll, wie dies im Artikel II., namentlich, wegen der Deserteurs verabredet ist, welche nicht als solche kenntlich sind, ist, wenn seit der Desertion oder dem Austritte eines Individuums dieser Kategorie bereits ein Zeitraum von zwei Jahren verstrichen ist, der requirte Staat nicht verpflichtet, der an ihn ergehenden Auslieferungsrequisition Folge zu

toutefois un réfractaire ou un déserteur avait commis un crime ou délit avant sa fuite, ou s'il était prévenu d'en avoir commis un, son extradition se fera d'après les règles établies dans les Articles XV et XVI ci-dessous, quand même il se serait écoulé un espace de deux ans depuis l'époque de son évasion ou de sa désertion.

#### ARTICLE IV.

Les communications qui, d'après l'Article II., auront lieu par rapport aux individus soupçonnés d'avoir déserté le service de l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, seront adressées, de la part de la Prusse au Commandant-en-chef et aux officiers chargés de l'extradition des déserteurs, et de la part de la Russie et de la Pologne au Général Commandant dans la Province Prussienne la plus proche; les réquisitions relatives aux individus mentionnés dans l'Article I, sous la lettre (b), seront adressés de la part de la Prusse aux autorités militaires et civiles de la Russie ou de la Pologne les plus proches, et de la part de la Russie et de la Pologne à la Régence Provinciale Prussienne la plus à portée.

Dans l'Empire de Russie le Commissaire spécial qui a pour mission de veiller au maintien des relations et bon voisinage sur la frontière sera également autorisé, comme par le passé, à faire et à recevoir les communications et réquisitions prévues dans le présent Article.

#### ARTICLE V.

S'il arrivait qu'un individu, avant sa désertion du service de l'une ou de l'autre des

leisten. Wenn jedoch ein Militairflüchtiger oder ein Deserteur vor seiner Flucht ein Verbrechen oder Vergehen begangen hat, oder wenn er eines solchen bezüchtigt gewesen ist, so soll seine Auslieferung nach den weiter unten in den Artikeln XV. und XVI. getroffenen Bestimmungen erfolgen, selbst wenn ein Zeitraum von zwei Jahren seit seinem Austritt oder seiner Desertion verflossen ist.

#### ARTIKEL IV.

Die im Artikel II. vorgeschriebenen Mittheilungen wegen der Desertion aus dem Dienste der jenseitigen Macht Verdächtigen werden Königlich Preussischer Seits an den Kommandirenden en Chef und an die der Auslieferung der Deserteure vorgesetzten Offiziere, Kaiserlich Russischer oder Königlich Polnischer Seits aber an das General-Kommando der nächsten Preussischen Provinz gerichtet, wogegen die Requisitionen, welche sich auf Individuen der im Artikel I. unter (b.) erwähnten Klasse beziehen, Königlich Preussischer Seits an die nächsten Russischen oder Polnischen Militair- und Civilbehörden, und Kaiserlich Russischer oder Königlich Polischer Seits an die nächste Preussische Provinzialregierung gerichtet werden.

Im Kaiserthum Russland wird der Spezialkommissarius, dessen Bestimmung ist, über die Aufrechterhaltung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen an der Grenze zu wachen, ebenso wie früher ermächtigt sein, die Mittheilungen und Requisitionen, welche in gegenwärtigen Artikel vorgesehen sind, zu machen und entgegenzunehmen.

#### ARTIKEL V.

Wenn der Fall eintritt, dass ein Individuum, bevor es aus dem Dienste des einen

Hautes Parties Contractantes, eût déserté les troupes d'un autre Souverain, ou d'un autre Etat, avec lequel l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes aurait conclu une Convention de Cartel, le déserteur n'en sera pas moins rendu à l'armée qu'il aura désertée en dernier lieu.

#### ARTICLE VI.

Il est expressément défendu aux autorités militaires et civiles respectives d'engager au service militaire ou civil de leur Souverain un individu dont la désertion du service militaire de l'autre Etat n'est pas douteuse, ou ne serait même que probable. Elles ne laisseront passer la frontière à aucun sous-officier ni soldat de l'armée de l'Etat limitrophe, à moins qu'il ne soit muni d'un passeport ou d'une cartouche du chef ou du Commandant du corps auquel il appartient. Tout individu qui, sans pouvoir se légitimer au moyen d'un pareil passeport ou d'une cartouche, sera découvert par ces autorités ou leur sera dénoncé par leurs subordonnés, et que des signes extérieurs ou d'autres circonstances rendront suspect d'appartenir aux troupes de l'autre Etat, sera sur-le-champ arrêté, avec tous les effets qu'on trouvera sur lui; on lui fera subir un interrogatoire, et il sera procédé ensuite conformément aux dispositions de l'Article II.

#### ARTICLE VII.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes feront tenir la main à ce qu'il soit satisfait promptement et loyalement aux réquisitions d'extradition qui seront adressées à leurs autorités. Dans le cas même où les individus récla-

oder des andern der hohen kontrahirenden Theile entwichen ist, schon von den Truppen eines andern Souverains oder eines andern Staats, mit welchem einer der hohen kontrahirenden Theile eine Kartelkonvention geschlossen hat, desertirt wäre, so soll gleichwohl ein solcher Ueberläufer derjenigen Armee ausgeliefert werden, von welcher er zuletzt desertirt ist.

#### ARTIKEL VI.

Den beiderseitigen Militär- und Civilbehörden ist ausdrücklich untersagt, ein Individuum, dessen Desertion aus dem jenseitigen Militärdienst als gewiss oder selbst nur als wahrscheinlich anzunehmen ist, in den Militär- oder Civildienst ihres Souverains aufzunehmen; auch dürfen sie keine Unterofficiere oder Soldaten der jenseitigen Armee auf der Grenze durchgehen lassen, wenn sie nicht mit einem Passe oder Abschiede von dem Chef oder Kommandeur des Truppentheils, dem sie angehören, versehen sind. Jedes ohne einen solchen Pass oder Abschied von ihnen betroffene oder von ihren Untergebenen ihnen angezeigte Individuum, welches in Folge äusserer Merkmale oder sonstiger Umstände den Truppen des andern Staates anzugehören verdächtig ist, haben sie mit sämmtlichen bei ihm befindlichen Effecten sofort zu verhaften und zu Protokoll vernehmen zu lassen, welchem nächst nach den im Artikel II. enthaltenen Bestimmungen zu verfahren ist.

#### ARTIKEL VII.

Die hohen kontrahirenden Theile werden darauf halten, dass den an ihre Behörden zu richtenden Auslieferungsrequisitionen schnell und ohne Rückhalt genügt werde. Selbst in dem Falle, wo die reklamirten Individuen



més auraient été entre-temps engagés au service de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel ils se trouvent, cette circonstance n'influera en rien sur les obligations mutuelles résultant du présent Article.

#### ARTICLE VIII.

S'il s'élevait des doutes sur l'exactitude de telle ou telle circonstance rapportée dans l'acte de réquisition, ces doutes ne pourront, les cas mentionnés dans l'Article III exceptés, motiver un refus d'extradition.

#### ARTICLE IX.

Non-seulement l'extradition d'un déserteur ou d'un individu sujet au service militaire devra toujours et sans exception être accompagnée d'un procès-verbal qui aura été dressé pour constater les causes et les circonstances de son arrestation, mais encore, s'il appartient à la catégorie de ceux qui, d'après l'Article II, doivent être livrés d'office, les effets militaires qui auront servi à faire découvrir sa désertion, seront aussitôt restitués avec lui. Si, au contraire, l'individu appartient à la classe de ceux qui ne doivent être livrés qu'à la suite d'une communication préalable entre les autorités militaires respectives, ou d'une réquisition spéciale, dans ce cas, afin de mettre hors de doute que son extradition est conforme aux principes établis dans la présente Convention, l'acte de réquisition qui le concerne devra, lors de l'extradition, être produit en original ou en copie vidimée.

#### ARTICLE X.

Les points de la frontière où l'extradition régulière des déserteurs et autres individus

in den Dienst des Staates aufgenommen sein sollten, auf dessen Gebiete sie sich befinden, soll dieser Umstand auf die aus dem gegenwärtigen Artikel entspringenden gegenseitigen Verpflichtungen von keinem Einflusse sein.

#### ARTIKEL VIII.

Sollten über die Richtigkeit irgend eines in dem Requisitionsschreiben angeführten Umstandes Zweifel entstehen, so können diese, die im Artikel III. erwähnten Fälle ausgenommen, eine Verweigerung der Auslieferung nicht begründen.

#### ARTIKEL IX.

Bei der Auslieferung eines Deserteurs oder Militairpflichtigen ist jederzeit und ohne Ausnahme nicht allein das bei seiner Verhaftung über die Veranlassung und Umstände derselben aufgenommene Protokoll, sondern es sind auch, wenn derselbe zur Klasse der nach Artikel II. von Amtswegen Auszuliefernden gehört, die Militaireffekten, durch welche seine Desertion sich ergeben hat, sofort mit zu überliefern. Gehört er dagegen zu den erst nach vorheriger Kommunikation mit den respectiven Militair-Behörden oder in Folge einer besonderen Requisition auszuliefernden Individuen, so ist, um jeden Zweifel darüber zu beseitigen, dass seine Auslieferung den im gegenwärtigen Verträge bestimmten Grundsätzen gemäss sei, allemal das Original oder eine beglaubte Abschrift des ihn betreffenden Requisitionsschreibens bei seiner Auslieferung vorzuzeigen.

#### ARTIKEL X.

Die Grenzzorte, wo früher die ordnungsmässige Auslieferung der Deserteure und



avait lieu précédemment, continueront à servir pour le même objet aussi longtemps que les autorités respectives ne conviendront pas d'un changement à cet égard. Les fonctionnaires chargés dans ces endroits de recevoir les individus qui devront être livrés, seront, suivant que ces fonctionnaires appartiennent à l'état militaire ou à l'état civil, indiqués par les autorités militaires ou civiles compétentes à celles de l'autre Etat.

#### ARTICLE XI.

(1.) Pour tout déserteur ou individu sujet au service militaire, les frais d'entretien seront acquittés à raison de quatre (4) gros d'argent de Prusse ou de douze (12) copeks argent de Russie, par jour, à compter du jour où il aura été arrêté pour être livré, soit d'office, soit par suite d'une réquisition. Si le déserteur a emmené un cheval de service, il sera bonifié pour ce dernier par jour, et à compter de l'époque susindiquée, deux metzes d'avoine et huit livres de foin avec la paille nécessaire, et ces fourrages seront payés chaque fois selon le prix courant du marché de la ville la plus proche.

(2.) La restitution du déserteur se fera au plus tard huit jours après son arrestation, laquelle aura lieu dès qu'on l'aura découvert; les frais de son entretien ne seront rétribués de part et d'autre que pour le même terme de huit jours, à moins que l'éloignement du lieu où le déserteur aura été arrêté, ou d'autres circonstances bien constatées, ne retardent nécessairement au delà de ce terme son extradition aux autorités compétentes. Si, par suite de maladie, le transfuge se trouvait avoir été reçu à un hôpital, les frais qui en résulteront seront acquittés par le Gouvernement réclamant, à raison de

anderer Individuen stattgefunden hat, werden auch ferner, und zwar so lange zu diesem Zwecke beibehalten, als die beiderseitigen Behörden nicht etwa über eine Abänderung in dieser Beziehung sich vereinbaren. Die an diesen Orten mit dem Auslieferungs-geschäft beauftragten Beamten sind, je nachdem sie zum Militair- oder Civilstande gehören, von Seiten der betreffenden Militair- oder Civil-Behörden den jenseitigen namhaft zu machen.

#### ARTIKEL XI.

(1.) An Unterhaltungskosten werden für jeden Deserteur oder Militairpflichtigen von dem Tage an, wo er zum Zwecke seiner von Amtswegen oder auf Requisition zu bewirkenden Auslieferung verhaftet worden ist, vier (4) Silbergraschen Preussisch Kurant oder zwölf (12) Kopeken Silber täglich vergütet. Hat der Deserteur ein Dienstpferd mit sich genommen, so werden, von dem ebengedachten Zeitpunkte ab, täglich auf dasselbe zwei Metzen Hafer und acht Pfund Heu nebst dem nöthigen Stroh, gutgethan, und diese Fourage wird nach den jedesmaligen Marktpreisen der nächsten Stadt bezahlt.

(2.) Die Auslieferung des Deserteurs wird spätestens acht Tage nach seiner bei dessen Entdeckung sofort stattfindenden Verhaftung erfolgen, und die Kosten für seinen Unterhalt sollen auch gegenseitig nur für den Zeitraum von acht Tagen erstattet werden, es sei denn, dass, seine Auslieferung an die betreffenden Behörden, wegen der Entfernung der Ortes, wo derselbe ergriffen worden, oder wegen anderer hinreichend nachgewiesener Umstände, über jenen Zeitraum hinaus verzögert werden müsste. Ist der Ueberläufer Krankheit halber in ein Hospital aufgenommen worden, so werden die

cinq (5) gros d'argent de Prusse, ou de quinze (15) copeks argent de Russie, par jour, pour tout le temps pendant lequel son état de santé l'aura retenu à l'hôpital.

## ARTICLE XII.

Si, outre le déserteur lui-même, l'on parvient encore à découvrir le cheval de service emmené par lui, et que ce cheval soit rendu à l'Etat auquel il appartient, la personne qui par son avis aura amené la saisie du cheval, obtiendra de l'Etat auquel se fera l'extradition une récompense de sept écus et demi (7½) de Prusse (six roubles 75 copeks argent de Russie).

## ARTICLE XIII.

Afin de pouvoir acquitter sans délai cette récompense, ainsi que les frais d'entretien mentionnés dans l'Article XI, lesquels dans aucun cas ne pourront être augmentés, les Hautes Parties Contractantes feront déposer chez les fonctionnaires chargés sur les points d'extradition de la réception des déserteurs, une certaine somme d'argent au moyen de laquelle ils payeront, lors de l'extradition du déserteur ou de l'individu sujet au service militaire, et du cheval, les frais d'entretien, sur une spécification présentée aux susdits fonctionnaires par les fonctionnaires de l'autre Etat chargés de l'extradition, ainsi que la récompense pour la saisie du cheval. Si l'on trouvait la dite spécification défectueuse, ce qui toutefois pourra difficilement avoir lieu, vû la détermination précise du taux de la rémunération et des frais d'entretien, elle n'en devra pas moins être soldée et ce ne sera que plus tard qu'une réclamation à ce sujet sera prise en considération, le seul cas

desfallsigen Kosten von dem reklamirenden Gouvernement mit fünf (5) Silbergroschen Preussisch Kurant oder fünfzehn (15) Kopeken Silber täglich für die ganze Zeit seines Aufenthalts daselbst erstattet.

## ARTIKEL XII.

Wird ausser dem Deserteur zugleich das von ihm mitgenommene Dienstpferd entdeckt und dem Staate, welchem es gehört, zurückgegeben, so erhält derjenige, durch dessen Anzeige die Beschlagnahme des Pferdes erwirkt worden ist, von dem Staate, an den die Auslieferung erfolgt, eine Belohnung von sieben und einem halben (7½) Thaler Preussisch Kurant (sechs Rubel 75 Kopeken Silber).

## ARTIKEL XIII.

Zur Berichtigung dieser Belohnung, sowie der im Artikel XI. bemerkten Unterhaltungskosten, welche in keinem Falle erhöht werden dürfen, werden die hohen kontrahirenden Theile bei den mit dem Auslieferungsgeschäft in den dazu bestimmten Grenzorten beauftragten Beamten eine gewisse Summe Geldes niederlegen lassen, von welcher diese Beamten sofort bei Auslieferung des Deserteurs oder Militairpflichtigen und des Dienstpferdes sowohl die Unterhaltungskosten auf den Grund einer Berechnung, welche bei der Auslieferung von der dazu beauftragten jenseitigen Behörde mit zu übergeben ist, als auch die Belohnung für die Beschlagnahme des Dienstpferdes zu berichtigen haben. Sollte diese Berechnung für unrichtig gehalten werden, was jedoch bei der genauen Festsetzung des Satzes der Belohnung und der Unterhaltungskosten nicht leicht wird stattfinden können, so soll dennoch die Zahlung der aufgerechneten Summe erfolgen

excepté où il n'aurait pas été satisfait à la disposition de l'Article IX, concernant la restitution simultanée des effets militaires trouvés sur le déserteur, ou l'exhibition de l'original ou de la copie vidimée de l'acte de réquisition, dans lequel cas il ne sera payé ni frais d'entretien ni récompense.

#### ARTICLE XIV.

Les déserteurs et les individus sujets au service militaire ne pouvant contracter de dettes que l'Etat auquel ils appartiennent eût l'obligation légale d'acquitter, les dettes qu'ils pourraient avoir, ne feront jamais, lors de l'extradition, un objet de discussion entre les autorités des deux Etats. Si un individu, durant son séjour dans l'Etat qui le livre, a contracté envers des particuliers des obligations que son extradition l'empêche de remplir, il ne reste à la partie lésée que de faire valoir ses droits par devant les autorités compétentes de l'Etat auquel appartient son débiteur.

Pareillement, si un déserteur ou un individu sujet au service militaire se trouvait, au moment où il est réclamé, en état d'arrestation pour des engagements qu'il aurait contractés envers des particuliers, l'Etat auquel s'adresse la réquisition ne sera pas pour cela libéré de l'obligation de le livrer sans retard.

#### ARTICLE XV.

(1.) Ceux qui, dans le pays de l'un des deux Souverains, commettent un crime ou

und erst später ist eine desfallsige Reklamation zu untersuchen, mit alleiniger Ausnahme des Falles wo der im Artikel IX. enthaltenen Bestimmung wegen gleichzeitiger Ueberlieferung der bei einem Deserteur gefundenen Militaireffekten oder Vorzeigung des Original-Requisitionsschreibens oder einer beglaubten Abschrift davon nicht genügt wäre, indem alsdann weder die Unterhaltungskosten, noch die Belohnung gezahlt werden.

#### ARTIKEL XIV.

Da weder von Deserteuren noch von ausgetretenen Militairpflichtigen Schulden kontrahirt werden können, die den auf ihre Person Anspruch habenden Staat zu deren Erstattung rechtlich verpflichten, so kann auch die Bezahlung solcher Schulden bei der Auslieferung nie einen Gegenstand der Erörterung zwischen den Behörden beider Staaten bilden. Hat ein solehes Individuum während seines Aufenthalts in dem Staate, von welchem es auszuliefern ist, Verbindlichkeiten gegen Privatpersonen übernommen, an deren Erfüllung es durch die Auslieferung verhindert wird, so bleibt dem dadurch verletzten Theile nur übrig, seinen Schuldner bei dessen kompetenter vaterländischer Behörde zur Geltendmachung seiner Rechte in Anspruch zu nehmen.

Ebenso befreiet die persönliche Haft, in welcher ein Deserteur oder ausgetretener Militairpflichtiger sich im Augenblicke seiner Reklamation etwa wegen eingegangener Privatverbindlichkeiten befinden sollte, den Staat, an welchen die Reklamation gerichtet ist, keinesweges von der Verpflichtung zur sofortigen Auslieferung des reklamirten Individuums.

#### ARTIKEL XV.

(1.) Diejenigen, welche in den Staaten eines der beiden Souveraine ein Verbrechen

délit, ou qui sont accusés ou prévenus d'en avoir commis un, et qui ensuite prennent la fuite et se rendent dans le pays de l'autre Souverain, seront restitués de part et d'autre sur une réquisition qui aura lieu de la manière indiquée ci-dessous dans l'Article XVI.

(2.) L'état ou la condition du coupable, de l'accusé, ou du prévenu, ne changera rien à cette disposition, et il sera restitué, à quelque état ou à quelque condition qu'il appartienne, qu'il soit noble, habitant d'une ville ou de la campagne, libre, serf, militaire ou civil.

(3.) Mais si le dit criminel ou prévenu est sujet du Souverain dans le pays duquel il s'est rendu par sa fuite après avoir commis un crime ou délit, dans le pays de l'autre Souverain, sa restitution n'aura pas lieu, mais le Souverain dont il est sujet fera administrer contre lui bonne et prompte justice selon les lois du pays. Il est surtout convenu que lorsqu'un individu passe du territoire d'un Etat sur celui de l'autre, y commet un crime ou délit, et rentre ensuite dans l'Etat d'où il était venu, les autorités de cet Etat (quoique l'extradition d'un pareil individu soit inadmissible d'après les dispositions précitées) n'en prêteront pas moins, si elles en sont requises, aux autorités compétentes de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel le crime ou délit a été commis, toute aide et assistance que les lois du pays leur permettront pour constater les faits et découvrir les coupables, appartenant à l'autre Etat, dès que l'action commise est telle qu'elle est punissable aussi d'après la législation de l'Etat requis. Si cependant un individu quelconque a été arrêté dans le pays où il a commis un crime, délit, ou un excès quelconque, et ce pour avoir commis le dit crime, délit, ou excès, le Souverain du pays où l'arrestation s'est faite, fera administrer justice con-

oder Vergehen vollbringen, oder eines solchen angeschuldigt oder bezüchtigt sind, und darauf entfliehen und in das Gebiet des andern Souverains sich begeben, werden gegenseitig auf eine Requisition, welche auf die unten im Artikel XVI. bezeichnete Art erfolgen muss, ausgeliefert.

(2.) Der Stand oder die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse des Verbrechers, Angeschuldigten oder Bezüchtigten machen hierin keinen Unterschied, und selbiger wird ausgeliefert, wes Standes er auch sei, Edelmann, Stadt- oder Landbewohner, ein Freier oder Leibeigener, ein Soldat oder vom Civilstande.

(3.) Ist aber der erwähnte Verbrecher oder der Angeschuldigte ein Unterthan desjenigen Souverains, in dessen Land er geflüchtet ist, nachdem er in dem Lande des andern Souverains ein Verbrechen oder Vergehen begangen hat, so findet die Auslieferung nicht statt, sondern der Souverain, dessen Unterthan er ist, wird denselben sofort nach seinen Landesgesetzen zur Untersuchung und Strafe ziehen lassen. Es ist insbesondere verabredet, dass, wenn ein Individuum sich von dem Gebiete des einen Staates auf dasjenige des andern begiebt, dort ein Verbrechen oder Vergehen begeht, und hierauf in den Staat zurückkehrt, aus dem es gekommen, die Behörden dieses Staates (obwohl die Auslieferung eines solchen Individuums nach den vorerwähnten Bestimmungen unstatthaft ist) nichtsdestoweniger, wenn sie darum angegangen werden, den kompetenten Behörden des Staates, auf dessen Gebiet das Verbrechen oder Vergehen begangen worden, alle Hülfe und Beistand leisten sollen, welche ihnen die Landesgesetze gestatten, um den Thatbestand festzustellen, und die Schuldigen, die dem andern Staate angehören, zu entdecken, vorausgesetzt, die begangene That sei von der Art, dass sie auch nach der Gesetzgebung des

tre lui et lui fera infliger la peine qu'il a encourue, quand même un tel individu serait sujet de l'autre Souverain.

En aucun cas l'individu arrêté dans le pays même où il s'est rendu coupable d'un crime, délit, ou excès quelconque, ne pourra être livré ni ne sera reçu dans l'autre pays avant d'avoir été condamné par jugement formel.

#### ARTICLE XVI.

(1.) L'arrestation d'un criminel qui doit être livré de la part d'un Etat à l'autre, aura lieu à la réquisition d'un bureau de police ou d'un tribunal du pays où le prévenu aura commis le crime qui lui est imputé, et cette réquisition sera adressée à un bureau de police ou à un tribunal de l'autre pays. Auront en outre le droit de faire une semblable réquisition: dans les Etats de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le Procureur du Roi; dans l'Empire de Russie, le Commissaire spécial chargé de veiller le long de la frontière au maintien des relations de bon voisinage; dans le Royaume de Pologne, les Chefs de districts limitrophes, ayant pour le maintien de ces relations les mêmes attributions et les mêmes droits que le Commissaire spécial Russe.

Les autorités respectives sont tenues, lors même qu'elles seraient incompétentes pour

requirirten Staates strafbar ist. Sobald jedoch ein Individuum in dem Lande, wo dasselbe ein Verbrechen, Vergehen oder irgend eine Uebertretung sich hat zu Schulden kommen lassen, deshalb verhaftet worden ist, so kann der Souverain des Landes, in welchem die Verhaftung erfolgt ist, dasselbe zur Untersuchung ziehen und die verwirkte Strafe vollstrecken lassen, wenn auch dieses Individuum ein Unterthan des anderen Landesherrn wäre. — In keinem Falle wird ein Individuum, welches in dem Lande selbst, wo es sich eines Verbrechens, Vergehens oder irgend einer Uebertretung schuldig gemacht hat, verhaftet wurde, ausgeliefert, oder in dem anderen Lande übernommen werden, bevor es durch ordentliches Erkenntniss verurtheilt worden ist.

#### ARTIKEL XVI.

(1.) Die Verhaftung eines Verbrechers Behufs dessen Auslieferung soll erfolgen auf die Requisition einer Polizei- oder Gerichtsbehörde des Staates, in welchem der Angeeschuldigte das ihm schuldgegebene Verbrechen begangen hat. Diese Requisition wird an eine Polizei- oder Gerichtsbehörde des andern Staates gerichtet. Es sollen zu einer solchen Requisition ausserdem berechtigt sein: in den Staaten Seiner Majestät des Königs von Preussen der Königliche Staatsanwalt; in dem Kaiserthum Russland der Spezialkommissarius, welcher beauftragt ist, längs der Grenze über die Aufrechterhaltung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu wachen; in dem Königreiche Polen die Vorsteher der Grenzkreise, welche für die Aufrechterhaltung dieser Beziehungen dieselben Befugnisse und dieselben Rechte, wie der Russische Spezialkommissarius, haben.

Die betreffenden Behörden sind verpflichtet, selbst dann, wenn sie zur Erfüllung der

faire droit à la réquisition qui leur est adressée, de l'accepter et de la faire tenir sans délai aux fonctionnaires compétents.

(2.) L'extradition effective ne se fera toutefois, de la part de la Prusse, qu'à la réquisition du Gouverneur-Général ou du Gouverneur Civil du Gouvernement de l'Empire de Russie, ou à la réquisition du tribunal supérieur du Gouvernement du Royaume de Pologne, où le criminel ou prévenu a déjà été ou doit être soumis à une enquête judiciaire. Dans les cas prévus au présent Article, la réquisition sera adressée au tribunal supérieur de la Province de la Monarchie Prussienne où le criminel ou prévenu, fonctionnaire public ou autre, sera présumé avoir cherché un asile. Les autorités de l'Empire de Russie feront passer leurs réquisitions par l'intermédiaire du Commissaire spécial Russe.

(3.) De la part de la Russie et du Royaume de Pologne l'extradition aura lieu à la réquisition du tribunal supérieur de la Province Prussienne où le criminel ou prévenu a déjà été ou doit être soumis à une enquête judiciaire, laquelle réquisition sera adressée au Gouverneur-Général du Gouvernement de l'Empire de Russie, ou au tribunal supérieur du Gouvernement du Royaume de Pologne, où le criminel ou prévenu sera présumé avoir cherché un asile.

(4.) Les deux Gouvernements se communiqueront réciproquement la liste des tribunaux supérieurs et autorités publiques chargés dans les Etats respectifs d'expédier ces réquisitions.

ihnen zustehenden Requisition nicht kompetent sind, dieselbe anzunehmen, und sie unverzüglich an die kompetente Behörde zu befördern.

(2.) Die wirkliche Auslieferung geschieht jedoch von Seiten Preussens nur auf die Requisition des General-Gouverneurs oder des Civil-Gouverneurs desjenigen Gouvernements des Kaiserthums Russland, oder auf die Requisition des Obergerichtes desjenigen Gouvernements des Königreichs Polen, wo gegen den Verbrecher oder Angeschuldigten eine gerichtliche Untersuchung bereits stattgefunden hat oder stattfinden soll. In den durch gegenwärtigen Artikel vorgesehenen Fällen wird die Requisition an das Obergericht derjenigen Provinz der Preussischen Monarchie gerichtet, wo der Verbrecher oder Angeschuldigte, sei er öffentlicher Beamter oder nicht, dem Vermuthen nach Zuflucht gesucht hat. Die Behörden des Kaiserthums Russland werden ihre Requisitionen durch den Russischen Spezialkommissarius übermitteln lassen.

(3.) Von Seiten Russlands und des Königreichs Polen wird die Auslieferung nur auf die Requisition des Obergerichtes derjenigen Preussischen Provinz erfolgen, wo gegen den Verbrecher oder Angeschuldigten eine gerichtliche Untersuchung bereits stattgefunden hat oder stattfinden soll. Diese Requisition wird an den General-Gouverneur desjenigen Gouvernements des Kaiserthums Russland oder an das Obergericht desjenigen Gouvernements des Königreichs Polen gerichtet, wo der Verbrecher oder Angeschuldigte dem Vermuthen nach Zuflucht gesucht hat.

(4.) Beide Regierungen werden sich gegenseitig das Verzeichniss der Obergerichte und öffentlichen Behörden mittheilen, welchen die Erlassung dieser Requisitionen in den betreffenden Staaten anvertraut ist.



(5.) Dans tous les cas précités, soit que la demande d'extradition éte faite par un tribunal supérieur de la Prusse, soit qu'elle provienne d'un des Gouverneurs-Généraux ou Gouverneurs Civils de l'Empire de Russie, ou d'un tribunal supérieur ou d'un Gouverneur Civils du Royaume de Pologne, la réquisition doit être accompagnée d'une expédition, soit de la sentence, si elle a déjà été prononcée, soit de l'arrêt de mise en accusation ou du mandat d'arrêt (Haftbefehl) du tribunal compétent spécifiant en détail les circonstances du crime ou délit, ainsi que les motifs de suspicion.

Dans les cas de soustraction de fonds publics ou d'effets appartenant à la Couronne, la réquisition des Gouverneurs Civils devra être accompagnée, en outre, d'une spécification authentique des sommes ou effets détournés ou soustraits. Les mêmes formalités seront observées pour les réquisitions d'un tribunal supérieur de la Monarchie Prussienne.

(6.) La demande d'extradition et les pièces à l'appui devront être présentées dans les six mois, à compter du jour où l'annonce de l'arrestation du criminel ou du prévenu aura été expédiée au fonctionnaire ou au tribunal qui aura demandé cette arrestation. En cas de retard, l'obligation de livrer le criminel ou prévenu cessera.

(7.) L'extradition elle-même aura lieu lorsque, par suite de l'interrogatoire qu'on fera subir au prévenu, l'identité de sa personne aura été reconnue, et si l'action qui lui est imputée est telle que suivant les lois de l'Etat auquel s'adresse la réclamation, le cou-

(5.) In allen vorgedachten Fällen, der Antrag auf Auslieferung möge von einem Obergerichte Preussens gemacht sein oder von einem der General-Gouverneure oder der Civil-Gouverneure des Kaiserthums Russland, oder von einem Obergerichte oder einem Civil-Gouverneur des Königreichs Polen ausgehen, soll die Requisition von einer Ausfertigung entweder des Erkenntnisses, wenn ein solches schon ergangen ist, oder des Beschlusses über die Eröffnung der Kriminaluntersuchung oder einem Haftbefehl des kompetenten Gerichts begleitet sein, in welchem die näheren Umstände des Verbrechens oder Vergehens, sowie die Verdachtsgründe auseinandergesetzt sind.

Bei Unterschlagungen von öffentlichen Geldern oder von Gegenständen, welche der Krone angehören, soll die Requisition der Civil-Gouverneure ausserdem von einem authentischen Verzeichniss der Summen oder der Gegenstände begleitet sein, welche entfremdet oder unterschlagen worden sind. Dieselben Förmlichkeiten werden bei den Requisitionen eines Obergerichts der Preussischen Monarchie beobachtet werden.

(6.) Der Antrag auf Auslieferung und die zur Begründung desselben dienenden Dokumente sollen binnen sechs Monaten von dem Tage an, wo die Anzeige über die Verhaftung des Verbrechers oder des Angeschuldigten an den requirirenden Beamten oder das requirirende Gericht abgesandt wird, vorgelegt werden. Im Verzögerungsfalle erlischt die Verbindlichkeit zur Auslieferung des Verbrechers oder Angeschuldigten.

(7.) Die Auslieferung selbst soll erfolgen, nachdem durch Vernehmung des Angeschuldigten die Identität seiner Person festgestellt worden, und wenn die ihm schuldgegebene Handlung eine solche ist, dass auch nach den Gesetzen des requirirten Staa-

pable devrait également être soumis à une enquête criminelle. Si l'individu, dont on demande l'extradition est accusé de plusieurs crimes ou délits, l'extradition aura lieu aussi lorsqu'une seule des actions qui lui sont imputées entraînerait une procédure criminelle aux termes de la législation de l'Etat requis.

(8.) Pour être livré, le criminel sera transporté jusqu'à l'endroit où se trouve l'autorité de l'Etat requérant, chargée de le recevoir. Il lui sera remis contre le remboursement des frais.

#### ARTICLE XVII.

Il sera payé:

(a.) Pour l'entretien du criminel, à compter du jour de son arrestation, quatre (4) gros d'argent de Prusse, soit douze (12) copeks argent de Russie, par jour;

(b.) Pour frais de détention, tant que celle-ci dure, cinq (5) gros d'argent de Prusse, soit quinze (15) copeks argent de Russie, par jour; et en outre

(c.) Les déboursés à liquider dans chaque cas particulier pour le transport du criminel jusqu'à la frontière, et pour la fourniture des pièces d'habillement dont il avait besoin.

#### ARTICLE XVIII.

Ni les déserteurs, ni les individus sujets au service militaire, ni les criminels ne pourront, de la part de l'Etat qui le réclame, être poursuivis sur le territoire de l'autre Etat, soit par quelque acte de violence ou d'autorité arbitraire, soit clandestinement. Il est en conséquence défendu qu'un détachement militaire ou civil, quelqu'il soit, ou

tes der Schuldige gleichfalls zur Kriminaluntersuchung gezogen werden müsste.

Ist das Individuum, dessen Auslieferung verlangt wird, mehrerer Verbrechen oder Vergehen angeschuldigt, so soll die Auslieferung auch dann stattfinden, wenn nur eine der ihm schuldgegebenen Handlungen nach der Gesetzgebung des requirirten Staates eine Kriminaluntersuchung zur Folge hätte.

(8.) Behufs der Auslieferung soll der Verbrecher bis an den Ort transportirt werden, wo sich die mit seiner Uebernahme beauftragte Behörde des requirirenden Staates befindet. Er wird derselben gegen Erstattung der Kosten übergeben werden.

#### ARTIKEL XVII.

An Kosten werden —

(a.) Für den Unterhalt des Verbrechers, vom Tage seiner Verhaftung an, täglich vier (4) Silbergroschen Preussisch Kurant (zwölf [12] Kopeken Silber);

(b.) An Kosten der Haft, so lange diese dauert, täglich fünf (5) Silbergroschen Preussisch Kurant (fünfzehn [15] Kopeken Silber); und ausserdem,

(c.) Die in jedem einzelnen Falle zu liquidirenden Auslagen für den Transport des Verbrechers und für Anschaffung der zu seiner Bekleidung erforderlich gewesenenen Gegenstände bezahlt.

#### ARTIKEL XVIII.

Weder Deserteure, noch Militairpflichtige, noch Verbrecher, können von Seiten des reklamirenden Staates auf gewaltsame, eigenmächtige oder heimliche Weise auf das Gebiet des andern Staates verfolgt werden. Es ist daher untersagt, dass zu diesem Zwecke irgend ein Militair- oder Civilkommando oder geheimer Abgeordneter die Grenze beider



quelque émissaire secret, passe dans ce but la frontière des deux Etats.

Si, de la part de la Puissance réclamante, la poursuite d'un ou de plusieurs déserteurs, d'individus sujets au service militaire, ou de criminels qui se sont sauvés, a été ordonné au moyen d'un détachement militaire ou civil, ou de toute autre manière, cette poursuite ne devra s'étendre que jusqu'à la frontière qui sépare les deux Etats. Là le détachement devra s'arrêter, et un seul homme passera la frontière. Celui-ci s'abstiendra de tout acte de violence ou d'autorité privée, et s'adressera au fonctionnaire militaire ou civil compétent pour lui faire la demande de l'extradition, en lui exhibant l'acte de réquisition de ses supérieurs. Ce délégué sera reçu avec les égards que les deux Gouvernements se doivent mutuellement, et l'on procédera ensuite conformément aux termes de la présente Convention.

#### ARTICLE XIX.

(1.) Tout acte d'autorité qu'un employé civil ou militaire de l'un des deux Etats exercera sur le territoire de l'autre, sans y avoir été expressément autorisé par les fonctionnaires militaires ou civils compétents de ce dernier Etat, sera considéré comme une violation de territoire et puni en conséquence.

(2.) S'il s'élève des doutes sur le fait même de la violation de territoire, ou sur les circonstances particulières qui l'ont accompagnée, il sera établi une Commission Mixte, présidée par le Commissaire de la partie lésée. Les Commissaires perpétuels, désignés d'avance pour cet effet, seront pour la Prusse Conseiller Provincial du Cercle (Landrath) sur la frontière duquel la violation du territoire doit avoir eu lieu, pour l'Empire de

Staaten überschreite. Ist von Seiten der reklamirenden Macht die Verfolgung eines oder mehrerer Deserteure oder Militairpflichtiger, oder geflüchteter Verbrecher mittelst eines Militair- oder Civil-Kommandos, oder auf andere Art verfügt worden, so darf sich diese Verfolgung nicht weiter als bis zur Grenze, welche beide Staaten von einander trennt, erstrecken. Hier muss das Kommando Halt machen, und nur Ein Mann darf die Grenze überschreiten. Dieser muss sich, bei Enthaltung jeder Ausübung von Gewalt oder Eigenmacht, unter Vorzeigung des Requisitionsschreibens seiner Vorgesetzten, an die kompetente Militair- oder Civilbehörde wenden und auf die Auslieferung antragen. Ein solcher Abgeordneter wird mit denjenigen Rücksichten, welche beide Gouvernements sich gegenseitig schuldig sind, empfangen werden, und das weitere Verfahren erfolgt sodann nach der Vorschrift des gegenwärtigen Vertrages.

#### ARTIKEL XIX.

(1.) Jede amtliche Handlung, welche ein Civil- oder Militairbeamter des einen der beiden Staaten auf dem Gebiete des andern Staates ausübt, ohne von der kompetenten Militair- oder Civilbehörde dieses letzteren Staates dazu ausdrücklich ermächtigt zu sein, soll als eine Gebietsverletzung angesehen und demgemäss bestraft werden.

(2.) Wenn sich Zweifel über die Thatsache der Gebietsverletzung selbst oder über die besonderen Umstände erheben, welche sie begleitet haben, so soll eine gemischte Kommission unter Vorsitz des Kommissarius des verletzten Theiles niedergesetzt werden. Beständige, hierzu im Voraus bestimmte Kommissarien sollen für Preussen der Landrath desjenigen Kreises, an dessen Grenze die Gebietsverletzung vorgekommen sein

Russie le Commissaire Spécial chargé de veiller au maintien des relations de bon voisinage, et pour le Royaume de Pologne le Chef du District limitrophe le plus rapproché.

(3.) Du côté de la Prusse, le Procureur Supérieur du district de juridiction (Ober-Staatsanwalt des Ober-Gerichtsbezirkes) ou le Procureur du cercle sur la frontière duquel la violation de territoire sera censée avoir eu lieu, aura le droit d'assister aux travaux de la Commission Mixte; et dans ce cas un employé de justice délégué à cet effet, soit de la part du Gouvernement Impérial, soit de la part de l'Administration du Royaume de Pologne, y assistera également. Dans tous les cas les membres de la Commission Mixte seront en nombre égal de la part de chacune des Hautes Puissances Contractantes.

Dans les cas particuliers il sera loisible aux deux Gouvernements de confier ces enquêtes à des employés envoyés *ad hoc*.

(4.) Les Commissaires auront le droit de s'adjoindre dans des cas particuliers un employé de justice pour entendre et assermenter les témoins. Si des militaires de rang inférieur ou appartenant à la garde frontière se trouvaient impliqués dans l'affaire dont il s'agit, leur interrogatoire ne pourra avoir lieu qu'en présence de Délégués envoyés *ad hoc* par l'autorité militaire compétente.

(5.) La Commission Mixte aura soin de bien éclaircir les faits, pour constater si effectivement une violation de territoire a eu lieu, et qui en est l'auteur. Si la Commission est d'accord à ce sujet, les pièces du procès seront transmises au tribunal compétent de l'Etat auquel le prévenu appartient,

soll, für das Kaiserthum Russland der Spezialkommissarium, welcher beauftragt ist, über die Aufrechterhaltung der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu wachen, für das Königreich Polen der Vorsteher des nächsten Grenzkreises sein.

(3.) Preussischer Seits soll der Ober-Staatsanwalt des Obergerichts-Bezirktes oder der Staatsanwalt des Bezirktes, auf dessen Grenze die Gebietsverletzung stattgefunden haben soll, berechtigt sein, den Verhandlungen der gemischten Kommission beizuwohnen, und in diesen Falle wird an denselben ein zu dem Ende von der Kaiserlich Russischen Regierung oder von der Regierung des Königreichs Polen abgesandter Justizbeamter ebenfalls theilnehmen. In allen Fällen sollen die Mitglieder der gemischten Kommission jeder der hohen kontrahirenden Mächten gleich an der Zahl sein.

In befonderen Fällen bleibt es den beiden Regierungen vorbehalten, diese Untersuchung besonders zu dem Zwecke abgeordneten Beamten anzuvertrauen.

(4.) Die Kommissarien sollen das Recht haben, in besonderen Fällen sich einen Justizbeamten zuzuordnen, um die Zeugen zu vernehmen und zu vereidigen.

Wenn Militairs geringeren Grades oder solche, welche der Grenzwache angehören, in die Angelegenheit verwickelt sind, um die es sich handelt, so soll ihr Verhör nur in Gegenwart von Kommissarien stattfinden, welche von der kompetenten Militairbehörde *ad hoc* abgeordnet sind.

(5.) Die gemischte Kommission soll Sorge tragen, die Thatfachen vollständig aufzuklären, um festzustellen, ob wirklich eine Gebietsverletzung stattgefunden, und wer sie begangen hat. Wenn die Kommission hierüber einig ist, werden die verhandelten Akten dem kompetenten Gerichte des Staates,

afin que la peine soit prononcée et incessamment portée à la connaissance de l'Etat dont le territoire aura été violé.

Tout individu arrêté dans le pays même où il aura commis une violation du territoire, sera traduit devant le tribunal le plus proche de ce pays, soit militaire, soit civil, selon que le coupable appartiendra à l'état militaire ou civil. Le dit tribunal examinera le fait, entendra les témoins, et instruira le procès jusqu'au point où la sentence pourra être prononcée. Les pièces de la procédure seront transmises alors, soit au Général-en-Chef des troupes auxquelles appartient le coupable, soit lorsque celui-ci est un employé civil, à son supérieur compétent, afin de faire prononcer la sentence conformément aux lois de chaque pays.

L'information du procès aura lieu sans interruption et devra être accélérée autant que possible. Si le tribunal chargé de prononcer la sentence, demande auparavant des éclaircissements ultérieurs, ces éclaircissements seront fournis à la réquisition du dit tribunal par les Commissaires chargés de l'information du délit.

#### ARTICLE XX.

Il est défendu aux autorités et aux sujets des Hautes Parties Contractantes, soit de receler un déserteur, un individu sujet au service militaire et déjà réclamé, ou un criminel passible d'extradition, soit de les aider à se rendre dans d'autres contrées plus éloignées, afin de les soustraire par-là à l'extradition.

Les Gouvernements respectifs procéderont d'après les lois du pays contre les personnes

welchen der Angeschuldigte angehört, übersandt, um die Strafe festzusetzen, von welcher unverzüglich dem Staate, dessen Gebiet verletzt worden, Kenntniss gegeben werden soll.

Jedes Individuum, welches in dem Staate selbst, wo dasselbe eine Gebietsverletzung begangen hat, verhaftet worden ist, soll vor das nächste Militär- oder Civilgericht dieses Staates, je nachdem der Schuldige dem Militär- oder Civilstande angehört, gebracht werden. Dieses Gericht soll die Thatsache untersuchen, die Zeugen vernehmen und die Sache so weit instruiren, dass die Abfassung des Erkenntnisses erfolgen kann. Die verhandelten Akten werden alsdann entweder dem kommandirenden General der Truppen, zu denen der Schuldige gehört, oder, wenn letzterer ein Civilbeamter ist, seiner vorgesetzten Behörde übersandt, um das Urtheil nach den Gesetzen des Landes fällen zu lassen.

Die Untersuchung soll ohne Unterbrechung geführt und möglichst beschleunigt werden. Begehrt das Gericht, welches das Urtheil zu sprechen hat, zuvor noch anderweite Aufklärungen, so sollen diese auf Requisition des gedachten Gerichtes durch die mit der Untersuchung beauftragten Kommissarien beschafft werden.

#### ARTIKEL XX.

Beide hohen kontrahirenden Theile verbieten ihren Behörden oder Unterthanen, einen Deserteur, bereits reklamirten Militairpflichtigen, oder zur Auslieferung geeigneten Verbrecher zu verbergen, oder demselben nach anderen entfernten Gegenden fortzuhelfen, um ihn auf diese Weise der Auslieferung zu entziehen.

Wider diejenigen, welche sich eines Vergehens dieser Art schuldig machen, werden

qui commettraient un délit de cette nature, et les autorités des deux Etats se donneront mutuellement pour leur propre satisfaction des renseignements sur la manière dont les contrevenants auront été recherchés et punis.

die beiderseitigen Gouvernements, nach Massgabe ihrer resp. Landesgesetze, verfahren, und die Behörden beider Staaten werden einander zu ihrer Genugthung Kenntniss davon geben, dass und auf welche Weise die Kontravenienten zur Verantwortung und Strafe gezogen worden sind.

#### ARTICLE XXI.

Il sera rigoureusement défendu aux sujets des Hautes Parties Contractantes d'acheter, de quelque individu que ce soit, ne fût-il pas encore reconnu être un déserteur, ou réclamé comme tel, des effets qui portent indubitablement le caractère d'une propriété de l'Etat. Il leur sera surtout interdit d'acheter le cheval qu'un déserteur aura emmené avec lui, ou de faire l'acquisition d'objets qu'un criminel aura emportés en se sauvant, et dont il se trouvera possesseur illégitime. Chacun des deux Gouvernements emploiera tous les moyens que lui offrent les lois du pays, pour faire gratuitement rentrer l'autre en possession de ces objets, ainsi que des effets militaires susmentionnés.

#### ARTIKEL XXI.

Die hohen kontrahirenden Theile werden ihren respektiven Eingesessenen auf das Strengste untersagen, von irgend einem Individuum, auch wenn dasselbe als Deserteur noch nicht erkannt oder reklamirt sein sollte, Effekten anzukaufen, welche den Charakter von Staatseigenthum unverkennbar an sich tragen. Dieselben sollen ganz besonders vor dem Ankauf des vom einem Deserteur mitgebrachten Dienstpferdes und vor der Erwerbung der von einem flüchtig gewordenen Verbrecher mitgebrachten, widerrechtlich von ihm besessenen Sachen gewarnt werden. Jede der beiden Regierungen wird alle ihr durch die Landesgesetze zu Gebote stehenden Mittel anwenden, um sich gegenseitig zur unentgeltlichen Wiedererlangung dieser Gegenstände, sowie der obgedachten Militaireffekten, behülflich zu sein.

#### ARTICLE XXII.

Si l'extradition d'un déserteur, d'un individu sujet au service militaire, ou d'un criminel de la catégorie plus haut mentionnée, n'a pas été faite dans un cas où, d'après cette Convention elle aurait dû avoir lieu, et que le dit individu, par une nouvelle fuite, retourne dans le pays auquel il aurait dû être livré, le Souverain de ce pays ne sera pas tenu de le rendre.

#### ARTIKEL XXII.

Wenn die Auslieferung eines Deserteurs Militairpflichtigen oder Verbrechers der oben bezeichneten Art in einem solchen Falle nicht erfolgt ist, wo sie nach dieser Convention hätte erfolgen sollen, und ein dergleichen Individuum durch Flucht wieder in das Land zurückkehrt, dem dasselbe hätte ausgeliefert werden sollen, so ist der Souverain dieses Landes nicht verpflichtet, ein solches Individuum wieder herauszugeben.

## ARTICLE XXIII.

(1.) Chacun des deux Etats s'oblige à reprendre ceux de ses propres sujets dont l'autre Etat voudrait se débarrasser. Cette obligation cessera toutefois, s'il s'est écoulé dix ans depuis que l'individu qu'on veut renvoyer a quitté son pays natal et que pendant ce temps il a vécu à l'étranger sans passeport en règle ou certificat d'origine (Heimathschein) délivré par l'autorité compétente, ou bien si ce passeport ou certificat d'origine (Heimathschein) a cessé d'être valable depuis dix ans.

(2.) Ce laps décennal ne sera pas censé interrompu par un emprisonnement ou une détention quelconque à laquelle l'individu renvoyé aurait été condamné dans le pays qui le renvoie. Au contraire, la durée de cette détention sera comprise dans le nombre des années à l'expiration desquelles cesse pour le pays natal l'obligation de reprendre l'individu, et cette obligation cessera *ipso facto* si le terme de dix ans venait à expirer pendant la durée de la détention.

(3.) S'il arrivait qu'un individu condamné à un emprisonnement ou une détention quelconque fût rendu à son pays natal avant le terme de dix ans fixé ci-dessus, et sans avoir subi sa peine en entier, il pourra être soumis à en accomplir le reste dans le pays qui le reçoit, et cette peine y sera commuée alors selon l'exigence du cas et conformément à ce que prescrivent les lois en vigueur.

(4.) Les individus dont les passeports, certificats d'origine ou autres pièces de légitimation sont encore valables, ou ne sont ex-

## ARTIKEL XXIII.

(1.) Jeder der beiden Staaten verpflichtet sich, diejenigen seiner Unterthanen wieder zu übernehmen, welche der andere Staat ausweisen will. Diese Verbindlichkeit soll jedoch erlöschen, wenn zehn Jahre verflossen sind, seitdem das auszuweisende Individuum sein Vaterland verlassen und während dieser Zeit im Auslande gelebt hat, ohne mit einem ordnungsmässigen Pass oder einem Heimathschein Seitens der kompetenten Behörde versehen zu sein, oder auch wenn dieser Pass oder Heimathschein seit zehn Jahren abgelaufen ist.

(2.) Diese zehnjährige Frist soll durch eine Gefängnisstrafe oder durch irgend welche Haft, zu der das ausgewiesene Individuum in dem ausweisenden Staate etwa verurtheilt gewesen ist, nicht als unterbrochen erachtet werden. Im Gegentheil soll die Dauer dieser Haft in die Zahl der Jahre eingegriffen sein, nach deren Verlauf für den Heimathstaat die Verpflichtung zur Zurücknahme des Individuums erlischt, und diese Verpflichtung soll *ipso facto* aufhören, wenn die zehnjährige Frist während der Dauer der Haft abgelaufen ist.

(3.) Sollte ein zu Gefängnisstrafe oder irgend einer Haft verurtheiltes Individuum seinem Heimathstaate vor Ablauf der hier oben festgesetzten zehnjährigen Frist ausgeliefert werden, und zwar ohne seine Strafe vollständig verbüsst zu haben, so soll er angehalten werden können, den Rest derselben in dem übernehmenden Staate abzubüssen, und diese Strafe wird sodann dort nach Erforderniss des Falles und in Gemässheit der in Kraft befindlichen Gesetze umgewandelt werden.

(4.) Die Individuen, deren Pässe, Heimathscheine oder andere Legitimationspapiere noch gültig oder nicht länger als seit Jah-

pirés que depuis un an, pourront s'ils sont sujets de l'un des deux Etats, y être transférés sans correspondance préalable avec les autorités compétentes de cet Etat.

(5.) La remise et l'admission des individus ci-dessus désignés se feront: —

(a.) De la part de la Prusse par l'intermédiaire des Conseillers Provinciaux des cercles limitrophes;

(b.) De la part de la Russie et du Royaume de Pologne, selon l'exigence du cas, soit par l'intermédiaire des autorités militaires sur les points désignés dans l'Article X de la présente Convention pour l'extradition régulière des déserteurs et autres individus, soit par l'intermédiaire des douanes ou barrières qui en dépendent.

(6.) Hors les cas prévus au paragraphe 4 aucun individu se disant sujet de l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes ne pourra être transféré sur le territoire de l'autre qu'à la suite d'une entente préalable entre les autorités compétentes, qui sont: —

Pour la Prusse, les Conseillers Provinciaux (Landräthe) des cercles limitrophes; pour la Russie et pour le Royaume de Pologne, le Commissaire spécial Russe et le Chef du district limitrophe Polonais, chacun pour ce qui le concerne (Article XIX, § 2).

(7.) Aussitôt qu'il aura été constaté par des preuves irréfragables que l'individu qu'il s'agit de renvoyer est effectivement sujet de l'Etat auquel l'admission en est proposée, il y sera immédiatement admis sans distinction de religion ou d'origine (Heimath), lors même qu'il ne serait pas possible de détermi-

resfrist abgelaufen sind, sollen, wenn sie Unterthanen des einen der beiden Staaten sind, in denselben ohne vorgängige Korrespondenz mit dessen kompetenten Behörden ausgewiesen werden können.

(5.) Die Ausweisung und die Uebernahme der vorstehend bezeichneten Individuen geschieht: —

(a.) Von Seiten Preussens durch Vermittelung der Landräthe der Grenzkreise;

(b.) Von Seiten Russlands und des Königreichs Polen, je nach Erforderniss, entweder durch Vermittelung der Militärbehörden auf den im Artikel X. der gegenwärtigen Convention für die regelmässige Auslieferung von Deserteuren und anderen Individuen bestimmten Punkten, oder durch Vermittelung der Grenzzollämter oder der Uebergangsstationen, die von ihnen abhängen.

(6.) Die im § 4. vorgesehenen Fälle ausgenommen, soll kein Individuum, welches sich für einen Unterthan eines der beiden hohen kontrahirenden Theile ausgiebt, anders auf das Gebiet des andern Staates ausgewiesen werden dürfen, als nach vorgängiger Verständigung zwischen den kompetenten Behörden, welche sind:

Für Preussen die Landräthe der Grenzkreise;

Für Russland und für das Königreich Polen der Russische Spezialkommissarius und der Vorsteher des Polnischen Grenzkreises, jeder soweit es ihn betrifft (Artikel XIX, § 2).

(7.) Sobald durch unabweisliche Gründe festgestellt worden, dass das auszuweisende Individuum wirklich Unterthan des Staates ist, bei welchem seine Uebernahme beantragt ist, so soll dasselbe unverzüglich und ohne Rücksicht auf Religion oder Heimath übernommen werden, und zwar selbst dann,

ner au juste l'endroit de sa naissance ou la commune à laquelle il appartient.

(8.) Dans tous les cas susmentionnés les frais, quels qu'ils soient, résultant d'une translation de cette catégorie resteront à la charge de l'Etat qui l'aura opérée.

(9.) Si le Gouvernement de Russie ou celui de Pologne voulait se défaire d'un individu dont le transport dans sa patrie ne pourrait être effectué qu'à travers le territoire Prussien, le Gouvernement de Prusse ne refusera jamais son consentement à l'exécution d'un pareil transport, pourvu que, lors de l'extradition de cet individu aux autorités frontières Prussiennes, il leur soit remis en même temps: —

- (1.) Une déclaration certifiée du Gouvernement auquel appartient cet individu, portant son consentement à le recevoir;
- (2.) Le montant complet des frais de transport et d'entretien de l'individu en question, pour toute la route jusque dans sa patrie.

Si ces deux conditions ne sont pas complètement remplies, le Gouvernement Prussien, vû les Conventions qui existent à cet égard entre lui et d'autres Etats, ne pourra se prêter à recevoir un individu qui devra être transporté dans un Etat tiers.

Dans le cas où de pareils individus appartenant à un Etat tiers auraient néanmoins été admis dans les Etats Prussiens, on vetru d'un passeport délivré par des autorités Russes ou Polonaises, et que leur prétendu pays natal refusât de les recevoir, les autorités Prussiennes pourront les renvoyer en Russie ou en Pologne pendant la durée d'un an, à dater de leur entrée de l'un de ces pays en

wenn es nicht möglich sein sollte, dessen Geburtsort oder die Gemeinde, der es angehört, genau zu bestimmen.

(8.) In allen vorerwähnten Fällen bleiben die Kosten jeglicher Art, welche durch eine solche Ausweisung entstehen, dem ausweisenden Staate zur Last.

(9.) Wenn die Kaiserlich Russische oder die Königlich Polnische Regierung in den Fall kommen sollte, sich eines Individuums entledigen zu wollen, dessen Transportirung in seine Heimath nicht füglich anders, als durch das Preussische Gebiet geschehen könnte, so wird die Königlich Preussische Regierung ihre Einwilligung hierzu nie versagen, wenn, bei Ueberlieferung des Auszuweisenden an die Preussischen Grenzbehörden, diesen zugleich.

- (1.) Eine bescheinigte Annahme-Erklärung derjenigen Landesregierung, welcher der Auszuweisende angehört, und
- (2.) Der vollständige Betrag der Transport- und Unterhaltungskosten des Auszuweisenden für den ganzen Weg bis in seine Heimath übergeben wird.

Ohne die vollständige Erfüllung der beiden vorstehenden Bedingungen kann sich die Königlich Preussische Regierung bei den zwischen ihr und andern Staaten in dieser Beziehung bestehenden vertragsmässigen Vereinbarungen zur Uebernahme irgend eines, einem dritten Staate zuzuweisenden Individuums nicht verstehen.

In dem Falle, wo dergleichen einem dritten Staate angehörige Individuen dennoch in die Preussischen Staaten auf Grund eines ihnen von einer Russischen oder Polnischen Behörde ertheilten Passes zugelassen sein sollten, und ihr angeblicher Heimathstaat ihre Aufnahme verweigerte, sollen die Preussischen Behörden sie nach Russland oder Polen binnen einer Frist von Ei-



Prusse, en consignant dans leurs passeports le motif de ce renvoi.

Mais si des étrangers qui auraient volontairement quitté le territoire Russe ou Polonais, ou qui en auraient été renvoyés sans être dirigés sur un point quelconque de la Monarchie Prussienne, venaient néanmoins à se présenter en Prusse, parce que le pays dont ils se disent originaires aurait refusé de les recevoir, le fait qu'ils se trouvent munis de passeports de sortie Russes ou Polonais ne pourra pas être un motif de leur renvoi, en Russie ou en Pologne, et dans ce cas les autorités Russes et Polonaises ne seront pas obligées de les réadmettre.

#### ARTICLE XXIV.

La durée de la présente Convention, dont toutes les dispositions sont également applicables au Royaume de Pologne, est fixée à douze ans.

#### ARTICLE XXV.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Berlin dans l'espace de six semaines ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, nous, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs, l'avons signée et y avons apposé le sceau de nos armes.

Fait à Berlin, le <sup>8 Aout</sup><sub>27 Juillet</sub> 1857.

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nem Jahre, von ihrem Eintritte aus einem dieser Länder nach Preussen an gerechnet, zurückweisen dürfen, indem auf ihren Pässen der Grund dieser Zurückweisung vermerkt wird.

Wenn aber Ausländer, welche das Russische oder Polnische Gebiet freiwillig verlassen haben, oder welche aus demselben ausgewiesen worden sind, ohne nach irgend einem Punkte der Preussischen Monarchie dirigirt zu werden, sich dennoch in Preussen einfinden sollten, weil ihr angeblicher Heimathstaat ihre Aufnahme vorweigerte, so soll der Umstand, dass sie mit Russischen oder Polnischen Ausgangspässen versehen sind, keinen Anlass zu ihrer Zurückweisung nach Russland oder Polen abgeben können und in diesem Falle die Russischen und Polnischen Behörden auch nicht verpflichtet sein, sie wieder zuzulassen.

#### ARTIKEL XXIV.

Die Dauer der gegenwärtigen Konvention, deren sämtliche Bestimmungen gleichmäßig auf das Königreich Polen Anwendung finden, ist auf zwölf Jahre festgesetzt.

#### ARTIKEL XXV.

Die gegenwärtige Konvention wird ratifizirt werden, und die betreffenden Ratifikationsinstrumente sollen in Berlin binnen sechs Wochen, oder noch früher, wenn es thunlich ist, ausgewechselt werden.

Zur Beglaubigung dossen haben wir, die beiderseitigen Bevollmächtigten, solche unterzeichnet und mit unserem Siegel versehen.

Geschehen zu Berlin, den <sup>8 August</sup><sub>27 Juli</sub> 1857,

v. MANTEUFFEL.  
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